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Introduction
The following book of collected essays is the main result of the First International
Conference on Scepticism held from 8 to 11 May 2017 at Universität Hamburg and or-
ganised by the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies (MCAS) in close cooperation
with the Department of Philosophy at the Sapienza University of Rome. It addresses
the main elements, strategies, and definitions of scepticism. The book is divided ac-
cording to a historical framework with special foci on ancient, medieval, and early
modern philosophy: Emidio Spinelli (the Sapienza University of Rome) was respon-
sible for the ancient period, Racheli Haliva (MCAS, Universität Hamburg) was respon-
sible for the Middle Ages, and Stephan Schmid (MCAS, Universität Hamburg) was re-
sponsible for the early modern period. The redaction of the book was undertaken by
Yoav Meyrav (MCAS, Universität Hamburg), and the following contains an overview
of all the essays included in the present volume, looking into the topics discussed in
the conference and elaborated upon for publication.
In his paper “Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes: An Ignored Jewish Premonitory
Critic of the Cogito,” Carlos Lévy argues that Philo of Alexandria foresaw and refuted
the Cartesian cogito as the solution to the problem of absolute knowledge. After lo-
cating the main tenets of Philo’s attitude to the Pyrrhonian tradition, which is illumi-
nated by a comparison with Cicero’s respective attitude, Lévy shows how Philo’s at-
titude to knowledge precludes the possibility of Descartes’s cogito. Philo would
probably have dismissed Descartes’s cogito as absurd, as it involves an artificial dis-
connection between the human self and its metaphysical rootedness in God, only to
re-establish it later. For Philo, as for Augustine after him, the problem of knowledge
is intertwined with the ethical question of the relationship between God and the
human being, at which the human being arrives through grasping the shortcoming
of reason and the priority of faith.
In “Sextus Εmpiricus’s use of dunamis,” Stéphane Marchand embarks upon a
terminological exploration of the word dunamis in Sextus’s corpus. Although not fre-
quent in Sextus’s writings, dunamis is explicitly connected to the sceptical praxis and
its application is telling regarding Sextus’s understanding of sceptical discourse,
which avoids the dogmatic meaning of dunamis as found, for example, in the Aris-
totelian tradition. Through a careful examination of the instances of dunamis in Sex-
tus’s corpus, Marchand shows that it can express sceptics’ observable ability to carry
out their activity, and also function as a lexical tool to uncover semantic equivalence
or logical entailment, which may mask weaknesses in dogmatic arguments. Finally,
Marchand argues that whenever one finds an instance of dunamis that can be under-
stood as if its employment reflects a certain theory, this is in fact part of Sextus’s
strategy of arguing according to the usage norms of the field within which he argues,
without committing to the theory behind this usage.
In his paper “Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value?”, Diego Ma-
chuca examines the Pyrrhonian notions of suspension and undisturbedness and
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asks whether they are in fact valuable with regard to morality and knowledge. In
other words, can these notions really contribute to behaviour that is morally right
or wrong, and can they really allow one to attain truth and avoid error? It seems
that if this is not the case, then Pyrrhonism is fundamentally useless and perhaps
even harmful. In the course of his argument, Machuca argues against this negative
assessment, most notably responding to Martha Nussbaum’s critique and exhibiting
its shortcomings. Machuca argues in favour of Pyrrhonism’s value according to the
basic Pyrrhonian principle of appearance: it is sufficient to show that Pyrrhonism ap-
pears valuable to the Pyrrhonist in order to defend its value.
In “endoxa and the Theology of Aristotle in Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’: Contexts for
Similarities with Sceptical and Cartesian Arguments in Avicenna,” Heidrun Eichner
offers a fresh analysis of Avicenna’s famous “flying man” thought experiment,
which is frequently compared to Descartes’s argument for the existence of the meta-
physical cogito. Eichner argues that instead of a single argument, in Avicenna we
find a cluster of “flying man” arguments, which, when discussed side by side, reflect
a continuous development in Avicenna’s philosophy. This development consists of
two contributing factors: Avicenna’s attitude towards endoxa type arguments and
the legacy of arguments for the immortality of the soul which stem from the so-called
Theology of Aristotle (in reality a medieval Arabic adaptation of Plotinus’s Enneads).
Equipped with these fresh analytical tools, Eichner shows that Avicenna’s “flying
man” can be understood as a logical inversion of Descartes’s cogito; for Avicenna,
thinking correctly about a “flying man” is enough to secure his existence as a distinct
mental entity.
In “The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī, Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas, and
Sforno,”Warren Zev Harvey uncovers a narrative of argumentation and counter-argu-
mentation regarding reason’s ability to defend monotheism. In the Muslim tradition,
Averroes employed an Aristotelian argument based on the claim that the universe is
a unified whole to counter al-Ghazālī’s sceptical claim that reason alone cannot pre-
vent the possibility of a plurality of Gods and hence is an insufficient foundation for
the theological principle of God’s unity. Harvey shows that subsequent argumenta-
tions in the Jewish tradition—here reflected in Maimonides, Moses Narboni, Hasdai
Crescas, and Obadiah Sforno—are variations on this theme, which is refined, en-
riched, and opens avenues for philosophical and theological novelties.
In “What is Maimonidean Scepticism?”, Josef Stern delves into one of the most
heated scholarly debates surrounding Maimonides’s philosophy; namely, the place
of scepticism in his thought. Stern argues that there are two ways in which Maimo-
nides can in fact be regarded as a sceptic: first, his argumentative method is similar
to the Pyrrhonian method for generating equipollence, and second, he finds a prac-
tical value in the suspension of judgment. Regarding the first way, Stern shows that
Maimonides thinks that the mere possibility of doubt is insufficient to challenge a
knowledge claim; Maimonides prefers to present, in many contexts, two opposing ar-
guments of equal strength between which there is no criterion to decide. Regarding
the second way, Stern shows that in Maimonides, suspension of judgment can lead to
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a state of tranquillity, a kind of happiness, and/or awe and dazzlement that is akin to
the kind of divine worship that the dogmatist holds can be achieved through the ac-
quisition of positive knowledge about God.
In “Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception,” Henrik Lagerlund outlines the
Greek and Latin sources of scepticism available in medieval times, tracing the
roots of an original form of sceptical argumentation in the Latin tradition; namely,
divine deception. Even though there were some influences from earlier forms of scep-
ticism during this time, Lagerlund shows that scepticism was largely reinvented in
the Middle Ages according to a new set of considerations that are independent of
the ancient tradition. Unlike the Pyrrhonian view, which aims at the suspension of
judgment and tranquillity, and is therefore a practical consideration, medieval scep-
tical arguments revolve around epistemological debates. In other words, it was in
medieval philosophy that scepticism became intertwined with epistemology, as it
is to this day.
In his paper “Spinoza on Global Doubt,” José María Sánchez de León Serrano
proposes a reassessment of Spinoza’s strategy against the radical scepticism adopted
by Descartes in his Meditations.Whereas scholars tend to see Spinoza’s monism as
his main defence against the sceptical threat, Sánchez de León Serrano argues
that monism is in fact liable to generate scepticism. Spinoza can only resolve this in-
ternal difficulty by showing how the finite human mind can adequately grasp the
whole of Nature that contains it.
In “Scepticism in Early Modern Times,” Sébastien Charles challenges the attempt
to reduce the phenomenon of scepticism in the early modern period to an appropri-
ation of Sextus Empiricus’s version of Pyrrhonism. Arguing against the univocal
meaning of scepticism in early modernity, Charles discusses three authors whose re-
spective forms of scepticism differ from each other with respect to motivation, em-
ployment, and argumentation. First, Pierre-Daniel Huet—who is often the subject
of debates as to whether he was a Pyrrhonian or an Academic sceptic—is primarily
a Christian philosopher who uses sceptical strategies as part of his apologetic project
to safeguard the Christian religion from attacks from early modern rationalism. Sec-
ond, Simon Foucher actually opposes Pyrrhonism, which he interprets as a form of
negative dogmatism. Instead, he adopts what he believes to be the Academic scep-
tical approach; scientific progress is possible as long as it is granted that scientific
claims are revocable and that they are not apodictic truths. Finally, despite being
usually regarded as a radical sceptic, Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville conceived
scepticism primarily in a propaedeutic role, as a foundation for the natural philoso-
phy of its time.
In “Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism,” Stephen Schmid also argues
against understanding early modern scepticism as a species of Pyrrhonism. Instead,
Schmid proposes a distinction between Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepti-
cism, which represent different stages in the historical development of sceptical
ideas. Each stage differs from the others in extent and scope, constructing an argu-
mentative succession which increases in gravity. The object of Pyrrhonian scepticism
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is the ability to know the nature of things, leaving the question of the fact of their
existence untouched; Cartesian scepticism is directed against the very existence of
things outside us, but leaves untouched the question of whether we have thoughts
with a determinate content in the first place; Humean scepticism takes up this
final problem, doubting not only the truth of our thoughts, but also whether what
we take to be thoughts about certain things are proper thoughts about these things
at all.
In “Narrowing of ‘Know’ as a Contextualist Strategy against Cartesian Sceptical
Conclusions,” Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernandez tackles epistemic contextualism, a
contemporary response to scepticism. Epistemic contextualism claims that Cartesi-
an-style sceptical arguments set extremely high standards for knowledge that we
do not have to meet in ordinary or scientific contexts. Nuñez Hernandez develops
an original proposal to address the main criticisms of this position, arguing that
in Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, the meaning of “know” is narrowed down
to such an extent that it does not apply to the vast majority of the instances to
which “knowledge” is actually attributed.
My thanks go to all my colleagues for their cooperation, to the MCAS team, and
primarily to Yoav Meyrav for his professional redaction of every article and his help
in summarising the content of the contributions. Special thanks are due to Rachel
Aumiller for her involvement in the early stages of the preparation of this volume.
Thanks are also due to Maria Wazinski and Mikheil Kakabadze for their valuable ed-
itorial help. This is also the appropriate place to thank the German Research Council
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for the generous financial support that made
the creation of the Maimonides Centre and the open access of this publication pos-
sible.
Hamburg, May 2019 Giuseppe Veltri
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Carlos Lévy
Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes: An Ignored
Jewish Premonitory Critic of the Cogito
The starting-point of this paper is a double statement of fact. First, in the transmis-
sion of the sorts of tablets of the sceptic law that are the tropes of Aenesidemus, our
initial witness is neither a philosopher in the narrow sense, nor a doxographer, nor
an encyclopaedist, but someone who was and remains an atypical character in the
world of philosophy: a Jew born in Alexandria, raised in the paideia, who never
abandoned the principles of his faith. Philo thought that there could exist a kind
of complex compatibility between the Jewish Torah and Greek philosophy. Nowa-
days, scholars generally dismiss the Philonian version of the tropes.¹ In my opin-
ion—but it seems that I am almost the only one to think so currently—it is an
error, since Philo was, from a chronological, geographical, historical, and linguistic
point of view, the closest to Aenesidemus. H. von Arnim expressed the same opinion
at the beginning of the twentieth century that was, but it was shaken by Janáček’s (to
my mind) unconvincing criticism, whose authority played an important role in de-
valuing Philo’s version of the tropes.² Certainly there would be much to say about
this question, but the main fact is that Philo, who lived in a city brimming with phi-
losophers, quickly identified Aenesidemus’s tropes as something very important to
his own reflections on Jewish law.
On this matter, there is a sharp contrast between the attitudes of Cicero and
Philo. Cicero was himself a disciple of the sceptic Academy and a good friend of Tu-
bero, to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his Pyrrhonian books, yet Cicero never men-
tions Aenesidemus.³ In his opinion the tradition of doubt was represented by the
Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades. Scepticism, a term that had no precise equiv-
alent in his vocabulary, was for Cicero essentially an aspect of Platonism. Unlike Ae-
 On this question, see Carlos Lévy, “Philon d’Alexandrie est-il inutilisable pour connaître Éné-
sidème? Étude méthodologique,” Philosophie antique 15 (2015): 7‒26.
 Hans von Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung,
1889); Karel Janáček, “Philon von Alexandreia und skeptische Tropen,” Eirene (1982): 83‒97.
 Photius says that Aenesidemus’s book was dedicated to Lucius Tubero, who was his sunairesiōtēs
(“classmate”) in the Academy. This Tubero is commonly identified with Lucius Aelius Tubero, who
was a legate of Quintus Cicero during his pro-consulate in Asia from 63 to 58 BCE. On Tubero, see
John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 118. On
the debate about the Academic identity of Aenesidemus, see the contradictory positions of Fernanda
Decleva Caizzi, “Aenesidemus and the Academy,” Classical Quarterly 42 (1992): 176‒89, who denies
that Aenesidemus was a student in the Academy, and Jaap Mansfeld, “Aenesidemus and the Academ-
ics,” in The passionate intellect. Essays on the transformation of Classical Literature, ed. Lewis Ayres
(New Brunswick-London: Transactions, 1996), 235‒48, who affirms that he was.
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nesidemus, he never intended to remove scepticism from the family of the Socratic
doctrines. For him Pyrrho was a dogmatic indifferentist.⁴
Further in this paper, in a comparative perspective, we shall deal with Augus-
tine’s intellectual and spiritual itinerary. It is well-known that, after a very long
and complex evolution, he had an illumination in the garden of Milan, in July
386. It was a crucial moment for his conversion.⁵ One could think that, at this
time of his life, he would have isolated himself in order to write some fresh theolog-
ical meditation. But it was not the case. He retired with his mother and some friends
in Cassiciacum, in order to tackle a great number of philosophical themes, the first of
which was the refutation of the New Academy. This seems even stranger as in Con-
fessions 5.25,⁶ when he speaks about his own sceptical crisis (in 384‒85), he seems to
consider it as a minor episode, in the context of his liberation from a long-lasting
Manichaean influence.
In the case of Augustine, as in that of Philo, dealing with scepticism seems to
have been more than an intellectual challenge, but an actual kind of emergency.
Here again, the contrast with Cicero is telling. Cicero wrote his Academica when
he was sixty, an age roughly equivalent to today’s eighty, given differences in life ex-
pectancy. One would perhaps object that the link between Philo and Augustine is
mere coincidence. But the paradoxical relation between faith and scepticism is a
line which runs through the history of Western thought. The names of Montaigne
and Pascal can be mentioned here, among so many others, as carefully studied by
Charles Schmitt.⁷ The presence of this relation, however, does not mean that it
would be unidimensional. By exploring the cases of Philo and Augustine, we will
try to determine what, if anything, they have in common.
In principle, things look quite simple; Philo adopts and adapts the tropes of Ae-
nesidemus, while Augustine wants to triumph over the scepticism of the New Acad-
emy. In fact, this contrast between the former, who seems to feel some attraction to-
wards scepticism, and the latter, who treats it as an adversary, is fallacious. In both
 See Carlos Lévy, “Un problème doxographique chez Cicéron, les indifférentistes,” Revue des Études
Latines 58 (1980): 238‒51.
 On the Augustinian intellectual and spiritual itinerary, see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Bi-
ography, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
 Augustine, Confessions 5.25: “Accordingly, after the manner of the Academics, as popularly under-
stood, I doubted everything, and in the fluctuating state of total suspense of judgement I decided I
must leave the Manichees, thinking at that period of my scepticism that I should not remain a mem-
ber of a sect to which I was now preferring certain philosophers. But to these philosophers, who were
without Christ’s saving name, I altogether refused to entrust the healing of my soul’s sickness” (ita-
que Academicorum more, sicut existimantur, dubitans de omnibus atque inter omnia fluctuans, mani-
chaeos quidem relinquendos esse decrevi, non arbitrans eo ipso tempore dubitationis meae in illa secta
mihi permanendum esse cui iam nonnullos philosophos praeponebam. quibus tamen philosophis, quod
sine salutari nomine Christi essent, curationem languoris animae meae committere omnino recusabam).
Henry Chadwick, trans., Saint Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
 Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (Leiden: Brill, 1972).
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cases, things are far more complex. In the background of both cases is a question to
which Descartes gave an answer he considered to be definitive: is there something
that I can know with absolute certainty? I will try to demonstrate that Philo had fore-
seen and refuted the Cartesian solution, while Augustine in a certain sense anticipat-
ed it.
1 Prolegomena
Before dealing with Philo, I will say something about the pagan attitude towards re-
ligion, and more specifically that of the Hellenistic schools. In the Pyrrhonian tradi-
tion, passive observance of the religious tradition of the city is recommended in order
to avoid the disturbance of religious dissension.⁸ We find something quite opposite to
this indifferentism in Cicero’s treatise On the Nature of the Gods (De natura deorum).
The main purpose of this treatise, in the tradition of the New Academy, is to demon-
strate that the dogmatic explanations of the nature of the gods offered by Stoics and
Epicureans were disappointing and contradictory. I shall not insist on the arguments
used by Cotta against his dogmatic adversaries, since they have been explored at
length.⁹ Here I prefer to evoke a passage of the third book, rarely analysed in com-
mentaries on this treatise. At sections 11‒12 of the third book, Cotta, the exponent
of the Academic refutation of Stoicism, refuses to grant that gods or dead heroes
could appear among mortals and be seen in some exceptional occasions, let us
say in miracles. He adds that he prefers to believe something more probable, namely
that the souls of the great men are divine and immortal.¹⁰ In the case of Cotta, the
 See Carlos Lévy, “La question du pouvoir dans le pyrrhonisme,” in Fondements et crises du pouvoir,
eds. Sylvie Franchet d’Esperey, Valérie Fromentin, Sophie Gotteland, and Jean-Michel Roddaz (Bor-
deaux: Ausonius, 2003), 47‒56; Richard Bett, Pyrrho: his Antecedents and his Legacy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), esp. chap. 2; Emidio Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus, l’expérience sceptique et
l’horizon de l’éthique,” Cahiers philosophiques 115, no. 3 (2008): 29‒45.
 See Daniel Babut, La religion des philosophes grecs, 2nd ed. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2019); Jean-
Louis Girard, “Probabilisme, théologie et religion: le catalogue des dieux homonymes dans le De na-
tura deorum de Cicéron (3, 42 et 53‒60),” in Hommages à R. Schilling, eds. Hubert Zehnacker and Gus-
tave Hentz (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1983), 117‒26; Jaap Mansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean Theology,”
Mnemosyne 46 (1993): 172‒210; Jordi Pia, “De la Nature des dieux de Cicéron à l’abrégé de Cornutus:
une nouvelle représentation des élites dans la réflexion théologique,” Camenae 10 (February 2012),
http://saprat.ephe.sorbonne.fr/media/282f1da6517e2ba6025880dd887c8682/camenae-10-varia-jordi-
pia-derniere.pdf.
 Cicero, De Natura deorum 3.12: “Would you not prefer to believe the perfectly credible doctrine
that the souls of famous men, like the sons of Tyndareus you speak of, are divine and live for
ever, rather than that men who had been once for all burnt on a funeral pyre could ride and fight
in a battle ; and if you maintain that this was possible, then you have got to explain how it was pos-
sible, and not merely bring forward old wives’ tales” (nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest,
animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos, quam eos qui
semel cremati essent equitare et in acie pugnare potuisse; aut si hoc fieri potuisse dicis, doceas oportet
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Academic argumentation has a double function: first, to demonstrate that human
reason is incapable of elaborating a non-contradictory doctrine about the gods;
and second, to consider the possibility of a less naïve, more persuasive, and more
intellectual discourse about them. There is a kind of subtle connexion between Cot-
ta’s critical attitude and a form of transcendence. His critique aims at demonstrating
that the inability of reason to find what is absolutely true does not necessarily imply
its incapacity to detect what is false or to have an intuition of what is probable. Cotta,
as an Academic, is essentially an evaluator. He advances arguments in order to dem-
onstrate that the theory of the immortality of the best human souls is more plausible
than the naïve belief of the visible presence of gods. Implicitly, it is an extension of
the The Dream of Scipio (Somnium Scipionis, from book 6 of De republica) written by
Cicero ten years before. It is quite difficult to decide if this connexion between the
Academic contra omnia dicere and a transcendent perspective had antecedents in
the school of Arcesilaus and Carneades or if it was Cicero’s innovation.¹¹ At no mo-
ment, however, does he presume to understand what could be the nature of this ego
who, though not pretending to reach truth, thinks that it is qualified to express a
qualified opinion on opposite propositions. It can be asserted that, even when he
deals with philosophical themes, Cotta is unable to define his subjectivity otherwise
than through his own position in the Roman tradition.¹²
2 The Main Features of Philo’s Scepticism
I will not enter into details regarding Philo’s version of the tropes. It must be noted
that Philo’s sceptical aspects are not limited to the tropes that we find in his On
Drunkenness (De ebrietate). There are many other places where he uses sceptic argu-
ments in different ways.¹³ My purpose is to try to provide an answer to these two
questions: why Philo and why scepticism? Why does Philo frequently use sceptic
items, while he considers the sceptics themselves to be sophists? Here my method
will be to revisit some concepts of the confrontation between sceptics and Stoics, try-
ing to see what they become when they are used by Philo.
quo modo, nec fabellas aniles proferas). Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods. Academics, trans. H. Rack-
ham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1933.
 On the relation between the New Academy and the Platonic legacy, see Carlos Lévy, “La Nouvelle
Académie a-t-elle été antiplatonicienne?”, in Contre Platon I. Le platonisme dévoilé, ed. Monique Dix-
saut (Paris: Vrin, 1993), 139‒56.
 Cicero, De Natura deorum 3.9: “For my part a single argument would have sufficed, namely that it
has beed handed down to us by our forefathers” (mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maiores nostros
tradidisse).
 On this point see Carlos Lévy, “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” in Philo
of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 103‒20.
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2.1 Philo and Stoic Epistemological Concepts
First sunkatathesis (assent), katalēpsis (perception of reality), and epochē (suspen-
sion of assent). Briefly, since for the Stoics logos-nature is both God and Providence,
it generously offers true representations of the world to human beings. They are said
to be free to accept or to refuse them, since assent depends on us. They can also sus-
pend this assent. At the core of the confrontation between Stoics and sceptics is the
fact that for the former, it is normal to give assent to natural representations, while
for the latter no representation is adequately clear and unambiguous to be believed.
Both schools agree, however, that the relation (or the absence of relation) between
representations and assent is the central concern of the philosophy of knowledge.
Philo’s originality was chiefly due to his refusal to admit even the terms of the
problem. Within his corpus, only twice does he use sunkatathesis, a term which
was specifically Stoic, since it was coined from an electoral metaphor by Zeno, the
founder of the school.¹⁴ For the Stoics, human life is a kind of permanent electoral
process, in which representations are the candidates and the subject a tireless
voter. Sensory representations are almost sure to be elected, since most of them
are phantasiai katalēptikai (“cognitive representations”), whereas intellectual propo-
sitions need a more accurate examination. In Philo’s huge corpus, the near-absence
of one of the main concepts of Stoic vocabulary—and more generally of the philo-
sophic lingua franca of this time—can hardly be considered a mere coincidence. It
would be tempting to provide a stylistic explanation, since Philo generally avoids ne-
ologisms and non-classical concepts too narrowly connected to a precise philosoph-
ical context. But, at the same time, he often uses katalēpsis, another central concept
of Stoic epistemology. In Stoic doctrine, katalēpsis is a kataleptic, i.e., naturally evi-
dent representation, to which assent has been given.¹⁵ We know that Philo was famil-
iar with these kinds of scholastic definitions, since in the De congressu, he gives sev-
eral Stoic definitions with great accuracy, among them the concept of katalēpsis
which he includes in the more general concept of science, epistēmē.¹⁶ It is true
that Philo’s vocabulary is often much more exegetical than philosophical and gener-
ally not particularly inclined towards terminological innovations. At the same time, it
is quite probable that he did not want to accept a concept so clearly belonging to the
Stoic system, which expressed the autonomy of the human subject inside a perfectly
 See Carlos Lévy, “Breaking the Stoic Language: Philo’s Attitude towards Assent (sunkatathesis)
and Comprehension (katalêpsis),” Henoch 32 (2010): 33‒44.
 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians (Adversus mathematicos) 8.396 (= SVF 2.91).
 Philo, On the Preliminary Studies (De Congressu eruditionis gratia) 141: “Knowledge on the other
hand is defined as a sure and certain apprehension which cannot be shaken by argument” (ἐπιστή-
μης δέ· κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ βέβαιος, ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου). Philo, On the Preliminary Studies,
in On the Confusion of Tongues. On the Migration of Abraham. Who Is the Heir of Divine Things? On
Mating with the Preliminary Studies (Philo vol. 4), trans. F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press), 1932.
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determined nature. By contrast, katalēpsis had Platonic and Aristotelian antece-
dents.¹⁷
I hope that the process of Philo’s terminological preferences will become clearer
by examining one of the two occurrences of sunkatathesis in his corpus. On the Life of
Moses (De vita Mosis) shows Moses in a state of great perplexity about the date of
Passover, a very complex religious problem.¹⁸ On one hand, the date of the festival
was set at the fourteenth day of the first month, but on the other hand, certain mem-
bers of the group were plunged into mourning by the death of relatives. Due to their
ensuing state of ritual impurity, they could not attend the ceremonies of Passover
and were quite disappointed. For this reason, they asked the prophet to change
the date. Philo reports that Moses was torn between contradictory sentiments, be-
tween admitting or rejecting these protests. The inclination of a Stoic philosopher
probably would have been to reject them, since grief was one of the four fundamen-
tal negative passions. An Academic belonging to the Carneadean tradition would
have suspended his assent, while trying to see which of the two solutions would
be the most persuasive. A Pyrrhonian would have said that they were perfectly equiv-
alent. But when Moses does not know what to do, he asks God to give him a solution.
Subsequently, God emits an oracle preserving both the Law and loyalty to family.We
suggest, therefore, that Philo refused to use the concept of sunkatathesis because it
was a self-sufficient concept, namely a concept without any opening to transcen-
dence. The Stoic conception of assent was the most elaborate expression of confi-
dence in the sovereignty of the reason, both individual and universal, a doctrine
that Philo could not accept. That is why he prefers to use the term boulē (deliberation
and decision), much less connected to an immanentist context.
2.2 The transcendent epochē
The decision to forego the term sunkatathesis may be thought to imply the same at-
titude towards epochē, defined as suspension of assent. However, things are perhaps
a little more complex. Actually, epochē is used only once in the whole of Philon’s cor-
pus.¹⁹ This seems to create an almost perfect symmetry with the treatment of sunka-
tathesis. At the same time, it is worth noting that in the abstract of Aenesidemus’s
book Pyrrhoneioi logoi, written by the Patriarch Photius, the term epochē, which
 Plato, Gorgias, 445c; Republic 526d; Laws 830c; Aristotle, Sleep and Waking (De somno et vigilia)
458a29; Pseudo-Aristotle, De spiritu 484b33.
 Philo, On the Life of Moses (De vita Mosis) 2.225‒32.
 Philo, On Flight and Finding (De fuga et invetione) 136: “For the best offering is quietness and sus-
pense of judgement, in matters that absolutely lack proofs” (ἄριστον γὰρ ἱερεῖον ἡσυχία καὶ ἐποχὴ
περὶ ὧν πάντως οὔκ εἰσι πίστεις). Philo, On Flight and Finding, in On Flight and Finding. On the
Change of Names. On Dreams (Philo vol. 5), trans. F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press), 1934.
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will become so frequent in Neopyrrhonist philosophy, especially in Sextus Empiri-
cus, is never used.²⁰ Like Philo, Aenesidemus (at least in Photius’s report), frequently
uses katalēpsis, katalēptos, akatalēptos, but he carefully avoids sunkatathesis. In-
stead of epochē, he prefers to use aporia. Of course, Photius’s report is too brief to
allow for a perfectly clear conclusion. The reliability of a report written so many cen-
turies after the book in question can be contested. But it cannot be excluded that one
of the characteristics of Aenesidemus’s innovations would have been to relinquish
the traditional problematic sunkatatheis/epochē and emphasise instead the Pyrrho-
nian idea of isostheneia, the equal strength of opposite realities, leading to aporia.²¹
Therefore, it is not impossible that what we see in the Philonian corpus, namely the
almost complete rejection of the terms sunkatathesis and epochē, originated in Aene-
sidemus himself.
When Sextus gives his own version of Pyrrhonian modes, he says in his introduc-
tion that “the usual tradition amongst the older sceptics is that the ‘modes’ by which
suspension (epochē) is supposed to be brought about are ten in number.”²² In Philo’s
version of these modes, we find the verb epechein three times. The use of the term
epochē expressed something stronger than the verb epechein. The verb had a func-
tional meaning, while the noun had become the keystone, the motto of Academic
thought, from which Aenesidemus tried to depart.
In any case, the only Philonian occurrence of epochē deserves consideration. It
refers to one of the most famous episodes in the Bible, the sacrifice of Isaac. When
Isaac asks his father where the lamb for the holocaust is, Abraham answers that God
himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering. In his allegorical commentary,
Philo explains that the victim is the suspension of our judgement on points where
evidence cannot be found.²³ God accepts the epochē as the sacrificial offering, in
the place of Isaac. epochē is not only the recognition of the limits of the human
mind, but also the expression of the Patriarch’s faith in the infinite capacities of
God Almighty, able to surpass the limits of nature, for example by bringing up ex ni-
hilo a lamb in a desert. In Philo’s exegesis, the lamb is both a historical reality, since
he never excluded the literal sense of the sacred word, and the metaphor of the ep-
ochē, which in his perspective is meaningless if not referred to God.
 Photius, Bibliotheca 212.
 On these concepts, see Jacques Brunschwig, “L’aphasie pyrrhonienne,” in Dire l’évidence, eds.
Carlos Lévy and Laurent Pernot (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997), 297‒320; Bett, Pyrrho, 14‒59; Harold
Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Ri-
chard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 58‒81.
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1933), 1.14.
 Philo, On Flight and Finding 136.
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If we exclude the dubious testimony of Epiphanius,²⁴ no pagan Sceptic had sug-
gested this kind of interpretation. For a Sceptic or a Stoic, the understanding of the
meaning of epochē needed a thorough comprehension of main intellectual processes.
For Philo, it was necessarily based on the hermeneutic of the divine Word, in a pas-
sage apparently without relation to the suspension of judgement.
Here we must stress a crucial point. The main difference between Pyrrhonian
and Academic philosophers was that for the former all presentations and opinions
were basically equivalent, while for the latter the impossibility of reaching certain
truth did not prevent the world from offering some semblance of plausibility. For Ar-
cesilaus, the first scholarch of the New Academy, the eulogon, though produced by a
fallible reason, was the best mean to act in a non-undifferentiated way. For Car-
neades, his most brilliant successor, the pithanon, the impression of plausibility pro-
duced by certain representations, allowed limited progress in knowledge and ac-
tion.²⁵ Usually Philo shows great hostility towards the pithanon, perhaps because
in his Platonic culture it had too many sophistic associations. He has a somewhat
more nuanced attitude towards eulogon, but also some negative views. In Allegorical
Interpretation (Legum allegoriae) 3.229, he says that it is unreasonable to believe in
logismois pithanois, an expression which means here something like sophisms.²⁶
At 3.233 it is said that the pithanon involves no firm knowledge with regard to the
truth.
We find one of the most eloquent instances of this rejection in On the Life of
Moses 1.174. When the prophet saw that the Hebrews hesitated to follow him and
to fight the Egyptian army, he asked them: “why do you trust in the specious and
plausible and that only?” (τί μόνοις τοῖς εὐλόγοις καὶ πιθανοῖς προπιστεύετε;). At
the same time, in On the Special Laws (De specialibus legibus) 1.36‒38 he develops
the hierarchy in which the eulogon and the pithanon can find a sense different
from the one they had in Arcesilaus’s or Carneades’s philosophies. Even if it is not
possible to have perfect knowledge of the truth of God, Philo says, the research in
itself is a source of joy: “For nothing is better than to search for the true God,
even if the discovery of Him eludes human capacity, since the very wish to learn,
if earnestly entertained, produces untold joys.” Actually, even if God is unknowable,
it is possible to act “like the athlete who strives for the second prize since he has
been disappointed of the first. Now second to the true vision stands conjecture
and theorising and all that can be brought into the category of the reasonable.”
 Epiphanius, Panarion, De fide 9.33‒34; fragment 132 in Simone Vezzoli, Arcesilao di Pitane
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2016).
 On these concepts see the opposite interpretations of Pierre Couissin, “Le stoïcisme de la Nou-
velle Académie,” Revue d’Histoire de la Philosophie 3 (1929): 241‒76; Anna Maria Ioppolo, Opinione
e Scienza (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1986), esp. 121‒217.
 In Philo, Allegorical Interpretation (Legum allegoriae) 3.41, pithanotēs is evoked within the logoi
sophistikoi.
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Like the Academics and the followers of Aenesidemus, Philo emphasises the
continuity of research. For example, just before describing the sceptic modes at On
Drunkenness 162, he says that the worse kind of ignorance is that which accentuates
the lack of science, the belief of having reached science. The best way to avoid this
kind of ignorance is to indefatigably pursue inquiry, a point on which Philo agrees
with all the sceptics. There is, however, an essential and paradoxical difference. In
his case, the research is not the pursuit of a wholly or almost wholly unknown
truth, but of the one that God Himself revealed to human beings.
2.3 The Status of Scepticism in Philo: The Essential Role of
Decency and Shame
How, then, to explain the rather heavy presence of scepticism in Philo’s corpus? Is his
aim to merely dissipate the false illusion of knowledge, in order to make the path
towards the revealed truth easier? In my opinion, there is a much deeper connexion
between theology and philosophy. To understand it, let us go back to the primitive
scene, i.e., the meeting of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, a scene for which
Philo gives two interpretations.
In the On the Creation of the World (De opificio mundi) Philo takes some distance
with respect to the biblical verse. He stresses aidōs (respect, decency), a transcenden-
tal virtue in his axiology, since it is the only one that is mentioned in the Paradise.
The version is somewhat different in the Allegorical Interpretation where he gives his
own interpretation of the biblical “and they were not ashamed.” There he distin-
guishes three concepts: anaischuntia, shamelessness, which is the sign of evil;
aidōs, decency, characteristic of virtuous people; and the lack both of decency and
of shamelessness.²⁷ The sage is here characterised by his aidōs, an idea which is ab-
sent from our Stoic testimonies. Of course, in Stoicism aidōs is a subdivision of eu-
labeia, one of the three eupatheiai (positive passions), but Stoics never stressed
aidōs as a fundamental virtue of the sage.²⁸ As if he felt himself how surprising
 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.65: “The words suggest three points for consideration: shame-
less, and shamefastness, and absence of both shamelessness and shamefastness. Shamelessness,
then is peculiar to the worthless man, shamefastness to the man of worth, to feel neither shamefast-
ness nor shamelessness to the man who is incapable of right apprehension and of due assent thereto
and this is at this moment the prophet’s subject. For he who has not yet attained to the apprehension
of good and evil can not possibly be either shameless or shamefast” (τρία κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἐστίν· ἀναι-
σχυντία, αἰδώς, τὸ μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖν μήτε αἰδεῖσθαι·ἀναισχυντία μὲν οὖν ἴδιον φαύλου, αἰδὼς δὲ
σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ μήτε αἰδεῖσθαι μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖν τοῦ ἀκαταλήπτως ἔχοντος καὶ ἀσυγκαταθέτως,
περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ὁ γὰρ μηδέπω κατάληψιν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ λαβὼν οὔτε ἀναισχυντεῖν
οὔτε αἰδεῖσθαι δύναται).
 Diogenes Laertius 7.116: “And accordingly, as under the primary passions are classed certain others
subordinate to them, so too is it with the primary eupathies or good emotional states. Thus under wish-
ing they bring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness, respect, affection; under caution, reverence
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this promotion of decency was, as an essential virtue, and of shamelessness as the
strongest expression of evil, Philo asks:
Why then, seeing that results of wickedness are many, has he mentioned only one, that which
attends on conduct that is disgraceful, saying “they were not shamed,” but not saying “they did
not commit injustice,” or “they did not sin” or “they did not err”? The reason is not far to seek.
By the only true God, I deem nothing so shameful as supposing that I think and that I feel. My own
mind the author of its exertion? How can it be? (μὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ μόνον θεὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως αἰσχρὸν
ἡγοῦμαι ὡς τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νοῶ ἢ ὅτι αἰσθάνομαι. ὁ ἐμὸς νοῦς αἴτιος τοῦ νοεῖν; πόθεν;)
Does it know as to itself, what it is or how it came into existence? Sense-perception the origin
of perceiving by sense? How could it be said to be so, seeing that it is beyond the ken either
of itself or of the mind? Do you not observe that the mind which thinks that it exercises itself
is often found to be without mental power, in scenes of gluttony, drunkenness, folly? Where
does the exercise of mind show itself then? And is not perceptive sense often robbed of the
power of perceiving?²⁹
This text is in my opinion essential to understand Philo’s attitude towards scepticism.
We must first notice the extreme solemnity of the affirmation, since he swears by
God: “By the only true God.” The most shameful thing one can imagine is to think
that one is the subject of one’s thoughts and sensations.
In the most common perception of the history of philosophy, the cogito is the one
assertion that even the most radical sceptic cannot ruin. Philo seems to have antici-
pated the Cartesian response to scepticism and to have avant la lettre elaborated an
objection which is much more ethical than epistemological. To affirm that it is me
who thinks is to discard the only virtue evoked about human beings in Paradise,
the virtue of decency, to ignore and to betray the content of Revelation. But it also
raises a problem of philosophical methodology: what kind of truth can we access
by isolating knowledge from ethics? In so many Philonian texts, aidōs is the capacity
to control the desire for absolute independence and superiority. For Philo, the cogito
is not the solution of the problem of knowledge, but the supreme fallacy, since it ar-
tificially separates knowledge from ethics and metaphysics. More exactly, it supposes
that the problem of truth is only epistemological.
In Philo, as, many centuries later in another Jewish thinker, Emmanuel Levinas,
the main route to transcendence is ethics, not epistemology. What is essential is my
relation to others, not my relation to the representations of the world. Sceptical argu-
ments display the permanent fallibility of the human mind and sensations, but in
Philo’s thought epistemological arguments are only means to assert something far
more essential: the impossibility of considering a human being as the autonomous
and modesty; under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness” (καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά,
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν,
ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαναἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην,
εὐθυμίαν). Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume II: Books 6‒10, trans. R.D.
Hicks, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.68‒69, emphasis added.
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subject of his or her thoughts. Philo’s position is exactly the contrary of Descartes’s.
Descartes’s refutation of the sceptic arguments provides him access to the cogito. God
is then called upon for help, in order to reconnect the thinking subject with the
world. Philo’s itinerary is exactly the reverse. He first absolutely rejects the cogito
as an absurd pretension that ignores the metaphysical situation of the human
being. It is precisely this rejection that legitimatises the use of the sceptic tropes.
Philo would have probably considered Descartes’s method as an artificial manipula-
tion. To disconnect the human mind from intersubjectivity and from a relation to God
was, for him, simply impossible.
2.4 From the Negation of the Self to an Ethic of Responsibility
This transfer of the problem from knowledge to ethics and metaphysics implies a dif-
ficulty. If I am not the author of my thoughts, how could I be considered responsible
for my acts? This is something close to the objection expressed by the Stoics in order
to refute their sceptic adversaries. How could I be responsible for my actions if I do
not give my assent? Philo’s solution to this difficulty is ingenious and original.When
God tells him to go and see the Pharaoh, Moses, the most perfect man in Philo’s opin-
ion, initially tries to evade this obligation. He pretends that he is not gifted in speech
and he suggests that God could choose somebody else. But God, who however under-
stands the process of Moses’s aidōs, answers:
Dost thou not know who it is that gave man a mouth, and formed his tongue and throat and all
the organism of reasonable speech? It is I Myself (autos eimi egō): therefore, fear not, for at a
sign from Me all will become articulate and be brought over to method and order, so that
none can hinder the stream of words from flowing easily and smoothly from a fountain unde-
filed. And, if thou shouldst have need of an interpreter, thou wilt have in thy brother a
mouth to assist thy service, to report to the people thy words, as thou reportest those of God
to him.³⁰
Philo wants to make clear that aidōs, of which in his opinion scepticism is but a
shadowy and perverse figure, cannot be an argument to avoid responsibilities. The
human being is not the subject of his or her thoughts and actions, but he or she
is responsible for them. That is the central paradox of Philo’s thought, something
close to what will be expressed by Levinas through the expression difficile liberté.
A final remark on Philo. If it is an error to think that the human being is the real
subject of his or her thoughts, the logical consequence is that the sceptic, in order to
be coherent with himself, must disappear as author of his scepticism. In an entirely
different philosophical context, it is the conclusion at which Pyrrho arrived, though
 Philo, On the Life of Moses, in On Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses (Philo vol. 6), trans. F.H. Colson
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 1.84.
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he could not prevent his main disciple Timon from creating a fervent cult of person-
ality.³¹ Philo never mentions the philosophers or the rabbis whose work he followed.
He rarely quotes philosophers, and those he does cite are not always those you might
expect. But he is especially harsh with sceptics, whom he faults for their arrogance
and aggressiveness. In Questions and Answers on Genesis (Quaestiones et solutiones
in Genesin) 3.33 they are compared to professional warriors, for they believe that phi-
losophy is a permanent attack against other doctrines, without having any idea of the
causes and consequences of these fights. His main explanation of that aggressive-
ness is that it gives them real pleasure. Ismael is both a sceptic and a sophist in
his allegorical explanation, since it is said about him in Genesis 16.12 that “‘His
hands shall be against all men, and all men’s hands against him’; for this is just
the Sophist’s way, with his pretence of excessive open-mindedness, and his love of
arguing for the sake of arguing. This character aims his arrows at all the representa-
tives of the sciences, opposing each individually and in common. He is also their
common target since they naturally fight back, as though in defence of their own off-
spring, that is, of the doctrines to which their soul has given birth.” Neither is the
function of scepticism to allow intellectual victories through a systematic critical at-
titude. In Philo’s opinion, if it is used correctly, i.e., in a way quite different from that
of the sceptics themselves, its main aim is to lead one toward metaphysical humility,
of which the first and definitive expression must be found in Genesis.
3 From Philo to Augustine
3.1 The Problem of the Self in the Contra Academicos
Is it legitimate to say that Philo opened the way to a monotheistic refutation of the
cogito, an attitude founded on the idea of the impossibility of isolating knowledge
from ethics and transcendence? It would be arrogant to presume to provide a com-
plete answer to such a complex question, but it can be of some interest to examine if
the transition from Judaism to Christianity entailed a deep modification of Philo’s in-
tuition. Here we will tackle only one case, but a very weighty one, that of Augustine,
a choice that can seem somewhat paradoxical, since he did not know enough Greek
to read Philo and probably felt little empathy for Philo’s exegetical method. On the
other hand, he could not ignore his existence, since he certainly heard his master
Ambrose speak about a thinker whom he plagiarised so frequently. For all these rea-
sons, the confrontation between Augustine and Philo can perhaps help to differenti-
ate what is structural in the monotheistic relation to scepticism and what depends on
the cultural and the personal characteristics of the different thinkers.
 See Diogenes Laertius 9.64; fragment 60 in Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Pirrone. Testimonianze (Na-
ples: Bibliopolis, 1981).
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It is impossible here to enter into the very complex details of these three books of
dialogue. Our aim is rather to try to understand how Augustine himself presented
this strange anti-sceptic emergency, apparently more philosophical than theological,
that led him from Milan to Cassiciacum. Actually, Augustine evolved in his successive
presentations of the Contra Academicos. His first letter to Hermogenianus offers
many explanations in a quite surprising and somewhat confused way. He says noth-
ing about his conversion, but he uses many philosophical items. Like Cicero who, in
a letter to Atticus paradoxically recognised that his refutation of the Stoic gnoseolog-
ical doctrine was less persuasive than the defence of that doctrine proposed by Anti-
ochus,³² he admits that he was unable to succeed in overcoming doubt.³³ At the same
time, he seems proud of having acted against the New Academy, since he says that in
the search for truth, people were paralysed by the idea that a man as subtle as Car-
neades had been unable to locate it. Last but not least, he again expresses his theory
of an esoteric teaching of a dogmatic Platonism in the Academy. He recognises that
there was no certainty there, but asserts that it was riskier to let people think that the
philosophers of the New Academy were really sceptics, a belief that he presents as a
cause for philosophical apathy. He says that to affirm that the Academics were secret-
ly dogmatists was a way, perhaps not entirely convincing, to create a desire to seek
out the truth.³⁴ In this letter, scepticism has an ambiguous status. It is an adversary
but also an object of admiration and even of imitation. Imitatus sum, he says, since
like them he reacted to a situation: they tried to fight naturalist dogmatisms,while he
wanted to break the intellectual inertia of his contemporaries.
Fighting scepticism is presented by Augustine as an unavoidable mission if he
had any hope of inciting the inquisitio veri in them again. It must be noted that for
him scepticism is also represented by the Academy, and in fact, solely by the Acad-
emy. The easiest explanation of the omission of neo-Pyrrhonism would be to say that
Cicero, his main source, had himself ignored Aenesidemus and his followers. But it
can be objected that Aulus Gellius, Favorinus, and probably many others had tackled
the neo-Pyrrhonist innovations. That Augustine never heard about them is rather im-
probable. It seems more plausible that he limited himself to the New Academy be-
cause he was interested less in scepticism itself than in the strange connection be-
tween transcendentalist Platonism and Academic philosophy that he presents as
 Cicero, Letters to Atticus 13.19.5: sunt enim vehementer πιθανὰ Antiochia (“For the views of Anti-
ochus are strongly persuasive”; my translation).
 Augustine, Letters 1.3: “my chief delight is not your having said—with more affection than truth—
that I have outdone the Academics, but the fact that I have broken a most hateful bond by which I
was held back from tasting the sweetness of philosophy by despair of attaining to truth. And truth is
the food of the soul” (non tam me delectat, ut scribis, quod Academicos uicerim, scribis enim hoc
amantius forte quam verius, quam quod mihi abruperim odiosissimum retinaculum, quo a philosophiae
ubere desperatione ueri, quod est enim animi pabulum refrenabar). Augustine, Letters: Volume 1 (1‒
82), trans. Wilfrid Parsons (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951).
 On the Augustinian myth of the secret dogmatism of Arcesilas, see Carlos Lévy, “Scepticisme et
dogmatisme dans l’Académie: ‘l’ésotérisme’ d’Arcésilas,” Revue des Études Latines 56 (1978): 335‒48.
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the expression of the desperatio ueri that created a distance between himself and
philosophy.
Many elements here differ from what we found in Philo. First of all, Augustine is
really concerned by the problem of the auctoritas of the Platonic school, a problem
that for Philo is meaningless. This major Latin concept is present from the beginning
of the letter, where Augustine expresses his reverence towards the Platonic school,
without excluding the sceptic Academy. But it is also interesting to notice that for
him these philosophers were not people in permanent search of truth but people
who discouraged others from finding it. On this point Augustine at least uncon-
sciously agrees with neo-Pyrrhonists, who accused the philosophers of the New
Academy of practising a negative dogmatism while themselves pretended to be seek-
ers of truth. But Augustine, as the great reader of the Ciceronian Academica that he
was, could not ignore that Cicero had refuted this charge in advance in the Lucullus
109‒10. Antipater the Stoic said that “Carneades should at least allow that this prin-
ciple itself is apprehended, that the wise person holds that nothing is apprehensi-
ble.” And the Ciceronian answer is: “but just as he holds those as persuasive rather
than apprehended principles, so with this one, that nothing is apprehensible.”³⁵
There was no negative dogmatism in the Academy, at least in his Ciceronian version.
In order however to fight his own desperatio ueri, Augustine needs to counterbalance
the negative dogmatism he attributes to the Academics by his assertion of an esoteric
dogmatism. Augustine presents himself both as someone who wants to make the
most of philosophy and someone who feels responsible for the fate of philosophy
among his contemporaries. It was a sort of pastoral function inside the field of phi-
losophy before the religious pastoral functions. Here we are very far from Philo. The
similarity between the two thinkers is, however, that in a different way, both hold
that the sceptics were not really people in search of the truth.
3.2 From Augustine to Philo?
Things become still more divergent in the Enchiridion, written in 422. There is no
mention of this kind of pastoral function. Now Augustine essentially speaks about
himself. Retrospectively, the Contra Academicos becomes the means for fighting
the doubts which assailed him, at the moment when he was, he says, tamquam in
ostio, hesitating in embracing faith. There is no more mention of an uncertain hy-
pothesis about the sceptical Academy, but he stresses the obligation of removing
the desperatio veri, of which the Academics are said to have been the champions,
by all means (utique). The strength of this word proves that he passed the stage
 Cicero, Lucullus 110: sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum nihil posse percipi.
nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Cicero, On Academic Scepticism,
trans. Charles Brittain (Indianapolis/Cambrige: Hackett, 2006).
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where he believed himself obliged to furnish a justification of his attitude towards
the Academy. Now he presents himself as the one who will find a solution to the
problem for which the Academics were unable to find a solution. And perhaps
most important in the Enchiridion is the assertion that if there is no assent, there
is no faith: At si tollatur assensio, fides tollitur; quia sine assensione nihil creditur.³⁶
The opposition is now radical, between scepticism—founded on the desperatio
ueri—and faith, which is truth and hope. No more mention of the auctoritas of the
Platonic school. In letter 118, written in 410, Augustine says that if Stoics and Epicur-
eans were clearly wrong, the Academics could not assume the role of embodying true
reason, since they were lacking humility, humilitas, an equivalent of aidōs and a
bridge between Philo and Cicero. At the end of his life, in the Retractationes, Augus-
tine will say that he wasted much time in refuting philosophers who were but impi-
ous pagans.³⁷
Actually, Augustine seems to have moved from a pre-Cartesian attitude to a post-
Philonian one. In Against the Academics (Contra Academicos), he is in search of the
proposition that will escape the sceptic systematic criticism and, as has been
 Augustine, Enchiridion 20.7: “Nor do I propose to solve a very knotty question which perplexed the
subtle thinkers of the Academy: whether a wise man should give his assent to anything at all, con-
fronted as he is by error, should he approve what is false; for according to these men all things are
obscure or uncertain. That is why during the early days of my conversion, I wrote three volumes, that
my progress might not be hindered by objections blocking, so to speak, the doorway. Certainly it was
necessary to remove that sense of the hopelessness of attaining to truth which apparently finds sup-
port in the arguments of the Academics. Now, among them every error is considered to be a sin, and
this they contend can be avoided only by withholding assent altogether. In fact, they say, whosoever
assents to things uncertain commits an error. Nothing is certain in human experience because of the
impossibility of seeing through the sham that falsehood puts on. And even if one’s assumption
should happen to be true, they will dispute its truth by arguments extremely subtle but at the
same time shameless. However, among us the just man liveth by faith. But take away assent, and
you take away faith, since without assent one can believe nothing. And there are truths which
may not be understood, but unless they are believed, it will be impossible for us to attain to the
happy life,which is no other tant life eternal. But I do not know whether we should argue with people
who are unaware not only that they are to live forever, but that they are alive now” (Nec quaestio no-
dosissima, quae homines acutissimos, Academicos torsit, nunc mihi enodanda suscepta est; utrum ali-
quid debeat sapiens approbare, ne incidat in errorem, si pro veris approbaverit falsa, cum omnia, sicut
affirmant, vel occulta sint, vel incerta. Unde tria confeci volumina in initio conversionis meae, ne imped-
imento nobis essent, quae tanquam in ostio contradicebant. Et utique fuerat removenda inveniendae
desperatio veritatis, quae illorum videtur argumentationibus roborari. Apud illos ergo error omnis puta-
tur esse peccatum, quod vitari non posse contendunt, nisi omnis suspendatur assensio. Errare quippe
dicunt eum quisquis assentitur incertis: nihilque certum esse in hominum visis propter indiscretam sim-
ilitudinem falsi, etiamsi quod videtur, forte sit verum, acutissimis quidem, sed impudentissimis conflic-
tationibus disputant. Apud nos autem, Justus ex fide vivit [Rom. I, 17]. At si tollatur assensio, fides toll-
itur; quia sine assensione nihil creditur. Et sunt vera quamvis non videantur, quae nisi credantur, ad
vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est, non potest perveniri. Cum istis vero utrum loqui debeamus
ignoro, qui, non victuros in aeternum, sed in praesentia se vivere nesciunt). Albert C. Outler, trans., Au-
gustine: Confessions and Enchiridion (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1955).
 Augustine, Retractationes 13.
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stressed by many scholars, he approaches the cogito.³⁸ In the following years, he dis-
covers the autonomy of theological thought in relation to philosophy. Gradually, he
realised that the main aim for a Christian was not to achieve an ego with a perfect
certitude but to give, through the concept of humilitas (a concept rather rare in Cic-
eronian philosophy), a merely less imperfect evaluation of the human being’s onto-
logical situation. It is a task of which Philo would not have disapproved, since he
would have interpreted humilitas as the Latin equivalent of aidōs.
To conclude. Augustine uses the word moles to describe scepticism.³⁹ A moles is
a huge block, something massive, impressive, that you cannot avoid. At the same
time, if you break the moles you can make many things with its fragments. The mon-
otheistic Revelation changed everything in the frame of the debate established by
Academics and Stoics: truth was no more an object of research, but a concrete
text transmitting the word of God. Faith, pistis, deprived rational logic of its primacy.
But at the same time, monotheism, at least in its principle, does not allow faith to be
only a passive orthopraxy. On the contrary, it implies a crucial interrogation of the
status of the subject him- or herself. Philo and Augustine—the Augustine of the
works later than Against the Academics—evidently disagree on many things, but
they agree on one point: the epistemological problem cannot be the central one; it
cannot have a perfectly autonomous existence. Actually, the main problem is that
of humilitas/aidōs, that is to say the attitude of the individual in front of God and
in relation with other human beings.
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Stéphane Marchand
Sextus Εmpiricus’s use of dunamis
Introduction
The main aim of my previous work on ancient scepticism has been to clarify the na-
ture of the sceptical discourse, namely to show its peculiarity in contrast with the
dogmatic discourse. My contention is that there is, at least in Sextus, a systematic
approach of sceptical discourse that involves both a theoretical definition and prac-
tical applications in his writings.¹
My purpose in this paper is to focus on the use of a very special word, that is
nonetheless very common in Greek literature: dunamis (“power,” “ability,” etc.).
The reason for focusing on this word is that, as a noun—or in its adverbial usage du-
namei (“implicitly,” “virtually,” “potentially”)—it is frequently connected, in Sextus’s
works, with the logos skeptikos, the sceptical discourse. For that reason, even though
Sextus does not use the word extensively, its instances are worth examining.
Thanks to the statistical data given by the TLG, we know that the word dunamis
is slightly under-represented in Sextus’s works.² The Greek texts of the 2nd century CE
are among those that use the word frequently (second only to texts in the 4th century
CE), probably due to Galen’s work. By comparison, Sextus’s usage seems parsimoni-
ous. This does not mean that dunamis is unimportant to Sextus’s work, but on the
contrary; he uses it cautiously, choosing it only when it is necessary or significant.
Obviously, dunamis is a very common word in Greek,which cannot be reduced to
an unequivocal meaning. Thus, not all the instances of dunamis in Sextus can be
This paper was presented at the International Conference on Scepticism, organised by E. Spinelli and
G. Veltri, 8‒11 May 2017, at the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies–Jewish Scepticism, Univer-
sität Hamburg. I would like to thank the organisers of this conference and the audience for the dis-
cussion, and more specially Gideon Freudenthal, Carlos Lévy, Jan Opsomer, Stephan Schmid, and
Josef Stern. I am also grateful to Diego Machuca and Jacques-Louis Lantoine for their helpful com-
ments on a previous version of this paper. I would like to thank Anthony Paletta and Yoav Meyrav
for their suggestions and comments.
 Stéphane Marchand, “Sextus Empiricus’ Style of Writing,” in New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism,
ed. Diego E. Machuca (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 113‒41.
 By TLG I am referring to the online database Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, directed by Maria Pan-
tella: http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/. The TLG counts 209 instances of the word in Sextus; relatively to
the global use of the word in the TLG and the size of Sextus’s corpus, 221 instances were expected,
and if Sextus had used the term as his contemporaries, he would have used it 263 times.
OpenAccess. © 2019 Stéphane Marchand, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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connected to a sceptical move. For instance, in grammar dunamis means the “pho-
netic value of sounds of letters,” and Sextus mainly refers to this meaning in AM 1.³
Similarly, Sextus sometimes uses the word in reference to the Aristotelian con-
ception of dunamis, in opposition to energeia (activity),⁴ although he does not en-
dorse any of the Aristotelian theses. It would be problematic if he did endorse
them, since the Aristotelian conception of dunamis is roughly dogmatic: it grants ex-
istence to something which is not self-evident and is instead the product of dogmatic
reasoning. According to this use, something is said to be dunamei (“potentially”)
when “it is capable of being actually” (δυνάμει γάρ ἐστιν ὃ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ
ὑποστῆναι; PH 2.226). But as Sextus shows in the case of the genus, nothing can
exist without being actually something: the potentiality of something is anything
but evident, as long as this potentiality has not been actualised.⁵
For the sake of my demonstration, I will call this last sense of dunamis the “po-
tentiality-dunamis.” It derives from the idea that a power can exist without being cur-
rently active. It seems clear that this sense rests on the opposition between dunamis
and energeia, which is extraneous to the sceptical project to avoid the endorsement
of a philosophical theory. Prima facie, it seems coherent that Sextus avoids such a
conception, preferring a conception of dunamis as a visible and evident power. How-
ever, my aim is to question this assumption and to examine whether Sextus in fact
totally abandoned the use of a “potentiality-dunamis.” More precisely, can we find in
Sextus something like a sceptical conception of dunamis as a potentiality?
In order to answer this question, I will focus on three kinds of sceptical uses of
the word dunamis: (1) to make reference to the activity of scepticism; (2) to indicate
the “implicit” or “virtual” content of some expressions or positions; and (3) to ex-
press something like a sceptical idea of potentiality.
 See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 1 (= Against the Grammarians), sections 99, 107, 110,
115, 116, 117, 125. In most cases, references to Sextus’s works appear in parentheses in the body of the
text, abbreviated, respectively, as AM (Adversus Mathematicos) and PH (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes).
 One of the various changes Aristotle introduced to the philosophical conception of dunamis is to
connect it clearly with energeia. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 5.7.1017a35: “Again, ‘to be’ means that some of
these statements can be made in virtue of a potentiality and others in virtue of an actuality. For we
say that both that which sees potentially and that which sees actually is ‘a seeing thing.’ And in the
same way we call ‘understanding’ both that which can use the understanding, and that which does;
and we call ‘tranquil’ both that in which tranquillity is already present, and that which is potentially
tranquil.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1‒9, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1933). See, for example, Joseph Souilhé, Étude sur le terme ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ dans les
dialogues de Platon (Paris: F. Alcan, 1919), 183; Gwenaëlle Aubry, Dieu sans la puissance: “dunamis” et
“energeia” chez Aristote et chez Plotin (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 92. For a comprehensive analysis of the
word, see now David Lefebvre, Dynamis: sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance
(Paris: J. Vrin, 2018).
 For this use in PH, see 2.27, 81 (with a distinction between ousiai, sustasei, dunamei; cf. also AM
7.38), 83.
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1 The Sceptical Ability
As is well-known, Sextus does not usually refer to scepticism as a philosophy. In-
stead, he frequently uses the word agōgē (“way of life,” “conduct”) to describe his
own stance. Since the sceptical activity mostly consists of the refutation of dogmatic
philosophy, or the “so-called philosophy,”⁶ it seems quite natural that Sextus avoids
the term “philosophy,” which carries dogmatic implications.⁷ However, we should
not expect absolute coherence from Sextus in his usage of the word “philosophy”;
such absolute coherence cannot be found in any philosopher or any natural lan-
guage. However, in the case of Sextus, this lack of coherence is also grounded phil-
osophically: the sceptic should not “fight over phrases” (PH 1.207). For Sextus, the
point is that, overall, we understand each other, even if we use words loosely or im-
properly. For that reason, sometimes Sextus uses the expression “sceptical philoso-
phy.”⁸ Be that as it may, Sextus’s use of philosophia to refer to scepticism remains
marginal, and he clearly prefers to speak of a skeptikē agōgē (“sceptical persuasion”).
Roberta Ioli has outlined the reasons why Sextus preferred the word agōgē to hairesis
(“choice,” “school”), concluding that scepticism “is a philosophical ‘choice’ not be-
cause of its doctrines or its adherence to a founder, but because of its dialectical at-
titude leading to epochē and apatheia,”⁹ that is, respectively, to suspension of judg-
ment and impassibility.
Now, the study about the way Sextus describes his own stance should be com-
pleted by his definition of scepticism as a dunamis: a “faculty,” a “capacity,” or an
“ability.” Compared to Sextus’s widespread use of agōgē, dunamis is not frequent,
but it appears at two key moments linked to the “general account” of scepticism,
where a definition of scepticism and its method is being carried out, without giving
attention to the particular theses of the dogmatic philosophy. At AM 7.1, Sextus
makes distinguishes between the account of “the general character of the skeptical
ability” (Bett’s translation of ὁ μὲν καθόλου τῆς σκεπτικῆς δυνάμεως χαρακτὴρ),¹⁰
and its particular application in the specific part of dogmatic philosophy. In PH
 hē kaloumenē philosophia (PH 1.6; 2.1, 12, 205; 3.278); see also the expression hē legomenē philos-
ophia (“what they call philosophy”; PH 1.18; 3.1)
 For the discussion of the relation between philosophy and scepticism with an interpretation of Pyr-
rhonian scepticism as an anti-rationalism, see primarily Gisela Striker, “Scepticism as a Kind of Phi-
losophy,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83, no. 2 (August 2001): 113‒29.
 Scepticism is presented in PH 1.4 as one of the “most fundamental kinds of philosophy” (hai
anōtatō philosophiai), and Sextus can refer to it as hē skeptikē philosophia (PH 1.5, 236; 2.6) or ephek-
tikē philosophia (i.e., the philosophy of suspension, PH 2.9).
 Roberta Ioli, “Agōgē and Related Concepts in Sextus Empiricus,” Siculorum Gymnasium N.S. 56,
no. 2 (July‒December 2003): 422. See also John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978), 165‒66 and 180‒82.
 Richard Bett, trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 3.
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1.11, as well, Sextus defines the Pyrrhonian philosopher as “someone who possesses
this ability” (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως). The ability in question is de-
scribed a few lines earlier as “an ability to set out oppositions among things which
appear and are thought of in any way at all” (δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ
νοουμένων καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον; PH 1.8, in Annas and Barnes’s translation).¹¹
This definition of scepticism describes the real activity of a sceptical philosopher:
to set out an opposition of impressions or theses in order to produce the equipollence
that leads to the suspension of judgment. This is the work of scepticism, the main
activity of Sextus when he engages in philosophy: to show the “opposition of things”
(τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶν πραγμάτων; PH 1.31).¹²
Why should we understand this activity as a dunamis? In PH 1.9, Sextus explains
that “we call it an ability not in any fancy sense, but simply in the sense of ‘to be able
to’” (῾δύναμιν᾽ μὲν οὖν αὐτὴν καλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περίεργον ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς κατὰ τὸ
δύνασθαι). What exactly is a “fancy sense” of dunamis? When describing language
or style, periergos means “sophisticated” or “elaborate.”¹³ Here, by kata to periergon,
Sextus refers to a sense of dunamis which is tricky or complicated to understand, be-
cause it seems to entail a theory of what a capacity is.¹⁴ Hence, for Sextus the scep-
tical ability does not entail such a dogmatic conception of dunamis; it only means
that the sceptic is able to have this kind of activity, namely to show the opposition
among things and appearances.
Let us turn our attention to the question of my introduction: does this capacity
have something to do with the potentiality-dunamis? It may be tempting to bridge
this use with the idea of potentiality (because a faculty is a kind of potentiality
which is not necessarily at work at all times, in the same way as the grammarian
is not a grammarian in action at every moment of his life). Nevertheless, we should
resist this temptation, considering that the sceptical dunamis is more obvious or evi-
dent; it merely refers to the fact that someone can do something, just because he has
already done it once, without any further claim about the nature or epistemological
status of this capacity. In the potentiality-dunamis there is, indeed, the idea that a
thing has a plurality of possible effects which can be realised under certain condi-
tions, and it does not seem that Sextus implies such an idea with his sceptical duna-
mis.
 Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, trans., Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 The main activity and not the unique one, because this description does not fit with what Sextus
is doing when he is writing the general account of the scepticism, that is, when he gives an account of
his own method.
 Cf. LSJ, s.v. περίεργος.
 As has been noted by Fabricius, for Sextus dunamis does not carry any distinction with technēn,
hikanotēta, hexin…not even with energeia. Johann Albert Fabricius, ed., Sexti Empirici opera: graece et
latine (Leipzig: sumptu librariae Kuehnianae, 1840), 1:9, note r.
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This interpretation is confirmed by PH 1.240, where Sextus draws a parallel be-
tween the sceptic’s use of certain expressions “without holding opinions” (adoxas-
tōs) and the Methodics’ use of aperiergōs (translated by Annas and Barnes as “in
a straightforward way”).¹⁵ For Sextus, saying something adoxastōs means saying
something without attaching dogmatic certainty to it; one is not asserting something
with assent, but is merely stating what appears to him to be the case (cf., for exam-
ple, PH 1.15). Hence, in the case of the sceptical ability, we should not understand
Sextus as saying that the sceptic possesses something like a “faculty” which
would imply a knowledge of hidden things (for example, the nature of the soul, or
of the intellect); he is rather stating that we can observe that the sceptic is able to
set out oppositions, just because we saw that he has already done such things.
Finally, this meaning seems to be confirmed by the following sentences of PH 1.9,
where Sextus explains the meaning of the definition of the sceptical ability (“an abil-
ity to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way
at all”). Sextus notes that the final part of this definition, namely “in any way at all”
(kath’ oiondēpote tropon), “can be taken either with ‘an ability’ (to show that we are
to understand the word ‘ability’ in its straightforward sense, as we said), or else with
‘to set out oppositions etc…’.”¹⁶ I will say something later about that subtle strategy;
for now, it is sufficient to note that there is no accurate or defined realisation of the
sceptical capacity—there is no clear definition of what might be a right way or a
wrong way to oppose things. Thus, there is also no distinction between what could
be a real or an accidental capacity of doing so. This sceptical ability can be realised
“in any way at all,” and that means that we should consider this term in his loose
and non-technical sense, without narrowly defining what a capacity is. Once
again, the fact that one has provided oppositions of things in order to provoke ep-
ochē is the only criterion to decide that one has the capacity to do so.
This first use of dunamis shows two important aspects of the scepticism of Sex-
tus Empiricus:
1. The peculiar nature of scepticism as a philosophical stance. Scepticism is a phil-
osophical position, but this position is shaped against more or less all the clas-
sical definitions of the philosophy, or at least the theoretical aspects of philoso-
phy. By choosing the word dunamis to refer to the sceptical activity, Sextus
expresses this very special relationship with philosophy.
2. The concepts used by Sextus are neutral, and he refers to them in a deflationist
way. Here the point of interest is not that he uses concepts merely in order to be
understood (in a pragmatic way, which is also for Sextus one of the main rules of
the sceptical use of language), but that he uses concepts to denote something
 A̓δοξάστως is not in the manuscript but comes from the traditio latina; the insertion is justified by
the previous sentence, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστόν τε καὶ ἀδιάφορον τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κοι-
νὸν εἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν, and by the next sentence as well.
 τὸ δὲ ῾καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον᾽ δύναται προσαρμόζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἁπλῶς τὸ τῆς δυνά-
μεως ὄνομα, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῷ ῾ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων᾽.
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evident, facts or phainomena, without making dogmatic assertions about things
that are not evident.
As we have seen, this use of the word dunamis shows that the idea of a sceptical abil-
ity is shaped by a rejection of the dogmatic idea of a faculty that could possess some
potentialities. Contrary to the dogmatic conception of faculty, the sceptical dunamis
seems to be the result of a more economic method, based on fact, without any com-
mitment to the structure or the nature of the mind.
2 From implicit to virtual: dunamis and the
sceptical use of language
We can now switch to another use of dunamis by Sextus, which appears mainly in a
linguistic context, under the form dunamei + saying verbs (phēmi, kaleō, legō,
phaskō, apophainō).¹⁷ This use appears when Sextus aims to explain, clarify, or refor-
mulate an expression A by a new formulation B, claiming that “by Awe say dunamei
—i.e., implicitly or virtually—B.” Regarding this use, translators hesitated between
“implicitly” and “virtually,” and we should wonder if this hesitation points towards
a more complex interpretation of Sextus’s dunamis.¹⁸ As I said, the main occurrences
of this use of the word is in linguistic contexts with saying verbs. However, we will
see that it can be expanded to verbs expressing all kinds of reasoning.¹⁹ It concerns
either dogmatic statements or sceptical expressions.
2.1 To explain or refute a statement
2.1.1 The implicit-dunamis
The “implicit-dunamis” refers to cases where Sextus shows that an expression A can
be replaced by an expression B. This use is not necessarily negative or critical. In AM
11.8‒10, for instance, Sextus uses dunamei or kata dunamin also to express semantic
equivalences: in that case it is the contention that for the Stoics the definition is the
 There are 14 instances of this construction with saying verbs (of the 209 occurrences of dunamis in
Sextus).
 Annas and Barnes choose to render it systematically by “implicitly”; Pellegrin and Bury seem to
hesitate between both. See Pierre Pellegrin, trans., Sextus Empiricus. Esquisses pyrrhoniennes (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1997); R.G. Bury, trans., Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1933).
 Cf. all the instances where Sextus uses verbs like logizomai (PH 1.69), antilegō (PH 2.155, 193),
tithēmi (PH 1.195, AM 7.399, 8.40), etc.
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same thing as a universal proposition: there is a difference between both solely in the
syntax (psilēi tēi suntaxei), or in the words (tēi phōnēi).²⁰
This kind of usage does not entail the idea of any potentiality. A potential mean-
ing implies that a word can have an additional meaning beyond that which is being
used. However, Sextus is not arguing that the dogmatic expression in question can
have another meaning, nor even that it does have a plurality of meanings; he is mere-
ly saying that the new formulation is only a reformulation of a dogmatic thesis. This
move does not even necessarily entail a critical purpose, as it can be a simple refor-
mulation of a thesis, as for example in the case of Protagoras (PH 1.216), when Sextus
explains that saying that man is the measure of things is implicitly saying (that is, is
equivalent to saying) that man is a criterion of all things, which can be seen (falsely)
as a common feature with the sceptics.²¹
2.1.2 The virtual-dunamis
The second case, which I will call “virtual-dunamis,” is used to show the logical con-
sequence of a position. Sextus points out the virtual consequence of an assumption,
mainly in order to show a problem or a contradiction in the thesis discussed. In the
previous case, the dunamis was semantic, whereas in this case, it is a logical conse-
quence, or an argumentative consequence. There is no big difference between those
two cases, and we can say that the meaning of dunamis is the same in both, but that
Sextus uses the word in two different contexts.
The virtual-dunamis is linked to logical context: this use is a kind of tool which
allows to show the implication of a position, mainly in order to show a problem or a
contradiction in the thesis discussed. That is the case, for instance, concerning the
notion of place in AM 10.13 when Sextus shows that the person who says that a
part of place exists implicitly means (δυνάμει ὁ λέγων…τοῦτό φησιν) that the
place exists.²² In that case, the expression with dunamei is a polemical tool to display
the theoretical implications of formulations which could appear unproblematic. It is
mainly used in order to realise the sceptic economical strategy which does not aim to
expose detailed arguments or to be exhaustive in argumentation, but to settle for ar-
guments sufficient to provoke suspension of judgment, which is part of a strategy of
providing an outline. Thus, Sextus frequently shows that an argument or a definition
can be used to attain several aims, because it refutes dunamei a given argument. For
 See also AM 8.236, where kata men tēn dunamin is opposed to kata de tēn prophoran (“regarding
the explicit statement”).
 See also, again on Protagoras, AM 8.393.
 See also AM 2.81, where Sextus shows the circular definition of the telos of the rhetoric.
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instance, the arguments against the difference between conclusive and inconclusive
arguments “implicitly argued” against deficient arguments (PH 2.155).²³
In a similar fashion, Sextus reports the fact that, for Chrysippus, the dog “is vir-
tually reasoning” by using the “fifth unprovable.” Although in those passages Annas
and Barnes translate dunamis by “implicitly,” we can understand why certain trans-
lators choose “virtually.” Here, dunamis seems to be a little more complex than in
pure semantic cases because the problem is not only establishing a semantic equiv-
alence, but also determining if the positions taken involve certain consequences or
effects that are not clearly involved in the explicit position. In those cases, “virtual-
ity” is involved in so far as the subject is not really conscious that he is doing what he
is really doing or saying. That is clearly the case for Chrysippus’s dog—which is rea-
soning, even though it is not conscious that it is reasoning—or for Carneades, who is
using dunamei as a criterion because he is seeking happiness (AM 7.166).
Although both uses of the of dunamis (the linguistic “implicitly” and the logical
“virtually”) are very close, we still need to differentiate between them, because in
the virtual-dunamis Sextus seems to be aware that the expression A is not strictly
equivalent to B, but that the fact of claiming A has also the effect of claiming B.
In any case, neither of these uses implies the potentiality-dunamis, because the po-
tentiality-dunamis entails the fact that under certain conditions A can be B, whereas
in the implicit-dunamis or the virtual-dunamis, one who admits A necessarily admits
B.
2.2 In Sceptical Contexts
2.2.1 To Explain Sceptical Expressions
Most of the instances of dunamis appear in sceptical contexts, in which Sextus pres-
ents the meaning of the sceptical stance in PH 1, and especially in the part devoted to
the sceptical expressions (PH 1.188–thrice; 195, 199, 203, 208). In such a usage, Sex-
tus explains the meaning of a sceptical expression (phōnē) which is “elliptical” (el-
lipēs; 1.188), and therefore requires an explanation in order to ensure the reader’s
nuanced and non-dogmatic understanding. Since the sceptical use of language
has renounced to the myth of a perfect akribeia, namely to say things exactly as
they are, and promotes a pragmatic use of language where mutual comprehension
or understanding is the only rule, the sceptic can use expressions which can be
seen as incomplete and even ambiguous, provided that the reader understands his
 Also PH 2.112, 193; 3.37; AM 7.91, 399; AM 1.96. See also, in a sceptical context, PH 1.11, where Sex-
tus says that the concept of sceptical persuasion virtually defines “the Pyrrhonian philosopher.”
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intention. All the sceptical utterances can be seen as a form of katachrēsis, a loose
form of expression with an implicit content that can be elucidated.²⁴
In those cases, the formula dunamei + saying verbs is used to explicate what was
implicit in the expression. For example, in PH 1.188 Sextus affirms that “when we say
ou mallon (‘no more’), we implicitly say ‘no more this than that’.”²⁵ Regarding the ex-
pression ou mallon, one can perfectly see how incomplete it is, since it introduces a
comparison which is not explicit in the expression. In order to avoid a dogmatic in-
terpretation of ou mallonwhich could denote an absolute indetermination of things—
as is (maybe?) the case in Pyrrho’s thinking—Sextus’s explanation gives sense to the
expression in the context of isostheneia where two propositions or theses are op-
posed and have the same power of persuasion, which leads to epochē.²⁶
In the same fashion, Sextus presents sceptical assertions under the seal of rela-
tivisation or subjectivisation: if one can believe that the sceptic is making objective
assertions, we need to assume that he is saying implicitly “relatively to me,” as in PH
1.199 or PH 1.135.²⁷ Besides, one can wonder if all the sceptical discourse, not merely
the sceptical expressions, are to be interpreted as a katachrēsis, that is an approxi-
mation, carrying that kind of dunamis which is not systematically expressed for
the reason that, once again, the main aim of the sceptical discourse is not to be ac-
curate or precise but to be understood. Now, if Sextus had written his work trying to
express exactly all his positions without leaving any room for approximation, aside
from the fact that this project would have been impossible, it would have been un-
readable, or at least more difficult to read.We have an example of an effort to com-
pletely express the dunamis of the expression panti logōi logos isos antikeitai (“op-
posed to every account there is an equal account”) in PH 1.203, and it includes a
pretty weighty sentence: “to every account I have scrutinised which purports to es-
tablish something in dogmatic fashion, there appears to me to be opposed another
account, purporting to establish something in dogmatic fashion, equal to it in con-
vincingness or lack of convincingness.”²⁸ One can say that all the procedure of ren-
 See PH 1.135.
 ὅταν εἴπωμεν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον,’ δυνάμει φαμὲν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε’.
 In AM 1.315 Sextus mentions several senses (dunamis) of the ou mallon: “How will they [sc. the
sceptic] understand what force the phrase ‘no more’ has among sceptics, whether it is interrogative or
declaratory, and for what it is used, for the external object or the feeling we have?” (ἢ ποῦ συνήσουσι
τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει παρὰ σκεπτικοῖς ἡ ῾οὐδὲν μᾶλλον᾽ φωνή, πότερον πυσματική ἐστιν ἢ ἀξιωματική,
καὶ ἐπὶ τίνος τάσσεται, ἆρά γε τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου ἢ τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς πάθους;). English in D.L.
Blank, trans., Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 65.
 PH 1.199: “someone who says ‘every thing is undetermined’ also signifies according to us ‘rela-
tively to me’ or ‘as it appears to me’” (οὕτως ὁ λέγων ‘πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα’ συσσημαίνει ‘καθ’
ἡμᾶς’ ἢ ‘ὡς πρὸς ἐμὲ’ ἢ ‘ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται’); PH 1.135: “we use ‘is’ loosely, in the sense of ‘appears’,
implicitly saying ‘everything appears relative’” (τῷ ‘ἔστι’ καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘φαίνεται’, δυνάμει
τοῦτο λέγοντες ‘πρός τι πάντα φαίνεται’).
 δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι ῾παντὶ τῷ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ <ἐξητασμένῳ> λόγῳ, ὃς κατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτε-
ρος λόγος κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν, ἀντικεῖσθαι φαίνεταί
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dering the sceptical discourse explicit is in reality a process of relativisation: for the
expression panti logōi logos isos antikeitai, the relativisation consists of reminding
that:
1. This principle—which is the “chief constitutive of scepticism” (cf. PH 1.12)—
should not be interpreted as an assertion about all possible logoi—that would
be a dogmatic assertion comparable with the position of Protagoras—but as
an experimental principle grounded on the observation that for now the logoi ex-
amined are equal in convincingness.²⁹
2. Furthermore, this principle is not relevant for all logoi, but only for the dogmatic
logoi, and in this case the logos hos kataskeuazei ti dogmatikōs, that is the logos
which establishes something dogmatically. Hence, not all logoi are dogmatic, or
as Sextus says, “posit as real the things they hold beliefs about”; the sceptical
expression, and more generally the sceptical logos is just an avowal, or a subjec-
tive expression of what is apparent to the sceptic (cf. PH 1.15).
3. This opposition constitutes the third point of explicitation: the expression of the
equipollence of the logoi does not claim that in reality, or objectively, the logoi
are equal, but just that they seem or appear to be equal, which is sufficient
for the suspension of judgment.
4. Finally, to elucidate the expression, we must recall that the equality in question
has a scope; it is not an absolute equality, but an equality in persuasion, which is
necessary and sufficient to the suspension of assent, because the assent is given
relative to the convincingness of one’s logos or proposition.
Once again, let us turn now to the question of the potentiality-dunamis: are those
instances cases of potentiality? Admittedly, one could say that this use is very com-
mon and that we encounter instances of it in non-philosophical contexts which have
nothing to do with the Aristotelian conception of dunamis. But this answer would be
a lazy one; we can imagine that—even in non-philosophical contexts—one can use
both a sophisticated conception of dunamis and of the idea of potentiality. The essen-
tial argument is that, if any potentiality were involved, it would mean that a sceptical
expression would not necessarily have a sceptical meaning. However, that is not
what Sextus says. Rather, he claims that those expressions have a constant meaning
for a sceptic, even if it is possible that those expressions have several sceptical mean-
ings. It seems, then, that in this case the dunamis has nothing to do with potentiality,
μοι᾽, ὡς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ λόγου προφορὰν οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπείου πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὅ ἐστι
φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.
 Following the reading of Annas and Barnes, who print ἐξητασμένῳ instead of the ζητουμένῳ in
Mutschmann and Mau’s 1958 Teubner edition.
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and is rather to be connected to the previous linguistic meaning of dunamis as “a
meaning” of word, that is the “implicit-dunamis.”³⁰
Thus, this usage of dunamis remains neutral, and does not carry anything like a
potentiality. It is just a way to express two facts: the fact that the expression or the
sentence does not express explicitly or verbatim something which it implicitly con-
tains, and the fact that the implicit formulation is equivalent to the explicit one.
However, it retains two problematic elements.
2.2.2 Two Apparently Problematic Instances
2.2.2.1 PH 1.22
We say, then, that the standard of the Sceptical persuasion (tēs skeptikēs agōgēs) is what is ap-
parent (to phainomenon), implicitly (dunamei) meaning by this the appearances; because, since
the phantasia depends on passive and unwilled feelings, it is not an object of investigation.³¹
Annas and Barnes’s translation, quoted here (slightly modified), has “implicitly.”
Pellegrin’s French translation reads “virtuellement,” and Rachel Barney in her
paper on Sextean appearances likewise translates “virtually.”³²
Formally speaking, the expression is the same as in the previous instances. How-
ever, its meaning is not exactly the same: Sextus does not say that to phainomenon is
an elliptical expression whose complete meaning should be tēn phantasian; neither
does he explain (like in the dogmatic contexts above) a theoretical implication of
phainomenon. If we want to connect it to some of the previous instances, it is nearer
to the passage where Sextus uses dunamis to provide a reformulation semantically
equivalent to the expression, without any polemic intention.
Yet it seems to me that this use is quite different: Sextus offers a reformulation of
a crucial term in the sceptical vocabulary, using a term that is very common in dog-
matic philosophy: phantasia. Thus, to explain the sceptical concept of phainomenon,
he translates it using a dogmatic term. For that reason, he has to clarify his own po-
sition by specifying what he has in mind with this comparison. Hence, we should un-
derstand the end of the sentence ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός
ἐστιν, as a reformulation: “because, since the phantasia depends on passive and un-
willed feelings, it is not an object of investigation.”
 See LSJ, s.v. δύναμις (III): “force or meaning of a word”; or Diccionario Griego-Español (http://dge.
cchs.csic.es/xdge/), s.v. δύναμις (III): “c. sent. de valor y equivalencia. 1. ref. conceptos y palabras:
valor, significado, sentido; τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν tener el valor de, equivaler, significar Th. 5.20.”
 κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμὲν εἶναι τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴν φαντασίαν οὕτω
καλοῦντες· ἐν πείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν.
 Cf. Rachel Barney, “Appearances and Impressions,” Phronesis 37, no. 3 (January 1992): 301n25,
303. See also Bury’s translation: “giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation.”
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What about dunamei in this case? Sextus does not say that the word phainome-
non can have this meaning under certain conditions. Rather, he claims that phaino-
menon does contain the sense of phantasia, if we agree to conceive the phantasia as a
pure passive process. For Barney, this dunamei means “virtually”: that phainomenon
would not be identical to phantasia, but would signify a restriction “to the assent-
compelling content of phantasia.” Thus, Barney believes that dunamei implies in
this context that not every phantasia is identical to phainomenon, but only some
kind of phantasia. By contrast, I think that dunamei here is the expression of the
fact that for Sextus we can establish a relation between the sceptic phainomenon
and the dogmatic phantasia, yet with the proviso that we should understand the
phantasia without embedding any kind of activity.
Thus, despite the apparent peculiarity of this instance, PH 1.22 is a case of “im-
plicit-dunamis.”
2.2.2.2 PH 1.195
Let us turn to PH 1.195:
Now it is, I think, clear that these phrases (sc. “perhaps,” “maybe,” and “possibly”) are indica-
tive of non-assertion (aphasias). For instance, someone who says “perhaps it is” implicitly (du-
namei) posits what is thought to conflict with it, namely “perhaps it is not,” insofar as he does
not make an affirmation about its being so.³³
Annas and Barnes, in their choice of one single translation of dunamei, use “implic-
itly.” It is true that Sextus explained at the beginning of the chapter that “we take
‘perhaps’ and ‘perhaps not’ in the sense of ‘perhaps it is and perhaps it is not’”
(PH 1.194), in order to indicate the state of non-assertion (aphasia) of the sceptic.
But, at present, it seems that we are not facing a simple case of semantic equiva-
lence. As a matter of fact, if this instance of dunamis meant “implicitly,” it would sig-
nify that the meaning of “perhaps” for a sceptic is equivalent to “perhaps not.” Yet,
this is in no way what Sextus is saying. Rather, his purpose is to explain that by say-
ing “perhaps” he is also saying at the same time “perhaps not,” in the very fact that
by writing “perhaps” he is not making any dogmatic claim about the nature of real-
ity. Thus, in this case to posit dunamei B is to posit B at the same time as saying A.
The last sentence cannot replace the former sentence: to properly understand Sextus,
we have to understand at the same time A and B, since the sceptic neither posits nor
rejects any dogmatic thesis (cf. PH 1.193). This seems to be a case of virtuality, in a
certain manner similar to the logical implication. But once again, the difference be-
tween those two uses of dunamei, “virtually” and “implicitly,” is thin, and we must
 ὅτι μέντοι αὗται αἱ φωναὶ ἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικαί, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ γοῦν λέγων ‘τάχα ἔστιν’
δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι δοκοῦν αὐτῷ, τὸ ‘τάχα μὴ εἶναι’, τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τοῦ
εἶναι αὐτό.
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acknowledge that it does not entail the idea of potentiality, because the potentiality
entails the idea of a power which can be inefficient at least at a given time.
3 Toward a Sceptical-Potentiality?
3.1 The potentiality of the sceptical expressions
So far, it seems that dunamis is never used by Sextus in order to express some scep-
tical potentiality. Yet, my contention is that in the idea of potentiality within the no-
tion of δύναμις there is something that can be worthwhile for a sceptical approach.
To introduce this use, we can return for a while to PH 1.9, where Sextus explains
that the expression “in any way at all” (kath’ oiondēpote tropon) “can be taken” (du-
natai prosarmozesthai) either with one word or with another. Sextus points out that
such an expression has the potential to be interpreted or understood under both con-
structions,without mentioning which one is wrong or true; they are both true, or bet-
ter, both are efficient depending on the argumentative situation.
Admittedly, here Sextus does not use dunamis or dunamei but the verb dunatai
(to be able). Nevertheless, this meaning of dunamis is precisely connected to the
verb, in order to express the idea of possibility or potentiality carried by such a
verb. Thus, in that case, we are faced with a potentiality-dunamis. Sextus contends
that both constructions are possible but not necessary: “in any way at all” (kath’
oiondēpote tropon) can be constructed either with “an ability” (tēi dunamei), or
with “to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of” (τῷ ῾ἀν-
τιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων᾽). There is no primacy of one construction
over the other; both are right. Moreover, proposing one construction does not prevent
him from proposing the other construction. Thanks to the potentiality-dunamis, the
sceptic has a very efficient and economical tool that allows him to state phrases
with a plurality of effects, granting that a given interpretation of a phrase does not
necessarily exclude another interpretation. Thus, a phrase or an object Awhich is po-
tentially B can be both A and B at the same time, or can have only the effect of A or B
under certain conditions.
This sense of dunamis appears at the key passage PH 1.15:
But then, if someone who holds beliefs posits what he believes as being the case,while the Scep-
tic utters his own expressions in such a way that potentially (dunamei) they are bracketed by
themselves, then he cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them.³⁴
 πλὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ ὁ δογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸς τὰς φωνὰς
αὑτοῦ προφέρεται ὡς δυνάμει ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν περιγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν
λεχθείη. English translation in Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic and History of the
Self-Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), T98 (p. 271).
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I have deliberately switched to Luca Castagnoli’s translation because Annas and
Barnes rendered the term once again with “implicitly.” But, Castagnoli’s subtle inter-
pretation shows that here dunamei has a different sense from the other passages. By
dunamei Sextus is not saying that the sceptical expressions are always self-referential
(that would be the case if dunamis meant “implicitly” or “virtually”), but that they
can be self-referential, if they are interpreted dogmatically, that is as “absolutely
true.”³⁵ This interpretation is central to Castagnoli’s position, since his aim is to
show that Sextus does not promote the virtue of self-reversal or self-consumption
of the sceptical arguments; so the so-called self-reversal function of the sceptical ar-
guments is only a potentiality of the sceptical expressions, when they are interpreted
in a dogmatic way. It is thus a potentiality of those expressions, but not a stable vir-
tue, a quality, or a capacity of those expressions.
Besides, Castagnoli emphasises that there are, in the same context, two uses of
dunamai in PH 2.188 and AM 8.480 that share the same idea of potentiality regarding
the idea that some logoi can cancel themselves in certain conditions.³⁶ In both cases,
as Castagnoli rightly emphasises,³⁷ Sextus uses the verb dunamai to express a poten-
tiality or a possibility, whereas he does not use it concerning the simile of the fire or
the purgative drugs: the fact that they operate against themselves is not a mere pos-
sibility, but a stable or constant capacity. This is also the case in PH 1.206, where Sex-
tus says that sceptical expressions can be cancelled by themselves (ὅπου γε καὶ ὑφ’
ἑαυτῶν αὐτὰς ἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγομεν δύνασθαι).
Even if one does not agree with Castagnoli’s powerful and sophisticated inter-
pretation, we can notice that this interpretation of the sense of dunamei is also
shared by McPherran—with a totally different aim—but with the same idea that
here dunamei has a peculiar meaning.³⁸ This meaning cannot be reduced to the im-
plicit-dunamis or the virtual-dunamis because the self-cancellation of the sceptical
utterance is linked to the interpretation of this utterance. If someone takes a sceptical
 Castagnoli, 274.
 AM 8.480 explains how the argument against demonstration can cancel itself: “so too the argu-
ment against demonstration, after doing away with all demonstration, can cancel itself as well”
(οὕτω δύναται καὶ ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀπόδειξιν λόγος μετὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συμπερι-
γράφειν); PH 2.188 gives the same idea: “Arguments, like purgative drugs which evacuate themselves
along with the matters present in the body, can actually cancel themselves along with the other argu-
ments which are said to be probative” (δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς
ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἑαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτι-
κοῖς εἶναι λεγομένοις καὶ ἑαυτοὺς συμπεριγράφειν).
 Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation, 291n129.
 Mark L. McPherran, “Skeptical Homeopathy and Self-Refutation,” Phronesis 32, no. 3 (1987):
295n14: “By hōs dunamei Sextus simply means that—unlike the Dogmatist—he utters his maxim in
full awareness and acceptance of the fact that if his claims should happen to represent true propo-
sitions they would be capable of entailing their own falsehood.” Pierre Pellegrin translates in the
same fashion by “elles portent en elles-mêmes en puissance leur propre limitation.”
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utterance as it should be, that is as a subjective avowal, there is no need of a self-
cancellation for the very reason that such an avowal does not entail any belief.
These interpretations reveal the sense in which a dunamis-potentiality can be
worthwhile to the sceptical stance. Scepticism is not a philosophical system—even
if it can appear as somewhat systematic; it has no dogmatic principle, nor any
fixed criterion to determine what is true or false. Moreover, scepticism is shaped
against all kinds of dogmatism, not only the kind of dogmatism that prevailed in Sex-
tus’s time. Thus, this kind of dunamis-potentiality seems to be an interesting adapt-
able tool, a means to show what an argument or an interpretation can do without
asserting that it always has such a power.
3.2 The dunamis of the logos
So far, it might seem that this sense of dunamis remains scarce and exotic. However,
my purpose is now to show that one can connect this sense with another use of du-
namis, which shares the same sense and the same link with dunamis and the verb
dunamai in order to express the polymorphic power of the sceptical argumentation.
This use can be seen in the well-known text of PH 3.280‒81, which is a crucial
text since it describes precisely the sceptical use of the logos:
Sceptics are philanthropic and wish to cure by argument, as far as they can (kata dunamin), the
conceit and rashness of the Dogmatists. Just as doctors for bodily afflictions have remedies
which differ in potency, and apply severe remedies to patients who are severely afflicted and
milder remedies to those mildly afflicted, so Sceptics propound arguments which differ in
strength (kata ischun logous). They employ weighty arguments, capable of vigorously rebutting
(kai eutonōs anaskeuazein dunamenois) the dogmatic affliction of conceit, against those who are
distressed by a severe rashness, and they employ milder arguments against those who are af-
flicted by a conceit which is superficial and easily cured and which can be rebutted by a milder
degree of plausibility. This is why those with a Sceptical impulse do not hesitate sometimes to
propound arguments which are sometimes weighty in their plausibility, and sometimes appa-
rently rather weak. They do this deliberately, since often a weaker argument is sufficient for
them to achieve their purpose.³⁹
 Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλάνθρωπος εἶναι τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προπέτειαν κατὰ δύνα-
μιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖν οἱ τῶν σωματικῶν παθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι
βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν σφοδρῶς πεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι, τοῖς δὲ κούφως τὰ κου-
φότερα, καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς οὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰ ἰσχὺν λόγους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐμβριθέσι καὶ
εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆς οἰήσεως τῶν δογματικῶν πάθος ἐπὶ τῶν σφοδρᾷ τῇ προπε-
τείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖς δὲ κουφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆς οἰή-
σεως πάθος καὶ ὑπὸ κουφοτέρων πιθανοτήτων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς
ταῖς πιθανότησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀμαυροτέρους φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συνερωτᾶν ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέ-
ψεως ὁρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον.
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The crucial expression here is kata dunamin, translated by Annas and Barnes as “as
far as they can.” This translation understands this expression as a caveat, a manner
to express a “cautious attitude towards his therapeutic arguments”.⁴⁰ My contention
is that another understanding of this expression is possible, where dunamis is linked
with the sceptic potentiality.⁴¹
To tell the truth, this expression is rather complex. At first sight, it seems obvious
to me that it establishes a relation between the dunamis and the idea of the power of
argumentation, in the same way than Sextus, in this text, speaks of “remedies which
differ in potency” (kata megethos echousi boēthēmata) or arguments “which differ in
strength” (kata ischun logous). We may find this meaning of dunamis in Sextus’s
works, in particular passages about power of argumentation as in PH 1.35 and 39.
This interpretation prevails in Pellegrin’s translation “le sceptique… veut guérir par
la puissance de l’argumentation.”⁴² On such interpretation, the meaning of the pas-
sage is that the sceptic wishes to cure by argument according to its power. Such an
interpretation assumes that λογοῦ (“of the argument”) is implied with κατὰ δύναμιν,
in order to express a measure of the power of the argument, which is certainly one of
the purposes of this passage. If so, it should be a quite different use from what we
call the potentiality-dunamis.
Let us dig deeper into the power in question. One can wonder from which point
of view this power is determined: is Sextus thinking about an objective measure of
the argument, namely the fact that an argument is sound or unsound, valid or inva-
lid? If that is the case, it means that Sextus does accept the fact that certain argu-
ments are objectively good and others bad, which seems incompatible with the scep-
tical stance. For that reason, it seems preferable to consider that here Sextus is not
speaking about the logical validity of the argument he uses in order to produce equi-
pollence, but rather about the psychological effect an argument can have on the dog-
matist to whom he is speaking.⁴³ This interpretation is confirmed by the very fact that
 Diego E. Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” Méthexis 22 (2009):
107.
 Indeed, this expression is an old one: it can be tracked back to Hesiod (Works and Days 336) with
this sense; for the history of this expression, see Lefebvre, Dynamis, 37‒176. However, the other in-
stances of the expression in Sextus (AM 10.340 and 342) do not have this sense, and are opposed
to kat’ entelecheian in an Aristotelian fashion. Obviously, this is not an impediment that the expres-
sion has in PH 3.280 the sense “as far as he can,” it just underlines that, if it does, it should be a
hapax. There is also another instance in AM 11.10, cf. above, sec. 2.1.1.
 See the similar construction in Rafael Sartorio Maulini: “el escéptico, porque es filántropo, desea
curar por medio del discurso la arrogancia y precipitación de los dogmáticos con arreglo a su inten-
sidad.” Rafael Sartorio Maulini, trans., Sexto Empírico: Hipotiposis Pirrónicas (Madrid: Akal, 1996).
 For this position, see the central paper of Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness.” See also
Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” in Strategies of
Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, and Logic, ed. Mi-Kyoung Lee (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2014), 356‒73; Diego E. Machuca, “Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipol-
lence,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99, no. 2 (June 2017): 212‒28.
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Sextus is primarily interested by the definition of the power of an argument in terms
of plausibility (pithanotēs), since the equipollence or istostheneia is expressed in
terms of “equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing” (PH 1.10).⁴⁴ It
seems, then, that an argument does not have any objective and stable power, but
a variety of powers.
If I return to my distinction, I should say that these powers are not implicit (they
are not the same power), nor are they virtual (they cannot be effective at the same
time); they are potentialities which depend greatly on the context of the argumenta-
tion and the beliefs of the person to whom such argument is given. Thus, it seems
that the fact that a weighty argument can vigorously rebut (eutonēs anaskeuazein du-
namenois) the dogmatic affliction of conceit can be understood as a potentiality of
this argument. And the kata dunamin can express the fact that the sceptic use of
logos is an attempt to use the argument according to those potentialities.
Perhaps this interpretation is grounded in a fundamental equivocality of the
word dunamis and its cognates. It is true that we can also find in Sextus instances
of dunamis which express the objective power of something, like the power of the
syllogism (PH 2.235; see also 2.143, concerning the power of the assumptions), of
nourishment (1.53; also 1.131), the power of changing external objects (1.103), the me-
dicinal powers (1.133), and so on.⁴⁵ But it seems that in those cases, Sextus is refer-
ring to dogmatic theory, and often to a medical theory of power. However, when he
speaks about the dunamis of the sceptical arguments,we are dealing with—according
to my interpretation—a different appreciation of power, where potentiality is in-
volved.
To conclude, I would like to consider briefly two passages where Sextus speaks
about the dunamis of the sceptical arguments, and more precisely of the ten modes of
Aenesidemus.While introducing them, he expresses doubts about their number (peri
tou plēthous) and power (peri tou dunameōs): “they may be unsound (sathrous), and
there may be more than those I shall describe” (PH 1.35). Admittedly, the word sa-
thros seems to refer to a kind of objective appreciation of the validity of the argu-
ment. Yet, the exposition of the tropes does not actually contain any objective eval-
uation of this kind. Rather, Sextus introduces the whole exposition of the ten tropes
as a description of their dunamis (peri de tēs dunameōs tade). By the way, Sextus is
often ambiguous regarding the position of Aenesidemus from whom he borrows
many arguments, underlining that they should be abbreviated or completed and
criticising his Heraclitean affiliation.⁴⁶ As far as the dunamis of the tropes is con-
cerned, one can consider that he is offering an overview of the potentiality of this
 ῾ἰσοσθένειαν᾽ δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡς μηδένα μηδενὸς προκεῖσθαι
τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον.
 See also PH 3.15, 60.
 Carlos Lévy, “Pyrrhon, Énésidème et Sextus Empiricus: La question de la légitimation historique
dans le scepticisme,” in Antichi et Moderni Nella Filosofia Di Età Imperiale, ed. A. Brancacci (Naples:
Bibliopolis, 2001), 299‒329.
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stock of arguments, without considering that they are always sufficient. Once again,
the power of an argument is relative to a context or a situation of argumentation; it is
a potentiality that might lead to equipollence rather than an effective way to certainly
produce it.
Conclusion
Two remarks to conclude.
1. Firstly, this study of Sextus’s dunamis points out that there is no sceptical theory
of dunamis, but a plurality of usages which are connected to the common (phil-
osophical) use of this polysemic term. This fact is coherent with Sextus’s own
theory of the norms of language, since in Against the Grammarians he underlines
the fact that a sceptic should follow the usage of the people he is talking to;
then, in philosophy he follows the “usage of the philosophers, and in medicine
the medical usage” (AM 1.233‒34). Even if it could be deceptive, there is nothing
like a sceptical theory of dunamis.
2. However, in his use of the term, some interesting features have emerged. To sum
up, I should say that we are facing three sceptical functions of the dunamis, even
if they are not consciously connected by Sextus.
a. To denote the sceptical activity, that is the ability to set out oppositions (the
capacity-dunamis).
b. To express an equivalence of a term. This is what I called the “implicit-duna-
mis” in the linguistic field, in order to express a semantic clarification of an
expression—where the term A has to be substituted by B, every time and
under no condition: B is the real or true sense of A. And it is the same mean-
ing which prevails in the logical field to express a logical consequence of a
proposition (the virtual-dunamis)—where the proposition A entails a propo-
sition B as an implication. In this relationship, both A and B are effective at
the same time, even though only A is uttered.
c. In the meta-argumentative field: to express the potentialities of an argument
(the potentiality-dunamis) where B is a possibility or a potentiality of A. In
this relationship, an argument A has a wide-range of potentialities depend-
ing on the situation of enunciation or the beliefs of the interlocutors.
These functions show that even in a sceptical or empiricist context, one can talk and
make reference to “events” or “effects” (to tell the truth, I am not really sure that
there is a word which can express the object of that reference without providing
the false impression that the sceptical have a belief on the nature of that object)
that are not currently in action.
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Diego E. Machuca
Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic
Value?
1 Introduction
My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian scepticism, as this stance
is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works, has practical or epistemic value.
More precisely, I would like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judg-
ment (epochē) and undisturbedness (ataraxia) can be deemed to be of practical or
epistemic value. By “practical” value I mean both moral value and prudential
value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value to per-
sonal or social well-being. Hence, when I ask whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension
and undisturbedness have practical value, I mean whether they make us behave
in a manner that is morally right or wrong, and whether they allow us to attain
those goals that would make it possible to live well. As for “epistemic” value, it ba-
sically refers to the values of attaining truth and avoiding error. Hence, when I ask
whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension has epistemic value, I mean whether it allows
us to attain truth and avoid error. My main focus will be the practical value of
both suspension and undisturbedness, because this is the value that scholars of an-
cient philosophy critical of Pyrrhonism have emphasised. The reason for examining
the epistemic value of suspension is that doing so will enable a fuller assessment of
the significance of Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy, which is my primary concern.
I will begin by briefly describing the states of suspension and undisturbedness
and their connection, and by succinctly considering some objections to the effect
that, despite claiming to suspend judgment across the board, Pyrrhonists actually
hold a number of beliefs. This will provide the necessary framework for the subse-
quent discussions. I will then critically engage with interpreters who have called
into question the practical value of undisturbedness and suspension. Next, I will ex-
amine what the epistemic value of suspension might be. I will end by considering
whether, from a contemporary vantage point, one must conclude that Pyrrhonism
has no practical or epistemic value, and hence that it is of no philosophical interest.¹
This paper is a substantially revised and expanded version of an article originally published in Dutch
as “De praktische en epistemische waarde van het pyrronisme,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift
voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2016): 73‒98. For their comments, I would like to reiterate my thanks to
the anonymous reviewer for that journal and to Jan Willem Wieland, and to express my gratitude
to the anonymous reviewer for the present volume.
 Sextus employs “sceptic” and “Pyrrhonist” (and their respective cognates) interchangeably. I will
do the same. I will also follow him in using the term “dogmatist” to refer to anyone who makes as-
OpenAccess. © 2019 Diego E. Machuca, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-004
2 Suspension and Undisturbedness
When someone with even a slight familiarity with ancient Pyrrhonism thinks of it,
two notions invariably come to mind, namely, epochē and ataraxia. This is perfectly
reasonable. Consider, for instance, the definition of scepticism that Sextus offers at
the beginning of his best-known work, the Pyrrhonian Outlines:
The sceptical [way] is an ability to set up oppositions among things that appear and things that
are thought in any way whatsoever, an ability from which we come, through the equipollence in
the opposed objects and arguments, first to suspension of judgment and after that to undisturb-
edness (PH 1.8).²
At PH 1.10, Sextus defines equipollence or equal force (isostheneia) as “equality in
respect of credibility and lack of credibility, so that none of the conflicting arguments
takes precedence over any other as more credible” (cf. PH 1.190, 196, 202); suspen-
sion as “a standstill of the intellect owing to which we neither deny nor affirm any-
thing” (cf. PH 1.192, 196); and undisturbedness as “lack of perturbation and calmness
of soul.” Undisturbedness is not only the mental state at which the Pyrrhonist has
arrived after suspending judgment, but the goal that prompted the Pyrrhonist-to-
be to engage in philosophical inquiry in the first place. Indeed, Sextus tells us
that the hope of becoming undisturbed is the “causal principle” (i.e., the initial mo-
tivation) of the sceptical philosophy (PH 1.12), and that so far the Pyrrhonist’s aim is
both undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection (metriopa-
theia) in those things that are unavoidable (PH 1.25, 30; cf. PH 1.18, 215; 3.235). Ac-
cording to Sextus’s description of the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical itinerary (PH 1.12,
26, 29; cf. AM 1.6), the Pyrrhonist-to-be was disturbed by the variation (anōmalia)
he found in both perceptual and intellectual appearances and was in a state of apo-
ria as to which of them he should assent to. For instance, the same object appeared
to him to have conflicting perceptual properties depending on different spatial and
quantitative variables, or the same moral view appeared to him to be both convincing
and unconvincing depending on the vantage point from which it was considered. To
remove that state of disturbance, the Pyrrhonist undertook philosophical investiga-
tion in order to determine which appearances are true and which are false. However,
he was unable to do this owing to the seeming equipollence of the conflicting ap-
pearances, and so he suspended judgment. To his surprise, by suspending judgment
he attained the state of undisturbedness that he was seeking all along—there being
thus a contrast between the way undisturbedness was initially expected to be at-
sertions about how things really are on the basis of what they regard as objective evidence and sound
arguments.
 References to Sextus’s works are supplied in parenthesis in the body of the text, using the follow-
ing abbreviations: PH (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes), AM (Adversus Mathematicos), and AD (Adversus Dog-
maticos = AM 7‒11). All translations are my own.
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tained and the way it was in fact finally attained. Sextus emphasises that undisturb-
edness has closely followed suspension of judgment by chance (PH 1.26, 29) and as a
shadow follows a body (PH 1.29).
Sextus does not limit himself to reporting that undisturbedness has in fact fol-
lowed suspension. In the first and third books of PH, and above all in Against the
Ethicists (AD 5 = AM 11), he also explains why holding beliefs about how things really
are prevents one from becoming undisturbed, offering at the same time an account of
how suspension leads to undisturbedness, and also to happiness. His explanation
focuses exclusively on evaluative beliefs: the presence of the things one believes
to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces perturbation. For when a
person lacks what he regards as good, on the one hand he intensely desires to obtain
it and, on the other, he thinks he is persecuted by things naturally bad and restlessly
tries to escape them. If he acquires what he considers to be good, he is nonetheless
troubled both because he is irrationally and immoderately elated and because he is
afraid of losing it (PH 1.27, 3.237, 277; AD 5.116‒17, 146). For this reason, even when he
is not directly disturbed by the presence of those things he deems to be bad, he con-
tinues to be troubled by his constantly guarding against them (AD 5.117, 129). In ad-
dition, those who believe that things are by nature good or bad are unhappy or can
never attain happiness (AD 5.111, 113, 118, 130, 144) inasmuch as “all unhappiness oc-
curs because of some disturbance” (AD 5.112; cf. 141). Unlike the belief that things are
by nature good or bad, suspension of judgment on the matter makes it possible to
attain undisturbedness and happiness, and hence to lead a satisfactory life (PH
1.28; AD 5.111, 144, 160, 168; see also PH 3.235; AD 5.147, 150), for those who suspend
judgment “neither avoid nor pursue anything intensely” (PH 1.28). It should be noted
that Sextus remarks that undisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgment
about all things (PH 1.31, 205; AD 5.144; cf. AD 5.160, 168), which means that the at-
tainment of undisturbedness has so far occurred only when the sceptic has suspend-
ed judgment about all the matters he has investigated—both those that concern val-
ues and those that do not. The sceptic cannot of course rule out the possibility that
others will attain undisturbedness by suspending judgment only about some beliefs,
but given his past experience, it appears to him that undisturbedness will be attained
only when complete suspension is adopted.³
Despite what Sextus says in some of the passages just referred to, the Pyrrhonist
is not free from all disturbance and hence cannot attain complete happiness, since
not all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit of the things considered as good and
the intense avoidance of the things considered as bad. For the Pyrrhonist is disturbed
by certain things that impose themselves upon him, such as thirst and hunger (PH
 I have elsewhere argued that, in Sextus’s account of Pyrrhonism, one can identify three distinct
causes of disturbance concerning matters of opinion and that the holding of evaluative beliefs is
the ultimate source of doxastic disturbance by reference to which the other two can be explained.
See Diego Machuca, “Sources of Doxastic Disturbance in Sextus Empiricus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 56 (2019).
Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 45
1.29; AD 5.143, 148‒50, 156‒58; cf. PH 1.13, 24). Yet he is better off with regard to these
unpleasant affections (pathē) than the dogmatist, since he does not experience the
additional disturbance induced by the belief that such affections are by nature
bad; it is precisely the absence of that belief that renders them moderate and
more easily borne (PH 1.30, 3.235‒36; AD 5.118, 150‒55, 161; see also AD 5.128‒29,
145, 156‒60). The existence of those involuntary affections is the reason why Sextus
says that moderation of affection in things unavoidable is, along with undisturbed-
ness in matters of opinion, the sceptical aim.
It might be objected that, despite claiming to suspend judgment across the
board, Sextus holds a number of beliefs about the nature of certain mental states
as well as about the means for, and the hindrance to, the attainment of suspension
and undisturbedness. First, undisturbedness is presented as the core component of
human happiness and is hence deemed to be good or worthy of pursuit. Second, the
state of disturbance, caused by the holding of beliefs, is considered as something
bad or to be avoided. Third, there exists a causal link between undisturbedness
and suspension, which makes the latter a desirable state. Fourth, the Pyrrhonist be-
lieves that the opposing arguments he uses are, because of their objective equipol-
lence, an effective means to induce suspension.
For reasons of space, I will limit myself to making a few remarks in response to
that general objection. First, the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment or makes no determi-
nations about the intrinsic value of anything (PH 1.28, 163; 3.178, 182, 235), and hence
he does not believe that undisturbedness is objectively good or worthy of pursuit,
and that disturbance is objectively bad or to be avoided. Rather, these two states ap-
pear to him to be, respectively, good and bad for himself and others, and hence when
talking about them he is merely reporting on how things have so far appeared to him.
At one point, Sextus explicitly observes that, whenever the Pyrrhonist says that some
things are good and others bad, he is simply reporting on how they appear to him
(AD 5.19‒20).
Secondly, by saying that undisturbedness followed suspension by chance, Sex-
tus intends to express his characteristic caution, which prevents him from asserting
that things are by nature such that undisturbedness can only be reached by suspend-
ing judgment. Of course, he does not deny a necessary connection between them ei-
ther. He is simply restricting himself to describing what has hitherto occurred to him
and others, without making any assertions about the causal connection between
those states. By likening the connection between suspension and undisturbedness
to that of a body and its shadow, he is not being inconsistent. For one must not
put the emphasis on the fact that a shadow always and necessarily follows a body
when the body blocks light, but on the fact that in this situation there is a close con-
nection between them. Sextus’s intention is only to emphasise that up until now the
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sceptic’s suspension has been closely accompanied by the state of undisturbedness.⁴
Although the sceptic does not assert that suspension causes undisturbedness, given
his past experience he has the expectation that undisturbedness will continue to fol-
low upon his suspension of judgment about everything. And if undisturbedness re-
mains an aim he hopes to achieve, this will be a motivation for suspending judg-
ment. The same considerations apply to the connection between the holding of
beliefs and the state of disturbance: the sceptic only reports on his own experience.
Thirdly, Sextus does not believe that the arguments he has so far examined are
objectively equipollent or equally credible, but only reports that they appear so to
him (PH 1.196, 203). He employs certain types of arguments not because he can as-
sure us that there is a necessary connection between them and suspension, but sim-
ply because those arguments have thus far been successful in inducing this state in
himself and others. But this would be only a part of his response, given that, at PH
3.280‒81, he tells us that the Pyrrhonist employs any therapeutic argument that
makes it possible to induce suspension in his dogmatic patients.⁵ This shows that
the Pyrrhonist does not restrict himself to utilising the arguments that have induced
suspension in himself and his past patients, but may also use other arguments that
have not proven similarly successful. Or—to put it another way—it shows that the ar-
guments that have induced suspension in the Pyrrhonist and his past patients may
not achieve the same results with future patients.
A final and related point concerns the following question: when the Pyrrhonist
suspends judgment in the face of disagreements between equipollent positions, is
the connection between equipollence and suspension to be interpreted as a require-
ment of rationality or as a merely psychological constraint? Some scholars have de-
fended a rationalist interpretation according to which by suspending judgment the
Pyrrhonist is abiding by the following principle or norm of rationality: one is ration-
ally required to suspend judgment about p in the face of a disagreement between
views on p that strike one as equipollent. Others have defended the psychological
interpretation according to which suspension is the involuntary psychological effect
of being confronted with rival views that appear to one to be equipollent. Given that
the Pyrrhonist is a thinking being (PH 1.24) who is hardwired to respond in specific
ways, he is affected by the consideration of arguments pro and con p and automati-
cally reacts in a given way, even though he refrains from making assertions about
both whether those arguments are sound and whether they are objectively equipol-
lent. I will not enter here into the debate between the two interpretations, limiting
 See Diego Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006):
116.
 On the Pyrrhonist’s argumentative therapy, see Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and
φιλανθρωπία,” 129‒34; Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” Méthexis
22 (2009): 102, 112; Machuca, “Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry,” Apeiron
52 (2019): 199‒221.
Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 47
myself to saying that I side with the psychological interpretation.⁶ As we will see in
Section 4, the assessment of the epistemic value of suspension seems to partially de-
pend on which interpretation is correct.
3 The Practical Value of Suspension and
Undisturbedness
Whereas Sextus’s explanation of how holding value beliefs produces disturbance
may to a certain extent sound plausible from a contemporary vantage point, the ref-
erences to undisturbedness and happiness sound alien to those who are today in the
business of philosophy. The reason is that, in general, philosophy does not have
much to do with our well-being anymore. Moreover, the claim that undisturbedness
follows upon suspension may sound strange because we do not believe that we
could ever get rid of much of what disturbs us in our lives by suspending judgment
across the board. These and similar reasons no doubt explain why systematic discus-
sions of Pyrrhonian scepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy have entirely ig-
nored what Sextus says about undisturbedness, focusing for the most part on the
epistemological implications of the so-called “Five Modes of Agrippa” and, to a less-
er degree, on whether it is possible to eschew all beliefs and to act accordingly. It is
nonetheless worthwhile to examine what practical value there may be in Pyrrhonian
suspension and undisturbedness, because some scholars of ancient philosophy have
called into question both their prudential and their moral value. I will review their
criticisms and attempt to address them—at least in part.
One of the strongest and most common charges levelled in antiquity against both
Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism is the inactivity (apraxia) objection, of which
there were various versions. According to that objection, the denial of all knowledge
and the suspension of all judgment should be rejected because they make it impos-
sible either to perform any action at all, or to act in certain ways (morally, sensibly, or
rationally).⁷ Similar pragmatic responses to scepticism are found among interpreters
of Pyrrhonism, some of whom have contested the prudential value of both suspen-
sion of judgment and undisturbedness.⁸ For instance, it has been argued that most
 See Diego Machuca, “Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction,” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient,
Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), sec. 5; Machu-
ca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” Elenchos 34 (2013): sec. 4.
 I examine the various versions of the objection and the replies offered by Arcesilaus and Sextus in
Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme an-
tique, eds. Diego Machuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2019), 53‒87.
 The attempt to refute scepticism (of one kind or another) by focusing on its practical consequences
is still today a common manoeuvre among both philosophers and ordinary people, who usually dis-
card scepticism because its implications are disastrous, depressing, or immoral. Even in current dis-
cussions of the epistemic significance of disagreement, suspension of judgment is sometimes rejected
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theoretical puzzles, difficulties, or disagreements do not bring about anxiety but are
rather exciting and enthralling⁹; that it is unreasonable or ridiculous to think that
suspension can eliminate or mitigate the disturbance a person experiences or that
suspension is a reliable recipe for tranquillity¹⁰; that belief in objective values produ-
ces a sense of security, not anxiety¹¹; and that it is highly doubtful that the attain-
ment of undisturbedness is either desirable or psychologically possible.¹² If any of
this were true, then the prudential value of suspension and undisturbedness
would be undermined. For in those cases in which unresolved disagreements do
not cause anxiety, there is nothing to be removed through suspension, while in
those cases in which there is indeed anxiety concerning matters of belief, suspension
is useless either because it is not efficacious in removing that anxiety or because it is
simply impossible to achieve that goal given human beings’ psychological makeup.
And even if it were psychologically possible to attain the state of undisturbedness by
suspending judgment, living an undisturbed life is not appealing or desirable be-
cause it would deprive us of all excitement.
In response, let me first note that the above criticisms overlook the fact that it
seems to be one’s own psychological makeup and one’s personal history that deter-
mine to a considerable extent what causes anxiety in an individual, whether one re-
gards an undisturbed life as liberating or depressing, and whether one is able to at-
tain undisturbedness by suspending judgment or in any other way.¹³ For instance,
some logicians and mathematicians seem to be distressed by their failure to find sol-
utions to certain logical and mathematical paradoxes while others do not, even
because of its allegedly damaging practical effects. See Diego Machuca, “Conciliationism and the
Menace of Scepticism,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 54, no. 3 (September 2015): sec. 3.
This shows—pace Suzanne Obdrzalek, “From Skepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cic-
ero’s Academica,” Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012): 388‒90—that to reply to scepticism by pointing to its
practical consequences is not foreign to contemporary epistemological discussions.
 See Benson Mates, The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 63, 75‒76; Jonathan Barnes, Introduction to Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scep-
ticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), xxx‒xxxi.
 See Mates, The Skeptic Way, 63, 76‒77; Barnes, Introduction, xxxi; Richard Bett, “Le scepticisme
ancien est-il viable aujourd’hui?” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique, eds. Diego
Machuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2019), 172.
 See Julia Annas, “Doing without Objective Values: Ancient and Modern Strategies,” in Compan-
ions to Ancient Thought IV: Ethics, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 208, 213.
 See Gisela Striker, “Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism,” in Pyr-
rhonian Skepticism, ed.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 22; Strik-
er, “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepti-
cism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 196.
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. Mark McPherran, “Ataraxia
and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism: Is the Skeptic Really Happy?” Proceedings of the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1989): 150.
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though all of them care about their research and believe that it has epistemic value,
and perhaps even prudential value. Similarly, some people want to live a life of con-
stant excitement, vertigo, and risk, and their heart would therefore sink at the pros-
pects of a life characterised by the Pyrrhonist’s undisturbedness; but others do prefer
an undisturbed life. Moreover, some might even regard an undisturbed life as excit-
ing. Finally, the person taking up the Pyrrhonian attitude may either enjoy a laid-
back and indifferent state of mind—being aware as he is of the unavoidable complex-
ity of things and having, as it were, seen it all before—or else experience profound
angst—due to the uncertainty caused by unresolved disagreements and the hesita-
tion about what he is supposed to do in the absence of an epistemic criterion that
would allow us to determine what is true and what is false. For instance, the realisa-
tion that one cannot establish whether there exist objective moral values might spare
a person the anguish suffered by those who believe that an action they have per-
formed is morally wrong, or else might lead that person to depression or distress.
Whether, being a Pyrrhonist, one finds oneself in one or the other of these states
seems to depend on one’s personality or temperament. Consider the indisputable,
albeit often overlooked, fact that people react in strikingly distinct ways both
while and after facing extremely harsh situations. For example, while some people
have been able to survive concentration camps or civil wars and then to rebuild
their lives in remote countries after losing literally everything and without seeking
revenge, many of us find their reactions extremely hard to understand and would
most probably have been incapable of behaving in the same way. Consider also
how some religious believers lead an anguished life despite their belief in the exis-
tence of a benevolent and provident god, while some agnostics lead a fulfilling life
despite their suspension of judgment on the matter. I therefore do not think that
there are sufficient grounds for regarding Sextus’s report that some people were
able to become undisturbed after suspending judgment as ridiculous or false, unless
one believes that one is entitled to generalise one’s own experience and dismiss a
person’s report of his experience when it is radically different. Suspension may or
may not continue to work for the Pyrrhonist in the future and it may or may not
work for other people; it is up to each individual to try it and see, so that there is
no room for prejudices about its possible success. I do not mean to suggest that
one must accept as true every testimony one hears, but only that one should be ex-
tremely cautious when discarding someone’s report on his own experience.¹⁴ We
should keep in mind that Sextus does not intend to provide a recipe for becoming
undisturbed or for attaining happiness, but only reports on what has so far occurred
to him and others, and offers what appears to him as a tentative explanation of that
experience. In sum, it does not seem possible to determine a priori whether suspen-
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. McPherran, “Ataraxia and
Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 150, 171.
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sion and undisturbedness have any prudential value, i.e., whether they either con-
tribute to or make possible the attainment of those goals we seek in order to live well.
Martha Nussbaum is the interpreter who has most vehemently criticised Pyrrhon-
ism on account of its practical consequences, focusing on the moral and political
value of suspension and undisturbedness. Her attack on Pyrrhonism in “Equilibrium:
Scepticism and Immersion in Political Deliberation” is conducted by contrasting it
with John Rawls’s moral and political philosophy.¹⁵ Although she does not distin-
guish between them, Nussbaum in fact follows two different lines of argument: (1)
one that calls attention to the supposedly harmful practical implications of Pyrrhon-
ism¹⁶; and (2) one that calls attention either (a) to the Pyrrhonist’s alleged inconsis-
tency in believing in the value of undisturbedness and in being confident in the effi-
cacy of his means to attain it,¹⁷ or (b) to his alleged failure to show the impossibility
of the kind of justification that Rawls provided for our moral and political choices.¹⁸
These two lines of argument can be labelled, respectively, “pragmatic” and “episte-
mic.” Note that, were the epistemic line of argument successful, there would be no
need for the pragmatic: if the Pyrrhonist were inconsistent or did not succeed in un-
dermining the epistemic justification of our moral and political beliefs and practices,
then there would be no reason for worrying about the pragmatic consequences of
adopting his sceptical outlook. The primary purpose of Nussbaum’s essay, though,
is to develop the pragmatic line of argument, most probably because she is shocked
by what she takes to be the deeply damaging effects of Pyrrhonism and because she
thinks there is a threatening revival of Pyrrhonism in certain postmodernist thinkers
and in the popular part of our public culture.¹⁹ I will refrain from addressing here the
epistemic line of argument mainly because I am particularly interested in Nuss-
baum’s pragmatic line of argument, but also because I have dealt with the kind of
inconsistency she ascribes to the Pyrrhonist in the previous section and elsewhere²⁰
and because I think she simply underestimates the sceptical challenge that disagree-
 Martha Nussbaum, “Equilibrium: Scepticism and Immersion in Political Deliberation,” in Ancient
Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Acta Philosophica Fennica 66), ed. Juha Sihvola (Helsinki: So-
cietas Philosophica Fennica, 2000), 171‒97.
 Nussbaum, 191‒94.
 Nussbaum, 189‒92.
 Nussbaum, 183‒87.
 In previous work, Nussbaum focused at greater length on the epistemic line of argument. See
Martha Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives: Disturbance and the Life without Belief,” in The Therapy
of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994),
300‒306; Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literature and the Law,” Harvard Law
Review 107 (1994): 733‒36. Although Nussbaum also developed the pragmatic line of argument
(see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒15; “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737‒39, 742), she nonetheless
saw some practical benefits in adopting the Pyrrhonian outlook (see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313; “Skep-
ticism about Practical Reason,” 738, 742). In “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” she discusses at
greater length the views of those she regards as the contemporary counterparts of ancient Pyrrhon-
ism.
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 115‒23, 132‒33.
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ment poses to the task of epistemically justifying our moral and political beliefs and
practices.
Nussbaum claims that Pyrrhonism is both “morally and politically pernicious.”²¹
The Pyrrhonist’s denial of the possibility of reaching a consensus among rival posi-
tions and his loss of commitment to normative beliefs are the sort of views that made
the rise of Nazism possible and that could enable the recurrence of something sim-
ilar. The reason is that, for the Pyrrhonist, the choice of a political regime cannot be
based on reason, but only on the play of forces. She expresses a worry common
among anti-sceptics:
[A] person who sees himself and his political life as simply a space in which forces play them-
selves out cannot be relied on for the same committed behaviour we can demand from a person
who sees justice as possible and worthy of profound commitment and sacrifice. A person who
views every claim as having its equally powerful counterclaim and his inclination to one side as
mere antiquated habit is not likely to stick up for those habits in the way that someone will who
believes that they are justifiable by a rational procedure.²²
In addition, undisturbedness is not always desirable, for
the world in which we live is disturbing; disturbance is a rational response to it. And the person
who is with good reason disturbed, and who sees her disturbance as well grounded, will not be
satisfied, like the sceptic, by the removal of disturbance within her own person.²³
She even goes as far as to affirm that Pyrrhonism is
profoundly selfish, indeed solipsistic … seen as a program for philosophy in a needy and trou-
bled world containing urgent human problems. … If philosophy is only capable of making the
individual practitioner feel calm, then Socrates’s enemies would be right: philosophy is a dan-
gerous form of self-indulgence, subversive of democracy, and its teachers are corrupters of the
young. Fortunately, philosophy is capable of much more than that.²⁴
Nussbaum also thinks that Pyrrhonism deprives us of part of what makes us
human. For by suspending judgment, motivated by his desire for undisturbedness,
the Pyrrhonist loses his normative commitments, and when these go, “something
fundamental to humanity goes out with them, something that is integral to our abil-
ity to care for another and act on another’s behalf.”²⁵ She adds that
human beings are not only instinctual but also ethical creatures, who do care about getting
things right and do commit themselves to views of the good, modifying their animal behavior
accordingly. This means that the sceptic cannot straightforwardly claim to be allowing us to fol-
 Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 171.
 Nussbaum, 192‒93. Cf. Annas, “Doing without Objective Values,” 211‒12.
 Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 193.
 Nussbaum, 194.
 Nussbaum, 173.
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low our nature: he must admit that he is removing or curtailing something that is fundamental
in the natures of most human beings.²⁶
Thus, Nussbaum believes that the Pyrrhonist (i) is immoral, (ii) is unreliable, (iii)
does not care about others, and (iv) removes something essential to our human na-
ture. I will make six sets of remarks in reply to Nussbaum’s four criticisms.
The first thing to be noted is that Nussbaum commits a petitio principii inasmuch
as she takes for granted that about which the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment, name-
ly, the existence of something that is objectively right or wrong. Instead of establish-
ing the truth of the belief, called into question by the Pyrrhonist, that certain things
are morally good or bad, Nussbaum begs the question by assuming the truth of that
belief in her attack on Pyrrhonism. In her view, the world in which we live is disturb-
ing because there are morally bad things that occur that cause indignation and dis-
approval—such as the rise of certain political regimes responsible for mass murder—
and so looking for personal undisturbedness is objectively wrong. This is why the
Pyrrhonist is portrayed as selfish, solipsistic, politically subversive, and corruptive.
These claims, even if they were true, have force only for those who are already
moral realists; and I think it is acceptable to criticise the Pyrrhonist if one adopts
such a point of view. But it should be borne in mind that, in doing so, one has
not engaged the Pyrrhonist in philosophical debate, nor has one shown that he is
mistaken in suspending judgment in the moral domain. Insofar as she does not dis-
cuss the Pyrrhonist’s metaethical arguments, Nussbaum’s pragmatic line of argu-
ment is dialectically ineffective.
Secondly, it is a mistake to claim that the Pyrrhonist is necessarily selfish, solip-
sistic,²⁷ politically subversive, or corruptive, just as it is a mistake to claim that he is
necessarily philanthropic (despite what Sextus says at PH 3.280‒81), politically con-
 Nussbaum, 191. Richard Bett makes a similar point when claiming that the Pyrrhonist’s lack of
moral commitments and the passivity shown in his practical decisions reveal that he is not an ethi-
cally engaged agent. See “How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern,
and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Diego Machuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 3‒17. For this reason,
he maintains, the sceptical life is not a life that people could reasonably welcome or to which
they could aspire. It is also worth noting that a related objection has recently been raised by some
interpreters on the basis of a version of the inactivity charge levelled by the Stoics against the Aca-
demic sceptics: even if the Pyrrhonist’s scepticism does not condemn him to remain utterly inactive,
his actions are not those of a rational agent, for he does not believe he can offer any epistemic rea-
sons for his desires and his decisions, and so Pyrrhonism deprives us of the rationality distinctive of
human beings. Proponents of this objection include Casey Perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay
on Pyrrhonian Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Katja Vogt, “Scepticism and Ac-
tion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 165‒80; and Jan Willem Wieland, “Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?” Philosoph-
ical Explorations 15, no. 3 (September 2012): 277‒89. I have critically dealt with this objection in “Pyr-
rhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” sec. 5, and in “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.
 Or individualistic, as Luciano Floridi has called him in Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and
Recovery of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 32.
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servative or conformist (despite following the laws and customs of his community,
PH 1.23‒24),²⁸ or tolerant (despite the fact that he is unable to resolve disagreements
and hence cannot reject any view on epistemic grounds). For whether the Pyrrhonist
adopts one or the other of these attitudes depends on circumstantial factors, such as
his psychological makeup, his upbringing, his education, his life experiences, and
his socio-cultural context.²⁹ None of these attitudes is necessarily entailed by the
suspension of judgment or the adoption of what appears (to phainomenon) as the cri-
terion of action (PH 1.21‒24; AD 1.30 [= AM 7.30]). Insofar as he continues to suspend
judgment across the board, the Pyrrhonist has no epistemic reasons either to em-
brace or to reject a given attitude, and so he will, as Nussbaum points out, let the
play of forces drive him—a play of forces that nonetheless is not totally passive as
it includes the exercise of the natural capability of thinking (PH 1.24).³⁰ But this
means that nothing rules out the possibility that the Pyrrhonist may, for example,
have been raised in a familial and social context in which philanthropy is deemed
to be morally correct, and that the way things non-doxastically appear to him now
is shaped by such a conception. By the same token, nothing rules out the possibility
that he may be selfish and individualistic because of the upbringing he received or
because of his life experiences. The same goes for the Pyrrhonist’s alleged conserva-
tism or conformism, for he may have been raised so as to oppose authority and the
accepted ways of conducting oneself.³¹ Similarly, the fact that he cannot reject a
given position on the basis of its being incorrect or epistemically unjustified does
not entail that he must be tolerant. For his suspension does not of course require
that he respects all the views held in his community because such respect is the mo-
rally correct attitude. He may resist certain positions simply because they constitute a
practical hindrance to the way in which he lives or simply because they are emotion-
ally disruptive. Now, Nussbaum herself recognises my point when she talks about the
Pyrrhonist having an inclination towards a given attitude out of habit. She thinks
that this makes him unreliable (a claim I address next), but the point is that she
should accept that this does not make him necessarily selfish, solipsistic, politically
subversive, or corruptive. It is clear that, from the point of view of moral realists, the
Pyrrhonist’s suspension does not have moral value insofar as it does not entail the
 Bett writes about “the more general conformism of the skeptic,” which he regards as an “unat-
tractive feature” of the sceptic’s stance (“How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 11).
 See Diego Machuca, Review of Luciano Floridi Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery
of Pyrrhonism, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 338‒39; Machuca, “The
Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 134‒36.
 On the Pyrrhonist’s extensive but non-normative use of reason, see Diego Machuca, “Argumen-
tative Persuasiveness,” 116‒23; Machuca, “Pyrrhonism and the Law of Non-Contradiction,” secs. 4
and 5; Machuca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” sec. 4; Machuca, “Agrippan Pyrrhonism
and the Challenge of Disagreement,” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): sec. 3; Machuca,
“Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 5.
 Here I disagree with Bett, who claims that it is “unlikely that the skeptic will step far outside the
status quo if … that would be difficult or unpopular” (“How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 12).
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adoption of those attitudes they regard as morally correct. But, once again, this is
entirely different from claiming that he inevitably takes up attitudes that moral real-
ists regard as morally incorrect. Someone might object that the Pyrrhonist’s suspen-
sion lacks moral value all the same because, even though it does not preclude the
adoption of an attitude of philanthropy, tolerance, or respect for accepted modes
of conduct, such an adoption would not be based on the belief that these attitudes
are morally correct. This may be so from the point of view of moral realists, but such
an objection grants that the Pyrrhonist can conduct himself in a way that is not self-
ish, individualistic, politically subversive, or corruptive.
Thirdly, from a descriptive point of view, I am not sure that people with strong
commitments are in general reliable, nor that they are more reliable than those
who lack such commitments and let the play of forces drive them. This is so even
in those few cases in which people have reflected on their commitments and believe
that they are epistemically justified. Of all the religious believers and moral realists
you know, how many are reliable because of their religious and moral commitments?
It may be the case that someone is reliable precisely because he has strong commit-
ments to certain principles and rules. But it seems clear that certain patterns of be-
haviour may be stronger when they have been unreflectively acquired in childhood
than when they are the result of reflection, and in the former case they may be
much harder to dislodge even if one came to the conclusion that they have no ration-
al basis. It is no doubt possible that such patterns of behaviour are strengthened by a
process of reflection and justification, but the important point is that this does not
mean that they are not strong enough to confer reliability on the person in whom
they have been inculcated independently of such a process.
Fourthly, as regards the claim that, by suspending judgment about moral com-
mitments, the Pyrrhonist deprives us of part of our human nature, two remarks
are in order. The first is that, pace Nussbaum,³² the Pyrrhonist does not completely
deprive us of our emotions, for it does not appear to be the case that desiderative
attitudes such as “anger, fear, jealousy, grief, envy, passionate love … all rest …
upon belief”³³ and that “love, fear, grief” are based on “beliefs about worth.”³⁴ To
be more precise, I do not think that such emotions depend necessarily on belief.
For instance, do animals, which do seem to experience anger, fear, grief, and affec-
tion, hold beliefs? Also, granting that a two-year-old is capable of loving his mother,
does he hold the belief that his mother is worth love? And even if he does, does he
love his mother because he holds that belief? Someone could object that, even if one
granted that emotions can be experienced in the absence of beliefs, Sextus’s ascrip-
tion of the state of undisturbedness to the Pyrrhonist indicates that he seeks to re-
move all emotions. One could reply by noting that, as we saw in the previous section,
 Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒14; Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737.
 Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313.
 Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737.
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one part of the twofold goal of scepticism is the moderation of affection in things that
are unavoidable, and by arguing that, among the affections in question, Sextus in-
cludes certain emotions. However, the examples he gives of unavoidable affections
are always of a perceptual and physical kind: the feelings of cold and heat, thirst
and hunger (PH 1.13, 24, 29, 238; AD 5.143, 149, 152), pain and pleasure (AD 5.143,
150, 159)—where these seem to be understood exclusively in a physical way—and
the fact of having a fever (AD 5.156); he also speaks more generally of the way one
is affected perceptually (PH 3.236; AD 5.148). I nonetheless think that, when Sextus
speaks of the Pyrrhonist acting without opinions in accordance with the laws and
customs of his community (PH 1.17, 23‒24, 231, 237; AD 3.49, 5.166), there is an emo-
tional component in the non-doxastic appearances he has by virtue of those social
norms. Note that Sextus points out that the Pyrrhonist, proceeding in accordance
with traditional laws and customs, accepts that piety is good and impiety bad (PH
1.24), and that he will choose one course of action and avoid the other if compelled
by a tyrant to do some unspeakable deed (AD 5.166). It seems clear to me that this
implies that impious actions induce a negative emotion and corresponding reaction
in a Pyrrhonist who belongs to a given socio-cultural context. Similarly, if that Pyr-
rhonist witnessed what moral realists regard as an unspeakable or forbidden deed,
he might automatically experience a negative emotion that would trigger a gut reac-
tion: for instance, if faced with an act of rape, murder, or torture, he might experi-
ence a visceral response of repulsion and might do something to counter that act,
even though he suspends judgment about whether such an act is objectively bad
or to be avoided. If my interpretation is on the right track, then even after suspending
judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad, the Pyrrhonist still ex-
periences positive or negative emotions when confronted with certain situations.³⁵
Now, having moral emotions may be sufficient for us to be moral creatures. In this
regard, note that, based on a number of studies in psychology, some moral psychol-
ogists have called into question the rationalist view that moral judgment is caused by
a process of conscious reasoning or reflection, claiming instead that it is primarily
and directly caused by moral intuitions and emotions. For example, according to
the social intuitionist model defended by Jonathan Haidt, moral judgment is in gen-
eral the result of intuitions—i.e., quick, automatic, effortless, and affectively laden
evaluations—and moral action co-varies more with moral emotion than with moral
reasoning. In his view, moral reasoning is usually nothing but an ex post facto proc-
ess in which one seeks arguments that will justify an already-made judgment with
the aim of influencing the intuitions and actions of others.³⁶
 For more on this issue, see McPherran, “Ataraxia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 144,
154‒56; Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 131‒32; Machuca, “Argumentative
Persuasiveness,” 123; Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.
 See Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (October 2001): 814‒34; Thalia Wheatley and Jon-
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My second remark regarding Nussbaum’s claim that the Pyrrhonist removes
something that is fundamental in the nature of most human beings is that this
would be a problem only provided that the thing removed is unquestionably good.
Given that it is clear that Nussbaum thinks that the item removed is morally good,
I should repeat here my remark that Nussbaum assumes what she should prove
when arguing against the Pyrrhonist: removing something that is deemed to be
good by the moral realist is not a problem for the Pyrrhonist inasmuch as he sus-
pends judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad. But setting
the question of moral goodness aside, a present-day Pyrrhonist could point out
that not everyone agrees on the instrumental goodness or usefulness of morality,
as is shown, for instance, by the contemporary metaethical disagreement on this
issue. Moral error theorists maintain either that all positive moral judgments are
false because there are no objective moral properties,³⁷ or that they are all neither
true nor false because the moral facts they presuppose do not exist.³⁸ However,
among them there is a disagreement between moral fictionalists and moral abolition-
ists. The former claim that morality produces practical benefits (for example, person-
al happiness or political stability), and so that we should continue to make moral
utterances and have moral thoughts,while at the same time refraining from asserting
such utterances and believing such thoughts. That is, even though moral realism is
false, we should maintain the fiction that it is true.³⁹ One could argue that moral fic-
tionalists think that morality is instrumentally good in that it is an effective means to
attain certain goals we seek. Moral abolitionists, by contrast, contend that morality
causes more suffering than it prevents, and that it is therefore desirable and useful to
abandon moral language and thinking altogether.⁴⁰
Fifthly, and in connection with my previous remarks on the Pyrrhonist’s emo-
tions, the claim that his suspension prevents him from properly caring about others
overlooks the fact that whether one cares about someone or something seems to de-
pend to a considerable extent on one’s emotions rather than on one’s beliefs. A
mother who instinctively reacts to save her child from danger does not say to herself
that she takes it to be true that she is morally obliged to save her child or that her
child is worth saving; in fact, she may not have formed those beliefs at all and
might never form them.You likely care about the well-being of your parents, your sib-
lings, your children, your friends, or your spouse without having acquired the belief
that you have the moral obligation to care about them or the belief that they are
worth your care. Moreover, even though in some cases one concludes that one should
athan Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,” Psychological Science 16,
no. 10 (October 2005): 780‒84.
 See John Leslie Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
 See Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 See Joyce, The Myth of Morality.
 See Richard Garner, “Abolishing Morality,” in A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s
Moral Error Theory, eds. Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 217‒33.
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not be concerned about what might befall them, one will very likely be concerned all
the same. Hence, the holding of beliefs does not seem to be a conditio sine qua non
for loving your child, being concerned about your dog’s well-being, or caring about
the result of a soccer match. As I argued above, it seems clear that the Pyrrhonist’s
suspension does not do away with such emotions. Hence, I think that Julia Annas is
mistaken when she claims that the Pyrrhonist cannot be concerned about others’
physical and emotional problems,⁴¹ i.e., their “mundane problems like toothache,
poverty or unrequited love,” because “these could only bother him if he believed
that these were bad things, which of course he does not.”⁴² In her view, the Pyrrhon-
ist can only be bothered by others’ intellectual problems, i.e., by their holding of be-
liefs, because that is what he seeks to cure by means of his argumentative therapy,
which is motivated by a philanthropic attitude (PH 3.280‒81). If so, he could not be
concerned about the well-being of another full-blown Pyrrhonist. According to the
deflationary interpretation⁴³ to which I referred in my second set of remarks, neither
philanthropy nor the therapeutic use of arguments should be viewed as defining fea-
tures of Pyrrhonism: whether the Pyrrhonist is philanthropic or seeks to cure others
of their dogmatism by means of argument will depend on circumstantial factors. But
then one can likewise argue that nothing rules out the possibility that a Pyrrhonist
may be emotionally troubled by the unavoidable problems of others. A Pyrrhonist
who happens to be philanthropic may seek, by inducing suspension, to remove
the disturbance apparently caused in the dogmatists by their holding of beliefs,
but he may also seek to mitigate their unavoidable physical and emotional distur-
bances because he may be emotionally distressed by the unavoidable suffering of
anyone—whether a dogmatist, a newly converted Pyrrhonist, or a veteran Pyrrhonist.
Again, such distress will not be the result of the holding of beliefs, but part of the
emotions that impose themselves on the Pyrrhonist to the extent that he is affected
by those psychological and social factors that happen to influence him. Someone
will no doubt complain, once more, that this does not make the Pyrrhonist very re-
liable given that his concern about others’ problems of one kind or another will al-
ways be fortuitous or contingent. But I am not sure that this is different from the case
of those who claim to care about others due to their beliefs or even reflective beliefs.
For their holding the beliefs they hold seems to be dependent to a considerable ex-
tent on circumstantial factors. In addition, we see on a daily basis how many who
claim to be moral realists or religious believers and to reject inequality and unfair
suffering are entirely indifferent to those in need. Therefore, we should conclude ei-
 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 246‒48, 353.
 Annas, 246.
 The reason I call my interpretation of certain aspects of Sextus’s account of Pyrrhonism “defla-
tionary” is simply that I do not take such aspects to be essential to this form of scepticism. My inter-
pretation of the practical and epistemic value of Pyrrhonism is also deflationary inasmuch as, in my
view, the Pyrrhonist does not think that his stance has either kind of value in an objective sense.
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ther that they are being disingenuous in expressing their normative commitments, or
that belief does not ensure genuine concern for others.
Finally, I think it is important to make the probably obvious remark that, even if
we grant that Pyrrhonism has no prudential or moral value, we should guard against
mistaking pragmatic reasons for rejecting Pyrrhonism (or other forms of scepticism)
for epistemic reasons. The fact that Pyrrhonism represents a hindrance to the attain-
ment of certain goals one takes to be crucial to one’s personal or social life does not
prove that Pyrrhonism is incoherent or false. To do so, one has to examine whether
there are epistemic reasons for rejecting Pyrrhonism, and if one cannot find any, then
one should be prepared to accept the pragmatic consequences of our inability to re-
fute it, even if they are appalling. At least those who are in the business of philoso-
phy should swallow their fear and follow where the arguments lead.
I should emphasise that my aim has not been to defend the Pyrrhonist from the
charge of immorality in the sense of showing that he necessarily conducts himself in
a moral way, for whether he behaves morally or immorally from the point of view of
non-Pyrrhonists depends on a number of fortuitous factors. Nor have I attempted to
show that Pyrrhonism is a desirable or attractive philosophy inasmuch as it would
contribute to our well-being, for whether one finds it so will depend, to a consider-
able extent, on contingent psychological factors. My aim has instead been to dispel
certain serious misunderstandings regarding the Pyrrhonian stance.⁴⁴
4 The Epistemic Value of Suspension
What about the epistemic value of the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment? What is
its value concerning the goals of attaining truth and avoiding error? The answer
seems to depend in part on whose vantage point one adopts and in part on how
one interprets the connection between equipollence and suspension.
Let me address the second point first. As we saw in Section 2, such a connection
can be interpreted either as a requirement of rationality or as a merely psychological
constraint. If the Pyrrhonist’s reason for withholding assent whenever confronted
with conflicting views on p that strike him as equipollent were a commitment on
his part to investigating truth by applying the requirements of rationality, then the
 For other replies to the charge that Pyrrhonism lacks practical value that somewhat complement
the arguments advanced in the present section, see John Christian Laursen, “Yes, Skeptics Can Live
Their Skepticism and Cope with Tyranny as Well as Anyone,” in Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-
Renaissance Thought, eds. José Maia Neto and Richard Popkin (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004),
201‒23; Laursen, “The Moral Life of the Ancient Skeptics: Living in Accordance with Nature and Free-
dom from Disturbance,” Bolletino della Società Filosofica Italiana 219 (2016): 5‒22; and Emidio Spine-
lli, “Neither Philosophy nor Politics? The Ancient Pyrrhonian Approach to Everyday Life,” in Skepti-
cism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, eds. John Christian Laursen
and Gianni Paganini (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 2015), 17‒35.
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epistemic value of his suspension would be clear. For, first, by refraining from adopt-
ing a view on p in favour of which he does not have compelling evidence, the Pyr-
rhonist seeks to avoid error. Second, by remaining engaged in rationally driven inqui-
ry, he keeps searching for further evidence that could tip the balance in favour of one
of the rival views on p, which would bring him closer to the truth. If, by contrast, the
psychological interpretation of the connection between equipollence and suspension
were correct, it could be argued that Pyrrhonism does not have much to offer in
terms of epistemic value. For although the Pyrrhonist is a thinking being who is hard-
wired to suspend judgment when confronted with arguments pro and con p that
strike him as equipollent, he refrains from making assertions about whether those
arguments are sound, whether they are equipollent, and whether suspension is
the correct rational response in the face of equipollent disagreement. The Pyrrhonist
does suspend judgment, he does refrain from affirming that investigation of truth is
doomed to failure, and he does keep on inquiring into the various subjects about
which people hold beliefs. But although his suspension might make it possible to
avoid error, he does not affirm that this is indeed the case and that the avoidance
of error is therefore one of his reasons for suspending judgment. And although his
ongoing inquiry might make it possible to find the truth, he makes no assertions
about whether his inquiry is the correct means to search for truth. In line with my
deflationary interpretation of Pyrrhonism, I think that the Pyrrhonist’s continuing
engagement in philosophical inquiry is to be explained by the influence of psycho-
logical and social factors, and that his suspension only entails that he cannot affirm
or deny that truth can be found.
I think, however, that it is a mistake to claim that Pyrrhonism is of no epistemic
value if the psychological interpretation is correct, a mistake that brings me to the
first point mentioned above. For even if the Pyrrhonist himself refrains from affirm-
ing (or denying) the epistemic value of his suspension, this does not mean that the
suspension he exercises lacks epistemic value from the vantage point of those non-
Pyrrhonists who are committed to the requirement of rationality according to which
one should suspend judgment when confronted with a dispute one is unable to set-
tle. From that vantage point, it could also be argued that the epistemic value of Pyr-
rhonian suspension consists in that it encourages or promotes the intellectual virtues
of caution and humility, in two respects. First, the Pyrrhonist’s suspension is a rec-
ognition of his inability to give his assent to any one of the parties to a given dispute,
i.e., a recognition that he has so far been unable to settle the disagreements he has
examined. He describes as arrogance, rashness, and self-satisfaction the attitudes of
his rivals⁴⁵ inasmuch as they hold fast to their views on p without taking careful ac-
count of rival views on p or even despite acknowledging the existence of widespread
and entrenched disagreement over p. One could take the Pyrrhonian attitude to be a
good antidote to jumping to conclusions and performing hasty actions. He lacks his
 See, for example, PH 1.20, 90, 177, 3.235, 280‒81.
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rivals’ overconfidence in the correctness of their own opinions and the reliability of
their cognitive powers. In this regard, it is perhaps worth mentioning some recent
studies in psychology that show that unskilled people tend to suffer from “illusory
superiority,” rating their cognitive abilities as above average, whereas skilled people
tend to suffer from “illusory inferiority,” underestimating or underrating their cogni-
tive abilities.⁴⁶ One could argue that Pyrrhonian suspension would protect us from
this kind of epistemic bias, faced as we are with the difficulty of determining from
which sort of illusion we might be suffering. Second, Pyrrhonian investigation is
characterised by open-mindedness inasmuch as the Pyrrhonist does not affirm (or
deny) that the disagreements he has so far inspected are unresolvable in themselves,
but carries on his philosophical inquiry into the disputed matters. In other words, the
Pyrrhonist’s past failure to discover the truth in those matters (if there is any) does
not lead him to claim that the search for truth is doomed to failure. For he cannot
rule out the possibility that, through further investigation, he might discover new evi-
dence and arguments bearing on the disputed matters that will make it possible to
adjudicate the disagreements.
Some people—probably most—might nonetheless regard the Pyrrhonist’s across-
the-board suspension as lacking any real epistemic value in that it pushes intellec-
tual caution and humility to the extreme. They would argue that the Pyrrhonist ac-
tually manifests the vices of intellectual cowardice and of undue timidity in one’s
intellectual life. For although there are cases in which suspension is indeed ration-
ally required by the equal force of the evidence and arguments in favour of each of
the conflicting views, in most cases we do have strong epistemic reasons for prefer-
ring one of the views to the other(s). For this reason, they would also argue that the
Pyrrhonist is intellectually dishonest when he claims that, in all the disagreements
he has considered, the rival views strike him as equipollent. In response, it should
be remarked that, aside from the fact that the objectors’ own experience is different
from the Pyrrhonist’s, there seems to be no reason for suspecting that the latter is not
sincere or truthful when reporting on what has happened to him up to this point. For
it may indeed be the case that the Pyrrhonist has found himself in the state of being
at a loss how to resolve all those disagreements he has examined up to this point.
Hence, I do not think that the objectors can easily maintain that the Pyrrhonist is dis-
ingenuous, although they could perhaps still hold that, from their own non-sceptical
point of view, he is intellectually cowardly and unduly timid in his philosophical in-
vestigations.
 See, for example, Justin Kruger and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficul-
ties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 77, no. 6 (December 1999): 1121‒34; Joyce Ehrlinger, Kerri Johnson, Matthew
Banner, David Dunning, and Justin Kruger, “Why the Unskilled Are Unaware: Further Explorations of
(Absent) Self-Insight among the Incompetent,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process-
es 105, no. 1 (January 2008): 98‒121.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Does the Pyrrhonist promise us that, if we suspend judgment across the board, we
will become undisturbed regarding matters of opinion? No, he does not because
he cannot. Does he promise us that, if we attain such a mental state, we will find
it enjoyable and will even achieve a considerable degree of happiness or well-
being? No, he does not because he cannot. Does he promise us that the person
who suspends judgment across the board will act morally? No, he does not because
he cannot. Does he affirm that suspension has epistemic value in that it allows us to
attain truth and avoid error? No, he does not because he cannot. Does this all mean
that suspension and undisturbedness have no practical or epistemic value for us and
that reading Sextus is of no philosophical interest to us? I have already partially ad-
dressed this last question at the end of the previous section, but I would like to ex-
amine it further to conclude.
Someone might indeed argue that, if the Pyrrhonist has no doxastic commitment
to the practical and the epistemic value of suspension and undisturbedness but only
reports on the way things have appeared to him up to this point, then his whole en-
terprise will look pointless and he will hardly win new supporters.⁴⁷ Moreover, one
might wonder whether Sextus’s writings are of any philosophical interest insofar
as throughout them he is merely offering a personal testimony on what has so far
happened to him (e.g., PH 1.4, 187‒209). In reply, let me make two sets of remarks.
To begin with, even though the absence of assertions may lead many to reject
Sextus’s writings out of hand, nothing necessarily precludes one from finding
them philosophically challenging and intriguing. For it is one thing how Sextus in-
tends what he writes to be interpreted, and quite another how his readers react to his
writings or what use they can make of his writings. For example, someone may be-
lieve that some of Sextus’s arguments are sound and have significant philosophical
implications. Also, even if one rejects his stance as too radical, one may still find it
philosophically stimulating in that it challenges one to ponder more carefully prob-
lems concerning knowledge, justification, inquiry, disagreement, and action.⁴⁸ This
in fact explains why quite a number of contemporary epistemologists have engaged
with the justificatory challenges posed by the Modes of Agrippa. To better illustrate
my point, let me refer to Henri Estienne’s experience with Pyrrhonism as described in
the preface to his Latin rendering of PH published in 1562.⁴⁹ In an autobiographical
story of the genesis of the translation, he tells us that while afflicted by a quartan
 Cf. Nussbaum “Skeptic Purgatives,” 303; Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 189; and McPherran, “Atarax-
ia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 139–40.
 See Machuca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality,” 210n14.
 I have used the complete French translation of the preface provided by Emmanuel Naya in “Tra-
duire les Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes: Henri Estienne entre la fièvre quarte et la folie chrétienne,” in
Le scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe, ed. Pierre-François Moreau (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 48‒101.
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fever that was caused by an immoderate study of letters and that made him hate the
very sight of books, he stumbled upon an incomplete and hasty translation of the
main principles of the Pyrrhonian sect that he had made some time before. Its
first reading immediately made him laugh—subsequent readings having the same ef-
fect—which in turn allowed him to overcome his exhaustion and reconciled him with
the letters. By ridiculing the doctrines of the dogmatic authors the reading of whose
works required so much intellectual effort, Sextus’s work had a therapeutic effect on
Estienne, who therefore found Pyrrhonism of practical value. But, in Estienne’s view,
it may also be of both practical and epistemic value to the dogmatists themselves in-
asmuch as it can render them humble by attacking the impudence and rashness of
their assertions, and by allowing them to recognise their cognitive limitations and to
accept that the only truth is that of Revelation. By adopting such a fideistic stance,
Estienne took Pyrrhonism to be a remedy not only for the aversion to the study of
letters people may experience after reading the dogmatists’ works, but also for the
disease of impiety that affects the latter. Given such a twofold therapeutic effica-
ciousness, Estienne decided to make PH available to those with no knowledge of
Greek. Even though he recognises such a curative effect, he cautions us against abus-
ing the sceptical critical attitude by calling into question not only the erroneous
things said by the dogmatists but also those that are valuable, and despite observing
at the outset that he has metamorphosed into a sceptic, he later remarks that he is
not himself one and does not intend others to become sceptics. Although Estienne
makes clear the fictive character of his autobiographical story, the benefits he
found in a certain application of Pyrrhonism are to be taken seriously. Sextus
would of course reject a fideistic use of Pyrrhonism on the grounds that those
who made such a use would be doxastically committed to certain metaphysical
and religious views. But the issue under consideration is whether Pyrrhonism
could be of practical or epistemic value to someone who is not a Pyrrhonist, and
hence who eschews some of his beliefs while retaining others. In general, the fideis-
tic use made of Pyrrhonism in Renaissance and modern philosophy is a clear exam-
ple of the practical and epistemic value it may have for non-sceptics.
Secondly, it might well occur that some will identify with Sextus’s account of his
own experience or will be deeply influenced by it. For it does not seem possible to
establish a priori that Pyrrhonism is utterly unappealing as a philosophy.⁵⁰ Whether
that is the case depends on whether one values such attitudes as caution, open-
mindedness, questioning, and intellectual modesty; and, if one does, on whether
one thinks those attitudes should be adopted across the board and on whether
one thinks they are to be preferred to the sense of comfort or reassurance one
may experience when confidently espousing, say, moral or religious beliefs. For in-
stance, I know a scholar for whom the reading of Sextus’s writings prompts the ex-
perience of “being blissful,” in much the same way as does the reading of certain
 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 138.
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Buddhist texts. Also, if you may forgive my being self-referential, I should point out
that I have been reading Sextus and been interested in Pyrrhonism as a philosophy
for almost twenty years. Despite the deflationary interpretation of the epistemic and
practical value of Pyrrhonism that I have defended in this essay, I still find that form
of scepticism captivating and thought-provoking. This is due to the fact that I identify
both with the Pyrrhonist’s experience of being at a loss how to resolve the en-
trenched and longstanding disagreements we encounter in philosophy, morality, pol-
itics, religion, and economics, and with his experience of finding oneself, whenever
one carries the application of the logical and epistemological principles dictated by
reason to the limit, in a situation of aporia in which such principles end up under-
mining themselves.
You may still think that Sextus is not offering much, and you are of course free to
think so. But just keep in mind that others may disagree: the brand of Pyrrhonism
presented in his writings played an important part in the philosophical scene of
the Imperial age, had a tremendous impact on Renaissance and modern philosophy
thanks to the rediscovery of those writings, and continues to be a topic of lively dis-
cussion among both ancient philosophy scholars and analytic epistemologists.
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endoxa and the Theology of Aristotle in
Avicenna’s “Flying Man”: Contexts for
Similarities with Sceptical and Cartesian
Arguments in Avicenna
Starting with the publication of a 1927 article by Giuseppe Furlani, Avicenna’s
thought experiment of a flying man (known as the “flying man argument,” the ab-
breviation is FMA) has been investigated as a potential precursor of the Cartesian
cogito.¹ The FMA refers to a thought experiment that occurs in multiple forms with
varied emphases in several Avicennian texts.² A recent summary of the FMA-complex
runs as follows:
We are asked to imagine that a mature, fully functioning human is created by God out of noth-
ing. The human is in mid-air, his sight veiled and his limbs splayed so that he is not touching his
own body. There is no sound or smell. In other words, this person is in a state of total sensory
deprivation. Furthermore, he has just been created, so he has no memories of prior sensory ex-
perience. Avicenna asked what a person in this situation could know. […] Avicenna thought that
the flying man would be aware of his own existence. […] After all, Avicenna reasoned, the flying
man’s soul is aware of itself, but not of its body. How could this be, if the soul and body were the
same thing?³
Avicenna’s FMA evokes some reminiscence of certain sceptical attitudes, but these
are difficult to pinpoint in the texts presented below and seem to be restricted to
 Giuseppe Furlani, “Avicenna e il ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ di Cartesio,” Islamica 3 (1927): 53‒72. For a list
and discussion of research articles up to the year 2000, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s “De
anima” in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160‒1300 (London:
Warburg Institute, 2000), 80n5.
 For a list of references, see Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima,” 80‒6. In my contribution, I label these
texts as De Anima-type FMA (i.e., al-Šifāʾ, De Anima 1.1 and 5.7; al-Išārāt, Namaṭ 3, al-Risāla al-Aḍ-
ḥawīya, chapter 4). By endoxa-type FMA I am referring to passages contained in sections on non-de-
monstrative premises, i.e., mostly discussions of endoxa (in various Arabic equivalents) versus pri-
mary conceptions. I have not been able to use Ahmet Özcan’s edition of the al-Ḥikma al-Mašriqīya,
in his “İbn Sīnaʾnın el-Hikmetuʾl-meşrikiyye adlı eseri ve tabiat felsefesi” (PhD thesis, Marmara Üni-
versitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Istanbul, 1993). The references in Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima”
suggest that the text runs parallel to the version contained in the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ.
 Peter Adamson, Philosophy in the Islamic World. A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 84. While this account, and many others, is presented as a kind of digest of the
argument’s core, some analyses include longer translations of the original texts. See for example Mi-
chael Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’ in Context,” The Monist 69, no. 3 (July 1986): 383‒95; Hasse,
Avicenna’s “De anima,” 80‒87; Šifāʾ (De Anima) 1.1 is translated into English in Jon McGinnis and
David C. Reisman, eds., Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett,
2007), 178‒79.
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the vague phenomenon of “doubting.” Scholars have become increasingly cautious
about the comparison to Descartes (first made by Furlani) and have observed that the
apparent similarities are rather superficial. Dag Hasse’s emphasises the historical
connections: no direct or indirect connection between Avicenna’s and Descartes’s re-
spective texts could be established so far.⁴ Ahmed Hasnaoui carries out a profound
analysis and comparison of the two philosophical projects, identifying three areas of
difference: (1) while both philosophers systematically use doubt as a method, Des-
cartes’s doubt is general and metaphysical, whereas Avicenna’s doubt concerns par-
ticular propositions. (2) For Descartes, doubting, thinking, and being form a triad;
knowledge of one’s existence is constituted as a result of doubt. This is not the
case with Avicenna. (3) While Descartes seeks to find an Archimedean point in
order to establish a stable base for certainty, Hasnaoui suggests that Avicenna
seeks to establish an Eastern philosophy that transcends the philosophy of the Cor-
pus Aristotelicum.⁵ Based on the arguments’ goals, Peter Adamson spells out the dif-
ference between the two philosophers along the following lines: Descartes is con-
cerned with radical doubt, while Avicenna is concerned with soul and body, that
is, with self-awareness.⁶
In this essay, I would like to suggest an interpretation of the FMA’s development
that helps to strengthen our understanding of how elements that have been frequent-
ly perceived as the argument’s sceptical undertone can be contextualised historically.
Contrary to most studies on this subject, which analyse the FMA with reference to
Avicennian philosophy as a system, my analysis emphasises that the argument’s var-
ious forms should be interpreted independently from each other, as documents of a
continuous development of Avicenna’s philosophy.⁷ In other words, we are dealing
with a “cluster of flying men,” who are not always flying, and are perhaps even
not always men. This single thought experiment evolves, varies, and shifts in empha-
sis throughout Avicenna’s writings.
 Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima,” 80. For a more detailed discussion of the Latin versions see Juhana
Toivanen, “The Fate of the Flying Man,” in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Volume 3, ed. Rob-
ert Pasnau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 64‒98.
 Cf. Ahmed Hasnaoui, “La conscience de soi chez Avicenne et Descartes,” in Descartes et le Moyen
Âge, ed. Joel Biard and Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 290‒91.
 Peter Adamson, “Peter Adamson on Avicenna’s Flying Man Thought Experiment,” Philosophy Bites
(Podcast audio), November 26, 2012, https://philosophybites.com/2012/11/peter-adamson-on-avi
cennas-flying-man-thought-experiment.html: “Descartes is about radical doubt, Avicenna on soul
and body.” On cogito versus self-awareness see Adamson, Philosophy in the Islamic World. A History
of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 134.
 Ahmed Alwishah is one of the few contributors who tries to trace a chronological development of
the argument. See Alwishah, “Ibn Sīnā on Floating Man Arguments,” Journal of Islamic Philosophy 9
(2013): 49‒71. Unfortunately, Alwishah does not discuss the chronology along the lines established by
Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosoph-
ical Works, second edition (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
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The argument is fed by two major source-contexts, which are clearly discernible
in a very early stage of the arguments’ development in al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ (on this
new text, see the appendix below). These two source-contexts are a discussion of en-
doxa in treatises on logic on the one hand, and the Neoplatonist exhortation to strip
off one’s body on the other. Moreover, the FMA is used and further elaborated by Avi-
cenna in his various writings in two contexts: (1) the discussion of non-demonstra-
tive premises (this is roughly identical to the first source-context, namely the discus-
sion of endoxa); and (2) the immateriality of the soul. The degree to which each of the
two source-contexts influences the various versions of the FMA differs depending on
systematic philosophical concerns that were driving the elaboration of the details of
the argument in a given context. Sometimes, but not always, the variations depict a
chronological evolution of Avicenna’s philosophy.
For the purpose of my argument, it is important that we deal with a single cluster
of arguments elaborated in two contexts. As I am going to show in closer detail, the
sceptical undertone can be traced directly to the discussion of widespread opinions
(Greek endoxa; in Arabic the term varies—in this case ḏāʾiʿāt).⁸
In his logical writings, Avicenna devotes much attention to the role of demon-
strative and non-demonstrative premises. There, probing widespread assumptions
by making oneself doubt them is described as a tool for distinguishing between no-
tions that are based on unshakable intuitive knowledge and notions that we accept
because of what we hear about them from others. A hitherto unstudied passage from
al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ can show that in this quite early Avicennian text, the discus-
sion of endoxa is combined with a reference to a passage from the so-called Theology
of Aristotle.⁹ Thus, al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ can show that the Neoplatonist exhortation
to strip off one’s body, which is present in one way or another in each of the well-
 Avicenna’s terminology is quite complex and presumably not fully consistent, which we have to
understand as a reaction to his sources. The Glossarium Græco-Arabicum (http://telota.bbaw.de/
glossga/) lists the following counterparts for endoxon just in the translations of works by Aristotle:
mašūr and maqbūl for the Posterior Analytics, maḥmūd for the Rhetoric, and the term ḏāʾiʿ is regularly
used in the translation of Aristotle’s Topics. This variety in translations of Aristotle’s works is poten-
tially to be supplemented by the Arabic translations of commentaries on them. For the terminological
variety see the lists in Deborah Black, “Certitude, Justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in
Avicenna’s Epistemology,” in Interpreting Avicenna, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 124; Hasnaoui, “La conscience,” 287‒88. For a description of an instance in which
Avicenna amalgamates conflicting translations of terminology in the context of physics (i.e., different
types of moisture), see Heidrun Eichner, Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De generatione
et corruption (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001), 204‒15.
 The Theology of Aristotle is an adaptation of selections from Plotinus’s Enneads 4‒6. It was very
popular in the Arabic-Islamic tradition. Its textual history is quite complex, and its relation to the
Greek Plotinian texts has been studied intensively albeit not exhaustively; for a first orientation on
this see Maroun Aouad, “La Theologie d’Aristote et Autres Textes du Plotinus Arabus,” in Dictionnaire
des Philosophes Antiques, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
1989), 541‒90. The Arabic text is published in ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Aflūṭīn ʿinda al-ʿArab (Kuwait:
Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1977).
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studied De Anima-type FMAs, is added to the discussion of the endoxa at quite an
early stage in the development of Avicenna’s philosophy. This discussion in al-Muḫ-
taṣar al-Awsaṭ alludes to a passage at the beginning of chapter 2 of the Theology of
Aristotle, which contains the exhortation to strip off one’s body in order to become
pure intellect and thus climb up to the divine world and become placed there and
become suspended within it (see below).
By taking a developmental attitude towards the evolution of Avicenna’s writings
seriously, textual source-contexts from which Avicenna takes his starting point can
be distinguished from systematic philosophical concerns that were driving the elab-
oration of his argument. Within such a framework, instead of trying to develop an
essentialised standard account of the FMA, it might be easier to accommodate the
competing interpretations as referring to two distinct branches of a complex argu-
ment in the making.
1 The Discussion of endoxa: Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ
As noticed by Ahmed Hasnaoui and Deborah Black, we encounter several versions of
thought experiments that bear some similarity to the FMA in Avicenna’s discussions
of non-demonstrative premises. Both authors account for this similarity by pointing
to Avicenna’s general predilection for such a type of thought experiment.¹⁰ In con-
trast to Hasnaoui and Black, I argue that we are dealing with one single argument
and its variants; I also argue that the discussion of endoxa in Avicenna’s writings
on logic actually provides the context from which the FMA evolves later on. A pre-
sumably early version of the Avicennian discussion of endoxawhich has passed hith-
erto unnoticed is contained in the Burhān (the section on the Posterior Analytics) of
al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ.¹¹ The main part of this discussion, which is very much like
later versions of the De Anima-type FMA, is introduced with an emphasis on its spe-
cial status as a legacy and recommendation.¹²
 Cf. Hasnaoui, “La conscience,” 288‒89: l‘hypothèse de l’homme créé d’un coup est un procédé hab-
ituel—en tout cas, il ne s’agit pas d’un hapax—auquel Avicenne recourt quand il veut mettre entre pa-
renthèses certaines croyances naturelles; cf. Black, “Certitude,” 138: “this introspective technique is
one of which Avicenna is fond” (part of a general discussion at 137‒39).
 For a translation of the relevant passage, see the Appendix below. On al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ see
Gutas, Avicenna, 433. The Kitāb al-Burhān of al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ is being edited by Orainab Ma-
shayekhi as part of her M.A. thesis. I would like to thank her for allowing me to access her edition.
 fa-innī uwaṣṣī tawṣiʾatan, cf. Appendix below. Ibn Sīnā, Šifāʾ (De Anima), in Psychologie d’Ibn Sina
(Avicenne) d’après son oeuvre Aš-Šifa’ = Psychologie v jeho dile Aš-Sifa’, ed. Ján Bakoš (Prague: Éd. de
l’Acad. Tchécolovaque des Sciences, 1956), 18.7: ʿalā sabīl al-tanbīh wa-l-taḏkīr išāratan šadīdatan, in
the case of the passage in al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, the work’s title alludes to this. A discussion of this
is found in Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich, “The Thought Experimental Method: Avicenna’s fly-
ing man argument,” Journal of the Americal Philosophical Association 4, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 150,
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Other than later (shorter) versions of discussing the probing of endoxa,¹³ the pas-
sage in al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ hints at an immediate connection to the Theology of Ar-
istotle. Turning to oneself, stripping off one’s habits and becoming intellect in the
wording of al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ parallels exactly the wording at the beginning of
chapter (mīmar) 2 of the Theology of Aristotle. This mīmar parallels Plotinus’s En-
neads 4.4.1‒4 and 4.3.18‒20,¹⁴ adding comprehensive independent material on
docta ignorantia.¹⁵ Mīmar 2 is devoted to the soul’s knowledge of the higher world,
its recollection of the higher world after its descent to the body, and to explain
how ignorance of some details of the bodily world constitutes a superior type of
knowledge. In this context,¹⁶ the beginning of the chapter contains an exhortation
to be alone with oneself and turn to one’s self by stripping off one’s body and becom-
ing an immaterial substance:
with more details in Tommaso Alpina, “The Soul of, the Soul in itself, and the Flying Man Experi-
ment,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (September 2018): 207‒8.
 Here I will not deal systematically with these later versions of the endoxa, which are contained in
virtually all comprehensive summae by Avicenna. On the chronology of the major works see Gutas,
Avicenna, 165.Within this framework, the chronology of the texts is as follows: (early) middle period:
ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Kuwait:Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1980), 12.5‒12; Kitāb al-Hi-
dāya, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbduh (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira al-Ḥadīṯa, 1968), 110.6‒112.9; later middle
period: Kitāb al-Šifāʾ: Kitāb al-Burhān, ed. ʻAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-
Miṣrīyah, 1954), 65.17‒66.4 and so forth; Kitāb al-Naǧāt fī al-Ḥikma al-Manṭiqīya wa-l-Ṭabīʿīya wa-l-Ilā-
hīyat, ed. Māǧid Faẖrī (Beirut: Dār al-Ǧīl, 1985), 80.6‒81.3 and 82.1‒83.1 (partial translation in Has-
naoui, “La conscience,” 288); late period: Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, ed. Jacques Forget (Leiden:
Brill, 1892). In al-Naǧāt, the section on the primary notions contains an extensive discussion on
the internal senses, most notably on wahm. In al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, the discussion of non-demon-
strative premises is extensive, given this work’s general brevity.
 For a brief survey of the correspondences between the chapters of the Theology of Aristotle and
the Enneads as well as on its contents, see Rotraud Hansberger, “Die Theologie des Aristoteles,”
in Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter, ed. Heidrun Eichner, Mathias Perkams, and Christian Schäfer
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), 166‒67.
 Cf. Peter Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus (London: Duckworth, 2002), 140‒47.
 The importance of this passage in the Theology of Aristotle has been discussed repeatedly with
reference to Avicenna’s theory of abstraction. Note that the focus of my analysis is different, though
some elements are related. For a recent reassessment of how Neoplatonic and Aristotelian elements
merge in Avicenna’s theory see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism,” in In-
terpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 1‒38. Cristina d’Ancona emphasises the importance of Neoplatonic elements, including the be-
ginning of mīmar 2. See d’Ancona, “Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna,” in Theories of Perception in
Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Pekka Kärkkäinen and Simo Knuuttila (Berlin: Springer,
2008), 47‒71. Dimitri Gutas criticises an earlier version of d’Ancona’s approach, including a reference
to FMA, in his “Intuition and Thinking: The Evolving Structure of Avicenna’s Epistemology,” in As-
pects of Avicenna, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2001), 1‒38. For a
more balanced evaluation of d’Ancona’s insistence on Neoplatonic elements see Hasse, “Avicenna’s
Epistemological Optimism,” 110‒12.
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Theology of Aristotle,mīmar 2 Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ
innī rubbamā
ḫalawtu bi-nafsī
wa-law innā raǧaʿnā
ilā anfusinā
I might stay alone with
myself
If we were to turn to
ourselves
wa-ḫalaʿtu wa-ḫalaʿnā
and slough off and slough off
badanī ǧāniban al-ʿādāt
my body, drawn away the habits
wa-ṣirtu ka-annī wa-ṣirnā ka-annā
and become as if I were and become as if we were
lam nasmaʿ šayʾan
wa-lam naʿtaqid wa-
innamā haṣalnā fī al-
dunyā dufʿatan
not hearing anything and
not having convictions
and being there in the
world all of a sudden as
ǧawhar muǧarrad ʿaqlan
an immaterial
substance
an intellect
bi-lā badan without body
fa-akūnu dāḫilan
fī ḏāti rāǧiʿan
ilayhā
and I would be inside
myself, turning to it.
Such close parallelism as is found in al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ (which comes close to an
actual paraphrase of the Theology of Aristotle) does not reappear in discussions of
endoxa contained in Avicenna’s later writings.¹⁷ Among the texts in the logica,
only this passage in al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ uses the notion of “sloughing off habits”
(ḫalʿ al-ʿādāt) while others use more neutral expressions for disregarding reported
opinions. This early version speaks of “becoming intellect,” a concept that corre-
 Among the De Anima-type FMA, the passage in al-Išārāt combines the thought experiment with
the exhortation to turn to oneself: irǧaʿ ilā nafsika […] Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt, 119,2. In Kitāb al-Hidāya, the
element of “coming down to the world” from an elevated position is alluded to in the endoxa-type
FMA: ka-annaka waradta ʿalā al-ʿālam dufʿatan (110.10). In the Theology of Aristotle, the pure intellect
is suspended and attached (mutaʿalliq) to the higher world, whereas the flying man in al-Išārāt is
splayed and suspended in free air for a moment (munfariǧa wa-muʿallaqa laḥẓa mā fī hawāʾ ṭalq;
119.9).
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sponds to the Theology of Aristotle and is not present in later versions.¹⁸ An element
that remains stable throughout the various FMA versions is the notion of “[being
there] all of a sudden.” It is present in nearly all versions of the discussions of en-
doxa, as well as in the De Anima-type versions of the FMA in al-Aḍḥawīya, al-
Šifāʾ, and al-Išārāt. In the context of the discussion of endoxa, this feature is clearly
linked to not basing one’s judgement on old habits or, most notably, opinions that we
have heard from others. In the De Anima-type this should be interpreted as a refer-
ence to memory of past sensations.
The element of “hearing” deserves attention: while in the De Anima-type ac-
counts in al-Šifāʾ and al-Išārāt, “hearing” appears to be an example of the activity
of the senses, in the endoxa-type versions and in al-Aḍḥawīya, “hearing” is the
way to have access to the opinion of others. In al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ, the way to
have access to information is described as the extraction of a meaning (maʿnā)
from its expression (lafẓ)—sensation is not an issue here. The state of the abstract
intellect is compared to sleep.¹⁹
Thus, among the discussions in the logical writings, al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ plays
an important role for my argument of a continuous evolution of the FMA as one
thought experiment modified and adapted repeatedly. In this very early writing,
the concern for freeing one’s intuitive understanding from opinions deeply rooted
in custom and habit (i.e., the discussion of endoxa) in fact can be linked to the The-
ology of Aristotle’s exhortation to stripping off one’s body.
2 Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya
Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya is a treatise stemming from the (early) middle period of Avi-
cenna’s activity; thus, it predates al-Šifāʾ.²⁰ It is devoted to the fate of the soul,
and the FMA is embedded in a chapter that argues that even in this world the ego
is not to be identified with body. Hence, after death, when the body is stripped
from its soul, the permanence of personal identity does not require a transformation
of the soul. The FMA occupies roughly the first half of chapter 4. The second half of
the chapter focuses on good and evil—good and evil pertaining to the body affect the
soul in a way comparable to the way it reacts if friends are affected.
In the context of my argument here, al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya plays an important
role for showing how the two types of FMA (endoxa-type and De Anima-type) relate
 Only a few among the other passages on the endoxa make any reference to ʿaql: Closest comes
ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma: “if a human being were to imagine himself created for the first time as intellecting”
(law tawahhama al-insān nafsahū ḫuliqa fī al-ḫulqa al-ūlā ʿāqilan; Ibn Sīnā, ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, 12.11‒12).
 This might strengthen al-Ṭūsī’s interpretation of the reference to sleep in al-Išārāt as a reference
to a state where the senses are blocked and the operation of intellect is pure and undisturbed. On this
see below.
 Cf. Gutas, Avicenna, 472‒77.
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to each other: Among the “classical” De Anima-type FMA, al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya
dwells most extensively on how we can step-by-step eliminate various parts of the
body from being the foundation of personal identity. Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya places
its emphasis on the epistemological component of identifying several distinct
parts of the body. While some organs in (actual) existence (fī al-wuǧūd) can be
taken away completely, others can only be taken away in part (i.e., the brain). The
heart can be taken away only in imagination (tawahhum). It is clear that the heart
is not the self-evident core of personal identity because it is less well-known than
this self-evident core:
As to the brain: One can assume that one part of it is separated from it while this item [i.e., guar-
antying personal identity] remains.
As to the heart: This is not possible for it in existence (wuǧūd) but in imagination (tawahhum).
This is so because a human being can know that his that-ness about which he talks is existent
while it is possible that at the same time he does not know that he has a heart and how it is,
what it is and where it is. Many people who do not see the heart affirm it and are convinced
about [its existence] based on what they hear, not intuitively (samāʿan lā bidāhatan), and they
think that it is the stomach. It is impossible that a thing is one while it is being known and un-
known together at one time.²¹
The fact that we have no intuitive knowledge of the heart and have to rely on what we
hear from others means that we have only imprecise and perhaps even false informa-
tion about it. Thus, in this discussion of how we know about the heart as part of our
body, the connection to the discussion of endoxa is still preserved in a quite explicit
way. Among the various versions of the FMA, in al-Aḍḥawīya, the motive for taking
away various layers of our body is spelled out most explicitly. One part of this process
is carried out in actual existence, the other solely in imagination.
Beyond the other De Anima-type versions, al-Aḍḥawīya does not draw on the
concept of cutting off the individual from external information (be it opinions
heard from others or sensory perception). In al-Aḍḥawīya, “doubting” does not at
all appear as an epistemic strategy. The focus is rather on taking away parts of the
body and thus identifying them as distinct from each other. Some parts can be iden-
tified by taking them away in actual existence (external limbs, parts of the brain),
while some can be taken away in imagination. In the case of the heart (in order to
distinguish from the true self), al-Aḍḥawīya operates with a distinction between in-
tuitive knowledge and knowledge based on hearsay or even false opinions, but it
does not refer to doubt. Instead of doubtable versus undoubtable knowledge,
 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Aḍḥawīya fī al-Maʿād, ed. Ḥasan ʿĀṣī (Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-Ǧāmiʿīya li-l-Dirāsāt
wa-l-Našr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1987), 127.13‒128.5. Unless noted otherwise, all translations into English are
my own.
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there is the distinction between what is known (the soul) and what is not known or at
least not known to all (the heart).²²
In the second half of the chapter after the thought experiment, Avicenna elabo-
rates on his conception of the relation between soul and body as a relation that is
comparable to how we become accustomed to friends and companions: when the
body suffers, the soul is affected in the same way as we are affected when friends
have to suffer evil:
If someone imagines that from this entity these bodily concomitants are taken away, and that he
loses some type of comfort and pain which he has because he shares in body, then he is like
someone who loses comfort and pain which exist in his brethren and companions. And if
then he obtains comfort and pain which are specific for him, then he is truly comfortable or suf-
fering pain.²³
3 Kitāb al-Šifāʾ’s De Anima 1.1 and 5.7²⁴
As the versions of the FMA in al-Šifāʾ’s De Anima-part have been discussed quite fre-
quently, in the present context I will emphasise only some minor details that have
received little attention so far and which may assist in identifying and reassessing
the context of elements of scepticism in Avicenna’s text.²⁵
Both passages in al-Šifāʾ’s De Anima-part draw on al-Aḍḥawīya argument’s core
structure of identifying known and unknown parts of the human being and its body.
 Adamson and Benevich’s analysis of the FMA in the De Anima part of al-Šifāʾ’s points out that the
statement “what is affirmed is distinct from what is not affirmed” is the weak spot of the argument.
The argument should not be saved by understanding it as saying “that these two things are possibly
distinct,” but rather this is “stated confidently and with no caveat.” There is no “reference to a dem-
onstration to be given later on that might show that they really are distinct” (Adamson and Benevich,
“Thought Experimental Method,” 151‒52). In view of Adamson and Benevich’s analysis, it should be
noted that the al-Aḍḥawīya in fact addresses the problem; it even stands at the core of this FMA ver-
sion.
 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Aḍḥawīya, 129.10‒14.
 Respectively, Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 18.4‒19.2; 252.1‒254.4 and following.
 The classic exposition is Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’ in Context.” There are several recent
contributions: Adamson and Benevich center on al-Šifāʾʾs De Anima. According to them, the FMA
serves to “determine whether it belongs to the soul’s essence that the soul be related to a body…
The answer to this question is no” (“Thought Experimental Method,” 148). The soul’s essence can
grasped by identifying its essential attributes (155‒60). Marwan Rashed argues that “Avicenna bor-
rows arguments developed originally by Abū Hāšim in order to demonstrate that a definite mode be-
longs to the living being as a whole (ǧumla).” Rashed, “Chose, item et distinction: L’”homme volant”
d’Avicenne avec et contre Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (Septem-
ber 2018): 167. Tommaso Alpina contextualises the FMA within the overall structure of al-Šifāʾʾs De
Anima and analyses it as a “transition from the inquiry into the existence of the soul as a relational
entity to that into the essence is marked by the Flying Man argument at the end of I, 1” (Alpina, “The
Soul of,” 202).
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The passage in De Anima 1.1 refers twice to the old remedy for dealing with obstinate
sceptics (beating them): at the beginning, Avicenna points out that we talk to a per-
son who is able to see the truth, who is not in need of being educated and beaten,
and who does not require guidance away from sophistries (min ġayr iḥtiyāǧ ilā taṯqī-
fihī wa-qarʿi ʿaṣāhu wa-ṣarfihī ʿan al-muġālaṭāt).²⁶ Towards the end he stresses again
that, in the case of a person who is unaware of his self, this person must be beaten
(wa-in kāna ḏāhilan ʿanhu yuḥtāǧu ilā yuqraʿu ʿaṣāhū).²⁷
In De Anima 1.1, the context of sensory deprivation is new as compared to earlier
versions: In the discussion of endoxa, the thought-experiment is primarily about
making sure that the person has not heard from others about their opinions. In
other words, the argument is primary concerned with moral and ethical implications.
In De Anima 1.1, however, vision and touch are ruled out as sources of information
due to the fact that there exist parts of the body to which these senses correspond.²⁸
In addition, the role of imagination (here, taḫayyul) is emphasised: a three-dimen-
sional extension of the incorporeal part of the self cannot be conceived and, even
if imagination were to conceive an additional hand, it would not conceive it as
part of the immaterial.²⁹ The concept of doubting—familiar from the endoxa and
missing in al-Aḍḥawīya—is reintroduced and combined with the concept of affirma-
tion (iṯbāt): the flying man does not doubt the affirmation of his self.
In the De Anima 5.7 the focus has somewhat shifted. The argument is embedded
in a discussion of how the various levels of the soul’s faculties and powers are unit-
ed, most notably as regards sensation (iḥsās) and appetitive powers (quwwā šahwā-
nīya) (as it turns out, according to Avicenna’s psychology these two are located in the
animal and vegetative part of the soul).³⁰ The FMA provides the third argument for
this principle’s immateriality.³¹ The FMA is introduced as a reference to what has
 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 18.8
 Ibn Sīnā, 19.2
 Only in De Anima 5.7 (Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ [De Anima], 252.3: lam yasmaʿ ṣawtan) is the flying
man also blocked from hearing.When touch and vision are being blocked, in all accounts, this seems
to primarily serve the aim of preventing the flying man from having any notion of his parts.
 It is not easy to discern precisely what the argumentative context for this remark is. One context
might be the elaboration of the role of the internal senses in Avicenna’s theory of mental existence:
the thought experiment’s man can conduct more thought experiments—this does not weaken the on-
tological status of what he is thinking. Moreover, I would like to suggest that this should be linked to
discussions on the role of imagination when doubting conclusions. The term Avicenna prefers for this
in his discussions of endoxa and non-demonstrative premises, however, is wahm. The activity of
wahm leads to correct results only if it relies solely on sensation, not if it relies on more abstract no-
tions.
 This unifying principle is to be construed by analogy to the common sense that unites the activ-
ities of the five senses (Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ [De Anima], 249.9‒11). It coordinates various layers of
activity: “Because of this it is true when we say: ‘When we feel something we have a desire.’ Or:
‘When we see this we become angry.’ This one thing in which these powers are united is what every-
one estimates to be his self (ḏāt).” Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 250.6‒8.
 Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 251.10, and so forth.
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been said earlier, and in fact this version in De Anima 5.7 stands closer to al-
Aḍḥawīya than De Anima 1.1: the structure of its argument revolves around the
“What is known is not identical to what is not known.”³² The (Plotinian) theme of
taking off one’s body like garments is emphasised:
In reality, these parts of the body are nothing else but garments which become for us like parts of
us because they have been attached to us for such a long time.When we imagine ourselves we
don’t imagine ourselves as naked but with bodies as cover. The reason for this is the long attach-
ment. In the case of garments, we are used to taking them off and throwing them away, other
than it is the case with the parts of body. Our opinion (ẓannunā) that the parts of our body
are parts of us is more deeply rooted than our opinion that garments are a part of us.³³
These parts of the body are not known intuitively, i.e. “because I know that I am my-
self.”³⁴ Rather I know that I have a heart and a brain “by sensation, by hearing [what
others say], by experience (bi-l-iḥsās wa-l-samāʿ wa-l-taǧārub).” Here, we can discern
how De Anima 5.7 relates to al-Aḍḥawīya’s reference to the distinction between intui-
tive knowledge and questionable knowledge: in al-Aḍḥawīya, knowledge about the
heart is based on hearsay (samāʿ); in De Anima 5.7 this is amplified to knowledge
based on these three sources. In this account, we can discern an immediate connec-
tion to Avicenna’s elaboration of the theory of sensation, most notably the internal
senses. In addition to sensation in a stricter sense, this includes experience that
rests on memory, which is one of the five internal senses.
4 Al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt
When describing the evolution of the FMA as a continuum of modifications in the
arguments’ scope, an element of continuity between al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt and De
Anima 5.7 exists in their shared interest in just what constitutes personal identity
and also coordinates the various powers. However, al-Išārāt’s version introduces a
completely new level of “sceptical” attitude to the argument by questioning the
very possibility of intuitive introspective access to the self—albeit very tentatively
and, ultimately, dismissively.While in all other versions of the FMA this was not pre-
sented as a problem, the reference to mental states that might question this ability
garners al-Išārāt’s discussion a specific quality. We may try to explain this feature
by the fact that the theory of self-awareness, of feeling (šuʿūr) one’s self, becomes in-
creasingly important in the later works of Avicenna. In De Anima 1.1, the obstinate
sceptic who questions intuitive self-awareness is to be treated by being beaten: he
cannot be reached by the argument. Al-Išārāt is somewhat more careful when stip-
 Ibn Sīnā, 252.4.
 Ibn Sīnā, 252,4‒8.
 Ibn Sīnā, 252.15.
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ulating the conditions for the thought experiment. The person should be “sound”
(ṣaḥīḥ) or in some other state in such a way that they have sound intuition (bal
wa-ʿalā baʿḍ aḥwālika ġayrihā bi-ḥayṯu tufaṭṭinu li-l-shayʾ fiṭnatan ṣaḥīḥatan)³⁵: “I
think (ʿindī) that this is something which [every] person has who carries out this in-
trospection (al-mustabṣir), in a way that even in the case of a sleeper during his sleep
and a drinker in his drunkenness his self does not escape him, even if no represen-
tation of the self exists in memory (ḏikr).”³⁶ “Soundness” as a precondition for carry-
ing out the thought experiment extends not only to intellect (ʿaql) but also to the
(bodily) condition (hayʾa).³⁷ Sensation is blocked from the flying person; more pre-
cisely, as in De Anima 1.1, seeing and touch are blocked in a way that prevents the
flying person from perceiving parts of the body.
The version of the argument in al-Išārāt has become quite influential for many
interpretative approaches. In particular, the interpretation which has been made
popular by al-Ṭūsī’s commentary has influenced its later reception. Al-Ṭūsī’s com-
mentary has the tendency to understand the text as systematically covering all op-
tions of a scenario. He understands the reference to the one who sleeps as an allu-
sion to someone whose external senses are blocked, while the reference to the one
who is drunk would refer to both external and internal senses.³⁸ This implication
is not really present in Avicenna’s text, and one might as well think of sleep and
drunkenness as states where the mind is not functioning completely soundly. Like-
wise, al-Ṭūsī interprets the condition that the person should not see the parts of
the body as an allusion to the whole (ǧumla); he interprets the condition that the per-
son’s limbs should not touch each other as a precaution against feeling the parts.
Other texts (the arguments in al-Aḍḥawīya and De Anima 1.1) suggest that for Avicen-
na himself the emphasis is only on the parts. Al-Ṭūsī interprets hawā’ ṭalq as “tepid
air,” and thinks that Avicenna suggests that sensation of heat and cold is also
blocked. If we understand hawā’ ṭalq as just referring to “free air” (a lexicalised ex-
pression), the passage in al-Išārāt (like the scenario in De Anima) takes precautions
against the parts of the body touching each other.
5 Conclusion: Cogito Yes or No?
How can these observations on details of the development of the flying man argu-
ment help us to better understand the argument’s scope as well as the presence of
“sceptical” elements? Apart from showing that there is in fact a connection between
the evolution of the FMA and the discussion of endoxa in antiquity and after, we can
 Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt, 119.2‒3.
 Ibn Sīnā, 119.4‒6.
 Ibn Sīnā, 119.7: (al-dhāt) […] ḫuliqat […] ṣaḥīḥa al-ʿaql wa-l-hayʾa.
 Cf. al-Ṭūsī, Šarḥ al-Tamwīḥāt, in Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā
(Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1985), 2:343.1‒344.1.
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better understand how certain elements function in the overall framework of Avicen-
na’s corpus. We can see why the role of doubt oscillates so much in our interpreta-
tions. In the endoxa-type of the FMA, doubt serves to evaluate information and to
filter external influences: opinions we hear from others can be doubted, they do
not form part of the core of certain knowledge we have in ourselves. How thinking
or the formation of concepts is actually effected is not of interest in this context.
In the De Anima-type, this feature of blocking external information is taken over
by sensory deprivation: The flying man (possibly to the exclusion of the Išārāt’s ver-
sion) does not actively doubt the objects of sensation or the exterior world, but the
very setting of the thought experiment blocks him from these objects.
These two elements function in analogous ways in the two types of arguments
and hence can be easily replaced by each other in our analyses when comparing Avi-
cennian texts. In fact, even the De Anima-type FMA calls for this type of interpreta-
tion: When the De Anima-type emphasises that the flying man does not doubt his
self, we are led to the question what would happen if we did not block the flying
man from sensation. Could he systematically doubt all the information he receives
from his senses? Would he then have doubts about his self? Among the Avicennian
texts themselves, only al-Išārāt’s version seems to think along these lines and to in-
clude the option of really questioning sensation (during sleep and drunkenness).
Even given the thought experiment’s provisions for isolating him from the exterior,
the flying man might encounter problems in accessing his self-evident self—when
sleeping or when drunk. Avicenna thinks he does have access, but does not seem
to be entirely sure about this. In contrast, the earlier texts assume that after doubting
there remains something certain.
We have to keep in mind that this process is not really what we are familiar with
calling “thinking” nowadays. Avicenna’s theory of the internal senses and his inter-
est in the phenomenon of self-awareness were important steps in elaborating a more
“modern” medieval conception of thinking. His theories integrated contemporary
medical state-of-the-art knowledge about the importance of the brain with the phil-
osophical imperative of explaining intellectual activity as a purely immaterial proc-
ess relying on external immaterial principles.
By amalgamating the two types of FMA, one might easily construct a striking
parallel with Descartes. However, Avicenna keeps these two strands separate. The
De Anima-type flying man is facing a situation which is the inverse of the Cartesian
setting: His genius malignus would be the person who carries out the thought experi-
ment and manipulates the flying man’s small little world. This genius malignus would
not deceive the flying man by deceiving his senses when providing them with false
information, as in the Cartesian example. Rather, the genius would create an empty
world in which all possibilities of sense-perception (or more general: any type of
doubtable knowledge) appear to be a priori eliminated. The flying man knows
only what is left over and what is not taken away by the all-doubt-eliminating genius,
and what is left over is the flying man’s immaterial self. As a result, Avicenna’s De
Anima-type flying man actually cannot have doubts about anything at all.
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When comparing his situation to that of the Cartesian thinking ego, however, we
must also consider the framework of Avicenna’s ontology. This ontology includes a
strong conception of mental existence: objects formed in the intellect and/or imag-
ined in our minds do exist. The very existence of the doubting flying man is secured
by the thought activity of the person who carries out the thought experiment—this
thinking person securing his (mental) existence does not necessarily have to be
the flying man himself, but could be. If Avicenna or someone else carries out this
thought experiment, the doubting and flying man is made a form by the active intel-
lect as well. Given this form of a flying man, the flying man as an entity does exist in
mind and has a mental existence. Thus, for the very existence of the flying man’s im-
material self it is sufficient that someone (externally or internally) creates it as a dis-
tinct entity by thinking about it correctly, an ego cogito id est, so to say. In Avicenna’s
FMAs references to the first person and the third person are used quite interchange-
ably—in our minds, we can isolate our own selves as well as those of other persons.
Appendix: A Text from the Section on the Posterior
Analytics in Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ
Ms. Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, folio 102r: If we were to turn to ourselves and
slough off the habits, and if we were to become as if we do not hear anything and
do not have convictions and as if we were there in the world all of a sudden as an
intellect, and if we were to make ourselves doubt them [i.e., the ḏaʾiʿāt, “widespread
opinions” mentioned earlier]—then this is possible for us, and this is not possible in
the case of the intelligibles and objects of imagination mentioned earlier. For exam-
ple, if we place ourselves in this position, and if then we present to ourselves that
justice is good and lying is base, and if we then make ourselves doubt about this,
this is possible for us. Or rather, it is not necessary for us to think this is true. If
we present to ourselves that the whole is larger than the part, then it is not possible
for us to have doubts about this. If we were to present to ourselves that behind the
universe there is either something or vacuum it would not be possible for us to have
doubts about this, while this [in fact] is false.
folio 102v: Widespread [views (ḏāʾiʿāt)] and the accepted [views (maqbūlāt)] which
take their rank are the principles of dialectics (ǧadal).When they are taken in a dem-
onstration, this is sophistry (muġālaṭa). Opinions (maẓnūnāt) are the principles of
rhetoric (ḫiṭāba), and the ambiguous [views (mušabbahāt)] are the principles of
sophistry (muġālaṭa). Here we are only talking about what is good for demonstration,
how it is, what its signs are, and how it is used in demonstration. Before this I shall
give you a recommendation (fa-innī uwaṣṣī tawṣiʾatan).
I say: If you wish to consider whether a premise is primary, then take it as if you
were refuting what is familiar and the customs and what you have heard people say.
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Rather think that this is the first day you hear something or that intellecting it is
sleep. Then make present the premise as a meaning (maʿnā) without its wording
(lafẓ) in your mind. See if it is possible that you have doubts about it, and whether
you find for yourself that its opposite is possible. If you do not find something like
this, see whether there is no way for what calls you to believe it is true that its op-
posite enters your imagination (wahm) and leaves what is in the custom of your
senses (ḥiss). [And see] whether the impossibility of forming its concept in your imag-
ination is because your imagination calls you in it to one of the states of sensibles. If
this is the case, have doubts about it, and if this is not the case, then it is self-evi-
dent.
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The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,
Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas, and Sforno
Medieval philosophers usually held that monotheism can be proved by reason. They
had good authority for this opinion, since the Philosopher himself had concluded his
Metaphysics 12.1076a5, with a felicitous quotation from Homer: “a plurality of sover-
eigns is not good. Let there be one sovereign!” (Iliad 2:204). Nonetheless, there were
some medieval sceptics who denied that reason can prove monotheism. Two such
sceptics were al-Ghazālī and Hasdai Crescas. In my following remarks, I shall discuss
the views of al-Ghazālī and Crescas, as well as those of two staunch defenders of Ar-
istotelian monotheism, Averroes and Maimonides. The story I wish to tell begins with
al-Ghazālī, moves on to Averroes and Maimonides, and concludes with Crescas. Cres-
cas may be seen as taking up the cudgels for al-Ghazālī against Averroes and Maimo-
nides. My story will also include a section on Moses Narboni, who was the first to
perceive the relationship of Maimonides’s view to Averroes’s. In addition, it will in-
clude a postscript on Obadiah Sforno’s discussion of the problem.
Al-Ghazālī (1058‒1111)
In his Incoherence of the Philosophers, Discussions 5‒7, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn
Muḥammad al-Ghazālī maintains that God’s unity is not known by reason but by
prophecy alone. According to reason, he argues, there can be more than one God.
He held that Aristotelian philosophers, like al-Fārābī and Avicenna, were thus neces-
sarily unsuccessful in their attempts to establish God’s unity philosophically.
In Discussion 5, al-Ghazālī challenges the Aristotelian view that Necessary Exis-
tence entails unity. Why, he asks, could there not be two Necessary Existents, both
uncaused (in accordance with the definition of necessary existence), and thus nei-
ther the cause of the other? Why, in other words, could there not be two independent
Gods?¹
In Discussion 7, al-Ghazālī returns to the problem of many Gods, and again
speaks about the possibility of two separate uncaused beings who were both “creat-
ing Gods.” He asks, “Why should it be impossible for the causal series to end in two
causes, one the cause of the heavens and the other the cause of the [four] elements,
or one the cause of the intellects and the other the cause of all bodies? […] [The phi-
 Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed. and trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brig-
ham Young University Press, 2000), 85. The passage is found also in Averroes, The Incoherence of
the Incoherence, trans. Simon van den Bergh (London: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1969), 1:170‒71. Arabic
text: Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), 288.
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losophers’] inability to deny two creating Gods [ilāhayn ṣāniʿayn] has become clear.”²
Al-Ghazālī’s challenge is plain and simple: Why not posit two independent creating
Gods, each necessarily existent, each the first cause of His own causal chain? After
all, Aristotelian philosophers had emphasised the essential difference between the
celestial realm, made of the “fifth element,” or ether, and the terrestrial realm,
made of earth, water, air, and fire. They had also emphasised the essential difference
between the intellects, which are incorporeal, and the corporeal beings, whether
made of the four elements or of the fifth element. Why not, then, suppose that
part of the universe was created by one God, and another part by a second God?
Why not? Shouldn’t the Aristotelians be able to agree with such a supposition?
Averroes (1126‒98)
Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rušd (Averroes) responds to al-Ghazālī’s
challenge in Discussions 5‒7 of his Incoherence of the Incoherence.
In Discussion 7, Averroes presents a particularly interesting argument. One world
entails one God. Heaven and earth, incorporeal beings and corporeal beings—all are
one and interconnected. The world is a cohesive and coherent whole. Everything fits.
It has no loose parts. Its oneness points to its One cause:
Now, this proposition [i.e., al-Ghazālī’s conjecture that one God could rule one part of the world,
and a second God another part] is not true […] The Creator of the heavens is [also] the Creator of
the cause that created the [four] elements. This is the theory of the philosophers […] For it is evi-
dent that the worlds [e.g., the celestial and terrestrial worlds or incorporeal and corporeal
worlds] exist through cause and effect, and it is the inquiry concerning these causes which
leads us to a first cause [ʿilla ūlā] for everything. And if some of these different principles
were wholly independent of others—that is, if some were not the cause of others—then the
world could not be a single [wāḥid] and interconnected [murtabiṭ] whole. To the impossibility
of this the divine words refer, “Had there been in [heaven and earth] Gods besides God, both
[heaven and earth] surely would have been destroyed” (Quran 21 [The Prophets]:22).³
Al-Ghazālī had alluded to the putatively absolute Aristotelian divisions between the
celestial and terrestrial realms or the incorporeal and corporeal realms. Averroes now
denies that these divisions are absolute.⁴ The world, he insists, is one (wāḥid) and
interconnected (murtabiṭ), and thus can have only one first cause, who is God.
 Al-Ghazālī, Incoherence of the Philosophers, 113; Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, 1:226
(Arabic 375).
 Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, 1:228‒29 (Arabic 379‒80). Averroes argues against the
possibility of many Gods also in his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. See below, “Post-
script: Obadiah Sforno (1475‒1550).”
 Averroes holds that the celestial and terrestrial realms have several factors in common. See his De
Substantia Orbis, ed. and trans. Arthur Hyman (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1986),
chapter 2, 87‒98 (Hebrew 30‒36).
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To be sure, it is not clear what force Averroes attributed to the argument for God’s
unity based on the unity of the world. Did he consider it an apodictic proof (burhān)
or only a good dialectical response to al-Ghazālī? This question shall not concern us
here.
Maimonides (1138‒1204)
Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides) raises the problem of many Gods in the
course of presenting his philosophic proofs for the existence, unity, and incorporeal-
ity of God in Guide of the Perplexed 2:1. The problem is found in two of three proofs
which appear as a sort of addendum after the conclusion of his discourse on the four
philosophic demonstrations of God based on the premise of the eternity of the world.
In the second of these three addended proofs, Maimonides writes:
It has already been established as true by means of a demonstration [bi-l-burhān; ibn Tibbon:
ba-mofet] [in Guide 1:72] that all that exists is like one [wāḥid; ibn Tibbon: eḥad] individual
with interconnected [murtabiṭ; ibn Tibbon: niqšar] parts, and that the forces of the sphere per-
vade this lowly matter and fashion it. Thus, it is impossible […] that one God should be exclu-
sively concerned with one part of what exists, and another God with another part, for one part is
interconnected [murtabiṭ; ibn Tibbon: niqšar] with the other […] [T]he substrate of the action [of
the supposed two Gods] is one [wāḥid; ibn Tibbon: eḥad], and its parts interconnected [murtabiṭ;
ibn Tibbon: niqšar] […]
In the case of any complex composed of parts, […] [its] first cause [al-sabbab al-awwal; ibn Tib-
bon: ha-sibba ha-riʾšona] is [that which causes] the coming-together of [those] parts […] If the
agent that causes the parts of the complex to come together […] is one, He is indubitably God
[…] [T]he fact that all that exists is one indicates to us that He who caused it to exist is One.⁵
The argument that Maimonides brings here against the conjecture that there are
many Gods is precisely Averroes’s argument against al-Ghazālī: if the world is one
and interconnected, it must have only one first cause. Maimonides does not mention
here al-Ghazālī or Averroes, but it is clear he has in mind the exchange between
them. The description of the world as “one” and “interconnected,” together with
the use of the concept of “first cause,” reflects prima facie the direct influence of
Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence.⁶ The triple use of the word murtabiṭ (“in-
 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1963), 1:250‒51. Arabic text: Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, ed. Shlomo Munk and Isaschar Joel (Jerusalem: Juno-
vitch, 1931), 174‒75. When citing Arabic terms from the Guide, I have also given the renderings in
Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon’s medieval Hebrew translation, which was used by Narboni, Crescas,
and Sforno.
 Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence was written in 1179/80, about a decade before the com-
pletion of Maimonides’s Guide in 1190. In a letter to his pupil Joseph ben Judah ibn Simeon written in
1191, Maimonides stated that he had just received all of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle except
the Parva Naturalia, and praised them. See Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Isaac Shailat (Maaleh Adummim:
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terconnected”) is particularly significant. Moreover, Maimonides’s previous proof,
i.e., the first of the three addended proofs, which similarly raised the problem of
many Gods, may also be indebted to the al-Ghazālī–Averroes debate.⁷
Maimonides begins the present proof of divine unity by alluding to his discus-
sion of the world as a macroanthropos in Guide 1:72. In this long and provocative
chapter, he presents much empirical evidence supporting the unity and interconnect-
edness of the world. The influence of Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence may
also be seen in this chapter. Maimonides writes, “just as in the single human being
there is a force that connects [quwwa tarbiṭu; ibn Tibbon: koaḥ yiqšor] the parts of the
body one with the other […] so there subsists in the world as a whole a force that
connects [quwwa tarbiṭu; ibn Tibbon: koakh yiqšor] its parts one with the other.”⁸
This very same comparison is found in Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence,
Discussion 10: “there must exist a […] force diffused in all the parts of the universe
in the same way as there is a force in all the parts of a single animal which connects
them [quwwa tarbiṭu] one with the other.”⁹ Guide 1:72 contains also the statements
that the oneness of the world is very “necessary” (ḍarūrī; ibn Tibbon: hekhraḥi) or
very “useful” (mufīd; moʿil) for the proof of God’s unity, and that “the One has cre-
ated one being.”¹⁰ In addition, it is written there: “it is impossible that the parts of
the world should exist […] without one another such that […] the heavens could exist
without the earth or the earth without the heaven.”¹¹ Guide 1:72 and 2:1 complement
each other and both chapters reflect the influence of Averroes’s Incoherence of the
Incoherence.
Maʿaliyyot, 1987), 313; cf. 552‒53. The books received presumably included Averroes’ long commenta-
ries on Aristotle. Now, Averroes’ long commentaries on the Physics, De Caelo, De Anima, and Meta-
physics were written between 1186 and 1191, and Maimonides’s acquiring them already in 1191 indi-
cates his great interest in Averroes’s work. It is plausible that he had previously read some of
Averroes’s Aristotelian epitomes, begun in 1159, and middle commentaries, begun in 1168. Maimoni-
des’s Guide alludes in at least one passage to Averroes’s Decisive Treatise, written in about 1178; see
my “Averroes and Maimonides on the Duty of Philosophical Contemplation (iʿtibār),” [in Hebrew,]
Tarbiz 58, no. 1 (1989): 122‒30. There is also evidence that the Guide was influenced by Averroes’s Ex-
position of the Methods of Proof, written in 1179/80; see Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 73‒76. The Decisive Treatise and the Exposition, together
with the Incoherence of the Incoherence, comprise Averroes’s three main theological treatises.
 Maimonides, Guide 2:1, p. 249‒50 (Arabic 173‒74). Maimonides, like Averroes, presumes here that if
there were a second God, He would be similar to the first God in one respect and different in another.
See Averroes, Incoherence, 1:228 (Arabic 378).
 Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187‒88 (Arabic 130).
 Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence, 1:253‒54 (Arabic 420). Averroes attributes this view to
Alexander of Aphrodisias. Van den Bergh (Incoherence, 2:143) notes that this precise view is not
found in Alexander’s known writings, although similar views are found in them.
 Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187 (Arabic 129)
 Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187 (Arabic 129‒130).
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The notion of the interconnectedness of the world also appears in Guide 1:54.
Moses is said in that chapter to have contemplated the entire world and the intercon-
nectedness (irtibāṭ; hiqqašram) of its parts.¹²
As with Averroes, it is not clear what force Maimonides attributed to the proof of
God’s unity based on the unity of the world. He refers to it as “necessary” or “use-
ful,” which may indicate that it is dialectical, not demonstrative. However, as we
have seen, he writes in Guide 2:1, that it has been proven “by means of a demonstra-
tion [bi-l-burhān; ibn Tibbon: ba-mofet]” in Guide 1:72 that “all that exists is like one
individual with interconnected parts.”
Narboni (c. 1300‒c. 1362)
The relationship between Maimonides’s abovementioned proof of God’s oneness in
the Guide of the Perplexed 2:1, and Averroes’s critique of al-Ghazālī in the Incoherence
of the Incoherence, was astutely noticed by Rabbi Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne,
known as Narboni, in his Commentary on the Guide. Narboni writes:
“It has already been established as true by means of a demonstration [in Guide 1:72] that all that
exists is like one individual,” etc. [Maimonides’s] words here are self-evident. However, it might
seem on the basis of what we have said [in commenting on Maimonides’s previous proofs] […]
that “it is not impossible that there be two Gods, one the cause of the heavens and the other the
cause of the earth, or one the cause of the intelligible and the other the cause of the sensible […]
Now, this proposition is not true […] [Rather,] the Creator of the heavens is the Creator of the
cause that created the [four] elements. This is,” as Averroes said [in the Incoherence of the Inco-
herence, Discussion 7], “the theory of the philosophers. For it is evident that the worlds [e.g., the
celestial and terrestrial worlds or the incorporeal and corporeal worlds] exist through cause and
effect, and it is the inquiry concerning these causes which leads us to a first cause for every-
thing. And if some of these different principles were wholly independent of others—that is, if
some were not the cause of others—then the world could not be a single and interconnected
whole [davar eḥad we-niqšar].” The sensible would not be connected to the intelligible, one
part of the world would not be connected to the other. The world would fall apart and be de-
stroyed. The Master [Maimonides] pointed to this, saying [in Guide 1:72]: “the fact that all that
exists is one indicates to us that He who caused it to exist is One.”¹³
 Maimonides, Guide 1:54, p. 124 (Arabic 84). Cf. my “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide
2:24,” Aleph 8 (2008): 216‒18.
 Moses Narboni, Beʾur le-Sefer More ha-Nevukhim, ed. Jakob Goldenthal (Vienna: Imperial and
Royal State Press, 1852), 2.1.26a‒b (my translation). The passage begins with a quotation of Maimo-
nides (from the text of the Guide cited above), continues with a quotation of al-Ghazālī (from the text
of the Incoherence of the Philosophers cited above, but as paraphrased by Averroes in his Incoherence
of the Incoherence), and follows with a quotation of Averroes (from the text of the Incoherence of the
Incoherence cited above). The words quoted from Maimonides’s and Averroes’s books are placed here
in quotation marks. On Narboni’s Commentary on the Guide, see Gitit Holzman, “Narboni’s Commen-
tary to Maimonides’ Guide,” [in Hebrew,] Daat 74/75 (2013): 197‒236.
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One of the most important medieval commentators on the Guide, Narboni also wrote
commentaries on at least five works by Averroes.¹⁴ He read Averroes’s books, as he
read Maimonides’s Guide, in Hebrew translation, and is sometimes considered to
be more an Averroist than a Maimonidean.¹⁵
In the text under discussion, Narboni does not mention al-Ghazālī by name and
mentions Averroes only obliquely, even though the whole passage is to a large extent
copied verbatim from The Incoherence of the Incoherence, which Narboni read in
Rabbi Qalonymus ben David ben Ṭodros’s Hebrew translation (c. 1328). Although
Narboni’s etiquette of quotation leaves much to be desired, it is safe to say that he
was not trying to hide the influence of al-Ghazālī and Averroes on his comments.
His discussions of Maimonides’s previous proofs of God refer the reader to the
views of al-Ghazālī and Averroes in the Incoherence of the Incoherence; he clearly ex-
pects the reader to read Maimonides’s discussion of divine unity together with Aver-
roes’s discussion. It is Narboni’s style to weave quotations into his own comments.
Narboni did not add anything new to the debate about many Gods between al-
Ghazālī, Averroes, and Maimonides. However, he deserves credit as a commentator
for perceptively documenting the relationship of Maimonides’s proof of the oneness
of God to Averroes’s critique of al-Ghazālī.
Hasdai Crescas (c. 1340‒1410/11)
Rabbi Hasdai ben Judah, known as Hasdai Crescas, agreed with al-Ghazālī that Rea-
son cannot prove the existence of the one God. He embraced al-Ghazālī’s sceptical
argument for many Gods, but also conceded the counterargument brought by Aver-
roes and Maimonides. In effect, he revised al-Ghazālī’s argument in order to meet the
common objection of Averroes and Maimonides. His discussion of the subject is
found in his Light of the Lord 1:3.4—a chapter treating the dogma of God’s unity:
This root [of the unity of God] comprises two notions: first, that God is One in Himself in perfect
simplicity; and second, the denial of plurality. For after it has been posited that He is One in
Himself and simple, it is still open to doubt [safeq] whether there is more than one God.
As for […] the [question of a] plurality [of Gods], it arises if we posit that there is a God, one and
simple, but that there is more than one. It is inescapable that the other [God] either occupies
Himself with the government of the universe or a part thereof, or does not.
It is false that He occupies Himself with a part thereof, for the entire universe is interconnected
[niqšar] and “like one individual” [eḥad] [see Maimonides, Guide 1:72; 2:1], and it is fitting that it
 Gitit Holzman, “The Theory of the Intellect and the Soul in the Thought of Moses Narboni” [in
Hebrew] (PhD diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996), 14‒24.
 For example, “Moses Narboni […] was the most accomplished Jewish philosopher of the Averroist
school,” and considered it “a pious duty to mold Maimonides’ words so that they agree with Averro-
es’s version of Aristotle’s philosophy.” Herbert A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 391‒92.
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comes from one Agent.
As for the case in which [the other God] does not occupy Himself with the government of this
universe, an objector can claim that there is a God who governs a different world from this
one, for the possibility of other worlds will be demonstrated [in Light of the Lord 4:2; cf. 1:2.1].
Here the doors of speculation are locked.
In order to remove this perplexity and this doubt, and to annul every objection to this great root
[i.e., the unity of God], the Law has enlightened our eyes, we the community of believers, by its
dictum, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One” [Deuteronomy 6:4].¹⁶
Although Crescas does not cite al-Ghazālī, Averroes, Maimonides, or Narboni, his dis-
cussion of the problem of many Gods manifestly continues their conversation. He
surely had Maimonides’s Guide open on his desk, and his mention of the world’s
being interconnected “like one individual” clearly alludes to it. He may not have
had before him al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers or Averroes’s Incoherence
of the Incoherence, but, as Harry Wolfson has observed, he could have been ade-
quately informed on the al-Ghazālī–Averroes debate simply by reading Narboni’s
Commentary on the Guide, which he used extensively.¹⁷ He may also have consulted
al-Ghazālī and Averroes more directly: his student Rabbi Zeraḥiah ha-Levi Saladin
authored the Hebrew translation of al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence.
In agreement with Averroes and Maimonides, Crescas holds that reason proves
that this world has only one God: the empirically observed oneness of the world
points to the oneness of God. However, he does not conclude that al-Ghazālī’s argu-
ment cannot be salvaged. It is still possible, according to him, to argue that one God
governs one part of creation and other Gods govern other parts. Our world may in-
deed be one and interconnected and therefore have only one God, but there may
be many worlds—each of them coherent and cohesive, and each having its own
one and simple God.
Crescas argues in Light 4:2 and elsewhere that there exists a plurality of worlds:
since space is an infinite expanse and an infinite number of magnitudes is possible,
it may be inferred that there could be an infinite number of worlds.¹⁸ Twice he cites a
midrash according to which God “travels about in 18,000 worlds” (b. Avodah Zarah
 Crescas, Light, 1.3.4, p. 115‒16 (English 114). Cf. Light, 1.1.31, p. 60; 1.2.19, p. 93 (English 68‒69, 96).
Page references to the Light are to Or Adonai, ed. Shlomo Fisher (Jerusalem: Ramot, 1990), followed
by references in parentheses to the English translation: Light of the Lord, trans. Roslyn Weiss (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018). I have omitted the text beginning with omnam ke-še-yitbaʾer and end-
ing with bilti manhig le-davar, since it almost certainly was not written by Crescas. See below, “An
Interpolation in Crescas’ Text.”
 Harry Austryn Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1929), 14. Cf. 729, s.v. Narboni, Moses.
 Crescas, Light, 4:2, p. 388‒92 (English 334‒37); cf. 1:2.1, p. 75; 1:2.15, p. 89; 1:2.19, p, 93 (English 82,
93, 96). See Wolfson, Crescas, 117‒18. See also my Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (Amster-
dam: Gieben, 1998), 8‒13, 23‒29, 31‒40.Cf. Ari Ackerman, “Hasdai Crescas and the Scholastic Philos-
ophers on the Possible Existence of Multiple Simultaneous Worlds,” Aleph 17 (2017): 139‒54.
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3b).¹⁹ If there are 18,000 worlds, there could be 18,000 Gods. If there is an infinite
number of worlds, there could be an infinite number of Gods. Crescas does not
draw this mind-boggling conclusion explicitly, but it is implicit in his arguments.
Much like al-Ghazālī, Crescas concludes: Reason cannot establish monotheism.
The belief that God is One is based not on Reason but on Scripture: “Hear, O Israel,
the Lord our God, the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4).
Crescas’s anti-Aristotelian theory of many worlds gives dramatic support to al-
Ghazālī’s argument that reason cannot establish monotheism. Reason may be able
to establish that there is one God for our closed little world, but it cannot establish
that there is one God for the infinite universe. Crescas successfully provided a new
and improved version of al-Ghazālī’s argument—a version that reflected the “new
physics” which was taking its first steps in his day.
In the quoted passage, Crescas uses the word “doubt” (safeq) twice: “it is still
open to doubt whether there is more than one God”; “to remove […] this doubt […]
the Law has enlightened our eyes.” Similarly, he writes in Light 1:3.6: “although
[Abraham] had an inclination toward the truth, he did not escape all doubt until
[God] caused His light to overflow upon him, which is prophecy.”²⁰ Reason cannot
dispel doubt regarding God. It cannot dispel scepticism. Only prophecy can do that.
An Interpolation in Crescas’s Text
The passage under discussion from Crescas’s Light of the Lord 1:3.4 contains two ad-
ditional sentences in the printed editions of the book. On the basis of manuscript evi-
dence, it is clear that these sentences are an interpolation added sometime between
the early 1405 recension and the final 1410 recension. There are many such interpo-
lations in the Light, some inserted by Crescas and some by students and colleagues
who helped him edit the book in his last years.²¹ In the present case, the interpola-
tion is anti-climactic, confused, and so preposterous that it may be concluded with a
 Crescas, Light, 1:3.4, p. 116 (English 115); 4:2, p. 388 (English 337).
 Crescas, Light, 1:3.6, p. 122 (English 119). See my “Maimonides, Crescas, and the Parable of the
Castle,” in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Thought, ed. Racheli Hal-
iva (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 167‒76.
 In the superior Florence ms. of the Light, written in Saragossa in 1405 by a scribe in Crescas’s cir-
cle and revised there in 1410, the words omnam ke-še-yitbaʾer through bilti manhig le-davar are added
in the margin. See my Physics and Metaphysics, 12; 34‒25. In the introduction to the Light, Crescas
mentions “associates” (ḥaverim) who helped him edit the book (p. 7; English 24). Regarding problem-
atic interpolations inserted by the “associates,” see my “The Authorship of the Reservations concern-
ing Determinism in Crescas’ Light of the Lord,” [in Hebrew,] Kiryat Sefer 55, no. 4 (1980): 794‒801. The
problem of divine power occupied Crescas in his last years. The discussion of divine omnipotence
(Light, 2:3) was a late addition to the book. In the uncorrected 1405 text of the Florence ms., it is omit-
ted in the list of topics given in the preface of Light 2. See my Rabbi Hasdai Crescas [in Hebrew] (Jer-
usalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2010), 48‒50.
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high degree of confidence that Crescas could not have written it. The paragraph con-
taining the interpolation reads as follows (with the interpolation italicised):
As for the case in which [the other God] does not occupy Himself with the government of this
universe, an objector can claim that there is a God who governs a different world other than
this one, for the possibility of other worlds will be demonstrated [in Light 4:2; cf. 1:2.1]. However,
since it will be proved in Books 2 and 3 [i.e., in 2:3, and 3a:1] that God’s power is infinite in inten-
sity, it is clear that the One has power for them all. As for the case in which one [God] governs and
the other [God] does not govern anything,] here the doors of speculation are locked.
The interpolation begins with a response to the sceptical argument from many
worlds: even if there are many worlds, the one God has sufficient power to govern
them all, for His power is infinite. This argument seems to have been framed by
someone who did not understand the original Averroist-Maimonidean proof. The ar-
gument deviates from the logic of that proof, which was based on the empirically ob-
served interconnectedness of the world and had nothing to do with the metaphysical
question of God’s power. The expected rationalistic response to the argument that
many worlds might entail many Gods would be the counterargument that the entire
infinite universe with all its multiple worlds is one and interconnected and so reflects
the work of one God.
In the continuation of the interpolation, it is argued, in favour of the sceptical
thesis, that, according to Reason, it is possible that there might be two Gods—one
governing the many worlds and another who does not govern them. This is curious.
What does it mean to imagine a God who governs nothing? If divinity is defined as
implying omnipotence, does it make sense to speak of an idle God? Meyer Waxman,
who generally lauds Crescas’s theology, derided this argument:
It must be admitted that Crescas in this point is not only weak, but prejudiced. His polemical
nature overmastered the philosophical. What does he mean by a passive God? If God possesses
infinite potence, what then is that other being? […] It is evident that this absurd argument was
only advanced […] as a shot at the philosophers, though it fell short of the mark.²²
Waxman is right that the argument is “weak” and “absurd.” However, he did not
know of the manuscript evidence that the argument is an interpolation and almost
certainly not authored by Crescas.
 Meyer Waxman, The Philosophy of Don Hasdai Crescas (New York: Columbia University Press,
1920), 70.
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Conclusion: Al-Ghazālī and Crescas vs Averroes and
Maimonides
The debate between al-Ghazālī, Averroes, Maimonides, and Crescas about the possi-
bility of many Gods concerns the epistemological foundations of monotheism. Does
monotheism depend on Reason or on Faith? Is Reason, left on its own, powerful
enough to overcome scepticism and prove monotheism? With regard to the funda-
mental theological principle of God’s unity, Averroes and Maimonides made a valiant
effort to defend Reason, while al-Ghazālī and Crescas were hard-nosed sceptics.
Postscript: Obadiah Sforno (1475‒1550)²³
The problem of many Gods was revisited about a century after Crescas by the famed
biblical exegete Rabbi Obadiah ben Jacob Sforno of Cesena, who endorsed the Aver-
roist-Maimonidean approach. His discussion appears in his philosophic treatise,
Light of the Nations, Question 8 (cf. Question 6). Sforno wrote two recensions of
this work, one in Hebrew (Or ʿAmmim, 1537) and one in Latin (Lumen Gentium,
1548). He knew intimately Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, which he read in
Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation. He may not have read Crescas’s Light of the Lord,
which was not readily available in Italy until it was printed in Ferrara in 1555. Sfor-
no’s discussion of the problem of many Gods is based primarily on Averroes’s Long
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but he also makes reference to the Incoher-
ence of the Incoherence. He read Averroes’s works in Latin translations. He begins his
discussion of the problem of many Gods as follows:
We shall investigate if there is only one Creator or if there are many Creators. Now, it seems at
first that there are many. The support for this is the argument of many of the ancients related by
Averroes in his [Long] Commentary on the Metaphysics 12.52 [= 12.10.1075a], saying: “Since con-
traries should have contrary principles, and the good and the bad we see in the world are con-
traries, it may be supposed that there are at least two principles or efficient causes in the world,
one producing the good things and the other the bad things.”
However, the opposite proves to be the case. The Creator is One and there is no other Creator
equal to Him. First, this is proved by Aristotle’s argument in the Metaphysics 10.7 [=10.2.
1054a], namely: “In passions, qualities, quantities, and motions, there is one in number.”
These words of his were explained by Averroes as follows: “As for passions, qualities, quantities,
and motions, there is in each of these species one thing that is the principle of the number of
them.” He further said: “When we join this with what has been proved in the Physics [8.5‒6;
 When this paper was originally presented in Hamburg in May 2017 at the conference on “Scepti-
cism from Antiquity to Modern Times,” it stopped with Crescas. Following my presentation, Dr. Giada
Coppola suggested I add a discussion of Sforno. I thank her for her suggestion and her helpful advice.
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256a‒260a], i.e., that there is a pre-existent Prime Mover absolutely separate from all matter […]
it is also proved that this existent [i.e., the Prime Mover] is the principle of Substance.”²⁴
The argument for the existence of many Gods, here set down by Sforno in the name
of “the ancients,” as reported in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, is
similar to the argument set down by al-Ghazālī in his Incoherence of the Philosophers.
However, whereas al-Ghazālī argued that the existence of a plurality of Gods may
seem to follow from the opposition of heaven and earth or of intellect and body,
“the ancients” make the same argument with regard to the opposition of good and
bad. Sforno’s proof here against the existence of many Gods is based on Averroes’s
remarks in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, not on his remarks in the In-
coherence of the Incoherence. All species of things have first causes, but there is one
First Cause for all things in the universe.
In a subsequent passage, Sforno has recourse to the argument from the world’s
“interconnectedness” and “oneness” that we have seen in Averroes’ Incoherence, Dis-
cussions 5‒7, and Maimonides’ Guide 1:72 and 2:1. Sforno writes:
[That there is only one God] is argued in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.52 [= 12.10.1075a], in his say-
ing: “There is good in the army and good in the commander, but there is more good in the
commander” […] He added: “All beings are ordered together, and directed toward a being
that is one in number.” Averroes explained: “It is clear this includes all beings, for they all
exist for the sake of one […] which is the First Cause […]” It is therefore appropriate that in Scrip-
ture the Creator, who […] orders all species of beings, is called “the Lord of Hosts [Adonai
ṣevaʾot]” [1 Samuel 1:3, 11, etc., esp. Jeremiah 31:34]. This teaches that from the manifest order
[…] in which the entire world is interconnected and one [mequšar we-eḥad; Lat. unitas], there
is demonstrated the existence of an Orderer who is One, and who intended the unity of the
world.²⁵
Aristotle and Averroes explain that the critical good is that of the military command-
er who knows how to arrange his troops with an eye to one purpose. As a well-or-
dered army reflects the skill of its commander, so the well-ordered universe demon-
strates the existence of the First Cause or God. The unitas universi proves the unitas
Ordinator. In using the expression “interconnected and one,” Sforno alludes to Aver-
roes’s arguments in the Incoherence, Discussions 5‒7, and Maimonides’s arguments
in the Guide 1:72 and 2:1. Sforno’s explanation of the term “Lord of Hosts” is resource-
 Obadiah Sforno, Kitve Rabbi Obadiah Sforno, ed. Zev Gottlieb (Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-Rav Kook,
1983), 456; Sforno, Lumen Gentium (Bologna: Anselmo Giaccarelli, 1548), 45a. See Averroes, Aristotelis
Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venice: Iunctas, 1562‒74), 8:256a‒257a; 338a. Arabic text:Tafsīr mā
baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa, ed., Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938‒52), 1273‒77; 1715 (note the
reading ǧawāhir instead of ǧawhar, i.e., “substances” not “substance”). Cf. Charles Genequand, Ibn
Rushd’s Metaphysics: A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on the Metaphysics,
Book Lām (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 201.
 Sforno, Kitve Sforno, 457; Lumen Gentium, 45b. See Aristotelis cum Averrois, 8:337a‒338a (Arabic
text, 1709‒15). Cf. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’s Commentary, 198‒200.
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ful, apt, and apparently original. He interprets the biblical “Lord of Hosts” in the
light of Aristotle’s excellent military commander, who arranges his troops skilfully
and unites them. Later in the text, he repeats this explanation:
This is what the Prophets taught, when they used the expression “The Lord of Hosts” [I Samuel
1:3, 11; Jeremiah 31:34; et al.]. For from the manifest connection [qešer; unitas] between the cel-
estial hosts and the terrestrial hosts, with their wonderful order, like the order found in every
army, whose soldiers unite according to the intention of the commander, the unity of the Creator
is demonstrated.²⁶
Celestial and terrestrial physics are wondrously interconnected, and reveal the unity
of the Creator, the Lord of Hosts.
Although Sforno’s main discussion of the problem of many Gods is found in
Light of the Nations, Question 8, he broaches it in Question 6 in a fascinating exeget-
ical passage:
The Law of our God […] gave a proof to show that the universe has a Creator who brought it into
existence, when it said: “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were
created” [Genesis 2:4]. In other words, from the connection [qešer; colligatum] of “the heaven
with the earth,” their being conjoined and concurring in the activity of their “generations”
[…] it is proved that “they were created” by the power of a Creator […] as it is stated explicitly
in the continuation of the verse: “in the day that the Lord God made earth and heaven” [Genesis
2:4] […]
This very same proof was expounded by Moses our Teacher, may peace be upon him, saying:
“Know this day and lay it to thy heart, that the Lord, He is God in heaven above and upon
the earth beneath, there is none else” [Deuteronomy 4:39]. This means that from the connection
[qešer; colligatio] of the higher realm with the lower realm and the arrangement of their order […]
it is demonstrated that “the Lord,” who brings the universe into existence […], is the “God,” who
is the Governor and Ordinator. Now, from this it is clear that “there is none else.” For the exis-
tence of more than one Creator is not possible, as will be proved by a demonstration in what
follows [i.e., in Question 8].²⁷
The collaboration between heaven and earth, testified by Genesis 2:4 and Deuteron-
omy 4:39, proves that there is one Creator (“the Lord”), who is also the Governor
(“God”) who gives order to the celestial and terrestrial “generations” (i.e., the plants,
animals, and other creatures).
In sum, with regard to the problem of many Gods, Sforno agreed with Averroes
and Maimonides and not with al-Ghazālī and Crescas. His distinctive contribution to
the debate concerning this problem was his novel Aristotelian explication of the bib-
lical cognomen, “Lord of Hosts,” and his adroit exegeses of Genesis 2:4 and Deu-
teronomy 4:39.
 Sforno, Kitve Sforno, 460; Lumen Gentium, 46b.
 Sforno, Kitve Sforno, 452‒53; Lumen Gentium, 43a‒b. Cf. Sforno, Commentary on the Pentateuch (in
standard rabbinic Bibles), Genesis, ad loc. and Deuteronomy, ad loc.
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Josef Stern
What is Maimonidean Scepticism?
Nowadays we call a philosopher a sceptic when he denies that knowledge is possi-
ble, and scepticism is a problem in epistemology, indeed a problem for its very pos-
sibility. Since Descartes, the sceptic is also prone to raise radical, hyperbolic doubts
like demon deceivers or brains-in-a-vat that challenge ordinary beliefs or common
knowledge like the existence of an external world or the existence of other minds.
It is no surprise, then, that the contemporary sceptic is someone primarily to be re-
butted, his doubts exposed as not just unjustified but even pathologically abnormal.
Scepticism nowadays is a disease whose cure is refutation.
In antiquity, it was different. Faced with conflicting perceptual appearances, and
the resulting anxiety and unhappiness of not knowing which one to believe, one in-
itiated enquiry in order to discover what is true and what the real natures of things
are, to reveal what to believe with security and thereby achieve some modicum of
happiness. But lo and behold, scientific enquiry led to new and additional conflicts,
not among appearances but between equally strong but opposing theories between
which the inquirer had no clear reason to believe one rather than the other. Not yet
freed from uncertainty and unhappiness, the rational reaction for the inquirer was
not to assert that knowledge is impossible—for that would also be a claim that
would raise conflict with others—but rather to suspend judgment, to refrain from as-
sertion, i.e., from commitments about what is real and true. Unlike the dogmatist
who claims to have reached his destination, the truth, the sceptic instead continues
the enquiry, never terminating his search with any final determination, which would
once again make him vulnerable to a conflicting assertion, and more unhappiness.
This indeed was the original meaning of skepsis: unceasing enquiry or investigation,
not doubt or the denial of knowledge. By suspending all judgment, by divesting him-
self of the anxious drive to achieve knowledge, thereby circumventing the source of
unhappiness, the sceptic ipso facto finds himself in a state of happiness, if only tran-
quillity or peace of mind. In sum, for the ancients, scepticism was not the disease,
but a cure to the dogmatist’s unhappy condition that results from his unsatisfiable
pursuit of the true natures of things in which to believe.¹
I wish to thank Gad Freudenthal for originally suggesting to me that I write a précis of my book, The
Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, as well as the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies—
Jewish Scepticism for hosting me as a senior fellow in 2016‒17 while I wrote this paper and present-
ed it at the Centre’s International conference on scepticism.
 This, of course, is an oversimplified presentation of ancient scepticism that, among other things,
does not distinguish between Academics and Pyrrhonians. For a more nuanced, critical presentation,
see Myles Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Bur-
nyeat, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 117‒48; Michael Frede, “The Skeptic’s Belief,” in
OpenAccess. © 2019 Josef Stern, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-007
According to the lore of our forefathers, after the third century CE, scepticism
dropped out of sight during the Middle Ages. Over the past quarter century, this re-
ceived view has now been corrected by distinguished scholars such as Dominik Per-
ler, Robert Pasnau, and Henrik Lagerlund, who mainly draw on evidence culled ei-
ther from early Christian thought, such as Augustine’s Contra Academicos, or from
late thirteenth through fourteenth century Latin philosophy, beginning with John
of Salisbury, continuing through Henry of Ghent, Siger of Brabant, Scotus, Ockham,
and Nicholas of Autrecourt.² In the Islamic world, one finds mention of al-Ghazālī,
who survived a short bout of scepticism and some of whose sceptical arguments an-
ticipate Hume and Descartes.³ In this paper, I want to sketch in broad strokes a scep-
tical philosophy put forth in the Arabic philosophical world, not in the writings of a
Muslim but of arguably the greatest medieval Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides
(1138‒1204).⁴
To call Maimonides a sceptic, or someone with sceptical leanings, will be a sur-
prise for those who know him, as he has traditionally been cast, as a card-carrying
Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 179‒200; Frede, “The
Skeptics’s Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,” in Essays in An-
cient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 201‒22; Gisela Striker, “Academ-
ics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard
Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 195‒207; Striker, “On the Difference between
the Pyrrhonists and the Academics,” in Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 135‒49; Striker, “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy,” Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 83, no. 2 (August 2001): 113‒29; Striker, “Sceptical Strategies,” in Doubt
and Dogmatism, ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1980), 54‒83.
 It is noteworthy that Richard Bosley and Martin Tweedale, eds. Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy,
second edition (Toronto: Broadview, 2006), an “interactive” anthology of medieval philosophy, contains
a topical unit on “Skepticism,” including readings from Augustine, Henry of Ghent, Siger of Brabant,
John Duns Scotus, and Nicholas of Autrecourt. On medieval scepticism, see Henrik Lagerlund, “A His-
tory of Skepticism in the Middle Ages,” in Lagerlund, ed. Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Miss-
ing Medieval Background (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 1–28; Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human
Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a, 75‒89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Pasnau, “Science and Certainty,” in Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 357‒68; Dominik Perler, “Does God Deceive Us? Skepti-
cal Hypotheses in Late Medieval Philosophy,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medi-
eval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 1‒28; Perler, “Skepticism,” in Cam-
bridge History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 384‒96; <litr=60>Perler, “Scepticism and Metaphysics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Phi-
losophy, ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 546‒65.
 On al-Ghazālī’s scepticism, see Taneli Kukkonen, “Al-Ghazali’s Skepticism, Revisited,” in Rethink-
ing the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill,
2010), 29‒60.
 As an overview of a sceptical reading of Maimonides’s Guide and for reasons of space, this essay
does not attempt to evaluate alternative and, in particular, dogmatic readings which would be nec-
essary to make a full case on its behalf. For such an evaluation of dogmatic readings, see Josef Stern,
The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
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Aristotelian, Neoplatonist, or Rationalist (whatever that means), or as a traditional
pious rabbi. But, in fact, he was already read in the Middle Ages and either appre-
ciated or criticised for his sceptical or agnostic views both by some of his greatest
commentators—including his translator Samuel ibn Tibbon, Shem Tov b. Joseph
ibn Falaquera, and Profayt Duran (Efodi)—and, among the Latin scholastics, by no
less than Thomas Aquinas.⁵ However, this reading of Maimonides was eclipsed by
Averroism in the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and only during the last
forty years has it re-emerged—indeed, as the catalyst for what I take to be the liveliest
debate in contemporary Maimonidean studies.
The historical sources of Maimonides’s scepticism are not known. To the best of
our knowledge, none of the classical sceptical works were translated into Arabic (or
Hebrew, including Philo’s description of the Modes), although we have a good de-
scription of the Pyrrhonists and Academics in Saadia’s Book of Doctrines and Beliefs
(probably drawn from a doxography). Galen and the medical tradition are a possible
avenue of transmission, and specific sceptical arguments surface not infrequently in
the Arabic literature.⁶ Arabic terms like wuqūf or tawaqquf and takāfu’ al-adilla have
been identified as translations of epochē and isostheneia; sceptics were known as
šākkūn, ǧuhhāl, mutaǧāhilūn, ḥisbānīya, muʿānida, lā adrīya, and sūfisṭāʾīya, a
term by which Maimonides refers to those who doubt the senses, a view he attributes
to the kalām.⁷ At the end of the day, Maimonides’s sources remain a mystery, and we
 Based on a close reading of Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences, in which we can see him work-
ing out the positions and their sources later expressed in their mature form in the Summas, Richard
Taylor argues that Aquinas read not only Maimonides as a sceptic about God and His attributes, but
also Avicenna through a Maimonidean lens. See Richard Taylor, “Maimonides and Aquinas on Divine
Attributes: The Importance of Avicenna,” in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed in Translation: A His-
tory from the Thirteenth Century to the Twentieth, ed. Josef Stern, James T. Robinson, and Yonatan A.
Shemesh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2019). For further discussion of Maimo-
nides’s sceptical influence on Aquinas, see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina,
Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986); Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, Mai-
monides and St. Thomas on the Limits of Reason (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995);
and Mercedes Rubio, Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the Knowledge of God. An Exami-
nation of the Quaestio de attributis (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008).
 See Saadia Gaon, Sefer Emunot we-Deʿot [in Hebrew,] trans. Joseph Qafih (Jerusalem: Surah Press,
1969/70), 69‒72. English translation in Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel
Rosenblatt (New Haven: Yale University Press), 80‒83. Saadia refers to the Pyrrhonists as those who
hold the doctrine of wuqūf and the Academics as mutaǧāhilīn. See also Harry A. Wolfson, Repercus-
sions of the Kalam in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1979), 160‒62;
Abraham Joshua Heschel, “The Quest for Certainty in Saadia’s Philosophy,” Jewish Quarterly Review
33, no. 3 (January 1943): 265‒313.
 On scepticism in the Islamicate world, see Saul Horowitz, Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis auf
die Entwicklung der Philosophie bei den Arabern (Breslau: Schatzky, 1915); Josef van Ess, “Skepticism
in Islamic Religious Thought,” Al-Abḥāṯ 21 (1968): 1‒15; Patricia Crone, “Ungodly Cosmologies,” in
Islam, the Ancient Near East and Varieties of Godlessness: Collected Studies in Three Volumes, Volume
3, ed. Hanna Siurua, (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 124‒27; Moshe Perlmann, “Ibn Hazm on the Equivalence of
Proofs,” Jewish Quarterly Review 40, no. 3 (January 1950): 279‒90; Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge Trium-
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also should not rule out the possibility that his scepticism was simply original to
him.
We can date the beginning of the contemporary debate to an essay published in
1979 by Shlomo Pines, who argued that Maimonides adopted a position allegedly
held by al-Fārābī in his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics according to
which “the human intellect can only cognize objects perceived by the senses and im-
ages deriving from sense data.”⁸ On that basis Pines claimed that “Maimonides is of
the opinion that no scientific certainty can be achieved with regard to objects that are
outside the sub-lunar world,”⁹ thereby ruling out human cognition of the form, or
concept, of any purely immaterial being like God and, indeed, of anything beyond
the sublunary realm of terrestrial physics, thereby excluding cosmology and astron-
omy. However, the conclusion Pines drew from these epistemic limitations was that
Maimonides, anticipating Kant, was a critical and not a sceptical philosopher. Lack-
ing certainty that there exist separate intellects, Maimonides held, to quote Pines
again, “there is no point in setting oneself the aim to intellect or to achieve a con-
junction with a separate intellect,”¹⁰ and instead Maimonides gave primacy to the
life of political or practical action over that of intellectual perfection.¹¹
phant (Leiden: Brill, 1970); Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981); Stern, Matter and Form, 146‒47, n25.
 Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Mai-
monides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 1, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979), 93. I write that al-Fārābī allegedly held this view because, in the ab-
sence of the lost Commentary, all our evidence are reports by ibn Bāǧǧa, Averroes, and others, which
has been recently challenged by Hebert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,”
Maimonidean Studies 3 (1995): 49‒103; Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist (Oxford: Littman Li-
brary of Jewish Civilization, 2011).
 Pines, “Limitations,” 93.
 Pines, 94.
 Pines claims that Maimonides should be characterised as a critical (rather than as a sceptical)
philosopher. See Shlomo Pines, “The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides’ Halakhic Works and
the Purport of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. Shlomo Pines and Yir-
miyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 11. See also Pines, “Dieu et L’Etre Selon Mamonide: Exégese
d’Exode 3,14 et doctrine connexe,” in Celui Qui Est: Interprétations Juives et Chrétiennes d’Exode 3‒14,
ed. Alain de Libera and Émilie Zum Brunn (Paris: Cerf, 1986), 15‒24; Pines, “Les limites de la méta-
physique selon al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, et Maimonide: sources et antitheses de ces doctrine chez Alex-
andre d’Aphrodise et chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13, no.1 (1981): 211‒25; 1‒14; Pines,
“Translator’s Introduction,” in Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, translated by Shlomo Pines (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1:lvii‒cxxxiv. Pines’s thesis has generated a huge literature,
some supporting but most challenging it. Those sympathetic to Pines or his general view include War-
ren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment, Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in
Jewish Law, Thought, and History, presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the occasion of his seventieth
birthday, ed. Jacob Elman and Jeffrey. S. Gurock (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1997), 149‒62;
Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide 2:24,” Aleph 8 (2008): 213‒35; Ken-
neth Seeskin, Searching for a Distant God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joel L. Kraemer, “Is
There a Text in this Class?” Aleph 8 (2008): 247‒99; and Stern, Matter and Form. Critics include
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I believe that Pines put his finger on the pulse of the Guide but in calling Mai-
monides a sceptic rather than a critical philosopher, I intend to depart both from
Pines’s conclusion that Maimonides surrendered the theoretical and adopted a prac-
tical or political ideal for human happiness and from Pines’s empiricist basis for Mai-
monides’s epistemic limitations. On the other hand, I do not mean to claim that Mai-
monides neatly fits into ancient categories of scepticism, either Pyrrhonian or
Academic. Since his dogmatists are the falāsifa, the Arabic (some more, others
less Neoplatonised) Aristotelians, the conception of knowledge (epistēmē or ʿilm),
that is the target of his sceptical critique is different from the Hellenistic models of
belief that his predecessors were attacking. And because his scepticism is also, I
shall argue, restricted to metaphysics, the specific arguments he gives differ from
the modes one finds in, say, Sextus.¹²
Notwithstanding these differences, I will argue that Maimonides is best charac-
terised as a sceptic for two main reasons: First, his arguments follow the sceptic’s
general argumentative schemata. In some cases, he deliberately gives for each argu-
ment for a proposition p a counter-argument of equal strength for not-p (or a contrary
of p), resulting in a state of equipollence with respect to which the inquirer is brought
to suspend judgment, epochē, and not assent to either proposition. In other cases, he
shows how reasoning specifically about metaphysics leads to its own self-refutation
and, again, epochē. And in almost all arguments, the deciding factor is the lack of a
criterion—although what that criterion is differs for Maimonides from the Ancients.
As with the Pyrrhonists, what is critical for scepticism for Maimonides is that the ar-
guments lead to conflicting claims of equal strength, equipollence (in Greek, isosthe-
Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” in Von der mitte-
lalterlichen zur modernen Aufklarung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987), 60‒129; Herbert A. Davidson,
“Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”; Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist; Charles H. Man-
ekin, “Belief, Certainty, and Divine Attributes in the Guide of the Perplexed,” Maimonidean Studies
1 (1990): 117‒41; Manekin, “Maimonides and the Arabic Aristotelian Tradition of Epistemology,” In
Beyond Religious Borders: Interaction and Intellectual Exchange in the Medieval Islamic World, eds.
David M. Freidenreich and Miriam Goldstein (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2011), 78‒95; Barry S. Kogan, “What Can We Know and When Can We Know It? Maimonides on
the Active Intelligence and Human Cognition,” in Moses Maimonides and His Time, ed. Eric Ormsby
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 121‒37; Alfred Ivry, “The Logical and
Scientific Premises of Maimonides’ Thought.” In Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, edited
by Alfred. L. Ivry, Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998), 63‒97; Ivry,
“Guide 2:24 and All That (i)jâza,” Aleph 8 (2008): 237‒46.
 Another difference I cannot discuss here for reasons of space is that, unlike the classical sceptics,
who generally adopted metriopatheia, or moderation, as their stance towards moral behaviour and
the emotions, Maimonides advocates apatheia, the eradication of (moral) emotions and bodily
urges (to the highest degree possible) and, where that is not possible, their minimisation as a form
of accommodation to necessity. This difference reflects Maimonides’s Neoplatonic negative valuation
of all things material or bodily. See Stern, Matter and Form, chapter 7. Because the body is physical or
natural, this stance is again compatible with his scepticism about metaphysics but it yields a rather
different picture than that of the classical sceptics.
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neia). It is not sufficient to raise a doubt, the least possibility that would challenge
the certainty of the knowledge claim. Second, the value Maimonides sees in suspen-
sion of judgment, epochē, or the self-refutation of reasoning, is never simply theoret-
ical but also practical: to put oneself in a state of mind either of tranquillity, hence, a
kind of happiness, and/or of awe and dazzlement that is an analogue to the kind of
divine worship that the dogmatist holds one can achieve through the acquisition of
positive knowledge about God. For Maimonides as for the Ancients, scepticism is al-
ways in the service of a practical end.¹³
In order to sharpen these two motivations for characterising Maimonides as a
sceptic, I will begin by spelling out the dogmatic background to which he is reacting.
From the start to finish of the Guide, Maimonides emphasises time and again
that the true human self is the intellect and that true human perfection is intellectu-
al:
[The human’s] ultimate perfection is to become rational in actu, I mean to have an intellect in
actu; this would consist in his knowing everything concerning all the beings that is within the
capacity of man to know in accordance with his ultimate perfection (Guide 3:27, 511).¹⁴
The true human perfection […] consists in the acquisition of the rational virtues—I refer to the
conception of intelligibles, which teach true opinions concerning the divine things. This is in
true reality the ultimate end; this is what gives the individual true perfection, a perfection be-
longing to him alone; and it gives him permanent perdurance; through it man is man (3:54, 635).
Within Maimonides’s Neoplatonised Aristotelian philosophical world, one achieves
this ideal human perfection through full actualisation of one’s intellectual potential-
ity: one acquires all possible concepts and truths—of physics, cosmology, and meta-
physics—and then contemplates or uses these truths in theoretical reasoning con-
stantly, exclusively, and continuously. The individual who achieves this intellectual
state is as close as one can be to a disembodied (separate) intellect. This is the phi-
losophers’ ideal, and it is also Maimonides’s ideal.¹⁵
But that leaves open the question—the core of the current controversy—as to
whether Maimonides believed that this ideal of intellectual perfection can be realised
or achieved by real human beings. The obstacle is that the human being for Maimo-
 See Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic,” on the practical dimension of scepticism in particular and, on
ancient philosophy in general, Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson,
trans. by Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? Trans. Michael
Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
 References to the Guide appear in parentheses in the body of the text according to book number
and book chapter, followed by the page number in Pines’s English translation.
 Pines argued that, because of his critical epistemology, Maimonides gives up the theoretical ideal
in the closing paragraph of the Guide 3:54 and opts for a life performing acts of loving-kindness, right-
eousness, and judgment through assimilation to God’s actions which he interprets as civic or political
happiness. This move has been criticised by many. For an alternative explication of this passage, see
Stern, Matter and Form, 340‒49.
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nides is necessarily a hylomorphic substance composed of matter/body and form/in-
tellect: there can be no form without matter and no matter without form. But this in
turn raises the question whether the human’s matter/body absolutely prevents her
from achieving the perfection of her form/intellect. More specifically, (1) does
one’s matter/body, which includes bodily faculties like the imagination, prevent
one from purely intellectual apprehension of metaphysics and the heavens; and (2)
do bodily needs and desires prevent one from constantly, exclusively, and undivided-
ly attending to and engaging in intellectual activity with the requisite concentration
to be a fully actualised, constantly active intellect? If we answer yes to either ques-
tion, the tension between the human’s intellect and body leaves her at most with an
incomplete grasp of metaphysics and with significantly less continuous and less in-
tensive intellectual activity than what perfection demands.
In response to this open question, readers of the Guide fall into two camps. Dog-
matic readers hold that Maimonides believed that the ideal of intellectual perfection
is humanly realisable; hence, it must be possible for human beings to acquire knowl-
edge of metaphysics, cosmology, and God. Sceptical readers hold that Maimonides
did not believe this is possible for the reason that, as Maimonides states, “matter
is a strong veil preventing the apprehension of that which is separate from matter
as it truly is” (3:9, 436‒37). Here “matter” signifies the imagination, which, as a bod-
ily faculty, cannot conceive or represent anything except as a body, i.e., a subject or
substance with attributes, a kind of compositeness or complexity that conflicts with
the simplicity of the immaterial. But without knowledge, or apprehension, of the im-
material, there is no knowledge of metaphysics, hence, no absolute perfection of the
intellect and no happiness consequent to that state.
In other words, dogmatic readers of the Guide identify Maimonides’s views with
those of his dogmatists, the falāsifa, the (more or less Neoplatonised) Arabic Aristo-
telians, like the earlier Al-Fārābī and Avicenna who, for all their differences, claim
that perfected human intellects possess scientific knowledge of metaphysics that
in turn enables conjunction or union with the Active Intellect and the highest kind
of intelligible happiness. This widely-held identification of Maimonides with the falā-
sifa is easily understandable. On traditional dogmatic readings of the Guide, it was
assumed that, because Maimonides harshly attacks the kalām, and because the falā-
sifa are their enemy, then, on the assumption that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s
friend, he must identify himself in general with the falāsifa and their Aristotelian
views. However, the full picture is much more complicated and nuanced. First, Mai-
monides’s deepest objection to the kalām—one senses genuine revulsion—concerns
their method or philosophical ideology: he depicts them as apologists, polemicists,
and theological opportunists who, rather than “[…] conform in their premises to the
appearance of that which exists, consider how being ought to be in order that it
should furnish a proof for the correctness of a particular opinion” (1:71, 178). They
shape the facts to fit their theory rather than, as Themistius insisted, have “the cor-
rect opinions conform to that which exists” (1:71, 179). However, on particular ques-
tions of significance for metaphysics and epistemology—especially on the nature of
What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 103
the modalities, the limits of causal explanation, and the evidence from the heavens
for belief in a deity—Maimonides finds in the kalām not insignificant grains of truth
and correctives to the philosophers’ self-confidence in their claims to knowledge (see
1:73, 208; 211; 1:74, 219; 2:19, 303; 3:15, 460).
On the other hand, Maimonides is highly critical of the philosophers, especially
on matters of metaphysics and cosmology. Of course, even given the received dog-
matic picture, there are specific issues where Maimonides explicitly declares his dis-
agreement with the philosophers, most notably that of creation vs. eternity. However,
the default assumption is that where Maimonides cites the philosophers without in-
dicating a disagreement, he agrees with them (and especially when he adds that the
Law also agrees with them, for example, on the existence of separate intellects,
namely, angels). Thus, it is frequently asserted that Maimonides accepts the philos-
ophers’ four proofs of the existence of God (in 2:1) and their doctrine of the unity of
the intellect in act, its object, and subject (in 1:68).¹⁶ In fact, however, when he attrib-
utes a given view to the philosophers, it is arguable that he means to distinguish it as
their view, not his, which he then attacks.¹⁷
Furthermore, on a number of subjects (prophecy, providence, cosmology), Mai-
monides adopts the familiar sceptical strategy of arguing ad hominem against the
philosophers, avoiding dogmatic assumptions of his own by assuming his oppo-
nent’s own assumptions and showing the antinomies or conflicting opinions to
which they lead—recognition of which should lead these opponents to give up
their assertions and suspend judgment. One such example is the philosophers’ theo-
ry of separate intellects, which they use to explain the motions of the spheres, and
 See Altmann, “Maimonides”; Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist, 126‒27, Ivry, “Logical and
Scientific Premises,” 73; Joel L. Kraemer, “How (Not) to Read The Guide of the Perplexed,” Jerusalem
Studies in Arabic and Islam 32 (2006): 350‒403; Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought: Stud-
ies in Ethics, Law, and the Human Ideal (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999); Tamar Rudavsky, Maimonides
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstrations: Principles and
Practice,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 47‒84. To be sure, some among both the me-
dieval commentators and modern scholars argue that even on issues like eternity vs. creation, despite
his explicit statements, Maimonides esoterically agrees with the philosophers; see Leo Strauss, “The
Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1952), 38‒94;Warren Zev Harvey, “A Third Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology
Puzzle,” Harvard Theological Review 74, no. 3 (July 1981): 287‒301. On the other hand, the sceptical
reading that distinguishes Maimonides’s stance from the philosophers’ does not claim that Maimo-
nides sees no cognitive value in the views of the philosophers. Maimonides generally adapts the phi-
losophers’ positions as the kind of wisdom that is appropriate to communal welfare even if is not “the
truth as it really is,” i.e., what science would demonstrate. For further discussion, see Stern, Matter
and Form, 12‒15; 32‒37.
 See Maimonides’s explicit statement distinguishing the philosophers’ premises and “methods of
inference” to prove the existence of the deity from “the method I shall adopt” in 1:71, 183‒84. Like-
wise, the doctrine of the unity of the intellect is proposed as the “dictum of the philosophers” (1:68,
163).
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which Maimonides presents in detail only in order to launch a vigorous critique.¹⁸ In
the same spirit, he provides a deep critique of their account of divine attributes, and
in particular negative attributes (as we shall explain below). But at critical moments
in the Guide, Maimonides also takes scepticism as his own stance and cultivates sus-
pension of judgment as the correct reactive attitude toward all metaphysical prob-
lems, exercise of which will lead to peace of mind and/or worship of God. Yet
even at those moments when it turns out (as the sceptical reader argues, on Maimo-
nides’s own view) that the intellectual ideal cannot be realised by human beings, it
does not follow that Maimonides surrenders the ideal of intellectual perfection. In-
stead it continues to serve as a regulative ideal that orients and shapes a life of un-
ending enquiry. However, what is necessary is that we re-evaluate how we measure
perfection: whether we judge it solely in terms of the product—the content of the
knowledge—attained, or whether we focus instead on the process and practices of
intellectual activity and enquiry, regardless of whether or not they achieve their ends.
Where Maimonides agrees with the falāsifa is that all knowledge including met-
aphysics, and in particular knowledge of God (if possible), must be based on the nat-
ural world explained by sublunar science:
I have already let you know [1:34, 74] that there exists nothing except God […] and this existent
world and that there is no possible inference proving His existence […] except those deriving
from this existent taken as a whole and from its details. Accordingly it necessarily behooves
one to consider this existent as it is and to derive premises from what is perceived of its nature.
For this reason it follows that you should know its perceptible form and nature, and then it will
be possible to make an inference from it with regard to what is other than it (1:71, 183).
But if the only route to knowledge of God is via “the existent world”—through the
natural sciences—it follows that Maimonides does apparently believe that we do
have knowledge of physics and nature. Indeed, he repeatedly states that “everything
that Aristotle has said about all that exists from beneath the sphere of the moon to
the centre of the earth is indubitably correct” (2:22, 319; cf. 2:24, 326). But not only is
Aristotelian natural science true, it is also Maimonides’s paradigm of scientific
knowledge. Its demonstrations and proofs furnish standards and criteria that any
other purported science or explanation, including divine science, or metaphysics,
must meet. For example, what is metaphysically possible (or necessary) must both
be compatible with and be constrained by nature as it actually is. And when he ar-
gues ad hominem against the falāsifa, the main fault he finds in their theories of cos-
mology and metaphysics is precisely their failure to live up to their own standards of
knowledge given in their theories of physics.
The first moral to be drawn, then, for Maimonides’s scepticism is that it is limited
to what lies beyond physics, in particular the philosophers’ cosmological and meta-
physical theories. Elsewhere in the Guide, Maimonides explicitly disowns scepticism
 See Stern, Matter and Form, 250‒305.
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with respect to the senses (1:73, 213‒14), and he also allows for mathematical knowl-
edge (1:31, 66). He also makes every effort to insulate his scepticism from the natural
sciences—although I am not as confident that his attempt at insulation or his distinc-
tion between the epistemic credentials of human knowledge of physics and of meta-
physics is as stable as he thinks.¹⁹ Now, that one’s sceptical stance can be restricted
is not news; as we will next mention, Pyrrhonists also restricted their scepticism to
non-evident beliefs, allowing themselves assent or at least acquiescence to the evi-
dent.²⁰ However, Maimonides’s distinction is between two domains or subject mat-
ters (nature or the sublunar world vs. cosmology and metaphysics), and the fact
that his scepticism is limited to metaphysics enables him to make dogmatic assump-
tions about the sublunar world that the classical sceptic could not make—for exam-
ple, assumptions about what human (scientific) knowledge requires, about physical
motion, causation, matter, and form presupposed by physics, assumptions from
which Maimonides launches his sceptical critique of the philosophers’ theories of
metaphysics.
A complementary restriction on Maimonidean scepticism is that it is directed ex-
clusively against claims to possess scientific knowledge, the kind of cognitive state
the calibre of which would enable the human, in medieval terms, to achieve the sta-
tus of a fully actualised or acquired intellect that either is in or leads to conjunction
with the active intellect. Unlike some interpretations of classical scepticism, Maimo-
nides does not challenge ordinary or rustic beliefs or “common knowledge,” let
alone generally accepted or “conventional” opinions or dialectical conclusions, or
 Notwithstanding all these statements avowing scientific knowledge of the sublunar world and the
natural sciences, at least one medieval commentator and one modern scholar have appealed to a pas-
sage in 3:23, 496 to argue that Maimonides was also sceptical of knowledge of the sublunar sphere.
See Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, [Heb.,] ed. Yair Shiffman (Jerusalem: World Union of
Jewish Studies Press, 2001), 274‒77 and Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and
Guide 2:24,” Aleph 8 (2008): 234‒35. I discuss this passage in Josef Stern, The Epistemology of Prophe-
cy: Maimonides on the False Prophet (manuscript in preparation). The larger issue is whether our lack
of knowledge of ultimate superlunar causes impugns our knowledge of the proximate sublunar caus-
es. Suffice it to say for now that, although it is clear that Falaquera himself takes scepticism to extend
both to the sublunar and superlunar worlds, all that Maimonides denies in that passage is knowledge
of the “origination” of sublunar natural things, i.e., explanation by their ultimate causes in the super-
lunar sphere.
 It is a subject of endless scholarly controversy how to characterise the evident/non-evident dis-
tinction: whether the evident are mere appearances that one passively receives, (non-epistemic) re-
ports about one’s own mental state rather than the world, or ordinary (rustic) beliefs as opposed
to theory-embedded or scientific/philosophical (gentleman’s) beliefs; see Jonathan Barnes, “The Be-
liefs of a Pyrrhonist,” Elenchos 4 (1983): 5‒43; Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic”; Frede, “Skeptics’s belief”;
Frede, “The Skeptic’s Two Kinds”; Striker, “Sceptical Strategies”; and Casey Perin, “Scepticism and
Belief,” in Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010), 145‒64.
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claims accepted because they suffer from fewer doubts than rival hypotheses.²¹ Nei-
ther are his arguments directed against claims as to what really exists in the sublunar
world or about the natures of things as opposed to their appearances.
Since he discusses certainty as a species of belief (1:50, 111), Maimonides’s scep-
ticism also does not exclude the possibility that someone may have certain belief in a
proposition about which he has no knowledge or understanding, specifically con-
cerning which he suspends judgment (I will sketch one example of this possibility).²²
His term for scientific knowledge is most frequently ʿilm, which translates the Greek
epistēmē (less frequently, he uses maʿrifa). Like most of his philosophical terms, Mai-
monides nowhere explicitly defines ʿilm, and his use of the term is sometimes
loose.²³ Within the Aristotelian tradition, epistēmē is closely linked to demonstration
(burhān) and to the intellect (ʿaql). And among the conditions Aristotle requires for
premises of a demonstration, the most important for Maimonides is that they must
contain the cause, or explanation, of the conclusion. For in order to have scientific
knowledge of x, one must understand x according to its “true reality” (ḥaqīqa), rather
than as it appears or according to common opinion, and we only understand x when
we know its causal explanation.²⁴ Aristotle goes on to distinguish explicitly between
demonstrations that contain a middle term that is the cause and explanation of the
conclusion, entailing both the fact that (to hoti; Arabic inna) the conclusion obtains
and its explanation why (to dioti, Arabic limā) and those demonstrations that contain
no cause and merely establish the fact that the conclusion is true. Among the scho-
lastics, this distinction came to be known as the difference between demonstrations
propter quid and quia, and I have argued elsewhere that only demonstrations propter
 According to Alexander of Aphrodisias’s principle; see Guide 2:3, 254; 2:23, 321. It is an intriguing
question whether Alexander’s principle may be related to the Academic’s idea of reasonable or prob-
able belief as a criterion in the absence of knowledge. On the status of Aristotelian (not kalām) dia-
lectical arguments, see Joel L. Kraemer, “Maimonides on Aristotle and Scientific Method,” in Moses
Maimonides and His Time, ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1989), 53‒88; Arthur Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy
of Maimonides,” inMoses Maimonides and His Time, ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington D.C.: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 1989), 35‒51; Ivry, “Logical and Scientific Premises.”
 On certainty as an epistemic notion in Arabic philosophy, see Deborah L. Black, “Knowledge
(ʿIlm) and Certitude (Yaqīn) in Al-Farabi’s Epistemology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 16
(2006): 11‒45, explicating al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Burhān, in Al-Manṭiq ‘inda al-Fārābī, volume 4, ed.
Majid Fakhry (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1987). Partial English translation in Jon McGinnis and David
C. Reisman, eds., Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, 2007), 63‒67. Manekin, “Maimonides,” argues that Maimonides replaced explanatory under-
standing (ʿilm or epistēmē) by certainty as the standard of demonstration, hence, of scientific knowl-
edge. For criticism, see Stern, Matter and Form, 142‒45, and Stern, Epistemology.
 See Hyman, “Demonstrative”; Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim [Hebrew,] trans. Michael Schwartz
(Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2002), 1:7n12 (translator’s note); Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstra-
tions”; Stern, Matter and Form, 138‒42.
 See Myles Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge,” in Aristotle on Science, ed. Enrico
Berti (Padua: Antenore, 1981), 97‒139.
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quid furnish what Maimonides, following Alexander of Aphrodisias, believes is nec-
essary to achieve knowledge or understanding.²⁵ I will return to this shortly, but the
significant upshot for us is that the target of Maimonidean scepticism is exclusively
scientific knowledge or understanding of metaphysics, not knowledge of physics and
not even beliefs held with certainty about metaphysics.
Against this background, we can now turn to what I earlier called the practical
orientation of Maimonidean scepticism. Maimonides does not simply make a theoret-
ical case that the falāsifa and he himself (and generalising, all humans) lack the
epistemic credentials for knowledge claims about metaphysics. He also makes the
normative claim that, given a sceptical critique, one ought to “refrain and hold
back,” “stop,” or “stand”—all translations of wuqūf, his term for epochē—upon rec-
ognising her lack of knowledge/understanding. But wuqūf or epochē is also not an
end in itself. Rather it is a step, as we also saw for the classical sceptic, towards ach-
ieving a kind of happiness. For the Pyrrhonist, their non-eudemonian happiness is
tranquillity (ataraxia), a certain kind of mental state, peace of mind, that follows al-
most as an accident (or so it is depicted) from epochē, the suspension of judgment on
all questions. Maimonides, in contrast, describes two different practical states in the
contexts of different arguments: one is also tranquillity, but the second is dazzlement
or awe. First, he sees the sceptic’s wuqūf as a way of freeing oneself from the unceas-
ing anxiety, endless irresolvable disagreements, and bad science that result from the
drive to satisfy the unsatisfiable epistemic desire to have knowledge of metaphysics.
When [studying “obscure matters like metaphysics”] one should not make categoric affirmations
in favor of the first opinion that occurs to him and should not, from the outset, strain and impel
his thoughts toward the apprehension of the deity; he rather should feel awe and refrain and
hold back until he gradually elevates himself (1:5, 29; my emphasis).
[I]f you stay your progress because of a dubious point; if you do not deceive yourself into believ-
ing that there is a demonstration with regard to matters that have not been demonstrated; if you
do not hasten to reject and categorically to pronounce false any assertions whose contradictories
have not been demonstrated; if, finally, you do not aspire to apprehend that which you are un-
able to apprehend—you will have achieved human perfection and attained the rank of Rabbi
Aqiba […] who entered in peace [shalom] and went out in peace [shalom] when engaged in
the theoretical study of these metaphysical matters (1:32, 68‒69).
When points appearing as dubious occur to him or the thing he seeks does not seem to him to be
demonstrated, he should not deny and reject it, hastening to pronounce it false, but rather
should persevere and thereby have regard for the honor of his Creator [yaḥus ʿal kevod qono].
He should refrain and hold back [Ar.: yaqif; Heb. ya‘amod] (1:32, 70).
In the first of these passages (1: 5), the “holding back” is in part an expression of cau-
tion in judgment, although the awe of the deity that motivates it and that it elicits
hints at more. However, in the next two passages, the first of which alludes to an
enigmatic rabbinic story of four scholars who entered a pardes, or orchard, which
 See Stern, Matter and Form, 162‒67.
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Maimonides interprets as the study of metaphysics, wuqūf, “staying your progress”
and “stopping,” is not merely not assenting to or not rejecting individual metaphys-
ical propositions. Rather it is not aspiring or seeking to know what one cannot know.
It is giving up or divesting oneself of the very aspiration or drive, and ipso facto tran-
quillity follows by freeing oneself of this source of unhappiness. The Hebrew word
shalom, here peace of mind or tranquillity, plays on shelemut (Arabic kamāl), perfec-
tion. But this perfection is achieved without knowledge and, indeed, only when one
does “not aspire to apprehend that which you are unable to apprehend,” namely, the
truths one seeks in “the theoretical study of these metaphysical matters.” Hence, the
perfection Maimonides recommends is not the unachievable intellectual one that re-
quires literally knowledge of everything including metaphysics. Instead it is the per-
fection of the one who, having disavowed his own unsatisfiable epistemic desires,
lacks no unfulfilled desire. At the same time, Maimonides makes clear that the
point is not to give up intellectual enquiry and the intellectual ideal: “The intention
[…] is not […] wholly to close the gate of speculation and to deprive the intellect of
the apprehension of things that it is possible to apprehend […] Their purpose, in its
entirety, rather is to make it known that the intellects of human beings have a limit at
which they stop” (1:32, 70). To stop at one’s limits is ipso facto to redirect oneself back
into enquiry into the domain of humanly achievable knowledge, physics, and the
sublunar world. However, enquiry into natural sublunar phenomena leads one, nat-
urally, as an inquisitive inquirer, to seek ultimate causes, hence, back into the realm
of the unsatisfiable epistemic desire to have knowledge of metaphysics with all its ill
effects, leading again to wuqūf/epochē, redirection to the sublunar, and so on. wuqūf
is the cure for the intellectual unhappiness that is due to unsatisfiable epistemic de-
sires. But it is also part of a circular exercise of skepsis as persistent, unending en-
quiry that never ceases at a final destination of secure dogmatic knowledge of ulti-
mate metaphysical causes.
The second result, or practical effect, of wuqūf is an expression of divine worship
—dazzlement, awe, spontaneous praise—that follows recognition of the limits of
one’s intellect. Just as Sextus tells us how Apelles achieved the effect of a horse’s
foam only when he gave up and flung his sponge at the canvas, so Maimonides de-
picts how at the very moment that his sceptic suspends judgment about metaphys-
ical knowledge through the discipline of self-imposed limits on his intellect, he puts
(or, better, finds) himself in a state of awe and dazzlement in the presence of God, the
metaphysical object par excellence—analogous to the state of divine worship that the
dogmatist seeks to achieve through the acquisition of positive knowledge about met-
aphysics and God. For example, following an antinomy concerning divine attributes
(to which we will return), he exclaims:
All men, those of the past and those of the future, affirm clearly that God […] cannot be appre-
hended by the intellects, and that none but He Himself can apprehend what He is, and that ap-
prehension of Him consists in the inability to attain the ultimate term in apprehending Him (1:59,
139).
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Glory then to Him who is such that when the intellects contemplate His essence, their apprehen-
sion turns into incapacity […] (1:58, 137).
For the governance and the providence of [God] accompany the world as a whole in such a way
that the manner and true reality of this accompaniment are hidden from us; the faculties of
human beings are inadequate to understand this. On the one hand, there is a demonstration
of His separateness, may He be exalted, from the world and of His being free from it; and on
the other hand, there is a demonstration that the influence of His governance and providence
in every part of the world, however small and contemptible, exists. May He whose perfection
has dazzled us be glorified (1:72, 193, my emphasis).
[Following the interpretation of the parable of the Garden of Eden and Adam’s “sin”:] Praise be
to the Master of the will whose aims and wisdom cannot be apprehended (1:2, 26).
In each of these cases, Maimonides works us through a process of sceptical reason-
ing leading to an equipollence of contrary propositions, followed by wuqūf. Treating
this process as a Hadot-like spiritual exercise, he shows us how one puts oneself into
a state in which one cannot but express awe and spontaneous praise of God—anal-
ogous or parallel to the state the dogmatist sought to achieve through the acquisition
of positive knowledge of God.
One final feature of the Maimonidean sceptical programme that I will just men-
tion—but, for reasons of space, not elaborate—is its distinctive brand of exegesis
whose central element is the parable and the parabolic interpretation of texts in
Scripture, Rabbinic literature, ancient philosophy, and of Maimonides’s own mak-
ing.²⁶ Maimonides’s use of the parable is not, however, as it is usually presented,
to control the dissemination of knowledge fully grasped by its author. Rather the
parable serves him as a medium for the expression of its author’s incomplete, partial,
flash-like grasp of metaphysics. Maimonides begins the Guide with a rich parable de-
picting an inquirer’s intellectual experience when engaged in enquiry into metaphy-
sics, using images of a tug of war of perplexity and lightning-like flashes in dark
night to capture the fact that none of “the great secrets [of metaphysics] are fully
and completely known to anyone among us,” i.e., all humans (1:Introduction, 7).
The parable, he continues, is the primary verbal form by which his ancient predeces-
sors among the prophets, rabbis, and Greek philosophers, for example, Plato, at-
tempted to put this intellectual experience into words. Following suit, Maimonides
composes his own parables to express his incomplete understanding of metaphysics.
Interpreting the proverb “Aword fitly spoken is like apples of gold in filigree, or finer
tracery, of silver” (Proverbs 24:11) as itself a parable about the interpretation of para-
bles, Maimonides argues that the multi-levelled semantic structure of a parable cor-
responds to the structure of the cognitive experience of incomplete understanding of
metaphysics. He shows how we begin by working through propositions that are com-
monly believed but not scientifically demonstrated. These constitute the parable’s ex-
ternal meaning and often turn out to express the Aristotelian position. Next we focus
 For a detailed discussion of the Maimonidean parable, see Stern, Matter and Form, chapter 2.
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on their implications and presuppositions and thereby expose problems, inconsis-
tencies, and antinomies. Through this cognitive process, one comes to grasp what
one can of the parable’s inner meaning: an incomplete grasp of metaphysics and
a sceptical acquiescence to the limits of one’s understanding.
To give a feel for the character of Maimonides’s scepticism with respect to knowl-
edge of metaphysics and, in particular, God, I now turn to two of his arguments,
sketched in broad strokes.
Recall Pines’s empiricist claim that all knowledge for Maimonides must be ab-
stracted from sensible images, thereby excluding the intelligible forms of purely im-
material beings, such as the Active Intellect or God. The dogmatist will object that we
may not be able to directly apprehend or perceive intelligible forms of immaterial be-
ings, but we can come to know general metaphysical propositions by inference, ab-
stracting physical concepts (for example, body, time, and space) and more general
intelligible concepts (such as unity, cause, simple, and incorporeal), combining
them into propositions, building syllogisms, constructing a science, and demonstrat-
ing general propositions, say, that there is one simple, incorporeal, first cause of the
universe—and this is God.²⁷ In reply to this dogmatic counter-argument, the sceptic
must explain why the falāsifa’s demonstrations, their indirect proofs for metaphysi-
cal theses, do not meet the standards of scientific knowledge. As I have mentioned,
the source of the problem is materiality and in particular the bodily faculty of the
imagination.
The strongest case a dogmatist could make for the possibility of knowledge of
metaphysics would be to produce a full-fledged demonstration for an unquestiona-
ble metaphysical proposition such as the existence of the deity.²⁸ Maimonides seems
to refer to such a proof in the following three passages:
 See Altmann, “Maimonides”; Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”; Davidson,
Maimonides the Rationalist. For discussion, see Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist, 65‒66. Addi-
tional examples of metaphysical propositions that are said to have been demonstrated are found
in Guide 1:58, 135; 1:59, 137‒39; 1:68, 163; 165; 1:71, 180‒81; 1:76, 227; 2:1, 246, 252; 2:4, 256; cf. Davidson,
Maimonides the Rationalist, 173‒74. In some of these cases, however, it is the philosophers who claim
to have demonstrated them; in others, we are given what is designated a “proof” (dalīl) which may or
may not be a demonstration.
 Such a “full-fledged” demonstration would ideally be a demonstration propter quid of the exis-
tence of God, a demonstration containing among its premises the cause, or explanation, of the con-
clusion that God exists. A purported demonstration of this kind is, for example, Anselm’s ontological
proof which is, in turn, criticised by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae Ia, Q 2, A 1, ad. 2. Herbert Da-
vidson claims that no ontological arguments are to be found in medieval Arabic and Jewish philos-
ophy, which instead concentrate on cosmological arguments that invariably begin from the world,
i.e., effects, from which they reason to a first cause or necessarily existent being. See Herbert A. Da-
vidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philos-
ophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 214‒15. However, apart from ontological arguments,
Marwan Rashed has argued that al-Fārābī aimed to reconstruct “analytic” proofs that argue from ef-
fects as “synthetic” proofs that begin from causes, suggesting that “full-fledged” demonstrations are
in fact propter quid. See Marwan Rashed, “Al-Fārābī’s Lost Treatise On Changing Beings and the Pos-
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For it is the greatest proof through which one can know the existence of the deity—I mean the
revolution of the heaven […] (1:70, 175)
On account of [its grandeur], the heaven is called a throne, indicating […] He who caused them to
exist and to move, and who governs this lower world […] the heaven indicates My existence,
grandeur, and power […] (1:9, 34‒35)
[…] the heaven proves to us the existence of the deity, who is its mover and governor, as we shall
explain.We shall make it clear that there is no proof indicating to us the existence of the Maker,
according to our opinion, like the indication deriving from the heaven. The latter also proves, as
we have mentioned, according to the opinion of the philosophers, the existence of the Mover of
the heaven and His not being either a body or a force subsisting in a body (2:18, 302).
What is the proof in question? Maimonides says that the heavens prove the existence
of God, but he does not tell us what about the heavens constitutes the basis of that
proof; there are, in fact, two candidates. Either it is the eternal motion of the spheres
from which the philosophers prove the existence of a prime mover or the irregular
motions, different velocities, and different directions of the embedded planets
which prove the existence of what Maimonides calls a “creator” or “particulariser”
who freely chose or willed to originate the spheres.²⁹
Now, it is well-known that Maimonides denies that either eternity or creation/
origination can be demonstrated; for this reason, the evidence for eternity and cre-
ation must be the empirical observation of the motions of the heavens. That is,
each is known from its effects or quia and the most that can be proven is the fact
that the world is either eternal or originated (to hoti; inna), not why it is. Thus, lacking
a full-fledged explanatory demonstration (propter quid; to dioti; limā), Maimonides
does not choose one proof rather than the other (which would rest the existence
of God on something less than fully demonstrated), and instead presents his own
proof, which is in the form of a Stoic “simple constructive dilemma.”³⁰ In fact, he
sibility of a Demonstration of the Eternity of the World,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18, no. 1
(March 2008): 19‒58. As we shall argue below, Maimonides’ critique of the best argument for the ex-
istence of God is not simply that it is from effects and not from a cause—after all God has no cause—
but, more significantly, that the attempt to causally explain His existence runs into an antinomy.
 For the former, see the philosophers’ twenty-sixth premise (2: Introduction, 239‒41); for the latter,
2:19, 310: “To my mind, there is no proof of purpose stronger than the one founded upon the differ-
ences between the motions of the spheres and upon the fact that the stars are fixed in the spheres. For
this reason you will find that all the prophets used the stars and the spheres as proofs for the deity’s
existing necessarily.”
 In Stoic terminology, the argument has the form: “If the first, then the third; if the second, then
the third; but either the first or the second; therefore in any case the third.” William Kneale and Mar-
tha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 178. It should be noted
that this argument form is neither an Aristotelian demonstration nor a syllogism. For an earlier ver-
sion of the argument, see Ibn Ṭufayl, Hayy ben Yaqdhân: roman philosophique d’Ibn Thofaïl, ed. and
trans. Léon Gauthier (Beirut: Imprimerie catholique, 1936). English translation in Lenn E. Goodman,
Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 94; Jon McGinnis and David
C. Reisman, eds. Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett Publish-
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presents two versions of this proof— once in 1:71, 181‒82, and again in 2:2, 252—the
main difference between them consisting in the addition of a last line in the second
proof. For reasons of space, I will give only the second version.
1. The fifth body, i.e., the sphere, hence, its motion, must either be subject or not be subject to
generation and corruption (i.e., either originated or eternal).
2. [Suppose the sphere is subject to generation and corruption, i.e., originated.] Anything that
exists after having been non-existent cannot have brought itself into existence, hence, of
necessity must have been brought into existence by something else. (First Intelligible)
3. Therefore, if the sphere is subject to generation and corruption, there must be something
else that brought it into existence after having been non-existent.
4. That being is the deity.
5. Therefore, if the sphere is subject to generation and corruption, the deity exists.
6. Suppose now that the sphere is not subject to generation and corruption (i.e., eternal). If it
has always and never will cease to be moved in a perpetual and eternal movement, then the
mover that causes it to move in this eternal motion is not a body or a force in a body. (As-
sumes premises 1, 3‒11, 14‒17, 16 in 2: Introduction)
7. Such a mover is the deity.
8. Therefore, if the sphere is not subject to generation and corruption, the deity exists.
9. But the world has either come into existence after having been non-existent or it has not
(i.e., it either is or is not subject to generation and corruption, originated or eternal).
10. Therefore, on both lemmas, the deity exists.
11. This deity who has been proven to exist (according to both lemmas) is the being that nec-
essarily exists by virtue of itself.
In the concluding line (11)—the line not found in the version in 1:71—Maimonides
identifies the deity (proven on both lemmas) with the Avicennean Necessary Existent
in virtue of itself, i.e., the being that is necessarily existent in itself and is entirely
uncaused by anything else, hence, one and simple.³¹ If you were to object that the
two lemmas of eternity and creation prove the existence of very different deities, Mai-
monides’s addition of line 11 may be intended to claim that there is only one such
ultimate being that is both creator and cause of the first intellect or prime mover.³²
ing Company, 2007), 290‒91. See Joel L. Kraemer, Maimonides: The Life and World of One of Civiliza-
tion’s Greatest Minds (New York: Doubleday Press, 2008), 383.
 In Stern, Matter and Form, 156‒58, I argue that Maimonides uses the term “Creator” to designate
the Avicennean Necessary Existent in Itself, based on his description in Guide 1:69, 169‒70 which he
in turn identifies with the Particulariser in 2:19, 303; 310; 2:20, 314; and 2:15, 449‒51.
 For example, see Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,” 153; Harvey, Physics and Metaphy-
sics in Hasdai Crescas (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1998), 77‒82; Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistomolo-
gy,” 228‒30; Kraemer, “How (not) to Read,” 17; Kraemer, “Is There a Text,” 365, who both see the two
lemmas leading to different conceptions of the deity, one of the kalām or Bible, and one of the phi-
losophers. Harvey, Physics, provides a very good review and analysis of the classical commentators
(including ibn Tibbon, Joseph Kaspi, Profayt Duran [Efodi], and Hasdai Crescas), who all take Maimo-
nides’s reference to the Necessary Existent in Itself to be based on the third of the philosophers’
proofs in Guide 2:1, thereby creating a contradiction internal to the Guide. On my view, Maimonides’s
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Maimonides repeatedly refers to this proof as a “method of demonstration about
which there can be no doubt” (1:71, 180), by which “perfect certainty is obtained”
(1:71, 181), and “as to which there is no disagreement in any respect” (1:71, 182).
Given this praise, I take it that the constructive dilemma is the “greatest proof” to
which Maimonides is referring in the passages quoted earlier from 1:70, 1:9, and
2:18. The proof is so certain and indubitable that one would assume that it also yields
ʿilm, or scientific knowledge, that God exists.
Yet, at the end of his long discussion of the set of incompatibilities between Ptol-
emaic astronomy and Aristotelian cosmology that led to the “crisis of the sciences” in
twelfth-century Andalusia, Maimonides writes:
For it is impossible for us to accede to the points starting from which conclusions may be drawn
about the heavens; for the latter are too far away from us and too high in place and in rank. And
even the general conclusion that may be drawn from them [the heavens], namely, that they
prove the existence of their Mover, is a matter the knowledge of which cannot be reached by
human intellects (2:24, 327, my emphasis).
This passage has been the subject of much recent controversy,³³ but what Maimo-
nides literally says is that there is a proof—prima facie, the constructive dilemma—
from the heavens to the existence of “their Mover” but that its conclusion is not
something of which the human intellect has knowledge. How is that possible? If
the constructive dilemma is a proof and, indeed, certain, why isn’t it knowledge?
And if it is not knowledge, how could it be a proof whose conclusion is believed
with certainty?
My answer in brief is that the proof may move us to assent to its conclusion—
after all, its two lemmas exhaust the possibilities and, therefore, it is necessary
and certain—but it is not knowledge because our assent to the premises of the two
lemmas, eternity and origination, is only based on their observable effects, the
spheres’ unending motion and irregular, different motions, respectively, and from
the premises of eternity and origination, we in turn infer the deity, the necessarily
existent being, as their cause. Hence, the proof is doubly quia: the existence of
God is proven from His effects twice over, and we lack any explanatory cause of
the conclusion that would yield understanding, knowledge, or ʿilm/epistēmē. Thus
“the greatest proof” is simply the best we humans can do, the proof no greater
than which is known by any human: indubitable, certain, and even necessary—
but, lacking any explanation, “a matter the knowledge of which cannot be reached
by human intellects.”
However, this is not the end of Maimonides’s story. One might take Maimonides’s
argument to show, as did his fourteenth-century commentator Moses of Narbonne,
own proof is not that of the philosophers but the proof in Guide 2:2, thus avoiding any contradiction,
although the proof nonetheless furnishes no knowledge.
 See the symposium of papers in Aleph 8 (2008).
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that “[The existence of God cannot be demonstrated] from prior [causes] because He
[…] is prior to all and nothing is prior to Him. How could [His existence] be explained
by a demonstration from the cause when He is the cause of everything and every-
thing is His creation?”³⁴ But this only prompts the objection: If God’s existence nec-
essarily has no cause, why should the fact that we cannot give a cause or explanation
count against our knowledge of His existence? There exists no cause we do not know.
Why, then, shouldn’t a certain, necessary, and indubitable quia demonstration suf-
fice for (scientific) knowledge of this conclusion? Without some idea of what we
do not understand, there is no punch to the sceptic’s challenge.
Contrary to Narbonne, I want to propose that Maimonides’s claim that we have
no knowledge of the existence of the deity on the basis of this proof is not because
God has no prior cause, true though that is. The real problem is that the attempt to
provide an explanation of God’s existence runs into an antinomy. The best explana-
tion of the existence of God rests on contradictory premises: each is individually
well-motivated but together they are incompatible. For Maimonides, this tension sig-
nals our incomplete understanding of the notions in question.
Maimonides presents this antinomy through an extended parable scattered
throughout the Guide about a ruler who is known by his subjects only by means
of his actions of governance.³⁵ However, for reasons of space, I will sketch the objec-
tion Maimonides raises by focusing on the two conflicting principles on which it
rests. One is about final ends, the other about the structure of immaterial causation,
a relation for which Maimonides appropriates the Neoplatonic term for emanation or
overflowing, in Arabic fayḍ.
The principle about final ends is that “The end is nobler than the things that
subsist [or act] for the sake of the end” (2:11, 275). The principle about emanation
is that the direction of emanation is always from the more noble to the less
noble.³⁶ Now, if we were to explain God’s emanation of the world, it presumably
would be by way of its final cause, the good it achieves. That good will never be a
benefit for God (for how can He be benefited by His own act?) but necessarily a ben-
efit for the world. However, according to the first principle, final ends must be more
noble than what subsists or acts for their sake and, according to the second, emana-
tion goes from the more noble to the less. So, either the final cause of the emanation
would necessarily be something more noble than the deity or divine emanation, or
emanation would proceed from the less to the more noble—both of which are absurd.
Therefore, Maimonides concludes: “[Whenever an immaterial being, e.g., a separate
intellect or the deity] causes a certain good thing to overflow from it, […] the exis-
 Moses Narbonne, Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis su dem werke More Nebuchim des
Maimonides, ed. and trans. Jakob Goldenthal (Wien: K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1852), 15b‒16a.
 For the parable of the ruler, see Guide 1:46, 97‒98; 1:69, 168‒71; 1:70, 175; 3:13, 454; and Stern, Mat-
ter and Form, 168‒77.
 On Maimonides’s understanding of emanation, overflowing, or fayḍ, see Guide 2:12, 278‒80; 3:22,
317‒20.
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tence, the purpose, and the end of the being conferring the benefits do not consist in
conferring the benefits on the recipients” (2:11, 275).³⁷ The emanation of goods is
never for the sake of anything else; instead there is simply a “residue” that suffices,
or overflows, to perfect something else as a necessitated by-product of the divine
cause. In quasi-ethical terms, emanation is an expression of grace, which is indeed
one way to translate the Arabic term fayḍ. But this conclusion has a cost: without a
final cause for the sake of which the emanating being subsists or the emanation acts,
we cannot explain the causal relation between God (or a separate intellect) and the
sublunary world, and, without an explanation, we have no understanding of emana-
tion, hence, no knowledge.³⁸
Before I turn to Maimonides’s diagnosis of the source of this failure of apprehen-
sion, I want to sketch a second Maimonidean argument that shows the impossibility
of knowledge of a class of metaphysical propositions. This argument is laid out in
Maimonides’s discussion of divine attributes which culminates in his frequently dis-
cussed via negativa or, more precisely, his analysis of categorial negations of priva-
tive attributive statements about God. Contrary to the dogmatic reading according to
which Maimonides uses these negations to furnish us with knowledge about God—
knowledge of what He is not—I shall argue for the sceptical reading that Maimonides
argues that even these statements furnish no knowledge, not even knowledge of
what He is not!³⁹
There are three background concepts that must be unpacked. First, because the
dogmatist against whom Maimonides’s argument seems to be directed is Avicenna,
the distinguishing fact about God is His unity, not merely that He is numerically one,
but that He is also indivisible, absolutely simple, incomposite, and, insofar as He has
no parts or structure that would require any explanation of His unity, absolutely un-
caused. This is what is meant by saying that God is necessarily existent in itself, from
which it also follows that He is incomparable and unique. Maimonides also trans-
forms the Avicennean God’s metaphysical uniqueness into a semantic thesis that
all predicates that apply to God and to creatures are totally equivocal and, because
all our understanding of linguistic terms derives from their application to creatures, it
follows that we have no understanding of any of the predicates that apply to God.
(Here we see Maimonides shifting from an ad hominem argument, directed against
 In more general terms: Whenever a being b of rank n emanates a good or benefit on a being c of
rank n-1—which is necessarily the case because the direction of emanation is from the higher rank to
the lower rank—the final cause or end of (the subsistence or act of) b cannot consist in emanating
that good onto c.
 For a similar objection, see al-Fārābī, Risāla fī al-ʿAql, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: 1938), 30. English
Translation by Arthur Hyman: “Letter on the Intellect.” In Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Arthur
Hyman and James J. Walsh (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 219. Al-Fārābī criticises those who explain
why forms descend to this world by the final cause “so that matters attain a more perfect existence”
because that “contradicts what Aristotle has shown” that the end must always be more noble than
that which it acts for the sake of.
 For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Stern, Matter and Form, 191‒249.
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his Avicennean dogmatist, to his own sceptical stance.) Conversely, on this Avicen-
nean conception, belief in a deity that is not uncaused or is a plurality, divisible,
or composite is belief in something other than God; it is idolatry or polytheism,
the false belief that God is not one, hence, material and even bodily. What Maimo-
nides will argue against the dogmatist is that, in his attempt to provide a theory of
our knowledge of divine unity, he ends up with idolatry.
Second, Maimonides argues that the objects of belief and knowledge are not
words—the sounds that come out of our mouths that he calls “external speech”—
but mental representations (taṣawwur), the system of which he calls “inner speech,”
the language of thought, which he thinks of as a language in its own right, as it were,
with its own linguistic structure and syntax. This is to say two things. First, there is
no cognition without representation. So, if no consistent, coherent inner representa-
tion corresponds to a string of words in external speech, one just mouths sounds in-
stead of expressing beliefs (1:50, 111‒12). Second, the expressive resources of inner
speech, or of the mental representations, must be adequate to the demands of knowl-
edge, and in at least the natural or sublunary sciences they are. Unlike the grammars
of external speech that are conventional and vary across linguistic communities, the
syntax of the language of inner representation is universal and, insofar as it is struc-
tured in ways that perspicuously reveal logical relations, it is therefore the preferred
system of representations to guide one to knowledge in the sciences.⁴⁰ Nevertheless,
however superior the inner mental representations are to external speech, they are
also composed according to a syntax. As a consequence, they also will be problem-
atic when it comes to expressing truths about metaphysics and, in particular, about
the absolutely simple God.
Third, Maimonides assumes a significant constraint on all representations, in-
cluding those of inner speech, if they are to count as knowledge. Not only must
the representation be true; its content must correspond to what exists in the
world. To this Maimonides adds the condition that, in order to serve as an object
of knowledge, a true representation must not only represent what is the case: how
it represents what it represents must also be the case.
So, a statement about God, such as (1) “God is one” is true not only if and only if
God is one, the statement must also represent Him as one. In particular, it cannot
represent Him as if He were a composite being with a substratum or essence and at-
 See Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (Maḳālah fi-Ṣinā‘at al-Manṭiḳ), trans. and ed. Israel Efros, Pro-
ceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research 8 (1937‒38), chapter 14. Arabic in Efros, “Mai-
monides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research 34
(1966). On al-Fārābī’s influence on Maimonides’s conception of logic here, see Josef Stern, “Maimo-
nides on Language and the Science of Language,” in Maimonides and the Sciences, ed. Robert S.
Cohen and Hillel Levine (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 173‒226; and for the Farabian background, the
Introduction to Fritz W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De In-
terpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
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tributes or accidents.With this constraint in place, Maimonides argues that there can
be no representation by which we can know, for example, that God is one is true.
Suppose Maimonides’s dogmatist opponent, the philosopher, demonstrates (1):
that God is one, an absolute unity, simple, and incomposite.⁴¹ Keep in mind that
no term including “one” applied to God has the same content it possesses when ap-
plied to any other creature and, furthermore, we also simply do not understand its
content. But even apart from its pure equivocality, the predicate “is one,” insofar
as it is a predicate or attribute-term, designates some affirmative attribute, or “pos-
session,” which is either essential or accidental, i.e., part of God’s essence or a con-
tingent attribute separate from His essence. In either case the dogmatist next needs
to explain why the complex essence, or essence-attribute combo, constitute one
being; he needs a cause. But God, he has said, is necessary in itself and uncaused.
Hence, in demonstrating that God is one, the dogmatist has represented Him in a
way that in turn requires an explanatory cause, contradicting his assertion that
God is absolutely uncaused. In short, he has misrepresented Him and indeed
ended up with idolatry.
Accordingly, you have not arrived at a knowledge of the true reality of an essential attribute, but
you have arrived at multiplicity. For you believe that He is a certain essence possessing unknown
attributes […] for if you say God […] is a certain substratum upon which certain borne things are
superposed and that this substratum is not like these adjuncts, the utmost of our apprehension
would be, on the basis of this belief, polytheism and nothing else. For the notion of the substra-
tum is different from that of the adjunct borne by it (1:60, 144‒45).
To avoid this contradictory metaphysical consequence of affirmative attribution, Mai-
monides proposes to the dogmatist that he might translate or regiment the external
speech statement, the affirmative (1), in inner speech as (2), the categorical negation
of the privation (“is many”) corresponding to the affirmative attribute or possession
(“is one”): (2) “Not (God is many).” A categorial negation denies that the subject
(here: God) falls under whatever category to which the predicate in question (“is
many”) belongs. So, to use Maimonides’s own example (1:59, 136), (3) “A wall
does not see” does not say that a wall is blind but that it does not fall in the category
of thing that is either seeing or blind. And a privation, in turn, is the absence of the
possession of an attribute in a subject in which the attribute ought to exist or normal-
ly does exist. So, blindness is a privation in creatures who, by nature, ought to have
sight. Now, privations, being absences, are not parts of anything, hence, they avoid
the problem of part-hood, hence, divisibility, created by affirmative attributes. But
Maimonides also emphasises that they are nonetheless attributes attributed, or pre-
dicated, to subjects and that, like affirmative attributes, they serve to individuate
 Note that Maimonides is arguing with the dogmatist, the faylasūf, on his grounds, on his assump-
tion that the deity is the necessary existent.
118 Josef Stern
subjects.⁴² So, privations avoid the problem of divisibility, and the categorial nega-
tion in turn denies that the subject belongs to the superordinate category to which
the privation (and its positive possession) belongs, hence, they doubly negate any
complexity of God. Nonetheless, while these categorial negations are better than af-
firmative attributions to God, Maimonides argues they are still not good enough. In
particular, they fail the condition that how what is represented is represented must
also be true. “For there is no oneness at all except in believing that there is one sim-
ple essence in which there is no complexity [tarkīb; lit. “composition”] […] and you
will not find therein any multiplicity either in the thing as it is outside of the mind or
as it is in the mind […]” (1:51, 113, my emphasis).
Even though (2) is better than (1), its subject-predicate syntax still implies that
there exists an attribute (signified by the predicate) formally distinguishable from
the substratum or substance (signified by the subject term), and this structural divi-
sion holds even if the attribute is privative and categorically negated. So, negated pri-
vative attributes are still subject to all problems of attribution from which Maimo-
nides concludes: “[…] negation does not give knowledge in any respect of the true
reality of the thing with regard to which the particular matter in question has
been negated” (1:59, 139). So, whenever we can demonstrate that God is one or, in
regimented inner speech, the (categorial) negation of (the privation of) multiplici-
ty/compositeness, it is nonetheless presupposed (hence, entailed) from the syntactic
form of the demonstrated proposition that He is composite! This problem for divine
attribution—which I call the “syntactic problem” of divine attributes—infects all at-
tribution, affirmative and negative. Maimonides, contrary to common opinion, is
not an advocate but a sceptical critic of negative theology. And again, the philoso-
phers’ theory that attempts to capture divine unity ends up also representing God
in an idolatrous form.
Without pursuing this antimony further, it puts Maimonides in the state of spon-
taneous awe and praise of God in the passages we quoted earlier (1:58, 137 and 1:59,
139). However, given his own critique of the possibility of expressing truths about
God in language, what form can that praise take?
The most apt phrase concerning this subject is the dictum occurring in the Psalms, Silence is
praise to Thee (Psalms 65:2), which interpreted signifies: silence with regard to You is praise
[…] Accordingly, silence and limiting oneself to the apprehensions of the intellects are more ap-
propriate—just as the perfect ones have enjoined when they said: Commune with you own heart
upon your bed, and be still. Selah (Psalms 4:5) (1:59, 139‒40).
The silence in this passage is not only silence in external but also in inner speech:
neither affirmative nor negative privative attributions express truths, hence, praise
 See 1:58, 134‒35; 1:59, 137‒39; 1:60, 143‒44.
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of God.⁴³ The silence is also an expression of epochē. By holding back from represent-
ing God using a false expression, thereby acknowledging the limitations of one’s rep-
resentational powers, one expresses God’s greatness. At the same time, the silence is
conjoined with “limiting oneself” to the domain in which there are “apprehensions
of the intellect” in which knowledge is possible. Silence with respect to metaphysics
goes along with continuing skepsis in the sublunar domain of natural science.
To return finally to Maimonides’s diagnosis of his scepticism with respect to
knowledge of metaphysics, his ultimate explanation of the human epistemic condi-
tion is that he is a hylomorphic substance whose matter limits the extent which his
form or intellect can be actualised.⁴⁴ As he writes in explanation of why he cannot
have knowledge of the existence of the deity: “[God] has enabled man to have knowl-
edge of what is beneath the heavens, for that is his world and his dwelling place”
(2:24, 327)—i.e., as a composite material substance, the human’s natural place is
the world of the elements, and it is there that he can achieve knowledge. But
among his material, or bodily, faculties, a particular source of the sceptical limita-
tions on the human intellect is his imagination.⁴⁵ As we saw with the syntactic prob-
lem of divine attributes, our human intellects must apprehend God through inner
speech representations that necessarily employ composite subject-predicate syntax.
Why “necessarily”? Because, as embodied intellects, we can never free our represen-
tation of an existent from the influence of the body, forced by our “wish to preserve
the conception of the imagination” (1:51, 114).
For Maimonides, this representational role of the imagination is a general obsta-
cle to knowledge of immaterial beings. Not only is the one God conceived in corpo-
real terms as an essence or substratum with attributes (1:51, 114). Similar antinomies
 Maimonides employs Psalms 4:5 three times in the Guide. In 1:50, 112, the silence is of external
speech; in 1:59, 140 it is of inner speech; and in 2:5, 260, he uses the verse to illustrate that the
true praise of God, like that of the spheres (literally), is articulated in mental representations, not
through “speech of lip and tongue.” The image of Psalms 4:5 also underlies Maimonides’s claim in
3:51, 623 that “true intellectual worship” of God occurs in those rare moments “when you are
alone with yourself, and no one else is there and while you lie awake upon your bed.”
 Because this possibility is a fact about humans, hence, about something in the sublunar sphere,
and not metaphysics, Maimonides can allow himself this diagnosis.
 Unlike other Arabic philosophers who posit distinct faculties of imagination for each of these
functions, Maimonides posits one faculty with multiple functions: retention of material forms corre-
sponding to sense impressions, the composition of given forms into more complex ones and division
of others, and the representation of truths (as propositions with, for example, essences as subjects
and attributes in predicate position). Note that the last role of the imagination is problematic only
when it is called upon to represent immaterial beings that are absolutely simple; the representation
of composite material substances using composite structures is perfectly fine. In addition, Maimo-
nides identifies the imagination with the “evil impulse” and the source of all deficiencies of reason
and character (2:12, 280). Indeed, I know of no medieval philosopher other than Maimonides who
assigns such a negative valence to the imagination and sees as much tension between it and the in-
tellect. Among Maimonides’s many references to the imagination in the Guide, see Maimonides 1:46,
98; 1:51, 114; and 1:73, 208‒11.
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arise, as we saw, with the idea of emanation (fayḍ) which Maimonides regards as the
best available figure to express the causality of an immaterial being even though it is
inadequate to the task of expressing the “true reality”: “For the mental representa-
tion of the action of one who is separate from matter is very difficult, in a way similar
to the difficulty of the mental representation of the existence of one who is separate
from matter” (2:12, 279). Again, the difficulty is that the imagination, a bodily faculty,
cannot represent any existent except as a body or any action except as a spatio-tem-
poral event. Recall that it is through a parable (of the ruler’s beneficence to his sub-
jects)—i.e., an imaginative product—that Maimonides articulates the emanational
final causal relation and exposes what we do not understand as glimpsed in the an-
tinomy to which it leads.
Maimonides’s objection, however, is not simply Aristotle’s point that no intellec-
tion or intellectual representation is possible without imagination, but rather that we
have no principled way to distinguish between the two.⁴⁶ For example, in order for
demonstration to serve as the basis of scientific knowledge, we must be able to dis-
tinguish between the necessary, the possible, and the impossible. But are these mo-
dalities to be determined by the intellect and by science (i.e., that the possible is a
potentiality that will be actualised at some point in infinite time) or by what is ad-
missible to the imagination (i.e., by mental judgments about equal alternatives
among which we choose to act)? What we need, Maimonides tells us, is a criterion
“that would enable us to distinguish the things cognized intellectually from those
imagined” (1:73, 211). Nonetheless, when pushed to produce this criterion, Maimo-
nides concedes that he possesses no such principle “that permits differentiation be-
tween the imaginative faculty and the intellect” (3:15, 460). If there were one,would it
be “something altogether outside both the intellect and the imagination, or is it by
the intellect itself that one distinguishes between that which is cognized by the in-
tellect and that which is imagined?” (3:15, 461).⁴⁷
Of course, this question is no surprise. If our matter prevents our intellects from
apprehending the immaterial, it will prevent us from clearly distinguishing the ac-
tualised intellect from bodily faculties like the imagination. And without a criterion
to distinguish them, there can be no principled scientific knowledge. Maimonides
concludes: “these are points for investigation which may lead very far” (3:15, 460):
they are the stuff of skepsis, enquiry that never terminates in knowledge.
 Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7.431a16.
 See Emil Fackenheim, “The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides,”
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 16 (1946/47): 60n61.
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Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception
1 Introduction
In his 1937 work The Unity of Philosophical Experience, Étienne Gilson writes: “Medi-
eval philosophy entered it [i.e., scepticism] as soon as Ockham’s philosophy took
deep root in the European Universities of the fourteenth century.”¹ This was an influ-
ential statement, but, as many have shown, it is simply not true. First, Ockham’s
philosophical thinking did not have sceptical implications, as Gilson asserts;² sec-
ond, there were very few sceptics in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. To be
fair, Gilson himself seems to have changed his mind in his great History of Christian
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, which he published in 1955.³ However, he was not
wrong to claim that philosophy changed after Ockham. The generation following
him rethought philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. There was a
looming threat of scepticism after Ockham, but it never materialised. There were sev-
eral reasons for this, as we shall see.⁴ Although there were few actual sceptics in the
Middle Ages,⁵ this does not mean that sceptical arguments failed to play an impor-
tant role in medieval philosophy. As I will suggest in this article, sceptical arguments
played a central role in the Latin Middle Ages from the late thirteenth century on-
wards. At the time, philosophers started emphasising epistemology, which was ac-
companied by a rediscovery of ancient scepticism. As I will highlight, there is a re-
markable knowledge of ancient scepticism in the Latin medieval tradition from the
late thirteenth century up to the sixteenth century, which, for some reason, has
been downplayed by previous scholarship.
The most important form of sceptical argumentation in the Middle Ages was the
development of a new form of sceptical hypothesis akin to the kind of sceptical argu-
ment entertained by René Descartes in the seventeenth century. It grew up in the
early fourteenth century and had a profound effect on philosophy. It developed
I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers for their comments.
 Étienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 72. For
an overview of this debate see Dominik Perler, Zweifel und Gewissheit: Skeptische Debatten im Mitte-
lalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2006), 4−8.
 Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 588
−94.
 Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955).
 See Henrik Lagerlund, “Divine Deception,” in Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, eds. Diego
Machuca and Baron Reed (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 222−31, for more on this.
 There were some noticeable exceptions. See Henrik Lagerlund, ed., Rethinking the History of Skep-
ticism: The Missing Medieval Background (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
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from the idea that God, given his power, could deceive us. The mere possibility that
God could be a deceiver had the consequence that nothing we think we know about
the world is certain because everything can be called into question. Such a hypoth-
esis had never before been seriously entertained in the history of philosophy; it could
have had the implications that Gilson suggested, but it did not. There were several
reasons for this, but the most philosophically interesting one was the development
of a new conception of knowledge by John Buridan and his followers. They argued
that the possibility of divine deception means that we should lower the standard
for what counts as knowledge. Knowledge can no longer be thought of as infallible,
which had been the prevailing view in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourteenth
century.
I will begin this article by considering the question: What was scepticism in the
Middle Ages? I will then discuss the sources of ancient scepticism available to medi-
eval philosophers. After this section, I will return to the argument from divine decep-
tion and its implications. Before addressing the question of why it did not cast phi-
losophy into global scepticism, I will make an excursion into the history of both
divine deception and external world scepticism.
2 What was Scepticism in the Middle Ages?
Medieval scepticism must be distinguished from ancient scepticism because medie-
val scepticism was not practical in nature, that is, its aim was not tranquillity or hap-
piness. Consider Sextus Empiricus’s definition of scepticism from Outlines of Pyr-
rhonism. He writes: “Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things
which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because
of equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension
of judgment and afterwards to tranquillity.”⁶ He immediately clarifies that by “abil-
ity” he does not mean a fancy ability in any metaphysical sense; it only means “to be
able to.” Basically, we “can” set out opposites among appearances and thoughts. Due
to these opposites and the equipollence between them, we must suspend judgment,
which will cause tranquillity. This is scepticism with a methodology and an aim, and,
even though there is a recognition that perhaps there is truth and knowledge and, in
some instances, we will perhaps not be able to set out the equipollence, the assump-
tion seems to be that we will always be able to and we must live as if we can. Hence,
there is in Pyrrhonism an emphasis on living life in a certain way.
Obviously, much more can be said about the Pyrrhonian approach to scepticism,
but it is clear right from the start that there was nothing like this in the Latin Middle
Ages, that is, there was no scepticism with the aim of the suspension of judgment
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, ed. and trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.8.
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and tranquillity. As far as I have been able to ascertain, scepticism was never a way
of life in the Middle Ages—at least for the clear majority of philosophers.⁷
What was scepticism in the Middle Ages, then? Scepticism, or sceptical argumen-
tation, was used in epistemological debates, and then nearly always in a negative
sense as an argument against certain views. Medieval scepticism, therefore, is epis-
temological, which also differentiates it from ancient scepticism. It is at this point in
the history of philosophy that scepticism becomes connected with epistemology—a
connection it will never shed. Hence, when we speak about scepticism in the Middle
Ages, we must use the term in a broad sense that incorporates both the positive view
(that is, that of actual sceptics like John of Salisbury and Nicholas of Autrecourt)—
which holds that everything is merely probable—and the negative view, which
uses scepticism as a tool or an argument against certain other views but whose
user is not necessarily a sceptic.
One of the first such uses of scepticism or sceptical argumentation can be found
in Peter Olivi (1248−98) as he argues against the species theory of cognition.⁸ A sim-
ilar kind of argumentation against species theory can be found in William of Ockham
(1285−1347), who writes:
The thing represented needs to be cognized in advance; otherwise the representative would
never lead to a cognition of the thing represented as to something similar. For example, a statue
of Hercules would never lead me to a cognition of Hercules unless I had seen Hercules in ad-
vance. Nor can I know otherwise whether the statue is similar to him or not. But according to
those positing species, the species is something prior to every act of intellectively cognizing
the object. Therefore, it cannot be posited on account of the representation of the object.⁹
Ockham here takes species to be representations, an idea which was common but not
universal in the thirteenth century, and asks if a representation can lead to knowl-
edge of an object external to us. His answer is that it cannot, unless we already
know the object in question. Arguments like this one were already well-known
 Perhaps John of Salisbury (1115‒76) is an exception. In any way, he seems to me to come closest to
the view of scepticism defended by Sextus. He was, however, not influenced by Sextus at all, but by
Cicero’s Academica, and adheres to his own version of Academic scepticism. In his most famous
work, Metalogicon, John defends something similar to Carneades’s probabilism, as it was reported
by Cicero. See Henrik Lagerlund, ed. Rethinking the History of Skepticism, and Christophe Grellard,
“Jean de Salisbury. Un cas médiéval de scepticisme,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theo-
logie 54 (2007): 16−40, for more. There seem to be thinkers in the Greek, Byzantine, and medieval
tradition that follow Sextus and Ancient scepticism more closely. See Börje Bydén, “‘To Every Argu-
ment There is a Counter-Argument’: Theodore Metochites’ Defence of Scepticism (Semeiosis 61),” in
Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002), 183‒218.
 Juhana Toivanen, “Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul”
(PhD diss., University of Jyväskylä, 2009), chapter 4.
 William Ockham, Reportatio, II, 12‒13: Opera theologica V, 274. All translations are my own unless
otherwise indicated.
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from Plato’s Phaedo (74d9‒e4). Sextus, as well, presents an argument against criteria
of truth that is identical to Ockham’s argument (although I know of no reason to
think that Ockham had any knowledge of Sextus, it is possible, as we shall see in
the next section). Sextus writes:
Just as someone who does not know Socrates but has looked at a picture of him does not know
whether the picture is like Socrates, so the intellect, studying the feelings of the senses but not
observing the external objects, will not know whether the feelings of the senses are like the ex-
ternal existing objects. Therefore, it cannot rely on similarity to judge them.¹⁰
Hence, external objects cannot be judged based on appearances, Sextus claims. Ock-
ham and Sextus seem to be using species and appearances in a similar way, namely,
as representations of external objects that are supposed to convey knowledge of
these objects by being similar to them. Both hold this to be impossible, and therefore
also hold that invoking representations in this way must lead to scepticism. For Sex-
tus, this is the end of the discussion, while for Ockham this is only the beginning, as
he proceeds to develop a new theory of cognition that does not rely on representa-
tion. Ockham, after all, is not a sceptic—Sextus would have branded him a dogmatic
thinker—but he does not hesitate to use sceptical arguments to his own advantage.¹¹
In the earlier well-known debate between Henry of Ghent (1217−93) and John
Duns Scotus (1266/8−1308) about divine illumination,¹² sceptical arguments are
used in much the same way; it is here that we also find actual references to ancient
sceptical authors, which are lacking in the writings of Olivi and Ockham. For exam-
ple, in the first two questions of Henry of Ghent’s Summa, the first question of Article
1 asks “whether humans can know anything” and the second question asks “whether
humans can know anything without divine illumination.” The ancient sources Henry
uses to inform his answers to these questions are Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and
Metaphysics 4, naturally; however, Henry also uses Plato’s Meno, which contains the
theory of recollection that is the background to Augustine’s notion of divine illumi-
nation and which is essential to Henry’s argument. Another source frequently used is
Augustine himself as well as the many references to ancient scepticism in his works.
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism 2.75
 There are important differences between Ockham and Sextus as well. For example, Ockham em-
phasises that the representation of a thing (a species) can only help to recognise a thing that is al-
ready known. In other words, it can only help to re-actualise habitual knowledge, but it cannot
help to initially acquire knowledge, whereas Sextus does not seem to distinguish between these
two cases.
 See Martin Pickavé, “Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Skepticism and the Possibility of
Naturally Acquired Knowledge,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Back-
ground, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 61‒96, and Richard Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of
Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), especially chapter 4, for more on this debate.
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Henry uses both Augustine’s Contra Academicos and, more significantly, Cicero’s
Academica.¹³
As part of his discussion, Henry develops an argument similar to those that we
found in Ockham and Sextus (although neither refer to “essence”). In the first ques-
tion of the Summa, he writes:
A thing cannot be known, if its essence or nature is not cognized, but only its image, because
Hercules is now known, if only his picture has been seen. A human being only perceives a
thing through its image, in the way of a species received through the senses, which is an
image of the thing, not the thing itself.¹⁴
The question in which this argument is embedded asks whether humans can have
knowledge. The argument is presented as one of several sceptical arguments that
Henry will eventually reject. Ultimately, however, certain knowledge is only attaina-
ble, according to Henry, with the help of God. He argues this point with references to
Augustine. In his rejection of divine illumination, Scotus portrays Henry as an Aca-
demic sceptic, and presents a strong but controversial defence of a naturalistic theo-
ry of knowledge acquisition.
After Henry, presentations of Academic scepticism and sceptical arguments can
be found in most commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (there are many of
them from the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries). An early example of
this is the commentary by Walter Burley (1275−1344) from around 1300. He begins
by pointing out two sceptical positions about knowledge: the Academic one,
which claims that we cannot know anything, and the Platonic one, which claims
that we cannot know anything new.¹⁵ The Academic position is outlined with explicit
references to Cicero’s Academica, and Plato’s position is presented with references to
Meno (his source here could be Averroes’s outline of Meno from his commentary on
Metaphysics rather than Plato’s original work, but this is a speculation). From the
fourteenth century onwards, these two positions came to be taken as representative
of sceptical views and were mentioned in most Posterior Analytics commentaries.¹⁶
 See Pickavé, “Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus,” for an account of Cicero’s influence on
Henry as well as an argument that Henry was the one who made Cicero’s Academica popular
again, which seems true to me. Henry quotes four passages from Cicero’s Academica in the first
three questions of his Summa. In all cases the quotations are from Lucullus’s speech (Lucullus 19,
21, 22, 30). Henry uses these passages primarily to establish that knowledge is possible and that
we can trust our senses, but also in one place to note that the Academics reject certain knowledge.
Lucullus plays a positive role in an otherwise negative story. He is a Stoic and used by Cicero to de-
fend Stoicism as well as to present arguments against the Academics.
 Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum ordinarium I, 1, arg. 7 (Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia
XXI).
 Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum, 64.
 See Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.”
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They conveniently provide the “vicious” extremes in-between which the correct
views should be located.
3 The Sources of Medieval Scepticism
In this section, I would like to say something about the various sources of ancient
scepticism that were available in the Middle Ages. By putting these together, it
might look like the Latin medieval thinkers had almost as good (or bad) a knowledge
of the ancient sceptics as we have today, but this supposition is incorrect.¹⁷ Although
the sources were there and, to some extent, available and used, we know very little
about just how well-used they in fact were. This is particularly true of the Latin trans-
lations of Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. Here is the list of available texts:
1. Cicero, Academica (known throughout)
2. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (late thirteenth century)
3. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians (date unknown, but probably the
same as item 2)
4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (a partial translation from the
twelfth century and a complete one from the fifteenth century)
5. Augustine’s Contra Academicos (known throughout)
Cicero was enormously influential in the Middle Ages, perhaps even as influential as
Aristotle, as Schmitt suggests in his pioneering study.¹⁸ The manuscript tradition of
the Academica (item 1) is divided into two because it is based on the two editions of
the work that Cicero himself produced. They are often referred to as Academica pri-
ora, which survived only in the second of two books, and Academica posteriora,
which survived only in the first of four books. These together are what we now
refer to as the Academica. According to Schmitt, there is little influence of the Aca-
demica posteriora before the fifteenth century,¹⁹ and this seems to me to be correct.
Many medieval authors refer to the Academica as Lucullus, which is the name of the
person delivering the main monologue from Academica priora.
The first references to the Academica appear in the ninth century, but one of the
more important uses of the work can be found in the aforementioned twelfth century
thinker John of Salisbury. The next important usage of it is in Henry of Ghent’s
 Neither Cicero nor Sextus were translated into Arabic, and as far as I know they had very little
influence on the Arabic philosophical tradition.
 See Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academica in the Renais-
sance (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972).
 Schmitt, chapter 2, for more on Cicero’s Academica in the Middle Ages. Schmitt has made only a
limited study of the influence of Cicero’s books in the Middle Ages and does not mention at all the
fourteenth century, a period which contains more references to Cicero than at any previous time in
the Middle Ages.
132 Henrik Lagerlund
Summa.²⁰ From that time onwards, however, the Academica came to be used and ref-
erenced in most Posterior Analytics commentaries. The Academics are, as mentioned,
presented as representatives of the negative position that knowledge is not possible.
Although he misses its influence on the Posterior Analytics tradition, Schmitt empha-
sises that Cicero’s work gradually grew in influence in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.
In his book on the reception of Sextus Empiricus’s work, Luciano Floridi men-
tions three medieval Latin manuscripts of Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (item 2):
one in Venice, another in Madrid, and a third in Paris.²¹ As others have shown,
they seem to be three different versions of one late thirteenth-century translation
of all three books of Sextus’s Outlines (Floridi, though, dates it to the fourteenth cen-
tury). Floridi also mentions two additional sixteenth-century translations, one by Jo-
hannes Paéz de Castro, a known Spanish scholar and philosopher, and another by
Henri Estienne (Henricus Stephanus), from 1562. It is the last one that became the
most influential of the three different Latin translations: for example, it was printed
and used extensively by Montaigne.
Floridi’s conclusions about the first Latin medieval translation are not to be
trusted, however. A better study of these manuscripts has been completed more re-
cently by Roland Wittwer.²² He has shown that the translation must be from between
1265 and 1280, and, although he cannot make an attribution to any named translator,
he finds the closest stylistic parallels with an anonymous translator of Aristotle’s De
partibus animalium from the same time. Wittwer is, however, able to discredit the
suggestion by Floridi and others that Nicholas of Reggio (born 1280) is the transla-
tor.²³ He also shows that the three manuscripts are written by different hands and
are independent of each other. Interestingly, he also points out that there is a refer-
ence to Pyrrhonism in Peter of Auvergne’s (died 1304) commentary on Aristotle’s Pol-
itics.Wittwer is not able to document any substantial influence of this translation be-
sides pointing out that its readership was not as small as scholars have previously
assumed.²⁴ It must be noted, of course, that our Latin word for sceptic, scepticus, de-
rives from this translation.
 Henry’s treatment of knowledge is also brought up and defended against Scotus by Gianfrancesco
Pico in the fifteenth century. See Schmitt, 41.
 See Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2002), chapter 3.
 See Roland Wittwer, “Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the Middle Ages,” Vivarium 54
(2016): 255‒85.
 Michael Frede argues that Nicholas of Reggio translated Galen’s An Outline of Empiricism in the
early fourteenth century, which is important since it contains multiple references to Sextus as well as
Pyrrhonism. See Frede, “A Medieval Source of Modern Scepticism,” in Gedankenzeichen. Festschrift
für Klaus Oehler zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Regina Claussen and Roland Daube-Schackat (Tübingen:
Stauffenburg, 1988), 65‒70.
 Charles B. Schmitt argues that only one person read Sextus in the fourteenth century, namely the
translator himself, but this is obviously false. He also has the date wrong. See Schmitt, “The Redis-
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In his book on Sextus, Floridi also mentions a partial anonymous translation of
Contra mathematicos (item 3) from around the same time as the translation of the
Outlines. It survives in one manuscript from Venice and contains books 3.37 to
5.25. There are, furthermore, two manuscripts from another translation, from the fif-
teenth century: one preserved in a manuscript in Rome that contains books 1‒4, and
another in a Turin manuscript that contains books 1‒3. The first complete translation
is from 1569.²⁵
Diogenes Laertius (item 4) was translated before the 1160s by Henricus Aristip-
pus. The manuscript of the translation is lost, but Henricus is thought to have trans-
lated at least books 1‒5, since those are referenced in two later works: Geremia de
Montagnone’s Compendium moralium notabilium (1285), and Pseudo-Burley’s De
vita et moribus philosophorum (between 1317 and 1320).²⁶ The latter work was for
some time celebrated as a product of the famous early fourteenth-century logician
and philosopher Walter Burley, since it is attributed to him in a fifteenth-century
manuscript, but it is now known that he was not its author. The work was, however,
extremely successful and is extant in over 270 manuscripts as well as in numerous
translations into vernacular languages. It has a similar structure to Diogenes Laer-
tius’s work and often starts with a quotation from it. It contains entries on Academic
sceptics like Arcesilaus and Carneades but makes no mention of the Pyrrhonian
sceptics, which is probably because the author did not have access to Diogenes’s en-
tire work (Pyrrhonism is only treated in book 9). The more famous translation of Di-
ogenes was composed in 1433 by Ambrogio Traversari. It is complete and contains
references to Pyrrho, Timon, and Sextus, as well as Pyrrhonism. This translation
was the first one to be printed, in the early sixteenth century.²⁷
I do not need to add much about Augustine’s Contra Academicos (item 5), since it
was, along with Augustine’s other works, known and referred to throughout the Mid-
dle Ages. Nevertheless, it is noticeable how much more frequently it is cited after the
late thirteenth century. As with Cicero’s Academica, Contra Academicos appears more
often after Henry of Ghent’s use. Henry uses it frequently in the first few questions of
his Summa and from there it makes its way into Posterior Analytics commentaries in
the fourteenth century. Burley’s commentary, mentioned above, is a case in point.
covery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles F. Burnyeat (Ber-
keley: University of California Press, 1983), 225‒51.
 See Floridi, Sextus Empiricus, chapter 4, for more on these translations.Wittwer (“Sextus Empiri-
cus,” 272) argues that this translation is the work of the same person who translated the Outlines.
 Rita Copeland, “Behind the ‘Lives of Philosophers’: Reading Diogenes Laertius in the Western
Middle Ages,” Interfaces: A Journal of Medieval European Literatures, 3 (2016): 245‒63.
 Charles B. Schmitt, “John Wolley (ca. 1530‒1596) and the first Latin Translation of Sextus Empir-
icus, adversus logicos I,” in The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Richard H.
Popkin, eds. Richard. A.Watson and James E. Force (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988), 61‒70, lists a first print-
ing in 1565 but there are several earlier printings, some of which are complete and others that are
shortened. I have consulted an edition from 1535.
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4 Divine Deception
The epistemological debates of the early fourteenth century became increasingly in-
tense and started to dominate the philosophical landscape. These debates were fur-
ther fuelled by the introduction of a new sceptical argument—an argument that had
the power to cast all medieval philosophy into scepticism, namely, the hypothesis of
divine deception. In the early decades of the fourteenth century, following Scotus’s
introduction of logical possibility and the separation of necessity and possibility
from essence, a new conception of divine omnipotence developed.²⁸ This new
view of God’s power generated the sceptical hypothesis of divine deception. God is
so powerful, that the mere possibility of deception threatens to cast philosophy
into global scepticism and undermine any knowledge of the external world. John
Buridan puts it succinctly in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics:
As is commonly said, the senses can be deluded, and it is certain that the species of sensible
things can be preserved in the organs of sense in the absence of sensibles, as is mentioned
in De somno et vigilia. And then we judge about what does not exist as if it existed, and so
we err through the senses. And the difficulty is greatly augmented by the fact that we believe
on faith that God can form sensible species in our senses without the sensible things them-
selves, and preserve them for a long time. In that case, we judge as if there were sensible things
present. Furthermore, since God can do this and greater things, you do not know whether God
intends to do this, and so you have no certitude and evidentness [regarding the question] wheth-
er there are men before you while you are awake or while you are asleep, since in your sleep God
could make a sensible species as clear as—indeed, a hundred times clearer than—what sensible
objects could produce. And so, you would then judge formally that there are sensible objects
before you, just as you do now. Therefore, since you know nothing about the will of God, you
cannot be certain about anything.²⁹
Buridan is very clear in his response to the sceptical argument that our intellects can
correct for sensory illusion and that our senses are overall reliable. Under any natural
circumstance, we can thus trust our senses and realise when they are deceiving us,
but in the case of divine deception, this is obviously not possible, as he explains. If
God chose to deceive us, we would have no way of knowing it, and, in this way, we
cannot be certain about anything.
The kind of argument presented by Buridan swept over fourteenth-century phi-
losophy and theology; all major thinkers of the time commented on the topic. Ock-
ham, Robert Holkot, and Adam Wodeham were all very influential philosophers
and theologians preceding Buridan and Peter Ailly. All of them agreed that God
could be deceiving us. Wodeham adds the following observation about the conse-
 See Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.”
 John Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Questiones argutissimae (Paris, 1518). Rep. as Kommen-
tar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva: 1964), II, q. 1, fol. 8rb‒va.
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quences of this doctrine: “we cannot know of any external thing—more precisely, of
anything other than our own mind—that it exists.”³⁰
Even though secondary literature mostly discusses the notion of divine decep-
tion in the context of its use in theological works and Sentence-commentaries, it
should be noted that this kind of scepticism also quickly worked its way into com-
mentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. A telling example of this is John Buri-
dan’s commentary, but also his somewhat younger contemporary, Albert of Saxony,
who offers an extensive treatment of the implications of divine deception for scien-
tific knowledge, that is, scientia. In question 3 of the first book of his commentary, he
writes:
Is it possible for us to know something? It is argued that this is not the case, because we cannot
have evidentness about something without fear of the opposite. Hence, it is not possible for us to
know something. The consequence holds from this, that scientia is evident without fear of the
opposite, therefore, it is not possible for us to know something. And the antecedent is proved,
because we cannot have a notion of something, that is neither evident by the senses nor the in-
tellect, hence, in no way. The consequence holds. And the antecedent is proved, first, since this
is not the case through the senses. For as much as it is apparent to me by the senses that fire is
hot, nevertheless, it is at hand that I do not have the judgment or the evidentness about this,
that is, that fire is hot, without fear for [the opposite]. For it is possible that some power, for in-
stance a divine, produced in my senses a species representing hot, and that cold has been de-
stroyed and hot introduced [in its stead], and that the action of the cold [thing] is suspended in
the senses. If this is posited, then it is apparent to me that fire is hot, but in truth it is cold. By
positing this case, which is possible, by the First Cause acting freely, it follows that as much as I
see the fire, I must be in doubt about the hotness of the fire, namely, that the coldness has been
corrupted and a hotness introduced. Hence, a species of hotness is represented in the senses,
and the action of a cold [thing] is suspended in the senses by the First Cause. Therefore, as
much as something appears to me to be hot, I have nevertheless to be in doubt about [this].
Hence, by the sense of touch, it is not possible to hold a certain judgment about something.³¹
Albert of Saxony goes on to draw very strong conclusions based on the idea of divine
deception.³²
This kind of argumentation can be found throughout philosophy in sentence-
commentaries and commentaries on Aristotle’s works all the way up to the sixteenth
century. In his commentary on Peter of Spain’s Summaries of Logic, John Mair writes
 Elizabeth Karger, “Ockham and Wodeham on Divine Deception as a Skeptical Hypothesis,” Viva-
rium 42 (2004): 229.
 Albert of Saxony, Expositio et Questiones in Aristotelis libros Physicorum ad Albertus de Saxonia
attributae, ed. Benoit Patar (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 1999), I, q. 3, fol. 3vb. See also Albert of Sax-
ony, Questiones circa logicam, in Albert of Saxony’s Twenty-Five Disputed Questions on Logic. A critical
edition of his Questiones circa logicam, ed. Michael J. Fitzgerald (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002),
345.
 Henrik Lagerlund, “Skeptical Issues in Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: John Bur-
idan and Albert of Saxony,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism:The Missing Medieval Background,
ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 193‒214.
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the following: “God can annihilate the ball without me knowing it while conserving
in my soul the assent that I have. In this way, I have assented to [the proposition] that
‘the ball is round’ and in this I am mistaken.”³³ Mair is here developing an example
used by Ockham about a star that God annihilates while preserving my cognition of
it. For Mair, this is a case of divine deception.³⁴ All these thinkers are, it seems to me,
in the same situation as Descartes after the First Meditation. All knowledge claims
about things to which God’s power extends can be disproven and it seems we cannot
know anything for certain anymore.³⁵
5 The Predecessors of Divine Deception
Divine deception is a global sceptical argument—as opposed to the traditionally local
sceptical arguments one can find in ancient thought—which generates scepticism to-
wards the external world. As mentioned, this kind of scepticism first appeared in the
early fourteenth century and continued in philosophy well into Descartes’s time. It
did have some predecessors, though, three of which I will mention here: a view out-
lined in Cicero’s Academica; one present in Augustine’s Contra Academicos; and a
third, visible in al-Ghazālī. First, let us have a look at what Cicero has Lucullus say:
Since the Academics have a methodical approach, I will set out their arguments systematically.
The first type tries to show that there are often [persuasive] impressions of things that don’t exist
at all, since our minds are moved vacuously by what is not the case in the same way as by what
is the case. After all, they say, you claim that some impressions are sent by god, for instance in
dreams and revelations from oracles, auspices, or entrails. […] Well, they ask, how is it that god
can make persuasive impressions that are false, but can’t make persuasive impressions that ap-
proximate the truth very closely? Or, if he can do that, why not persuasive impressions that can
only be discriminated [from true impressions], though with considerable difficulty? And if that,
why [not false but persuasive impressions] that don’t differ at all [from true impressions]?³⁶
This is a somewhat casual remark by Lucullus, who is reporting the arguments of
some Academic sceptics. Since Lucullus is a Stoic, he does not accept these argu-
ments, and Cicero employs him to ground arguments against the Academic position.
 John Mair, Commentary of Peter of Spain’s Summulae, Section of Posterior Analytics, 144vb.
 See Elizabeth Karger, “Ockham and Wodeham,” and the response to this in Claude Panaccio and
David Piché, “Ockham’s Reliabilism and the Intuition of Non-Existents,” in Rethinking the History of
Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 97‒118.
 Unlike José L. Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did it Have Ancient or Medi-
aeval Antecedents?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (2000): 333‒60, I think there is very little orig-
inal thought in Descartes’s sceptical arguments. For more on this see Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.”
Most medieval thinkers did not think that divine deception casts doubt on logic and mathematics, as
Descartes does, but some did. See Lagerlund, “Skeptical Issues.”
 Cicero, Academica 2.47. The translation quoted here is from Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, trans.
Charles Brittain (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 29.
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Neither Cicero nor anyone else at the time the Academica was written deals compre-
hensively with the idea that the Gods can deceive us and impart impressions to us
that are as persuasive as true ones. There is no indication that Cicero meant this
to be applied globally so that the Gods would always do this, which is what would
have to be the case for Cicero’s suggestion to be like Descartes or the medieval
idea of divine deception. It remains an intriguing, but isolated remark.
An equally fascinating passage can be found in book 3 of Contra Academicos,
Augustine seems to suggest a view very near to external world scepticism. I quote
the passage in its entirety:
“How do you know that the world exists,” replies the Academician, “if the senses are decep-
tive?” Your arguments were never able to disown the power of our senses to the extent of clearly
establishing that nothing seems to be so to us. Nor have you ever ventured to try to do so. How-
ever, you’ve energetically committed yourself to persuading us that something seems so and yet
can be otherwise.
Therefore, I call the whole that contains and sustains us, whatever it is, the “world”—the
whole, I say, that appears before my eyes, which I perceive to include the heavens and the
earth (or the quasi-heavens and quasi-earth).
If you say nothing seems to be so to me, I’ll never be in error. It is the man who recklessly
approves what seems so to him who is in error. You do say that a falsehood can seem to be so to
sentient beings. You don’t say that nothing seems to be so. Every ground for disputation, where
you Academicians enjoy being the master, is completely taken away if it is true not only that we
know nothing, but also that nothing seems to be so to us. However, if you deny that what seems
so to me is the world, then you’re making a fuss about a name, since I said I call this “world.”
You’ll ask me: “Is what you see the world even if you’re asleep?” It has already been said
that I call “world” whatever seems to me to be such.³⁷
The Academic sceptic with whom Augustine is arguing asks hypothetically whether
we can be certain the world exists if we cannot trust our senses. Augustine backped-
als in response and says that by “world” he means “my world,” that is, the world as
it appears to me, and the appearance of the world cannot be denied. Augustine does
not develop this. He merely uses it as an argument against the sceptic, but what is
interesting is, of course, that his view implies scepticism about the external world
as well as the related problem of other minds. This might be the first statement of
such a view in the history of philosophy. I am not aware of anyone else who had de-
veloped the view here expressed by Augustine, and he himself did not use it as a
sceptical argument—on the contrary, he considered it to be an anti-sceptical argu-
ment.
There are also some extreme sceptical arguments expressed in Arabic philoso-
phy, however, nothing quite like what we find in the Latin tradition. It is well-
known, at least among scholars, that al-Ghazālī’s (1085‒1111) sceptical arguments
are remarkably similar to arguments advanced by of Descartes and Hume. There
 Augustine, Against the Academicians and the Teacher, trans. Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1995), 74.
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have even been attempts to show that he must have influenced them.³⁸ This similar-
ity emerges not only in his most famous work, The Incoherence of the Philosophers
(Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), but also in his attitude to knowledge in his lesser-known intel-
lectual autobiography, Deliverance from Error (al-Munqiḏ min al-Ḍalāl). There he de-
scribes how he set out to find infallible knowledge, but could not. He writes, “I pro-
ceeded therefore with extreme earnestness to reflect on sense-perception and the
necessary truths, to see whether I could make myself doubt them.”³⁹ In the autobiog-
raphy, he mentions some familiar objections to sense-perception and finds that he
cannot trust it as a source of knowledge. He then proposes the now famous
dream-doubt:
Do you not see how, when you are asleep, you believe things and imagine circumstances, hold-
ing them to be stable and enduring, and, so long as you are in that dream-condition, have no
doubts about them? And is it not the case that when you awake you know that all you have im-
agined and believed is unfounded and intellectual? Why are you content that all your waking
beliefs, whether from sense or intellect, are genuine? They are true in respect of your present
state; but it is possible that a state will come upon you whose relation to you waking conscious-
ness is analogous to the relation of the latter to dreaming. In comparison with this state your
waking consciousness would be like dreaming!⁴⁰
Like Descartes in the Meditations, al-Ghazālī suggests that what I take to be my con-
scious experience might turn out to be a dream. There is no way to be sure that this is
not the case. Struck by this insight, al-Ghazālī is disheartened and cast into scepti-
cism.
When these thoughts had occurred to me and penetrated my being, I tried to find some way of
treating my unhealthy condition; but it was not easy. Such ideas can only be repelled by dem-
onstration; but a demonstration requires knowledge of first principles; since this is not admit-
ted, however, it is impossible to make the demonstration. The disease was baffling, and lasted
almost two months, during which I was a sceptic in fact though not in theory nor in outward
expression. At length God cured me of the malady; the necessary truths of the intellect became
once more accepted, as I regained confidence in their certain and trustworthy character this did
not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light which God
most high cast into my breast.⁴¹
 See Ulrich Rudolph and Dominik Perler, Occasionalismus: Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-is-
lamischen und im europäischen Denken (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000). Taneli Kukko-
nen, “Al-Ghazālī’s Skepticism Revisited,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medie-
val Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 29‒59, expresses strong reservations
concerning any direct influence by al-Ghazālī on Descartes and Hume.
 See Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1953), 23.
 Watt, 24.
 Watt, 25.
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As this quotation reveals, the similarities with Descartes’s Meditations are striking,
but it is not just Descartes whom al-Ghazālī precedes. Consider the following
quote from the seventeenth discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers:
The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually be-
lieved to be an effect is not necessary […] It is not a necessity of the existence of the one that
the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of the nonexistence of the one that the other
should not exist—for example, the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning
and contact with fire, light and the appearance of the sun, death and decapitation, healing and
the drinking of medicine, the purging of the bowels and the using of a purgative, and so on to
include all that is observable among connected things in medicine, astronomy, arts, and crafts.
Their connection is due to the prior decree of God,who creates them side by side, not to its being
necessary in itself, incapable of separation. On the contrary, it is within divine power to create
satiety without eating, to create death without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation,
and so on to all connected things.⁴²
This criticism of the necessary connection between cause and effect is remarkably
similar to Hume’s criticism and, before that, to Nicholas of Autrecourt’s arguments.
We cannot observe the necessary connection, but only that one thing follows the
other in time. In the quotation, we can also see evidence of al-Ghazālī’s occasional-
ism. He thinks that it is God who creates the coexistence of cause and effect, and,
hence that God can also see to it that a cause does not produce an effect. He writes
the following about God’s ability to deceive us:
I do not know what is at the house at present. All I know is that I have left a book in the house,
which is perhaps now a horse that has defiled the library with its urine and its dung, and that I
have left in the house a jar of water, which well may have turned into an apple tree. For God is
capable of everything, and it is not necessary for the horse to be created from sperm nor the tree
to be created from the seed—indeed, it is not necessary for either of the two to be created from
anything.⁴³
God can do pretty much anything he wants, al-Ghazālī argues, although he will not.
On the contrary, God is for him the source of certainty and knowledge as he is for
Descartes.
It seems that al-Ghazālī’s sceptical discussions had very little influence on the
Latin medieval and early modern tradition. Deliverance from Error was not translated
in the Middle Ages or in early modern times, but the Incoherence of the Philosophers
seems to have been. It was, however, not translated as a separate text in the Middle
Ages, but as part of Averroes’s refutation of that text. Averroes’s work is called the
Incoherence of the Incoherence, and was translated into Latin in 1328.⁴⁴ A fair amount
 Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed. and trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah:
Bringham Young University Press, 2000), 166.
 Al-Ghazālī, 170.
 The Latin translation was printed in 1497 together with a commentary by the late fifteenth-cen-
tury Italian philosopher, Augustino Nifo. Averroes’s work was then reprinted without Nifo’s commen-
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of knowledge of al-Ghazālī preceded this translation, however. Other works of his
were translated, and Averroes referred to him. Still, it is interesting that he was
being translated at a time when scepticism had become a problem and Latin philos-
ophy had turned to worry about epistemology and the status of Aristotelian science.
6 The Rejection of Divine Deception⁴⁵
The doctrine of divine deception did not lead the fourteenth century into scepticism.
One might ask, why? It certainly could have, but there are at least three reasons why
it did not. First, some thinkers argued that divine deception will simply not happen,
since it would be contrary to God’s benevolence. Second, other thinkers argued that,
although God can deceive, he will not do so because of a covenant between God and
humankind laid down at the moment of creation. The third and most philosophically
interesting reason consists in the revision of the concept of knowledge and the rela-
tivising of the concept of evidence.
Gregory of Rimini argued that God cannot be a deceiver since this would contra-
dict his benevolent nature. Gabriel Biel in the fifteenth century and Francisco Suárez
in the sixteenth century defended similar views. Rimini’s argument is that God can-
not deceive, since it would imply saying or making someone believe something false.
He writes: “God cannot say something false to someone, willing thereby that the per-
son, to whom he says it, assents to what is said.”⁴⁶ God cannot say something false or
make someone else say something false if that means that what is said is said in a
meaningful way, without irony, and in an assertive mode. Saying something false in
this way amounts to lying, argues Rimini, and God cannot lie, even given his abso-
lute power. Rimini is hence limiting God’s omnipotence by saying that due to his be-
nevolence he cannot be a deceiver.
A second reason why divine deception did not have the implications for philos-
ophy it could have had was the appeal to a contract or covenant between God and
humankind. This was a very common view, particularly among certain theologians
following Ockham, and all the main thinkers who were concerned with divine decep-
tion adhered to this view. We find it in Ockham, Holkot, Rimini, Ailly, and Biel. The
notion of a covenant governs both the natural and the moral order established by
God in the creation of the world. It takes as its starting point the idea that what is
is determined by God’s will and that whatever natural or moral laws there are are
tary in 1527. See Anthony H. Minnema, “The Latin Readers of Algazel, 1150−1600” (PhD diss., Univer-
sity of Tennessee, 2013), http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2602. It is, hence, possible that Des-
cartes had knowledge of it.
 This section is similar to a section appearing in Lagerlund, “Divine Deception,” 228‒30.
 Quoted in Dominik Perler, “Does God Deceive us? Skeptical Hypothesis in Late Medieval Episte-
mology,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lager-
lund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 182.
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also determined by an act of God’s will. These laws, therefore, are not absolute but
decided on or chosen by God. God had infinite possibilities from which to choose in
creating this world, and chose to establish this particular moral law and this partic-
ular causal order, which, of course, makes them special and necessary.
As someone like Ailly understands, within the concept of “covenant” there are
two covenants corresponding to the two kinds of ordained power. The first covers
the world in general and is made with all humans. The second is made with the
Church.⁴⁷ According to the first covenant, God has promised to uphold his creation
and all the laws that govern it. According to his absolute power, God could act in
whatever way he wanted towards his creation: change it, deceive us, and so forth.
However, according to his ordained power, he will not. Instead, he acts in accord
with the established laws. This view does not limit God’s omnipotence in any way,
since God is not limited by the laws he has put down, although given the covenant
he will abide by them. As humans, we can hence trust that God will not make
changes and that he is not deceiving us. The doctrine of covenant plays an important
role in late medieval and early modern thought, but perhaps the most important as-
pect of the theory is that it did not allow divine deception to take hold of philosophy.
The third way to deal with divine deception is the most interesting philosophi-
cally. Buridan is generally credited with devising this approach; it was repeated by
almost all philosophers following him well into the sixteenth century. I will here pre-
sent the view as defended by Albert of Saxony and Peter of Ailly. Both philosophers
take as their starting point the assumption that, in the face of possible divine decep-
tion, knowledge can no longer be assumed to be infallible. Given God’s omnipotence,
as we saw Buridan explain above, we can no longer be certain of anything; if we hold
on to the idea that knowledge is infallible, we will have to accept scepticism. Buri-
dan’s way out is to say that knowledge is fallible and that we must relativise what
he calls “evidentness” to the domain of enquiry we are concerned with. Albert of
Saxony explains this very clearly. He writes:
It must be noted that evidence is used in two ways, namely maximal and natural evidence. Max-
imal evidence is used for propositions in accordance with which the intellect by its nature cog-
nizes with assent to the proposition, and cannot dissent from it. In this way,we say that the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction is evident, and, similarly, it is by this evidence that it is evident that I
know that I exist. Natural evidence, however, is such evidence that nothing opposite appears
through human reasoning unless by sophistry. And in this way natural principles and conclu-
sions are said to be evident. It must be noted that [such principles] are not strictly speaking evi-
dent, since the intellect that holds this to be evident can be deceived by a supernatural power.⁴⁸
Albert uses the example to explain that God may have changed appearances so that
Socrates, who appears human to me, is in fact a donkey, or that fire is hot when it in
fact is cold. Hence, it is not maximally evident that “Socrates is a human being” or
 William Courtenay, “Covenant and Causality in Pierre d’Ailly,” Speculum 46 (1971): 94‒119.
 Albert of Saxony, Questiones circa logicam, 348‒49.
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that “Fire is hot.” These are only naturally evident, which means that there is no nat-
ural counterevidence to them. These are truths only given the assumption that we are
not being deceived by God.
Ailly explains this distinction in a similar way. He explains it, however, in terms
of absolute versus conditional evidence. For the latter he also uses secundum quid
and ex suppositione. In Albert’s view, natural evidence is conditional in Ailly’s termi-
nology because it assumes that God is not deceiving us, that is, it puts God aside, so
to say. He notes as well that whatever is absolutely evident is infallible (infallibilis),
and the examples he gives are the principle of non-contradiction and the certainty
that one is alive. He also adds to this list truths such as the fact that one cannot
be made cold by warmth.⁴⁹ Ailly also adds a distinction between what is condition-
ally evident and what is merely probable. Something is probable if it is possible to
conclude the opposite, but if something is evident, on the other hand, then there
is no counterargument to it, save, of course, divine deception.⁵⁰
Mainly through Ailly, this concept of knowledge and the new account of evident-
ness that followed from it influenced later philosophy. We can see its influence well
into the sixteenth century.⁵¹ It very elegantly short-circuited the global sceptical
threat of divine deception and, although it ultimately moved from a view of knowl-
edge as infallible to a view of it as fallible, it allowed philosophy and natural science
to develop without the threat of scepticism, which it did well into the sixteenth cen-
tury when the debate took a different turn.
7 Conclusion
Scepticism or sceptical argumentation in the Latin Middle Ages was very different
from ancient scepticism. It took on an epistemological flair from the late thirteenth
century onwards, which it never quite escaped. A strong motivator for the epistemo-
logical turn in the use of sceptical argumentations was the development of a new ar-
gument that had a power and global reach unlike anything previously suggested in
the history of philosophy, namely, the hypothesis of God as a deceiver. This new argu-
 Peter of Ailly, Quaestiones super libros sententiarum cum quibusdam in fine adjunctis (Frankfurt:
Minerva, 1968), I, q. 1, art. 1, fol. 48r.
 Peter of Ailly, I, q. 3, art. 3, fol. 78r. The same argument with the same terminology is used by John
Mair in the early sixteenth century. See Henrik Lagerlund, “Knowledge and Scientia in Two Posterior
Analytics Commentaries after Buridan: Albert of Saxony and John Mair,” in Knowledge in Medieval
Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 213‒32.
 See Elizabeth Karger, “A Buridanian Response to a Fourteenth Century Skeptical Argument and
Its Rebuttal by a New Argument in the Early Sixteenth Century,” in Rethinking the History of Skepti-
cism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 215‒32. Karger
presents a debate between Mair and Antonio Coronel from the early sixteenth century about Buri-
dan’s theory. Coronel presents a sceptical argument questioning the idea that natural evidence is
enough for knowledge.
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ment threatened to cast philosophy into global external world scepticism, but due to
new developments, particularly the suggestion that knowledge claims are not infal-
lible, this threat was removed. At the same time as this debate about the status of
knowledge claims, medieval philosophy also rediscovered both Academic and Pyr-
rhonian scepticism. This rediscovery was surely motivated, at least in part, by the de-
bate. It was Academic scepticism that came to have the most influence on the ongo-
ing debate.
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Spinoza on Global Doubt
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a reassessment of Spinoza’s response to global or hyperbolic
doubt, which is the distinctive mark of Cartesian scepticism. Scholars have tradition-
ally interpreted the scarcity of Spinoza’s pronouncements on the topic of doubt and
scepticism as a sign of dogmatic indifference towards sceptical worries and as a
weakness of his philosophy. Recent studies have detected greater nuance than this
first impression and attempted to identify a more elaborate response to radical scep-
ticism in Spinoza’s metaphysical commitments, on which his epistemological views
are based.¹ The majority of these studies conclude that monism constitutes Spinoza’s
main defence against scepticism. Despite variations, their chief argument is the fol-
lowing. Sceptical worries do not emerge unless we assume a fundamental disagree-
ment between our perceptions and reality. The monistic framework presented by Spi-
noza, by contrast, conceives of reality as a unified whole in which ideas and physical
things are one and the same substance, expressed in two different ways. Therefore,
there is no place in such a monistic conception for the fundamental disagreement
between ideas and things presupposed by the sceptic.
In what follows I will argue that Spinoza’s monism, far from precluding sceptical
doubt, is in fact liable to generate it. This is not to say that Spinoza is a sceptic (he is
definitely not). What I would like to show is that his theoretical framework is more
congenial to modern scepticism than is usually assumed. The perfect agreement be-
tween ideas and physical things, which Spinoza’s monism in principle entails, disap-
pears when we descend from the level of the one infinite substance to the level of the
finite human mind.Whereas scholars have acknowledged this fact, they have under-
estimated its far-reaching implications. Spinoza explains the existence of doubt in us
by the fact that we are part of nature and, consequently, grasp things partially. More-
over, he conceives falsity as the privation of knowledge that our partial apprehension
of things involves. The problem of scepticism resurfaces here: how can the human
mind, being part of nature, grasp things other than partially, i.e., falsely? The gap
between the one infinite substance and the finite human mind entails a fundamental
disagreement between our ideas and reality, analogous to the disagreement assumed
by the sceptic. In this specific sense, I hold that Spinoza’s monism unavoidably gen-
erates scepticism, unless there is a way to bridge the gap between the finite human
mind and the one infinite substance. In this paper, I examine Spinoza’s approach to
this crucial problem. I argue that the adequacy of ideas, which makes them impervi-
 See section 2.
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ous to doubt, is ultimately founded upon the human mind’s ability to conceive the
infinite. I further argue that this ability, in turn, requires the existence of features
or properties that are common to God and the human mind and allow the human
mind to transcend its partial viewpoint. I will proceed as follows: the next section
provides a brief account of some recent readings of Spinoza’s anti-scepticism as
grounded in his monism. The third section examines Spinoza’s reflections on
doubt contained in his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect² and shows that
only a clear apprehension of God’s essence can dispel scepticism. The fourth section
explores the conditions of possibility of such an apprehension in the finite human
mind, according to the second book of Spinoza’s Ethics. The final section proposes
a new hypothesis concerning the theoretical presuppositions behind modern scepti-
cism and argues that Spinoza and the modern sceptic, despite their antagonistic
views, share a similar conception of knowledge.
2 Spinoza’s Monism versus the Sceptical Challenge
Since the present paper deals with Spinoza’s stance towards global doubt, let us first
clarify the meaning of the expression “global doubt.” Scholars generally agree that
the variety of scepticism that emerges during the 16th and 17th centuries differs in
crucial respects from its ancient counterparts. One possible way of explaining the
main difference between the two is that whereas ancient scepticism argues that
true perceptions are indistinguishable from false ones, early modern scepticism sup-
poses that the entire set of my perceptions is false.³ Although this might not sound
like a significant difference, it is actually a crucial one. The ancient form of scepti-
cism does not question the existence of veridical perceptions, only our ability to dis-
tinguish them successfully from false ones. Thus, one can endorse this form of scep-
ticism and still admit “the possibility of some sort of knowledge of the world.”⁴ The
 All the quotations in English from Spinoza’s works are taken from Baruch Spinoza, The Collected
Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985‒
2016). References are according to Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter
Verlag, 1925); henceforth: G. I employ the following standard abbreviations for Spinoza’s works: TIE—
Treatise of the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione); TTP—Theological-
Political Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus), Ep.—Letters (Epistolae). Passages in the Ethics
will be referred to by means of the following abbreviations: a(‐xiom), c(‐orollary), p(‐roposition),
s(‐cholium) and app(‐endix); “d” stands for either “definition” (when it appears immediately to
the right of the part of the book), or “demonstration” (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third
definition of part 1 and E1p16d is the demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1.
 See José Luis Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did it have Ancient or Mediaeval
Antecedents?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 17, no. 4 (October 2000): 337‒38.
 Bermúdez, 337. To make this clearer, consider the following example. A typical sceptical argument
among ancient sceptics is that the same object appears differently under different circumstances,
thus making impossible to determine which appearance is the true one. This kind of sceptical reason-
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modern form of scepticism, by contrast, assumes that all my perceptions can be si-
multaneously mistaken, thus suggesting the extreme possibility that there is nothing
but universal deception. Due to its all-embracing character, this form of doubt has
been described as “global doubt.”⁵ This is the kind of doubt that Descartes adopts
in his Meditations, expressed in sceptical scenarios such as the deceiving God.
How does Spinoza,well versed in Cartesian philosophy, respond to global doubt?
We find his most explicit pronouncement on this issue in his account of true ideas
(mainly contained in the TIE and in the second book of his Ethics). In conformity
with the traditional conception of truth, Spinoza holds that “a true idea must
agree with its object” (E1a6). However, he contends that the certainty of a true
idea—i.e., the features through which the mind recognises an idea as true—must
be contained in the idea itself, not in its relation to an external object. Certainty is
thus an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic property of true ideas. This means that,
by merely having a true idea, the mind is certain of its truth and can clearly distin-
guish it from a false one. One could of course ask whether the mind has true ideas at
all. According to Spinoza, we must assume it does, for otherwise the acquisition of
knowledge would be impossible. I can only know what certainty is if I already
have a true idea which serves as a standard or model of truth. Spinoza illustrates
this point in the TIE through the analogy with the fabrication of tools (G4:13‒14).
Since tools are produced by means of other tools, one could ask: how did the first
human beings make their tools, when there were no tools available? They made
them “with the tools they were born with” (G2:13). In like manner, Spinoza claims,
“there must be a true idea in us, as an inborn tool” (G2:16), by means of which
our intellect is able to form new true ideas. In order to serve as the standard of
truth, this true idea in us must be certain in virtue of itself, not in virtue of something
else.
This intuitionistic account of true ideas is of course unlikely to convince a sceptic
who has embraced global doubt.⁶ After all, global doubt affects the totality of our
perceptions, even those that seem most certain. When confronted with the sceptic’s
profession of doubt, Spinoza’s account of certainty seems to allow only for two ex-
planations of her state of mind: either the sceptic has no true ideas at all, or she sim-
ply feigns her global doubt. Such responses are unsatisfying and rather ineffective
against the worries raised by modern scepticism. Scholars have sought deeper rea-
sons for Spinoza’s apparent indifference towards doubt, and recent attempts have lo-
cated them in his metaphysical commitments. Since Spinoza’s epistemology is deriv-
ative of his metaphysical views, it is reasonable to look for a better response to
ing still presupposes the existence of objects appearing to us. See Dominik Perler, “Wie ist ein global-
er Zweifel möglich? Zu den Voraussetzungen des frühneuzeitlichen Außenwelt-Skeptizismus,” Zeits-
chrift für philosophische Forschung 57, no. 4 (October‒December 2003): 484.
 See Perler.
 See Robert Mason, “Ignoring the Demon? Spinoza’s Way with Doubt,” Journal of the History of Phi-
losophy 31, no. 4 (October 1993): 545‒46.
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scepticism in such views. Michael Della Rocca and Dominik Perler have presented, in
my view, the most elaborate and compelling cases in favour of this reading.⁷ In what
follows, I will summarise the results of their inquiries.⁸
According to these scholars, the key to the question lies in Spinoza’s monism,
whose main claims are that “except God, no substance can be or be conceived”
(E2p14) and “nothing can be or be conceived without God” (E2p15). By virtue of
this monism, Spinoza rejects all claims based on an arbitrary separation between
spheres or realms in reality.⁹ Spinoza, thus, dismisses all views of human nature
that isolate it from the rest of nature (or God) and treat it as a realm apart, insofar
as such separation runs counter to nature’s fundamental oneness. Certainly, Spinoza
draws a sharp distinction between the mental and the physical and denies any caus-
al interaction between the two. Yet the aim of this distinction is to establish their
union more effectively. Strictly speaking, the mental and the physical are not parts
or areas of reality, but the same infinite reality explained in two different ways. Spi-
noza thus concludes that “a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing cir-
cle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through
different attributes” (E2p7s).
When considered against this monistic background, Spinoza’s dismissal of scep-
ticism becomes more plausible. To begin with, as Perler observes, the sameness of
the physical and the mental excludes all possible doubts regarding the existence
of a physical world corresponding to our perceptions.¹⁰ By virtue of this sameness,
Spinoza establishes that the human mind is an idea whose object or ideatum is
the human body. Since a body existing in nature and the idea of it are the same
thing explained through different attributes, I cannot doubt, as Descartes does, the
existence of my own body. Monism also provides the key to Spinoza’s conception
of certainty as an intrinsic property of true ideas—a point that Della Rocca stresses.¹¹
The sameness of thought (i.e., the mental) and extension entails that thought “con-
tains in itself objectively the whole of Nature” and that “thoughts proceed in the
same manner as Nature, its object, does” (Ep. 32; G4:173a‒174a). The nature of
thought thus consists in representing its objects as they are in themselves, i.e., in
 See Michael Della Rocca, “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism,” Mind 116, no. 464 (Novem-
ber 2007): 851‒74; Dominik Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” Zeitschrift für philosophische For-
schung 61, no. 1 (January‒March 2007): 1‒26.
 There is a wealth of literature on the relationship between Spinoza and scepticism. I confine my
discussion to the studies of Della Rocca and Perler because they specifically trace Spinoza’s anti-
scepticism back to his monism. For further studies, see Martha Brandt Bolton, “Spinoza on Cartesian
Doubt,” Noûs 19, no. 3 (September 1985): 379‒95; Willis Doney, “Spinoza on Philosophical Skepti-
cism,” in Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, eds. Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman (La
Salle: Open Court, 1975), 139‒57; José María Sánchez de León Serrano, “The Place of Skepticism in
Spinoza’s Thought,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 35, no. 1 (January 2018): 1‒19.
 See Della Rocca, “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism,” 853.
 See Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” 13‒14.
 See Della Rocca, “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism,” 860‒61.
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knowing them, and therefore certainty is inherent to it. Here, again, we must bear in
mind that monism impels Spinoza to reject all arbitrary divisions of reality into sep-
arate compartments.¹² Thus, it makes no sense for Spinoza to divorce—as the sceptic
does—ideas and certainty, for this is tantamount to arbitrarily dividing reality into
unconnected spheres.
It is apparent that there is no place for global doubt within such a metaphysical
framework. The sceptic is obviously not compelled to accept this monistic conception
and can reject it as a dogmatic invention.¹³ Yet here is where the sceptic’s weapon
turns against herself: Spinoza can also retort and demand a justification of the scep-
tic’s assumption that ideas and cognition are not the same. The sceptic can only en-
tertain the hypothesis that all my ideas are wrong under the assumption that ideas
and knowledge constitute two separate realities, independent of one another. In this
respect, there is also a certain view of reality—a quite dualistic one!—behind the
sceptic’s position, even if she refuses to make claims about reality and believes
that her doubts are free from presuppositions. Thus, the strength of Spinoza’s anti-
scepticism consists in revealing the theoretical assumptions behind scepticism and
showing their arbitrariness.¹⁴
This is, in broad strokes, the recent verdict of two important scholars on the
question of the relationship between Spinoza’s anti-scepticism and monism. Al-
though I generally agree with this assessment, I believe it contains an important
flaw: it mainly addresses the question of doubt from the viewpoint of the one sub-
stance or God—where all ideas are true—but not from the viewpoint of the finite
human mind, where doubt actually occurs. If we descend, as it were, from one
level to the other, the congruence between ideas and things ceases to be obvious
and becomes a problem. As I show in the next sections, the question of global
doubt, albeit inexistent with respect to God, resurfaces at the level of the limited
human mind. Obviously, both Della Rocca and Perler take into account the limitation
of the human mind and the fact that, beside true ideas, it also has inadequate ones.
Yet they still address the issue only from the perspective of the one infinite sub-
stance, and therefore only admit the possibility of a “local” doubt, not a global
one.¹⁵ Certainly, if all ideas are true in God, and the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, then the human mind necessarily partakes of God’s true ideas. However,
this “participation” is precisely the issue, insofar as, for Spinoza, the inadequacy
of our ideas consists in the fact that they grasp reality ex parte, not absolute
(E2p11, p34, p35). The fact that the human mind is part of God’s intellect can lead
to the conclusion that all the ideas in the human mind are also partial, and therefore
inadequate. Unfortunately, Spinoza is unclear on this point, the importance of which
scholars have not sufficiently emphasised. I will address this issue in the next two
 See Della Rocca, 852‒53.
 See Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” 22‒23.
 See Perler, 4.
 See Perler, 23; Della Rocca, “Spinoza and the Metaphysics of Scepticism,” 852‒53.
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sections, first by focusing on Spinoza’s reflections on doubt contained in the TIE
(which show that Spinoza admits the possibility of global doubt), and then by briefly
examining his account of adequacy in the second book of the Ethics.
3 Spinoza’s Analysis of Doubt
Paragraphs 77‒80 in the TIE (G2:29‒30) contain the most thorough examination of
the question of doubt ever offered by Spinoza.¹⁶ An attentive reading of these para-
graphs shows that extreme doubt, far from being a false problem, is for Spinoza an
almost inexorable consequence of our containment in nature (i.e., our limitedness).¹⁷
It also shows that the elimination of doubt can only occur through an adequate grasp
of God’s essence. This puts Spinoza’s approach to doubt in close vicinity to Des-
cartes’, although, as I also show in this section, their respective strategies on this
point differ in crucial respects. Finally, the analysis of these paragraphs will help
us define the actual question Spinoza has to solve in order to overcome global
doubt: how can the finite grasp the infinite?
In §78, Spinoza writes:
There is no doubt in the soul, therefore, through the thing itself concerning which one doubts.
That is, if there should be only one idea in the soul, then, whether it is true or false, there will be
neither doubt nor certainty, but only a sensation of a certain sort. For in itself [this idea] is noth-
ing but a sensation of a certain sort. But doubt will arise through another idea which is not so
clear and distinct that we can infer from it something certain about the thing concerning which
there is doubt. That is, the idea that puts us in doubt is not clear and distinct (G2:29‒30).
We can distinguish in this passage two important claims, which, as I will show later,
provide the key for Spinoza’s solution to global doubt. The first claim establishes that
the cause of doubt differs from the thing concerning which one doubts. This implies
that, in order for doubt to arise, a plurality of ideas is required. Indeed, the veracity
of a given perception can only be challenged by another perception, for a perception
 It has been argued that Spinoza’s concern with doubt is only present in the TIE due to the early
influence of Descartes and disappears in subsequent works, showing that Spinoza lost interest in the
question. Yet there is, I think, a more convincing way to explain the apparent disappearance of the
issue of doubt in Spinoza’s later writings. Spinoza admittedly conceived the TIE as an introduction to
a more systematic work. Thus, he formulates in the TIE problems that will only find their definitive
solution in the Ethics. I contend that this is precisely the case with the issue of sceptical doubt,which,
as I argue in this and the next section, finds a definitive answer in Spinoza’s account (contained in
the second book of his Ethics) of the human mind’s ability to grasp God’s essence adequately.
 Thomas Nagel points out in a similar fashion the link between scepticism and our “containment
in the world”: “Skepticism is radical doubt about the possibility of reaching any kind of knowledge,
freedom, or ethical truth, given our containment in the world and the impossibility of creating our-
selves from scratch.” Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986),
6‒7.
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cannot contradict itself. The second claim asserts that the idea that causes doubt is
not clear and distinct. In other words, if I perceive something that challenges the ve-
racity of a previous perception and generates in me doubts about it, this second per-
ception will not increase my knowledge or make me apprehend the first perception
better. There is, thus, no insight or cognitive discernment in doubt.
In order to illustrate these claims, let us consider the example Spinoza gives di-
rectly afterwards. Country people, he says, react with great surprise when they hear
that the sun is much bigger than the earth. For them, the sun seems unquestionably
much smaller, for this is the way it appears to them and nothing in their daily expe-
rience contradicts this perception. In order to cast doubt on such an ordinary percep-
tion, one must know that the senses deceive. We can recognise here Spinoza’s first
claim: what causes doubt about a given perception (i.e., our perception of the
sun) cannot be this perception itself, but a different one (i.e., perception of the de-
ceptiveness of the senses). Now, to know that the senses deceive does not improve
my perception of the sun, it only makes me distrust its veracity, and for that reason
Spinoza observes that “the idea that puts us in doubt is not clear and distinct.” To
know that the senses deceive does not really increase my knowledge.¹⁸ To know
how the senses deceive, on the contrary, does. If I know, for instance, how visual per-
ception works, I can learn something certain about the size of the sun. This improve-
ment of my knowledge will then make my doubts about my perception of the sun dis-
appear.We thus conclude that doubt disappears as soon as the mind can form a clear
and distinct idea of the cause of doubt.
The example just considered is about a particular doubt concerning visual per-
ception. Let us now apply the two aforementioned principles to global doubt. Global
doubt, as already noted, affects the entire set of my perceptions. I entertain this kind
of doubt when I suppose, for instance, that a deceiving God distorts all my percep-
tions, even those which seem most certain and reliable. According to the first prin-
ciple, the cause of doubt differs from the thing concerning which one doubts. In
the hypothesis under consideration, the thing concerning which one doubts is the
entire set of my perceptions (i.e., everything), whereas the source of doubt is the sup-
position of a deceiving God. The second principle establishes that “the idea that puts
us in doubt is not clear and distinct.” Certainly, the idea of a deceiving God is a fig-
 These reflections show that doubt, insofar as it challenges the truth of our ordinary perceptions,
constitutes for Spinoza a kind of middle stage between our pre-theoretical, biased view of things and
true knowledge. Thus, even if doubt per se does not increase knowledge, it clears the ground for a
true cognitive development. This approach to doubt is reminiscent of Hegel’s, who in his early
work The Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy describes scepticism as “the free side of every phi-
losophy,” insofar as scepticism liberates thought from the limitedness and “the dogmatism of com-
mon sense.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1801‒1807, eds. Eva Moldenhauer and
Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 229, 238. Interestingly, Hegel men-
tions some definitions and propositions from Spinoza’s Ethics as examples of this organic link be-
tween scepticism and philosophy (Hegel, 229‒30).
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ment of the imagination, and as such it is not a clear and distinct idea. It simply des-
ignates an unknown source of doubt. The strength of this sceptical hypothesis lies in
the fact that it locates the source of deception in an entity (i.e., God) that is prima
facie beyond the scope of our perceptions. The solution to this predicament must
therefore consist in expanding the scope of our perceptions to make God’s nature ac-
cessible to the human intellect.¹⁹ Is this not the same as divinising the human mind?
In a way it is, as I will show later.
However, according to the account of true ideas examined in the previous sec-
tion, Spinoza does not even accept the possibility of global doubt. For Spinoza, as
has been already noted, the mere possession of any true idea makes me certain of
its truth and dispels all doubts. Yet the continuation of the text we are analysing sug-
gests the opposite:
From this it follows that, only so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, can we call
true ideas in doubt by supposing that perhaps some deceiving God exists, who misleads us even
in the things most certain. I.e., if we attend to the knowledge we have concerning the origin of all
things and do not discover—by the same knowledge we have when, attending to the nature of
the triangle, we discover that its three angles equal two right angles—anything that teaches us
that he is not a deceiver […]. But if we have the kind of knowledge of God that we have of the
triangle, then all doubt is removed (G2:30).
This intricate passage is quite explicit regarding the following three points. First: we
can indeed doubt true ideas by supposing that a deceiving God exists. Second: this
supposition is conceivable as long as we have no clear idea of the origin of all things
(i.e., God). Third: if we are able to form a clear idea of God (comparable, in terms of
clarity, to the idea of the triangle), then all doubt disappears. Spinoza, then, does
admit the possibility of global doubt. In fact, global doubt seems to result almost in-
exorably from an imperfect knowledge of God.²⁰ Yet how does this conclusion cohere
with Spinoza’s account of true ideas as self-validating? At first glance, the require-
ment of knowing God in order to remove global doubt seems to contradict the
claim that true ideas are certain in virtue of themselves. The contradiction is indeed
inescapable if we wrongly interpret this requirement—as some scholars tend to do—
in a Cartesian fashion, as implying that God is a “supernatural guarantor” of our ra-
tional certainty, external to rationality itself.²¹ As a result of this extended misinter-
 Suppose that there indeed is a deceiving God and I can form a true idea of it. Since “to have a true
idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly” (E2p43s), the way this deceiving God ma-
nipulates my perceptions would no longer be a mystery for me. Therefore, its deceiving mechanism
would be neutralised.
 This is not the only passage where Spinoza affirms this. Consider the following ones from the TTP,
Chapter 6 (G3:84, ADN.VI): “So long as the idea we have of God himself is not clear and distinct, but
confused, we doubt God’s existence, and consequently, we doubt everything.”
 See for instance Robert Mason, The God of Spinoza: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 105: “It is not the origin of our clear and distinct ideas that matters. The whole
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pretation, scholars have generally disregarded Spinoza’s requirement, consequently
assuming that the possession of any true idea is enough to dispel global doubt.²² In
what follows I want to show that Spinoza’s understanding of God as the foundation
of certainty differs substantially from Descartes’ and is consistent both with his mon-
ism and with his conception of true ideas as self-validating.
The apparent contradiction between basing our certainty on God and conceiving
of true ideas as self-validating dissolves when we take into account Spinoza’s anal-
ogy of tools, examined in the previous section. Recall that, according to Spinoza,
“there must be a true idea in us, as an inborn tool” (G2:16), which serves as the stan-
dard of truth and enables the intellect to form new true ideas. In order to serve as the
standard of truth, this true idea in us must be certain in virtue of itself, not in virtue
of something else. Employing the analogy of tools, we can say that, just as the rest of
tools exist in virtue of an original tool, true ideas are certain in virtue of this original
true idea in us. Thus, the certainty of true ideas is derivative of the certainty of the
original true idea from which they stem. The TIE suggests (§38; G2:16) that the orig-
inal true idea in question is the idea of the most perfect being. We can thus under-
stand how it is possible to doubt true ideas in the absence of a clear idea of God.
Properly speaking, only clear knowledge of God—understood as the standard of
truth—is self-validating and impervious to doubt. The remaining true ideas are cer-
tain only insofar as they derive from this fundamental knowledge, and, for this rea-
son, Spinoza states that God is the principle and foundation of our knowledge
(E5p36s).²³ Without this basic knowledge, true ideas are “like conclusions without
premises” (E2p28d) and hence subject to doubt.²⁴
notion of God as a supernatural guarantor ‘supremely good and veracious’ is wholly out of keeping
with Spinoza’s metaphysics.” Mason automatically assumes here that to make distinct ideas depend-
ent upon their origin is tantamount to embracing Descartes’ conception of God.
 See again Mason, 105‒6: “Rather, the point of Spinoza’s apparent afterthought to his exposition of
Descartes must have been that knowledge of any clear and distinct idea is enough to remove the pos-
sibility of a general suspension of reason.” See also Pierre-François Moreau, Problèmes du Spinozisme
(Paris: Vrin, 2006), 181: “[…] l’idée vraie, quelle qu’elle soit, nous rend incapables de doutes.”
 For a similar reading of the dependence of true ideas on God, see Aron Garrett, Meaning in Spi-
noza’s Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71: “For an idea to be adequate means
it relates to God’s idea and part of its adequacy derives from this relation, there is something of what
it means to be God’s idea involved in each adequate idea. This ‘something’ must be known adequate-
ly, otherwise we could not have adequate knowledge. To have adequate knowledge is to know the
cause. The regress of causes stops at God’s infinite and eternal essence in thought. Consequently,
to have an adequate idea is to have knowledge of God’s eternal essence in thought.”
 One could argue that, since adequate knowledge of God is like an inborn tool in us (that is, an
innate idea), global doubt is utterly impossible for Spinoza. In apparent agreement with this, Spinoza
declares in E2p47s that “God’s infinite essence and eternity are known to everybody.” Yet in the very
same passage, Spinoza states that “men do not have such a clear cognition of God as they have of
common notions,” due to “the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies, and that
they have joined the name God to the images of things which they are used to seeing.” Thus, having
innate knowledge of God is compatible with ignoring God’s nature and sinking into scepticism. This
Spinoza on Global Doubt 155
Yet what exactly makes clear knowledge of God the standard of truth and imper-
vious to doubt? In §76 of the TIE, Spinoza describes God as “a unique and infinite
being, beyond which there is no being” (G2:29). Recall that, as Spinoza’s analysis
of doubt has established, the cause of doubt differs from the thing concerning
which one doubts. We can therefore doubt any content whatsoever—including true
ideas—as long as we can conceive of something else that negates it. Yet in the case
of God, this is not possible, for God is “a unique and infinite being, beyond which
there is no being” (italics mine). Since God encompasses all beings, forming a
clear idea of God leaves literally no room for the supposition of another being beside
it (like an evil genius) that could challenge the truth of this idea. Similarly, if a clear
idea of God leaves no room for another idea that could deny its truth, it also cannot
be certain in virtue of something else. Therefore, clear knowledge of God must be, due
to its all-embracing character, certain in virtue of itself.
Spinoza’s conception of adequacy, developed in the second book of the Ethics, is
in perfect accord with the foundational role that he attributes to the idea of God. By
“adequacy” Spinoza understands the intrinsic properties of a true idea regardless of
its relation to an external object (see E2d4). In other words, adequacy is what makes
a true idea self-validating or certain in virtue of itself. In E2p34, Spinoza defines more
precisely the notion of adequacy in the following way: “Every idea that in us is ab-
solute, or adequate and perfect, is true” (italics mine). An adequate idea is, thus, an
idea that is absolute in us. This equation between adequacy and absoluteness de-
serves our attention. The adjective “absolute” has different meanings. Philosophical-
ly, it can refer to something that is not relative to something else, as well as to some-
thing that features no restrictions or limitations. Spinoza employs the adjective in
this twofold sense with reference to ideas in §108 of the TIE (G2:38‒39). There he
states that the intellect forms certain ideas absolutely, and certain ideas from other
ideas. “Those that it forms absolutely,” he adds, “express infinity.” Absoluteness is
thus, in its twofold sense of infinity and non-derivability from prior concepts, the in-
trinsic property of those ideas that are certain in virtue of themselves and, for this
very reason, constitute the foundation of knowledge.²⁵ It is easy to see that these in-
trinsic properties are present in the idea of God described above, insofar as God is “a
unique and infinite being” and “the origin of all things.”
innate knowledge can still be confused because of deeply entrenched prejudices or other natural in-
clinations. The task of philosophy consists precisely in removing such obstacles to adequate knowl-
edge. Regarding Spinoza’s affirmation that “God’s infinite essence are eternity are known to every-
body,” see Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “On the Fish’s Knowledge of God’s Essence, or Why Spinoza was
not a Sceptic” (unpublished manuscript).
 Descartes had already argued in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind (particularly in Rule Six),
that the “secret” of the true philosophical method consists in correctly identifying the “absolute” and
the “relative.” See René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:21‒24.
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Yet the most pressing question still remains unsolved. For, even if we know now
that adequate knowledge of God removes general doubt, it is not obvious at all that
such knowledge is within our reach. It is not just the theological and philosophical
tradition before Spinoza that disagrees with him on this point.²⁶ Even from the stand-
point of Spinoza’s monism, the possibility of adequate knowledge of God presents
serious difficulties. Certainly, Spinoza equates God with nature, thus making the di-
vine accessible to rational inquiry. Yet the very fact that we doubt—even true ideas—
shows that the human intellect is limited and unable to apprehend nature in its en-
tirety. Spinoza states in E4p4 that “it is impossible that a man should not be a part of
Nature.” If the cause of doubt is our limitation, which is irremediable, how can we
possibly remove doubt? Differently put, how can a part of nature transcend itself
and adequately grasp the whole that contains it? In the next section, I examine Spi-
noza’s answer to these crucial questions in the second book of his Ethics.
4 How Can the Finite grasp the Infinite?
Spinoza stresses in numerous passages throughout his writings that the human mind
is part of God’s infinite intellect. This claim has, with respect to human knowledge,
two opposite consequences. On the one hand, as the scholium of E2p43 states, being
part of God’s intellect enables the human mind to “perceive things truly.”²⁷ On the
other hand, as the corollary of E2p11 establishes, the very same fact entails that
the human mind perceives things partially, i.e., inadequately. Since Spinoza admits
both the imperfection of human knowledge and its capacity to know things ade-
quately, we must assume that he employs the same expression (i.e., “being part of
God’s infinite intellect”) in two different senses. The sense in which our being part
of God obstructs knowledge is easier to understand than the sense in which it ena-
bles it. In the corollary of E2p11, Spinoza affirms:
[…] and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the nature
of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human
Mind, then we say that the human Mind perceives the thing only partially, or inadequately.
The fact that God’s mind has countless other ideas besides the human mind explains
for Spinoza that we perceive things partially, or inadequately. Our partial perception
of things does not merely restrict the scope of our knowledge in comparison to God’s:
 Most philosophers and theologians before Spinoza agree that God’s essence is unknowable to the
human intellect. See Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination (New Jersey: Prince-
ton University Press), 25‒28.
 E2p43s: “Add to this that our Mind, insofar as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite in-
tellect of God; hence, it is as necessary that the mind’s clear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s
ideas are.”
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it also makes our ideas false. According to E2p35, “falsity consists in the privation of
knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.” Spinoza,
thus, equates falsity with ignorance. This equation is prima facie contrary to good
sense: why should the unlimited extent of our ignorance render our ideas false? In
principle, knowledge of a particular thing does not require knowledge of everything.
Yet here lies precisely the issue, for, as already shown in the previous section, Spi-
noza’s monism does not allow the possibility of having complete knowledge of any-
thing without knowing the whole of nature. Ideas of particular things are unavoid-
ably mutilated (i.e., false) if they are not accompanied by clear knowledge of the
“unique and infinite being” that encompasses them. The difficulty is aggravated
by the fact that, according to Spinoza, “the object of our Mind is the existing body
and nothing else” (E2p13d). On the face of it, the prospects of human knowledge
could hardly look worse: if the human mind only perceives the body, which is a
tiny fragment of nature, and fragmentary knowledge of nature unavoidably entails
falsity, then the human mind is doomed to total error.
Spinoza, however, holds that this is not the case. There is also a sense in which
participation in God’s intellect enables the human mind to perceive things truly. Spi-
noza expresses this “positive” participation in the divine intellect by means of a
rather obscure phrase, namely: “God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind” (E2p34). As opposed to the previous understanding of our mind’s par-
ticipation in God, this one stresses the common identity between God’s intellect and
ours. Certainly, if the falsity of our perceptions results from the difference of scope
between God’s intellect and ours, it seems that true perceptions must consist in
some sort of coincidence or conjunction between God’s total perspective and our par-
tial perspective.²⁸ According to Spinoza, this coincidence occurs when the human
mind grasps “those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the
part and in the whole” (E2p38). Let us first focus on the expression “equally in
the part and in the whole” (aeque in parte ac in toto). If something is equally present
in the part and in the whole, it will remain the same considered either as a part or as
a whole. Therefore, such a thing will be perceived in exactly the same way from God’s
total perspective and from our limited, partial perspective. Our limitation is no im-
pediment for perceiving such thing: since it is equally present in the part and in
the whole, perceiving it partially does not entail any deformation or mutilation of
its nature. The same can be said about the expression “common to all” (omnibus
communia). If something is common to all, or is present in all parts of nature,
then it must be cognitively accessible from all possible perspectives, even the most
restricted and partial ones. Otherwise, such thing would not be “common to all.”
In sum, Spinoza’s main claim concerning all-pervasive things is that the human
 See Lilli Alanen, “Spinoza on the Human Mind,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35, no. 1 (Decem-
ber 2011): 16.
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mind can grasp them adequately (i.e., without mutilating them), precisely because
they are equally spread throughout all parts of nature.
It remains to determine what exactly these all-pervasive things are. As Spinoza
indicates in E2p37, the expression “common to all things” refers to the fact that all
particular things (be they thoughts or bodies) “agree in something,” namely, in
that “they involve the concept of the same attribute.” To clarify this, take for instance
the attribute of extension. All particular bodies have in common the mere fact of
being extended; extension is therefore the quality or nature that pervades all bodies.
The same applies to thought: all ideas have in common the mere fact of being modes
of the attribute thought, which is equally present in all of them. Extension and
thought are, thus, the all-pervasive contents that the human mind, despite its constit-
utive limitation, can grasp adequately or absolutely.²⁹ But this is not all. Thought and
extension are two among God’s infinite attributes, which express an eternal and in-
finite essence (E2p1‒2). Therefore, through the adequate grasp of thought and exten-
sion, the human mind adequately grasps God’s infinite essence. We find conclusive
evidence in favour of these claims in E2p46d, where Spinoza affirms that “what gives
knowledge of an eternal and infinite essence of God is common to all, and is equally
in the part and in the whole.” In sum,we must conclude that, by adequately grasping
those things that are equally present throughout all parts of nature (i.e., thought and
extension), the human mind attains adequate knowledge of God and overcomes
global doubt.
5 The Presuppositions of Global Doubt and
Spinoza’s Ideal of Knowledge
The previous section has shown that Spinoza’s conception of those things that are
“common to all” (omnibus communia) contains his actual response to scepticism
as well as the epistemological grounding of his monism. Yet this response is also
quite revealing of the kind of scepticism that Spinoza seeks to combat. As I want
to argue in this final section, Spinoza and modern scepticism share a similar ideal
of knowledge, despite their opposite views concerning the possibility of achieving
it. A close examination of this common ideal can shed some light on the much-de-
bated question regarding the theoretical presuppositions of global doubt and the ori-
gins of modern scepticism.
 One could argue that extension and thought are not the only things that are common to all. Being,
for instance, is also something that all things have in common. Yet, in spite of its common character,
being does not designate anything existing outside of the mind (as extension and thought do), but
merely an imaginative/subjective way of grouping things, as Spinoza expresses in E2p40s1: “But
when the images in the body are completely confused, the Mind also will imagine all the bodies con-
fusedly, without any distinction, and comprehend them as if under one attribute, viz. under the attrib-
ute of Being, Thing, etc.”
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In the second section, I have outlined in broad strokes (following Bermúdez and
Perler) the main difference between ancient and modern scepticism.Whereas the for-
mer points at the impossibility of distinguishing between false and true perceptions,
the latter entertains the much more radical hypothesis that all our beliefs about the
world might be mistaken. The difference between them is thus one of scope. The kind
of doubt that characterises ancient scepticism is “local”: it does not question the as-
sumption that things manifest themselves to us, only our capacity to discern the right
manifestations. The second kind of doubt, by contrast, questions all my beliefs about
the world, even the deeply entrenched one that supposes external objects as the
source of my perceptions. The hypothesis of a deceiving deity corresponds to this sec-
ond kind of doubt, which is also the kind of doubt with which Spinoza grapples.
Scholars have tried to understand why the sceptical worries of ancient thought re-
mained merely “local” and did not reach the scope and degree of radicalism that
characterise modern scepticism. Does modern scepticism have conceptual resources
at its disposal that ancient scepticism lacked? If so, which resources are they? At any
rate, everything indicates that a significant conceptual shift took place between the
two.
Bermúdez and Perler, among many others,³⁰ have proposed interesting theories
to answer this question.³¹ Bermúdez invokes the notion of divine omnipotence to ex-
plain what he calls “the originality of Cartesian scepticism.” The absence of this no-
tion in the ancient mindset might explain why ancient scepticism did not conceive
sceptical scenarios such as the deceiving God. After a thorough examination of
late medieval sources, however, Bermúdez concludes that the notion of omnipotence
is a necessary, yet not in itself sufficient condition for generating Cartesian scepti-
cism. Late medieval discussions regarding the possibility of God deceiving us by vir-
tue of God’s omnipotence remained strictly confined to the sphere of theology. The
reliability of our knowledge, which late medieval thinkers generally took for granted,
was not at the centre of these debates. In order for divine omnipotence to become a
source of sceptical doubt, other factors are required, such as Descartes’ scientific out-
look, which according to Bermúdez “shows that there is systematic and pervasive
error in our experience”.³² Bermúdez’s theory can be complemented with Perler’s.
Perler argues that global doubt is only possible in virtue of a strict separation—for-
eign to the ancient mindset—between the realm of material objects and the realm of
 We can mention here Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford
University, 2003); Myles F. Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Ber-
keley Missed,” The Philosophical Review 91, no. 1 (January 1982): 3‒40; Gail Fine, “Descartes and An-
cient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?” The Philosophical Review 109, no. 2 (April 2000): 195‒234. In
this list we should also include the aforementioned early text by Hegel, The Relationship of Scepticism
to Philosophy (Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1801‒1807).
 See Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism”; Perler, “Wie ist ein globaler Zweifel
möglich?”
 Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism,” 352.
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mental representations. The “autonomisation” of the mental that this strict separa-
tion entails sets the ground for extreme sceptical conjectures such as the inexistence
of a reality beyond our representations. Such extreme conjectures are only conceiv-
able under the assumption that representations are completely disconnected from
material objects and have an existence of their own, devoid of physical substrate.³³
Perler then uses this theory to give account of Spinoza’s anti-scepticism (see section
2). In Spinoza we also find the strict heterogeneity between the mental and the phys-
ical that is at the foundation of modern scepticism. Yet, since this heterogeneity does
not indicate for Spinoza real ontological diversity (for thought and extension are for
him attributes of one and the same substance), the threat of global error is prevented
by his monism from the very outset.
I would like to complement the two theories I have just presented with a third
one, based on my previous inquiries. My main claim is that global doubt is bound
up with an ideal of knowledge that takes divine knowledge as the standard or meas-
uring stick of valid cognition. Spinoza’s philosophy is governed by this ideal of
knowledge. I argue that global doubt results from the failure to meet this standard.
My exposition has started with Spinoza’s account of true ideas, according to
which certainty is an intrinsic rather than extrinsic feature of true ideas.We can rec-
ognise here the “autonomisation” of the mental described by Perler, which according
to him enables Descartes to conjecture the inexistence of an external world. Spinoza
turns this “autonomisation” into an advantage for human knowledge in the follow-
ing way. Since mental entities are causally independent of external objects, the ach-
ievement of truth must take place in the mind by virtue of its own power, without the
aid of any external entity. The knowledge that the mind has of its objects does not
derive from the objects themselves, but from its own active nature. Knowledge is
thus for Spinoza a self-sufficient domain identical with the sphere of the mental
and governed by its own rules. I have then shown how extreme doubt fits into
this picture. If knowledge and the mental are the same, the only possible way of ac-
counting for error and doubt (which are mental states) is by construing them as frag-
mentary knowledge. In order rank as such, knowledge must be all-embracing, not in
the sense of being omniscient, but in the sense of grasping the general structure of
reality (i.e., those things that are “common to all”) by virtue of its own power. Frag-
mentary or mutilated knowledge unavoidably leads to error, and eventually to the
hypothesis of a deceiving God. According to Spinoza, only adequate knowledge of
God can remove such a hypothesis, for knowing God is tantamount to apprehending
the general order of nature. This knowledge, in turn, renders the mind fully autono-
mous and self-sufficient, insofar as it consists in a certain conjunction between the
total perspective of nature and the partial perspective of the human mind.
In the third section, I pointed out that Spinoza’s solution to global doubt entails
a certain “divinisation” or “deification” of human knowledge. Indeed, the account of
 Perler, “Wie ist ein globaler Zweifel möglich?” 501.
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human knowledge just presented exhibits striking similarities with the way medieval
thought generally conceived of divine knowledge as opposed to human knowledge.
Prior to the “autonomisation” of the mental described by Perler, human cognition
was viewed, to a great extent, as receptive and causally dependent upon its objects.³⁴
According to this view, the privilege of knowing things a priori is reserved to God,
who as the creator of the world knows everything in the same way as an artisan
knows the objects she produces. Human knowledge, by contrast, comes after its ob-
jects.³⁵ Due to its dependence on external objects, human knowledge cannot be one
and all-embracing, as divine knowledge is. From the “medieval” viewpoint, the va-
riety and multiplicity of things requires different sciences governed by different rules
and endowed with varying degrees of certainty.³⁶ This is not the case with divine sci-
ence, which, insofar as it is prior to the things themselves, is not affected by their
plurality and mutability. In a way, the medieval distinction between divine and
human knowledge becomes in Spinoza the distinction between true knowledge
and imagination: whereas true knowledge is unitary and autonomously produced
by the mind, imagination is multiple and dependent upon external factors.
As paradoxical as it may sound, Spinoza’s ideal of knowledge is more liable to
generate extreme doubt than the medieval conception from which it departs. To
begin with, Spinoza’s ideal stands in stark contrast to the limitedness, fallibility,
and relativity of human conceptions. As has been shown in this paper, Spinoza is
 See Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 298‒99.
 Take for instance the following passage from Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: “For we know
all that we know only through looking at the beings; therefore our knowledge does not grasp the fu-
ture or the infinite. Our insights are renewed and multiplied according to the things from which we
acquire the knowledge of them. He, may He be exalted, is not like that. I mean that His knowledge of
things is not derived from them, so that there is multiplicity and renewal of knowledge. On the con-
trary, the things in question follow upon His knowledge, which preceded and established them as
they are: […]. Hence, with regard to Him, may He be exalted, there is no multiplicity of insights
and renewal and change of knowledge. For through knowing the true reality of His own immutable
essence, He also knows the totality of what necessarily derives from all His acts.” Moses Maimonides,
The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), part III,
chapter 21 (vol. II, 485). For a similar approach to divine knowledge, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theologiae, I, q. 14, a. 8.
 See Dominik Perler, “Does God Deceive Us? Skeptical Hypotheses in Late Medieval Epistemolo-
gy,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 190. It is note-
worthy that, right up until the fourteenth century, theologians and philosophers abided by the fa-
mous Aristotelian prohibition against metabasis eis allo genos, i.e., mixing methods from different
areas of knowledge. See Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 303‒12; see also
Cohen, How Modern Science Came into the World: Four Civilizations, One 17th-Century Breakthrough
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 509‒19. This prohibition is based on the assumption
that there exist clearly differentiated domains of knowledge, corresponding to the different genera of
beings. Each domain requires its own particular method, and hence it is “unscientific” to apply the
method of one domain in another one. From this point of view, sciences are (and must be) irreducibly
disparate and plural. Jean-Luc Marion shows how Descartes reverses this principle. See Jean-Luc Mar-
ion, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes, 4th ed. (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 30.
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aware of this fact and attempts to prove that all-embracing knowledge is within the
human mind’s reach despite its finitude. Modern sceptic thinkers such as Montaigne
and Sanchez argued, analogous to Spinoza, that the only acceptable form of knowl-
edge is one that transcends all partial perspectives and limitations—such as God’s
knowledge.³⁷ However, they rejected the possibility that the human mind could at-
tain such knowledge and, consequently, advocated scepticism. The medieval ideal
of knowledge does not involve this difficulty, simply because—unlike Spinoza and
the sceptics just mentioned—it does not restrict valid knowledge to divine cognition.
A closely connected aspect of Spinoza’s ideal of knowledge that is liable to gen-
erate scepticism is its strict requirement of unifying knowledge under a clear notion
of God. Plurality of ideas and sciences is for Spinoza the breeding ground for doubt:
all our ideas (even true ones) are for him subject to doubt as long as they lack a uni-
fying principle, i.e., a clear idea of God. If this unifying principle turns out to be un-
attainable, then global doubt becomes inescapable. From the “medieval” point of
view, by contrast, a plurality of disciplines and methods does not entail uncertainty.
One can have one science without having another, and this circumstance does not
detrimentally affect the soundness of the science one possesses.
In sum, a good case can be made for viewing modern scepticism and global
doubt as the result of the collapse of the medieval ideal of knowledge and its replace-
ment by a more “monistic” ideal (such as the one endorsed by Spinoza). A compel-
ling substantiation of this claim, however, would require a separate study.
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Scepticism in Early Modern Times
Introduction
Anyone interested in defining the nature and function of scepticism in early modern
thought cannot overlook the remarkable and always useful work of Richard Popkin
on the subject. By emphasising the decisive importance of scepticism in understand-
ing the complexity of early modern thought, his History of Scepticism from Savonar-
ola to Bayle has modified our view about the early modern history of ideas, which
cannot be reduced to a simple philosophical variation on Cartesian rationalism.
That being said, it seems to me that Popkin’s History of Scepticism has provided a
somewhat truncated reading of early modern scepticism, for example (1) by exagger-
ating the sceptical orientation of some of the thinkers he has considered, as we will
see later with the example of Pierre-Daniel Huet; (2) by insisting on the influence of
Pyrrhonian scepticism at the expense of Academic scepticism;¹ and (3) by dogmati-
cally denying the existence of a scepticism proper to the Enlightenment (aside from
Hume, of course), even though he subsequently modified some of his positions.²
In order to propose a specific and critical reading of Popkin’s interpretation of
the nature and function of early modern scepticism, I will present three figures of
that period analysed by Popkin, namely those of Pierre-Daniel Huet, Simon Foucher,
and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville. In doing so, I want also to underline the dif-
ficulty in presenting a coherent and consistent history of early modern scepticism
and the importance of determining precisely the role and function of scepticism at
that time, where it is more of an individual attitude than a shared legacy or “school”
(as it was in the ancient period), which raises of course the question of its interpre-
tation. This individual attitude varies according to the historical and philosophical
context in which it occurred. Indeed, scepticism could not be used in identical
ways in, for example, the pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian contexts; for Cartesian ra-
tionalism, in claiming to surmount doubt and achieve certainty by means of the cog-
ito, had required a reconfiguring of the sceptical toolkit, a fact that gave rise to the
emergence of a new sceptical typology aimed at opposing this new dogmatism. Sim-
ilarly, scepticism was obliged to reconceptualise itself in response to the success of
Newtonian physics, and this may account for the difference between the radical
 This is a common criticism, particularly in the work of French scholars working on Early Modern
scepticism. A good summary of such criticism can be found in Sylvia Giocanti, “Histoire du fidéisme,
histoire du scepticisme,” Revue de Synthèse 199, nos. 2‒3 (April 1998): 193‒210.
 See my “Introduction:What is Enlightenment Scepticism? A Critical Rereading of Richard Popkin,”
in Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklarüng, eds. Sébastien Charles
and Plinio Junqueira Smith (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 1‒15.
OpenAccess. © 2019 Sébastien Charles, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-010
scepticism more characteristic of the seventeenth century—at a moment where all
fields of knowledge were being criticised and all forms of dogmatism were a target
—and the mitigated scepticism, limited in its spheres of application, of the Enlight-
enment.
At this level, the analysis I propose contrasts sharply with the usual attacks
against Popkin’s History of Scepticism. Indeed, what is generally faulted in Popkin
is the excessive importance he attributes to the religious question, using Pyrrhonism
first and foremost as a critical tool in the service of atheism,³ and the relatively vague
definition of Pyrrhonism he proposes, which takes little account of the textual tradi-
tion in which the sceptical texts are inscribed in order to stress its argumentative di-
mension.⁴ So in considering the three examples I have just mentioned, the purpose
of this work is not so much to criticise Popkin’s analysis as to try to demonstrate how
difficult it is to speak univocally about early modern scepticism stricto sensus, that is
to say in the form of a relatively fixed and consistent method as found in Sextus Em-
piricus. Rather than rejecting Popkin’s general reading of modern scepticism, I prefer
to show, by using some striking examples, how the exclusive reduction of scepticism
to Pyrrhonism does not work, and represents an important interpretative mistake,
similar to a form of reductionism. On the contrary, it is important to understand
how any form of reductionism on this topic is unthinkable, because it is impossible
to present early modern scepticism as a philosophical stream with internal coherence
and a unique purpose.
1 The Nature and Function of Pierre-Daniel Huet’s
Scepticism
Let me begin with the figure of Pierre-Daniel Huet, who is regarded by Popkin as an
exemplary representative of “Christian Pyrrhonism,” Huet being in fact a “complete
Pyrrhonian sceptic.”⁵ That Popkin adopted this reading of Huet is no surprise, since
his general approach concerning scepticism consisted chiefly of emphasising the
moderns’ rediscovery of ancient Pyrrhonism, even if this meant obscuring or forget-
ting the other strands of scepticism such as Academic thought in the Classical peri-
od. This somewhat biased interpretation is currently being counterbalanced by much
more charitable readings of the influence of Academic scepticism on seventeenth
and eighteenth century philosophy. For example, Thomas Lennon and José Raimun-
 Giocanti, “Histoire du fidéisme, histoire du scepticisme.”
 Emmanuel Naya, “Le phénomène pyrrhonien: lire le scepticisme au XVIe siècle” (PhD diss., Univer-
sité Stendhal—Grenoble III, 2000), 5‒10.
 Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 278‒82.
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do Maia Neto⁶ treat today Pierre-Daniel Huet as a central figure in the revival of Aca-
demic scepticism.⁷ It is true that a reading of Huet’s work soon makes it clear that he
was deeply familiar with the sceptical tradition, Pyrrhonian and Academic.⁸ He cites
in turn Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, Aulus Gellius, and Saint Augus-
tine, in support of his arguments, and in so doing he displays a subtle and precise
intimacy with ancient scepticism. But if Huet advances an informed reading and a
comparatively fair interpretation of the themes and proponents of scepticism, it re-
mains to be demonstrated that he really is a sceptic, and what role he assigns to
scepticism within his own philosophical enterprise. In this sense, it is as useless
to present Huet as a Pyrrhonian (Popkin) or as an Academician (Lennon and Maia
Neto), the stakes of the debate being more consequential than a characterisation
which seems as anachronistic as it is sterile. And, in fact, a closer look at his Censure
de la philosophie cartésienne quickly reveals that scepticism serves him above all as a
weapon against the modern dogmatism represented by Cartesianism. In that sense,
the differences between Pyrrhonism and Academism are not really important to him,
and he largely prefers to underline their proximity by showing that sceptics have in
fact a very similar vision of the real nature of philosophy.⁹ Thus, if he takes the dif-
ferences between Pyrrhonians and Academic sceptics to be essentially verbal after
all, it is because he thinks that they agree to suspend judgment in the realm of theory
while following appearances in the realm of practice. In this respect, they are the
only true philosophers, for unlike the dogmatics, they seek to attain wisdom and
truth rather than claiming to have already achieved them.
In that sense, Huet’s recourse to both Pyrrhonian and Academic arguments
serves to show how Descartes and his disciples had warped the very essence of phi-
losophy, which consists of doubting and of questioning one’s own prejudices. This
the Cartesians had done by exceeding the limits imposed by the exercise of doubt
and claiming that it is possible for certainty to be borne out of uncertainty by
means of the cogito, which is, according to Huet, “a principle that is no less uncertain
 Thomas Lennon, “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain,”
in Scepticisme et modernité, eds. Marc-André Bernier and Sébastien Charles (Saint-Étienne: Publica-
tions de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 2005): 65‒75; José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Huet n’est pas un
sceptique chrétien,” Les Etudes philosophiques 2 (2008): 209‒22. See also Maia Neto, “Academic Skep-
ticism in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 2 (1997): 199‒220, and Maia
Neto, “Huet sceptique cartésien,” Philosophiques 35, no. 1 (2008): 223‒39.
 See Sébastien Charles, “Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Readings in Scepticism,” in Academic Scepticism in
the Development of Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Plinio Junqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2017), 259‒74.
 On this topic, see the sections “La ripresa dello scetticismo antico” and “Huet e la tradizione scet-
tica,” in Elena Rapetti, Pierre-Daniel Huet: erudizione, filosofia, apologetica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero,
1999), 255‒79.
 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain (Amsterdam: Henri du
Sauzet, 1723), 138.
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than all the others that he subjected to doubt.”¹⁰ In Huet’s strategy, sceptical argu-
ments serve to show that it is impossible to treat the cogito as a certain proposition.
Hence he accumulates arguments that show that the cogito, which Descartes presents
as an intuition, is in fact a deduction, and an invalid one.¹¹ This is the central con-
cern of both his Censure de la philosophie cartésienne and his Censure de la réponse
de Monsieur Régis à la Censure de la philosophie cartésienne, an incomplete manu-
script that Huet intended as a response to a book by Pierre-Sylvain Régis defending
Descartes’ philosophy.
In fact, for Huet, nothing is less self-evident than the purported self-evidence of
the cogito. First, Descartes does not even raise the question of knowing what this
term “to be” means and whether the thinking subject really is—a question he
ought to have broached if his doubt were as radical as he claimed and extended
so far as the category of existence. For after all, as Montaigne had already recog-
nised, the predication of existence should apply in reality only to a single subject,
God, the sole truly existent being, since all other natural beings have only a phenom-
enal, not a substantial, existence. Next, had Descartes examined the question of
what being is more thoroughly, he would have recognised that the “I” or the
“self” that thinks cannot think without being, and hence that the cogito is nothing
more than a tautology: “I am a thinker, therefore I am”; indeed, it is a defective syl-
logism of the question-begging kind: “If I think, I am; I am; therefore I am.” If we
look upon the cogito as a line of argument, Huet suggests, we must acknowledge
that it is not valid. The major premise that deals with thought is also problematic,
for what can it mean if not, “I think that I have thought,” since there is both a logical
and a chronological anteriority between the moment when we think and the follow-
ing moment when we have deduced that we exist? Given that Descartes himself rec-
ognised that memory is a deceptive faculty, I cannot be sure of having truly thought
before concluding that I have true existence, because there is nothing to assure me
that this idea of having thought is certain—hence the impossibility of reaching a
valid conclusion. Huet presents this line of thought as follows:
La mémoire de l’homme étant peu ferme et peu fidèle, la conclusion peut fort bien s’appliquer à
une autre proposition qu’à celle d’où elle est tirée. Ce qui nous arrive tous les jours dans les
entretiens familiers, où l’on oublie souvent en raisonnant le sujet de la conversation, et ce qu’on
a dessein de prouver. Il n’y a donc rien de certain et il peut y avoir de l’erreur dans la connexion
de l’argument de Descartes, et par conséquent il ne vaut rien. Ajoutons à cela que ce raison-
nement étant fondé sur ce principe, que tout ce qui pense est au moment qu’il pense, il s’ensuit
 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy, ed. and trans. Thomas M. Lennon (Amherst,
New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 1.14.109‒10.
 For an analysis of Huet’s critique of the evidence of the cogito, see Sébastien Charles, “Évidence,
vraisemblance et vérité selon Huet : le cartésianisme en question,” in Les usages de la preuve d’Henri
Estienne à Jeremy Bentham, eds. Jean-Pierre Schandeler and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin (Paris: Her-
mann, 2014): 101‒17; Charles, “On the Uses of Scepticism against a Certain Philosophical Arrogance:
Huet as a Critic of Cartesian Logic and Metaphysics,” Science et Esprit 65, no. 3 (2013): 299‒309.
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que quand je conclus que je suis de ce que je pense, je ne veux rien dire autre chose sinon que je
suis dans le moment où je pense. Or, est-il que cette pensée s’évanouit et ne subsiste plus dès
que je dis «Donc je suis», puisqu’il y a une différence de temps entre la première proposition et
la conséquence ? C’est pourquoi ce raisonnement doit nécessairement signifier ou «Je pense,
donc je serai» ou «J’ai pensé, donc je suis». Et, ainsi, cet axiome «Tout ce qui pense est dans le
moment qu’il pense», d’où Descartes fait dépendre toute la force de son argument, n’y aura
aucun rapport, et pour lui donner quelque force, il faudra le tourner ainsi : «Tout ce qui pense
est, même quand il ne pense point». Autant de changements et de corrections qui produiront un
sens entièrement faux et ridicule, de l’aveu même de Descartes.¹²
In short, there is no criterion of truth on which we can found a philosophical system
in an assured manner. If the arguments against the cogito are not all demonstrative
or original, what matters to Huet is to show that deductive propositions purportedly
founded on reason are all subject to doubt, based on the fact that reason is a limited
and fallible faculty. In that case, scepticism has a protreptic function, but it does not
mean that Huet is a sceptic. In fact, Huet’s recourse to scepticism is incomprehensi-
ble without taking the theological dimension of his thought into consideration. In-
deed, scepticism is in no way an end in itself for Huet; it is a strategic means of re-
jecting Cartesianism because it tends towards conceptualising a unique kind of truth,
placing faith and reason on the same level. The Preface to Huet’s Censura leaves no
room for doubt about his apologetic intentions,which are to criticise Descartes above
all, because “although he teaches that philosophy should submit to faith, he in fact
adjusted the faith to the principles of his philosophy,”¹³ thereby opening the door to
a subjection of religious truth to reason and allowing the mysteries of faith to be in-
terpreted by reason and rejected on the basis of their implausibility, with, as a con-
sequence, a negation of Christian revelation. On the contrary, Huet thinks that the
truths of reason must be subordinate to those of faith and that the exercise of reason
 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Censure de la philosophie de Descartes, Bibliothèque Nationale de France,
manuscript fonds français 14702, 6v‒7r. English translation in Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy, 88‒
89:
Moreover, since man’s memory is weak and unstable, the conclusion can be referred to some
premise other than the one from which it follows. Something like this happens to us in everyday
ordinary discourse, in which it is customary for us not to remember what the subject is of the
conversation and what one is trying to prove. Therefore, the connection of this pair of propositions, «I
am thinking,» and «I am,» is uncertain and deceitful, and is therefore an invalid argument. To this it
may be added that since the argument, «I am thinking, therefore I am,» depends on the proposition,
«whatever is thinking, is so long as it thinks,» it follows that when I conclude that I am from the fact
that I am thinking, nothing else is meant but that I am so long as I am thinking. And that thought has
already ceased when I say, «I am.» The antecedent, «I am thinking,» is at a different time from the
conclusion, «therefore I am.» The argument therefore means either «I am thinking, therefore I will
be,» or else «I thought, therefore I am.» And the proposition, «whatever is thinking, is so long as it is
thinking,» on which Descartes would base his argument, is irrelevant to it. The result is that for it to
be useful to his argument, it must be changed to the following, «whatever is thinking is, even while it
is not thinking.» Even according to Descartes, these changes and alterations are ridiculous and false.
 Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy, 64.
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has to be limited: “I believe that God is three in one, not by virtue of reason, but by
virtue of the first truth that revealed this.”¹⁴ In this respect, asking the question
whether Huet was truly a Pyrrhonian (Popkin) or an Academic sceptic (Lennon
and Maia Neto), or more one than the other, is not of great importance. He is
above all a Christian philosopher who uses scepticism in a purely strategic way to
serve his apologetic project, which is to preserve Christian religion from the attack
of early modern rationalism.
2 Simon Foucher’s Academic Scepticism, or the
Sceptical Way to Modern Science
The interpretation of the second figure, Simon Foucher, is more problematic consid-
ering my presentation of Popkin as having little interest in the renewal of Academic
scepticism. Foucher presents himself as a modern representative of this philosophi-
cal current, and Popkin was of course aware of it, as he quoted it in his History of
Scepticism: “Foucher saw himself as the reviver of Academic scepticism.”¹⁵ Neverthe-
less, it is not Foucher’s interpretation of Academic philosophy that interests Popkin,
but his anti-Cartesian epistemology and in particular his critique of the possible dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities. Surprising as it may sound, the
way Foucher interpreted Academic scepticism in the seventeenth century did not in-
terest Popkin, reflecting his disinterest in the question of the modern revival of Aca-
demic scepticism.
However, this question is far from trivial. Even if Foucher’s interpretation of Aca-
demic scepticism is sometimes confusing, it nevertheless enables us to understand
what the role of scepticism in early modern thought could be and why it was, accord-
ing to Foucher, the best and perhaps the only philosophy for his times.¹⁶ In that case,
it is a juste milieu between dogmatism and Pyrrhonism, which is a useful position to
legitimatise the scientific spirit of his century: “On peut distinguer les Académiciens
des Pyrrhoniens, en ce que les Académiciens reçoivent quelques vérités, comme de
géométrie et de mécanique.”¹⁷ If Foucher wished to rehabilitate Academic philoso-
phy, this was because he saw significant advantages in it. Indeed, Academism ap-
 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei (Caen: J. Cavelier, 1690),
1.2, §7, 30.
 Popkin, History of Scepticism, 275.
 Joël Boudreault and Sébastien Charles, “Simon Foucher’s Academic Scepticism: Between Truth
and Probability,” in Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Plinio
Junqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles (Dordrecht: Springer, 2017), 245‒58.
 Foucher Simon, Dissertation sur la recherche de la vérité (Paris, Estienne Michallet, 1687), 29‒30.
English translation: “The Academicians can be distinguished from the Pyrrhonians, in that sense that
the Academicians receive some truths, such as in the domains of geometry and mechanics.” All Eng-
lish translations of Foucher are my own.
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peared to be the only philosophy capable not only of dismantling the impasses cre-
ated by Cartesianism (by making a more useful use of doubt, for example), but also
of achieving reconciliation with Christianity, all the while providing the nascent sci-
ences of the time with more flexible, less dogmatic foundations than those advocat-
ed by the Cartesians.¹⁸
Because Foucher thought that a peculiar use of scepticism could support Chris-
tianity, assuming a close proximity to Huet’s position, as Popkin does, may be under-
standable, but actually amounts to a significant misinterpretation. Foucher has a
much more charitable conception of philosophy than Huet, he stresses its pars con-
struens rather than his pars destruens, and every philosopher who seeks truth with
sincerity is on the right path, as long as he knows how to recognise the evidence
where it manifests itself, and to remain doubtful when there is no evidence. In
fact, it is important to escape either to positive dogmatism (Cartesianism) or negative
dogmatism (which is symbolised, for him, by Pyrrhonism, a philosophical current
which rejects all type of truths¹⁹). Furthermore, according to Foucher, this is really
the method of the Academics:
Il est vrai que les Académiciens doivent douter d’une très grande quantité de choses, mais c’est
parce que ces choses sont douteuses, et il se trouve néanmoins que les principales vérités leur
sont connues, de sorte que leurs doutes regardent seulement les matières de sciences et les
propositions dogmatiques que l’on pourrait faire sur les sujets de pure spéculation humaine.²⁰
Another fundamental difference between Foucher and Huet concerns their relation
to Cartesianism. Indeed, Foucher’s conception of the Academic method of philoso-
phising is strongly influenced by his reading of Descartes, particularly his Discours
 It should not be forgotten that Foucher prided himself on his own knowledge of science and that
he was the author of a study on hygrometers in which he touted the methodological advances of sci-
ence in his era. See his Nouvelle façon d’hygromètres (N.p., 1672), reissued in his Traité des hygromè-
tres, ou machines pour mesurer la sécheresse et l’humidité de l’air (Paris: Estienne Michallet, 1686).
 Foucher often tends to present Pyrrhonism as a form of negative dogmatism. This strategy aims to
highlight the positivity of academic scepticism. But he tries sometimes to bring them closer, by insist-
ing on their zetetic method: “Les pyrrhoniens et sceptiques différaient de nos académiciens en ce
qu’ils ne reconnaissaient aucune vérité, au lieu que nos philosophes en reconnaissent plusieurs.
Mais en cela leur différence n’était pas si forte qu’elle ne se pût ôter avec le temps, car les uns et
les autres faisaient profession de rechercher la vérité.” Foucher, Dissertations sur la recherche de la
vérité (Paris: Jean Anisson, 1693), 177. English translation: “The Pyrrhonians or Sceptics differed
from our Academicians, in that they did not recognise any truth, instead of our academic philoso-
phers recognize several. In this, their difference was not so strong that it could not be taken away
with time, for both professed to seek the truth.”
 Foucher, Dissertation, IX. English translation: “It is true that the Academics must doubt a very
large number of things, but that is because these things are doubtful; and it is nevertheless the
case that the principal truths are known to them, such that their doubts relate only to the subject
matters of the sciences and the dogmatic propositions that could be formulated on topics of pure
human speculation.”
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de la méthode. Hence it is no coincidence that some maxims of this method resemble
those of Descartes, as, for example, the first one, which consists of refusing to treat
the senses as the criterion of truth, and the second one,which requires us to set aside
opinions and prejudice. Due to this method, it is possible to demonstrate a number
of metaphysical truths that have the advantage of being certain because they are not
based on sense perception but on the work of the mind upon itself.²¹ These truths,
supposedly all known to the Academics and transmitted esoterically, recall in part
the results Descartes arrived at in his Meditations. They consist first (1) of the imme-
diate and primary knowledge of the soul; then (2) of the knowledge of its fundamen-
tal characteristics, namely its unity, spirituality, and immortality; (3) then of the
knowledge of God and God’s essential attributes, namely unity, infinity, and eternity;
and last comes (4) the reconciliation of divine providence with human freedom.
These truths emerge from demonstrations that are based solely on the work of the
mind on itself, which has caused them to follow from one to another and, according
to Foucher, transforms Academic philosophy into a kind of praeparatio evangelica,²²
and Cartesianism into a modern form of Academism. As we can see once more, we
cannot embrace a uniform reading of the modern reception of scepticism without
questioning the use made of sceptical texts by early modern authors who resort to
them. In the specific case of Foucher, the recourse to Academic scepticism leads
him to adopt a purified form of Cartesianism, in which its overly dogmatic aspects
have been rejected because they tended to lead to an opposition between philosophy
and theology.
If Foucher’s interpretation of Academic philosophy seems somewhat disconcert-
ing and hardly “sceptical,” this has to do with his inclination to stress the epistemo-
logical productivity of this method to defeat Cartesianism on its own ground, even if
he shares with Descartes more or less the same conception of truth founded on evi-
dence, and the same rejection of probabilism.
It is in the context of this debate with Cartesians that we must view Foucher’s
critical reading of Carneades’ probabilism.²³ While Cicero seems to have granted
an enviable epistemological status to the probable, Foucher considers it as no
more than a makeshift which ought not to constitute an essential component of Aca-
demic philosophy, since that philosophy ultimately aims at the true and the certain
 Foucher, Dissertation, 125: “The Academics having admitted that the things we know begin from
our ways of being [ideas], they assume that the first things we know belong to us and are in our souls,
that is, in the being that knows within us.”
 Foucher, Dissertation, 144: “It is this that led Saint Augustine to say that if the Gospel had been
preached at the time of these philosophers, they would have said, ‘This is what we were looking for.’
As well, we have had the experience of Platonists and Academics having willingly embraced our re-
ligion, so true is it that this disposition of mind which leads to contempt for sensory things and to
avoiding prejudices is beneficial to Christianity.”
 Section 10 of the Dissertation (Ce que c’est que connaître les choses probablement, suivant les Aca-
démiciens; “What probable knowledge consists of, according to the Academics”) is entirely dedicated
to an exposition of the concept of the probable. See Foucher, 144‒47.
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and to this end possesses a sure criterion, none other than evidence. According to
Foucher, who again follows Descartes, it is evidence that provides that highly
sought-after criterion of truth, while probability always contains an immanent reason
for doubt:
Nous ne saurions trouver une meilleure marque de la vérité que la force qu’elle a d’emporter
notre consentement malgré nous-mêmes, et sans que nous ajoutions quoi que ce soit à son
action. Au lieu que la vraisemblance nous peut bien solliciter à consentir, mais elle ne saurait
nous obliger de le faire malgré nous.²⁴
In that case, a distinction must be made between the apodictic (or demonstrative)
sciences such as mathematics—in which the probable plays no more than a meth-
odological role and must bow out in favour of the demonstration to which it has
given rise, whose evidence imposes itself on our minds—and hypothetical “sciences”
such as medicine and moral philosophy, in which the probable finds justification be-
cause it allows for the desired action to occur but without our necessarily being able
to know whether any better action could have occurred. Thus, according to Foucher,
we must distinguish opinion—that is, the fact of acquiescing in things that are not
evident and are at best probable, which means that opinion always includes a com-
ponent of prejudice and is thus doubtful—from sensation, which consists of acqui-
escing in things that are clear and evident. Foucher reminds us that in matters of sci-
ence, the wise person must assent only to the true and never to the probable, for
assent to the probable is only tolerated in the sphere of the practical in order to
avoid inaction and the reproach of apraxia levelled by the dogmatists.
This is why our knowledge is at one and the same time certain and limited, in
contrast to divine knowledge; and it is in this respect that Cartesianism represents
the height of philosophical arrogance, for it treats extension as the very substance
of the material world, whereas for Foucher, although it is clear that we know the sen-
sible world through our ideas, it is not obvious that the modifications of our imma-
terial soul are capable of representing a material thing.We are dealing here with one
of the major issues of Foucher’s epistemology, according to which the perceived
world is no more than a relative one,²⁵ of which science provides us with no more
 Simon Foucher, Critique de la Recherche de la vérité (Paris: Martin Coustelier, 1675), 98: «We
cannot find a better mark of the truth than the force with which it impels our consent in spite of
ourselves and without our adding anything whatever to its action.Whereas, the probable can very well
invite us to consent, but it cannot force us to consent in spite of ourselves.»
 On this score, see the fictional dialogue between an Academic and a dogmatic presented in
Foucher, Dissertation, 100: “‘It is not just with regard to a stick that appears to us to be bent in
the water that our senses deceive us, it is with regard to everything we see in any setting whatever.’
‘What?’ he [the dogmatic] said, displaying astonishment, ‘we only see phantoms?’ ‘If by that you
mean that we only see the images of things that are outside of ourselves and not the things them-
selves, that is certain, because the senses only acquaint us with the effects and results of the action
of external things. But these effects and results are no more than ways of being or modifications of
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than a summary description.²⁶ Thus Foucher advances a “fallibilist” conception of
science, because he deems that scientific propositions can be considered true so
long as we manage to show that any other explanations for the same phenomena
are false. In this way, progress is possible in science so long as we are in agreement
about both the fact that scientific claims are revocable and the fact that they are not
of the same order as the truths proper to the apodictic sciences. This scientific meth-
od, whose discovery, according to Foucher, is to be credited to the Academics, has
the advantage of avoiding dogmatism and Pyrrhonism at the same time, as for
Foucher, Pyrrhonism is a form of negative dogmatism.
3 Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville: from Universal
Scepticism to Revolutionary Dogmatism
My third and final point deals with the radical differences between the reinterpreta-
tion of scepticism specific to the seventeenth century and the use made of it in the
eighteenth century, in a context where Cartesianism and Christianity were both in
crisis and no longer served as unconquered philosophical and theological reference
points as in the previous century.
In these circumstances, the legacy of scepticism once more took on new shape
and the sceptical texts of Antiquity ceased to serve primarily for the condemnation
of the dogmatic arrogance of rationalist metaphysics, even though thinkers such
as Voltaire continued to use them occasionally for this purpose.²⁷ Rather, those
texts were consulted primarily for their methodological value. Losing part of its crit-
ical radicality, scepticism now became a preparatory stage in which doubt was used
to question current knowledge not in order to refute it but to deepen it. All of this
harmonised with the concept of scientific progress established at that time. Of
course, an ongoing increase in knowledge does not imply the disappearance of scep-
tical doubts. Indeed, doubt retains all its validity when a philosopher seeks to ex-
trapolate from facts given by experience a metaphysics that would try to explain
them within a system. Hence is the distinction made by the French thinkers of the
Enlightenment between the “systematic mind” (esprit systématique), which is only
concerned with classifying and ordering facts and discoveries, and the “spirit of
the system” (esprit de système), which claims to be able to give them a final and ul-
our own substance, which depend on a large number of circumstances. It is not at all by the senses
that we can judge of the realities of things, by the senses we can judge only of how they appear; and it
is impossible that things should truly be everything they seem to be.’”
 Which does not, of course, preclude the progress of science and an increasingly nuanced descrip-
tion of nature, as Foucher testifies when he mentions the progress achieved through the use of the
microscope.
 On Voltaire and scepticism, see Sébastien Charles, “Entre pyrrhonisme et académisme : le scep-
ticisme de Voltaire,” Cahiers Voltaire 11 (2012): 109‒31.
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timate explanation. But if sceptical doubt is useful at a methodological level, the fact
remains that the progress of science is undeniable and makes incongruous a radical
and global form of scepticism, in which the idea of truth would be problematic.
Hence Enlightenment thinkers often invoked a mitigated scepticism or reasonable
Pyrrhonism,²⁸ whose sphere of application must be restricted to the moral and polit-
ical fields. This reasonable or mitigated scepticism, as it was then called, consists in
making use of humility in the scientific domain and therefore has a methodological
function. Moreover, it is strongly limited in its scope, touching only the field of nat-
ural philosophy, and leaving aside moral and political philosophy, not to mention
religion.
On this score, the figure of Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville will now serve me
well, for Brissot’s case is one of a transition from radical scepticism to reasonable
scepticism condensed into a period of just a few years. In this perspective, the read-
ing proposed by Popkin, which renders Brissot an “optimistic sceptic”²⁹ is highly
questionable. To achieve this, Popkin would have to erase the subtle variations
that led Brissot away from sceptical withdrawal to political engagement and assume
that the young Brissot—who draped himself in the mantle of scepticism at the end of
the 1770s—shared the convictions of the Brissot of ten years later, who wished to fulfil
political ambitions. To assert, as Popkin does explicitly,³⁰ that if Brissot did not com-
plete his project of universal scepticism it was because he was so tragically cut down
in 1793, is to overlook a large portion of Brissot’s intellectual journey and to miss the
fact that right from 1782, with the publication of his work on truth, his sceptical proj-
ect had already been somewhat compromised.
It is true that in his early writings, Brissot is among the few eighteenth-century
authors who present themselves as disciples of Sextus Empiricus, borrowing from
Sextus the idea of a systematic critique of the sciences and applying it to the modern
sciences for demonstrating both their vacuity and their uncertainty. In so doing, Bris-
sot went against the tenor of a century that congratulated itself on the continuous
progress of knowledge and the dissemination of the Enlightenment spirit.
 Beausobre used this expression in 1755 in his Pyrrhonisme raisonnable (Berlin: Étienne de Bour-
deaux, 1755). On this interpretation of scepticism, see Sébastien Charles, “Des excès dogmatiques à la
guérison sceptique : le pyrrhonisme raisonnable de Beausobre,” Libertinage et philosophie au xviie
siècle 12 (2010): 205‒17.
 Richard H. Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism in the Late 18th Century,” in Aufklarüng und Skep-
sis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte der 17. und 18. Jahrunderts, ed. Lothar Kreimendahl
(Stuttgart: Fromman Verlag, 1995), 173‒84.
 Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism,” 176: “At the very end of his treatise, Brissot said that he
hoped to discover in each science the very few truths that there are. He thought it would take him
several years to do so. Then, in a footnote at the end, he said that if his work on legislation and pol-
itics permit, in two or three years he could present a ‘tableau’ of these truths along with a universal
scepticism applied to all the sciences, and this would constitute a reasonable scepticism. Unfortu-
nately Brissot was executed before he could complete his work because he was the leader of the Gi-
rondists.”
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The first delineation of his monumental undertaking to undermine the scientific
optimism of the Enlightenment is found in a manuscript Brissot referred to as Plan
du scepticisme universel appliqué à toutes les sciences (“Plan for Applying Universal
Scepticism to All the Sciences”).³¹ In this manuscript, which outlines a project con-
ceived by the young Brissot as a collective enterprise that would offer readers a scep-
tical encyclopaedia to compete with Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, Brissot’s
reflections take the form of a critical review of all the knowledge of his time:
Ressusciter le pyrrhonisme trop longtemps oublié, détruire les fondements de toutes les con-
naissances humaines, étendre le doute jusque sur les sciences qui semblent le plus évidemment
marquées du sceau de la certitude, paraîtra le projet le plus fou, le plus ridicule, le plus atroce
aux yeux des philosophes, des savants, des théologiens, des femmes même, qui tous se flattent
de savoir quelque chose. On croit en effet dans ce siècle décoré du titre fastueux de philoso-
phique, que l’homme a perfectionné toutes les sciences, parcouru tous les degrés de leur
échelle; on croit que les erreurs ont disparu, que la vérité n’a plus de voile, on croit être au milieu
de la lumière et on est toujours dans les ténèbres.³²
The radicalism of Brissot’s project resides above all in his rejection of certainty in the
sphere of science, in which every discovery gives rise to new difficulties and adds to
what is unknown, indeed unknowable. Passing from theology to metaphysics to
other fields of thought, he uses and reuses the method of diaphōnia, assuming
that the clash between philosophical factions on every issue refutes dogmatism.
According to Popkin, Brissot’s thought constitutes “the most extended presenta-
tion of French Enlightenment scepticism,”³³ and we are indebted to him for having
“carried scepticism beyond the usual moderate view of the preceding philosophers
and scientists of the Enlightenment.”³⁴ But isn’t this too optimistic? Brissot’s radical
scepticism is in evidence only in his unpublished manuscript on universal scepti-
 See Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, De la vérité, ou Méditations sur les moyens de parvenir à la
vérité dans toutes les connaissances humaines (Neuchâtel: Imprimerie de la Société typographique,
1782), 361. The title Brissot uses there for the manuscript was the one he finally settled on; another
title, Plan raisonné du système de pyrrhonisme général (“Reasoned Plan for a System of General Pyr-
rhonism”), is found on the manuscript itself, but struck out (See Brissot de Warville, Plan raisonné du
système de pyrrhonisme général, Paris, Archives Nationales, pressmark 446 AP 21).
 Brissot, Plan raisonné, f. 1. English translation: «To revive Pyrrhonism, too long forgotten, to
destroy the foundations of all human knowledge, to extend the reach of doubt to include those
sciences that seem to have been most clearly stamped with the seal of certainty, will appear to be the
most foolish, ridiculous, and outrageous of projects in the eyes of philosophers, learned people,
theologians, and even women,who all flatter themselves that they know something. It is the case that
in this century, so lavishly styled ‘philosophical,’ it is believed that human beings have brought to
completion all the sciences and climbed every rung of their ladders. It is believed that error has
vanished, that truth is no longer obscured by a veil; it is believed that we are bathed in light even as
we continue to dwell in darkness.» All English translations of Brissot de Warville are my own.
 Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism,” 176.
 Richard H. Popkin, “Brissot and Condorcet: Skeptical Philosophers,” in The Skeptical Tradition
around 1800, eds. Johan van der Zande and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 31.
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cism. The true project of his treatise on truth published in 1782 was no longer to dem-
onstrate the vanity of the scientific enterprise, but rather to “seek what is certain in
human knowledge.”³⁵ Brissot had now embraced the “reasonable scepticism” of his
century, which consisted at the theoretical level of developing a pragmatic concept of
science and at the moral level of giving an ethical purpose, namely, human happi-
ness, to the philosophical enterprise.³⁶ Moreover, he expressed his hopes of estab-
lishing an organ intended to disseminate scientists’ and scholars’ observations in
order to increase and perfect human knowledge, a project he followed up on in
1783, when he established, in London, both a “Lyceum,” whose mission was to
bring together scholars and scientists, and a journal designed to publish their discov-
eries.
Brissot’s later thinking acknowledges that obstacles of course lie in the path of
the search for truth and always will: the fallibility of the senses; confused and ob-
scure ideas proper to certain fields such as metaphysics; the difficulty of grasping
all the relationships that come together to produce a fact; the limits of the human
mind; the misuse of words, especially abstract terms; the systematising spirit;
false erudition; passions and prejudices. These are all factors that lead us to a recog-
nition of the highly limited nature of the truths we can arrive at. But for all that, they
do not invalidate this enterprise of making us wise and happy. From this perspective,
philosophical inquiry should no longer seek to doubt for doubt’s sake, but should
aim to meditate in order to be useful to others and to one’s self. For this reason scep-
ticism is to be condemned, since it turns philosophy away from the consideration of
the public good.
I think the interest of Brissot’s case resides in the way he allows us to picture the
transformation of the role of the philosopher at the end of the Enlightenment, which
prefigures the intellectuel engagé of the last century and renders the sceptical pos-
ture, if not impossible, at least extremely rare. Of this transformation, Brissot was
himself conscious, emphasising in his autobiographical sketch that he “wanted to
liberate philosophy from the yoke of despotism.”³⁷ But being an activist for equality
and liberty is to acknowledge value in ideals, which ancient sceptics taught to be ir-
rational. Thus Brissot appears to have understood that the reactivation of scepticism
in the eighteenth century presumed its readjustment and that the scepticism of the
Enlightenment could not be independent of the new imperative of public utility
which the philosopher must obey, therefore breaking with the Hellenistic ideal of
the philosopher who is indifferent to the values shared in the public space.
 Brissot, De la vérité, 1.
 On the expressions “reasonable scepticism” and “mitigated Pyrrhonism” and their meaning, see
Sébastien Charles, “Introduction,” and Charles, “Escepticismo ilustrado: entre pirronismo razonable
y escepticismo radical,” in Dudas filosóficas. Ensayos sobre escepticismo antiguo, moderno y contem-
poráneo, eds. Armando Cintora and Jorge Ornelas (Barcelona: Editorial Genisa, 2014), 177‒202.
 Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, “Portrait de Phédor,” inMémoires (1754‒1793) (Paris: Alphonse
Picard & Fils, 1910), 1:15.
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Conclusion
The figures of Huet, Foucher, and Brissot illustrate well the plural uses made of scep-
ticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the difficulty of providing a
just interpretation of its nature and its function. Rather than trying to overestimate
the importance of the Pyrrhonian current in relation to the Academic one, or to priv-
ilege the epistemic role played by scepticism in the question of the relationship be-
tween faith and reason, as Popkin did in his work, I wanted to show in this paper the
difficulty of arriving at an unambiguous definition of the nature and function of early
modern scepticism. It is thus difficult to define Huet’s scepticism, be it Academic or
Pyrrhonian, without taking into account the apologetic purpose of his work, where
scepticism is an instrument used principally to serve the cause of Christianity. The
same holds for Foucher, whose avowed purpose is identical, even if his use of scep-
ticism follows a methodology ultimately very close to Cartesianism, which seems to
him to make sceptics the best craftsmen of the development of early modern science.
As for Brissot de Warville, his recourse to scepticism is just as dependent on a certain
context, where scepticism is conceived primarily in a propaedeutic role, as a founda-
tion for the natural philosophy of its time, which amounts to making him lose much
of his radicality.
If I had malgré tout to give my definition of early modern scepticism, I would dis-
tinguish two forms. First, a radical form, dominant in the seventeenth century, which
either employed sceptical arguments for religious purposes in order to save religion
from rationalist criticism or, alternatively, employed sceptical arguments in order to
question the principles on which religion is based (dogmas, miracles, prophecies,
etc.). Second, a more mitigated form of scepticism, specific to the eighteenth century,
which is mainly used as a method to overcome our prejudices and to build knowl-
edge collectively according to the encyclopaedic model. In this respect, Hume’s scep-
ticism is an exception during the Enlightenment, as if the sceptical radicalism of the
previous century was perpetuated through his thought. All this may appear very dif-
ferent from ancient scepticism, but it seems to me, nevertheless, that a certain spirit
of scepticism has been preserved over time, which consists in thinking by oneself
and distrusting dogmatism and prejudices, as if there were in fact a kind of skepsis
perennis integrating both sides, Academic and Pyrrhonian.
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Stephan Schmid
Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism
Introduction: Richard Popkin on Early Modern
Scepticism
Scepticism loomed large in the early modern period. In fact, many philosophers from
the late sixteenth until the midst of the eighteenth century grappled with the prob-
lem of how to justify our knowledge claims in a much more explicit and fundamental
way than their Aristotelian forerunners had.¹ In numerous articles and books, partic-
ularly in the latest edition of his volume The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to
Bayle, Richard Popkin argued that the early modern obsession with scepticism was
prompted by the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus’s writings from the second century
CE. As Popkin puts it, the reception of Sextus’s writings led to “an insoluble crise pyr-
rhonienne, as the various gambits of Sextus Empiricus are explored and worked
out.”² While Sextus’s sceptical considerations were first applied in theological con-
texts and religious debates, Popkin explains, they were soon transferred to other
areas as well. In Popkin’s diagnosis, this led to a nouveau pyrrhonisme, which
“was to envelop all the human sciences and philosophy in a complete sceptical cri-
sis, out of which modern philosophy and the scientific outlook finally emerged.”³
It is hard to overstate the importance of Richard Popkin’s work on the history of
scepticism. Not only did his investigation of early modern scepticism bring to the fore
authors who were widely neglected before him, but it also paved the way for a range
of outstanding studies in the history of early modern scepticism, which would have
been plainly impossible without his pioneering work.
All these merits notwithstanding and without denying due credit to Popkin’s ex-
ceptional historiographical work, I want to challenge his main tenet that the early
I am grateful to discussions with Zev Harvey, Yitzhak Melamed, José María Sánchez de León Serrano,
and Máté Veres and the excellent stylistic suggestions by Anthony Paletta and Yoav Meyrav, which
improved this chapter. I also thank the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies, DFG-FOR 2311,
for making this chapter possible in the first place.
 This is not to say that Aristotelian philosophers were uninterested in sceptical or even epistemo-
logical questions. This long-standing historiographical prejudice is finally about to be corrected.
For nuanced investigations into medieval or Aristotelian debates about scepticism, see Dominik Per-
ler, Zweifel und Gewissheit: skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,
2006), and Henrik Lagerlund, ed., Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Back-
ground (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
 Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 5.
 Popkin, History of Scepticism, 59.
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modern period was shaken by a Pyrrhonian crisis which then led to a nouveau pyr-
rhonisme. I am not the first to do so, but my criticism is different from previous ones.
In order to clearly articulate my objection and to distinguish it from other critiques, it
is important to distinguish two dimensions of Popkin’s main tenet.
Popkin’s claim that the early modern period was characterised by a crise pyrrho-
nienne can be read in two ways—and it seems that Popkin is happy to defend it in
both. In one reading, which highlights the historical dimension of Popkin’s tenet,
he makes a claim about the historical origin of early modern scepticism, stating
that it was triggered, influenced, and inspired by the rediscovery and reception of
Sextus Empiricus’s writings. In another reading, which emphasises the taxonomical
dimension of Popkin’s tenet, he makes a claim about the nature of early modern
scepticism, stating that it is indeed a form or species of Pyrrhonian scepticism and
is therefore aptly described as “new Pyrrhonism” (nouveau pyrrhonisme). While
most critics of Popkin focused on the historical dimension of Popkin’s tenet and ar-
gued that early modern scepticism was influenced and inspired by many other writ-
ings and traditions besides those of Sextus Empiricus,⁴ here I want to take issue with
the taxonomical dimension of Popkin’s claim. More precisely, I will argue that under-
standing early modern scepticism as a species of Pyrrhonism is misleading at best.
Even the two most famous early modern sceptics, René Descartes and David Hume, I
submit, developed and employed varieties of scepticism which are distinctively non-
Pyrrhonian.⁵ In addition, I argue that distinguishing between different varieties of
scepticism is of pivotal historical importance insofar as appreciating the fact that
Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepticism differ in crucial ways from one anoth-
er is key to understanding the historical development of sceptical ideas. These three
varieties of scepticism differ from one another in that each is in an important sense
stronger or broader than its antecedent versions; in other words, each calls into ques-
tion what had been taken for granted by their antecedents. In particular, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between Cartesian and Humean scepticism in order to understand
Kant’s philosophical project after the early modern period. Kant’s project was devel-
oped in response to Hume’s scepticism about causation, which is different from both
 Good examples are José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 2 (1997): 199‒220; Dominik Perler, “Was There a ‘Pyrrhonian
Crisis’ in Early modern Philosophy? A Critical Notice of Richard H. Popkin,” Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie 86, no. 2 (June 2004), 209‒20; and Ian Maclean “The ‘Sceptical Crisis’ Reconsidered:
Galen, Rational Medicine and the Libertas Philosophandi,” Early Science and Medicine 11, no. 3
(2006): 247‒74.
 By this restriction I do not mean to imply that the two varieties of scepticism developed by Des-
cartes and Hume are the only varieties of scepticism to be found in the early modern period nor
that they were exclusively and originally developed by Descartes and Hume. My restriction is simply
due to the fact that Descartes and Hume are both famous and highly influential early modern philos-
ophers.
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Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticism.⁶ Thus, understanding the history of scepticism
in general—and the proper target of Kant’s philosophising in particular—requires us
to appreciate varieties of scepticism different from the Pyrrhonian scepticism pre-
sented by Sextus Empiricus.
The paper consists of four sections. In section 1 I provide a brief characterisation
of Pyrrhonian scepticism on the basis of Sextus Empiricus’s description of Pyrrhon-
ism in his Outlines of Scepticism. This will set the basis for my comparative analysis
in the two subsequent sections, devoted to the two presumably most famous mani-
festations of scepticism in the early modern period: section 2 will be concerned with
the “hyperbolic” scepticism of René Descartes, which he famously develops in his
Meditations, while section 3 will focus on David Hume’s scepticism about causation.
Section 4 will summarise my findings.
1 Pyrrhonian Scepticism
We can only properly assess the taxonomical correctness of Popkin’s tenet, according
to which the early modern period was shaken by a Pyrrhonian crisis which led to a
new Pyrrhonism, once we clarify the meaning of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Only then
can we compare it with early modern varieties of scepticism.
At this point, one might raise a fundamental objection to my project. Describing
Pyrrhonism as a variety of scepticism parallel to early modern varieties presupposes
that ancient Pyrrhonism is an intellectual endeavour of the very same form or type as
modern scepticism, such that both enterprises are forms of “scepticism” in the same
sense. As recent scholarship in ancient philosophy has shown, however, this as-
sumption is highly problematic.⁷ For, unlike modern scepticism, which is concerned
with undermining knowledge claims about certain domains by raising doubts about
these domains, ancient Pyrrhonism is not particularly concerned with doubt at all. In
fact, there is not even an ancient Greek term for “doubt,” and if the Latin term du-
bitatio is used in treatises in the ancient sceptical tradition, it is not wielded in any
 This is meticulously defended by Michael Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008).
 See for instance Michael Williams, “Descartes’ Transformation of the Skeptical Tradition,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 289‒91, who lists altogether nine differences between Pyrrhonian and Des-
cartes’s scepticism. Other enquiries into the difference between ancient and (early) modern scepti-
cism are Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley
Missed,” The Philosophical Review 91, no. 1 (January 1982): 3‒40; and José Luis Bermúdez, “The Orig-
inality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did It Have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents?” History of Philosophy
Quarterly 17, no. 4 (October 2000): 333‒60.
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technical sense.⁸ The Greek word skeptikos simply means “seeker” or “investigator.”
This is exactly how ancient sceptics conceived of themselves: as investigators inter-
ested in the very questions of physics, ethics, and logic addressed by their dogmatic
opponents. Unlike their opponents, however, they recommended suspending judg-
ment about these matters since they did not find conclusive evidence to decisively
answer these questions.⁹ What is more, ancient sceptics advertised their scepticism
as a means for happiness or an untroubled life. By contrast, modern scepticism is
and was considered mainly as a threat, which not only undermines the endeavour
of scientific research but is also at odds with our self-understanding as cognitive
agents living in a material world.
I do not want to question these findings; especially in light of the fact that they
are grist for the mill of my case against Richard Popkin’s identification of a crise pyr-
rhonienne in the early modern period. However, these findings provide such a funda-
mental refutation of Popkin’s identification of a crise pyrrhonienne in the early mod-
ern period that it is hard to believe that he really wanted to claim that early modern
sceptics were in fact Pyrrhonists in the sense portrayed by Sextus Empiricus. Instead,
I will assume that Popkin construed “Pyrrhonism” as a position one can come to
adopt on the basis of Sextus’s views if one is interested in the typical modern epis-
temological project of exploring the limits of our knowledge by raising specific
doubts. Accordingly, my sketch of Pyrrhonian scepticism is not to be read as an ad-
equate representation of ancient Pyrrhonism, but as a systematisation of the sorts of
doubts that Pyrrhonians would have launched had they engaged in a kind of project
typically pursued by their early modern successors.
That said, what does (a “modernised” version of) Pyrrhonian scepticism consist
of? Towards what kind of epistemic state does a Pyrrhonian aim, and which types or
domains of knowledge does s/he undermine?
In response to these questions, the opening paragraph of Sextus Empiricus’s
Outlines turns out to be particularly revealing. In this passage, Sextus distinguishes
three schools of philosophers concerned with finding the truth. One school of
thought—which Sextus associates with Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics—believes
that they have actually discovered the truth. Sextus calls adherents of this school
dogmatists. Another school—which Sextus associates with “Clitomachus and Car-
neades, and other Academics”—asserts that we cannot arrive at the truth. In making
such a definite assertion, adherents of this school also qualify as dogmatists in Sex-
tus’s view. They are, as it were, negative dogmatists.¹⁰ Finally, followers of the third
 Katja Vogt, “From Investigation to Doubt: The Beginnings of Modern Skepticism,” in Roman Reflec-
tions: Essays on Latin Philosophy, ed. by Gareth Williams and Katharina Volk (Oxford, New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2015), 262‒64.
 Vogt, 262.
 It should be noted that, as a matter of historical fact, Sextus’s characterisation of the Academics
is probably wrong: as Cicero reports (in his Acad. 45 and Luc. 28), both Arcesilaus and Carneades de-
clared that they did not even know whether they know anything. For an investigation into the real
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school—whom Sextus identifies with the (Pyrrhonian) sceptics—have yet to come to a
conclusion about the truth. They are still investigating—and are for that matter true
“sceptics” in the original sense of the Greek term, or “seekers.” Lacking a convincing
resolution of the question as to what the truth is, Pyrrhonian sceptics withhold their
judgments about the truth of things or even about our capacity to know the truth.
Pyrrhonian scepticism, then, is a philosophical stance that —unlike the one Sex-
tus attributes to the Academics—is entirely anti-dogmatic. Pyrrhonian sceptics are
opposed to two dogmatic camps of philosophy in that they neither claim to know
the truth nor definitely deny our capacity to know it. Rather, they suspend their judg-
ment about the nature of things and our capacity to (eventually) know it. This anti-
dogmatic nature of Pyrrhonian scepticism is reflected by Sextus’s official definition
of Pyrrhonism:
Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in
any way at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and ac-
counts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity (PH 1.4.8).¹¹
A Pyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus explains, is able to counter every argument for a puta-
tive knowledge claim with an equally strong or convincing counter-argument. In light
of these conflicting arguments for and against a certain view, a Pyrrhonian sceptic
will suspend judgment. As it turns out, this suspension of judgment results in the
sceptic’s tranquillity or peace of mind. This is, Sextus explains, because the dogmat-
ics “who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually trou-
bled” (PH 1.12.27); as long as they lack what they take to be good, they feel that they
are victims of some natural evil, and when they have reached it they are in constant
fear of losing it. Pyrrhonian sceptics, by contrast, “who make no determination about
what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity;
and hence they are tranquil” (PH 1.12.28). Due to their suspension of judgment
about the truth of the matter, Pyrrhonian sceptics are less troubled than their dog-
matic opponents, and acquire—albeit accidentally—the desired peace of mind, in
hope of which philosophers come to philosophise in the first place.
Sextus’s definition of Pyrrhonian scepticism hints at another essential element
of Pyrrhonism: The Pyrrhonian sceptic comes to withhold her or his judgment
about the nature of things by setting out “oppositions among things which appear
and are thought of in any way at all.” In doing so, the Pyrrhonian sceptic does
not call into question that there are things that appear to us in a certain way and
difference between historical Pyrrhonists and Academics, see Gisela Striker, “On the Difference be-
tween Pyrrhonists and the Academics”, in Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135‒49, and Striker, “Academics versus Pyrrhon-
ists, Reconsidered,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 195‒207.
 All references from Sextus, abbreviated as PH, are cited in parentheses and taken from Outlines of
Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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are thought of in many ways. Sextus is explicit about this point,writing that “no-one,
presumably, will raise a controversy over whether an existing thing appears this way
or that; rather, they investigate whether it is such as it appears” (PH 1.11.22). The
scepticism launched by a Pyrrhonian sceptic, then, is of a restricted scope: it is re-
stricted to the true nature of things, leaving untouched the fact that there are things,
which appear to us in various ways.¹²
In sum, we should note two core features of Pyrrhonian scepticism: First, Pyr-
rhonism is anti-dogmatic in nature. As opposed to positively denying that we can
know the true nature of things, a Pyrrhonian sceptic simply suspends judgment
and is silent about the true nature of things. Whether we can, in principle, know
the true nature of things or not, the Pyrrhonian merely observes that there are as
many convincing arguments for a given position about the nature of things as
there are arguments against it and thus refuses to take a stance on the question,
withholding judgment. For all that—and this marks the second core-feature of Pyr-
rhonism—a Pyrrhonian sceptic is a realist of a certain stripe: the Pyrrhonian does
not doubt or question the very reality of things that appear in a certain way. He or
she only questions whether the things in themselves really exist in the way they ap-
pear to us.
There is much more to be said about Pyrrhonian scepticism. This should be
enough, though, for my present purpose of assessing Popkin’s claim that the early
modern period was shaken by a crise pyrrhonienne.
2 Cartesian Scepticism
Descartes was no sceptic. To the contrary, he was convinced that we can achieve ab-
solutely certain knowledge (scientia) about ourselves, God, and the nature of bodies.
In fact, he took great pains in defending his epistemological optimism, but in the
course of doing so, he famously employed sceptical strategies and doubts. Far
from defending scepticism, Descartes was only a methodological sceptic who con-
sciously invoked doubts in order to lay bare an unshakable and firm foundation
for certain and stable knowledge.¹³ But what is the nature of the scepticism that Des-
cartes employs in his search for certain knowledge?
 This “realist character” of Pyrrhonism has been convincingly pointed out by Burnyeat, “Idealism
and Greek Philosophy,” and Stephen Everson, “The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism,” in Psychol-
ogy (Companions to Ancient Thought 2), ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 121‒47. Cf. the critical remarks by Gail Fine, “Sextus and External World Skepticism,” Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003): 349‒52.
 See the opening lines of Descartes’ Meditations, where he explains that “once in the course of his
life” he wanted to “demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations.” See
Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1974‒1989; henceforth AT),
7:14; Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Edited and translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,
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It is well known that Descartes develops his methodological doubt in three
stages, each of which is stronger than its preceding stage to the extent that it calls
into question what was left untouched in the previous stage. Concerning Popkin’s
tenet, the crucial question is whether these three forms of doubt are indeed Pyrrho-
nian in nature. Popkin himself had no doubts about this. Or so it seems, when he
characterises Descartes’s three stages of doubt:
By moving from [1] the partial Pyrrhonism of doubting the reliability of our senses to [2] the met-
aphysical Pyrrhonism of the dream hypothesis, doubting the reality of our knowledge, to [3] the
total Pyrrhonism of the demon hypothesis, doubting the reliability of our rational faculties, we
finally discover the cogito, a truth so subjectively certain that we are incapable of doubting it at
all.¹⁴
Let us have a brief look at Descartes’s three stages of doubt in order to see whether
Popkin was right in describing them as three forms of Pyrrhonism.
Descartes begins his sceptical “demolition” of beliefs by casting doubt on his
sensory beliefs, that is, those beliefs he “acquired either from the senses or through
the senses.” Noting that he has often found that “the senses deceive, and it is pru-
dent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” (AT 7:18;
CSM 2:12), Descartes finds doubt in all our sensory beliefs at once and consequently
rejects them as uncertain.
At the same time, Descartes is clear that just pointing out that the senses some-
times deceive us is not sufficient for undermining our confidence in sensory beliefs in
general. As he remarks, sensory beliefs might be problematic with respect “to objects
which are very small or in distance,” but he admits that “there are many beliefs
about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the
senses,” citing examples like his belief that he is “sitting by the fire, wearing a winter
dressing-gown” (AT 7:18; CSM 2:12), and so forth.
Descartes’s first stage of doubt, based on the occasional deceptiveness of our
senses, does not venture very far. It does not even undermine our perceptual beliefs
in general, as it leaves untouched our beliefs about objects that are neither very
small nor distant.
Descartes’s second stage of doubt, which he induces by his famous dream hy-
pothesis, is more ambitious. It might well be, Descartes considers, that we are asleep
and that we just dream about the things that we seem to perceive. “How often, asleep
at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events,” he remarks, “that I am here in
my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I am lying undressed in bed!” (AT
7:19; CSM 2:13). However, as long as I cannot reject the hypothesis that I am just
dreaming what I seem to perceive, my sensory beliefs become dubitable. Unlike
Dugald Murdoch (vols. 1 and 2; henceforth: CSM), and Anthony Kenny (henceforth: CSMK) (Cam-
bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984‒1991), 2:17. References to Descartes’s writings
are given in parentheses.
 Popkin, History of Scepticism, 156‒57 (numbering added).
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the observation that our senses are sometimes deceptive, then, Descartes’s dream hy-
pothesis can undermine all our sensory beliefs. Given the possibility of dreaming, it
might well be that his formerly unquestioned beliefs—“that my eyes are open, that I
am moving my head and stretching out my hands—are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I
do not even have such hands or such a body at all” (AT 7:19; CSM 2:13).
But the doubt induced by the dream hypothesis goes farther than just affecting
our beliefs in the qualities of external things. It also undermines our confidence in
the very existence of these things. As for the dream hypothesis, it is not only the
case that extra-mental things might in fact be quite different from the way they ap-
pear, but also that they may not exist at all. Given that he might just be dreaming,
Descartes ponders, he might “not even have such hands or such a body at all.”
For all this, Descartes’s second stage of doubt leaves many other beliefs unaffect-
ed. In particular, it does not undermine non-empirical beliefs. “For whether I am
awake or asleep,” Descartes argues, “two and three added together are five, and a
square has no more than four sides” (AT 7:20; CSM 2:14).
It is only Descartes’s third and last stage of doubt, which is induced by the evil
demon hypothesis, that undermines non-empirical beliefs as well. Given that it is
(epistemically) possible that we are all victims of an evil demon that persistently de-
ceives us and interferes with our cognitive faculties, almost all our beliefs can be
doubted. As Descartes vividly puts it:
How do I know that he [i.e., an evil demon] has not brought it about that there is no earth, no
sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all
these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes believe
that others go astray in cases where they think that they have most perfect knowledge, may I not
similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or in some even
simpler matter, if this is imaginable? (AT 7:21; CSM 2:14)
To the extent that I cannot rule out the possibility that all of my thoughts—together
with their appearance of certainty—could have been instilled by an evil demon (and
how could I know for certain that I am not a victim of such a pervasive deception),
pretty much everything that I usually accept as true could be false. Even such simple
non-empirical beliefs as that 2 + 3 = 5 or that squares have four sides could have been
instilled in me by an evil demon together with the conviction that these facts cannot
be otherwise. As it is well known, there is only one belief that survives this third
stage of doubt according to Descartes. This is the cogito, Descartes’s insight that
“this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by
me or conceived in my mind” (AT 7:25; CSM 2:17).
So much about Descartes’s three stages of doubt. Are they aptly described as
forms of Pyrrhonism, as suggested by Popkin? As has become plain in this brief
sketch of these three stages already, this question is clearly to be answered in the
negative. As seen above, Pyrrhonian scepticism is committed to a certain sort of re-
alism: the Pyrrhonian does not doubt the reality of things that appear in a certain
way, but only questions whether the things are by nature the way they appear to
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us. Descartes’s second and third stages of doubt, by contrast, undermine such a re-
alist commitment: As long as we cannot rule out the possibility of dreaming or being
deceived by an evil demon, we cannot be certain whether there are in fact external
things that appear to us in a certain way—or whether we are simply hallucinating.
Unlike Pyrrhonian scepticism, the scepticism raised by Descartes’s last two
stages of doubt, which Popkin describes as “metaphysical” and “total Pyrrhonism,”
concerns our beliefs in the existence of extra-mental things, of which there is “no
controversy” according to Sextus. In fact, undermining our confidence in non-empir-
ical beliefs (such as our beliefs that 2 + 3 = 5 or that squares have four sides), Des-
cartes’s third stage of doubt even undermines our beliefs in what we usually take to
be necessary truths.¹⁵ For if we might be mistaken in thinking that squares have four
sides, squares with five, six, seven, or any other number of sides might well be pos-
sible, after all—and the same holds for the rational square root of 2 or the largest
prime number.
Relying on the criterion of scope, only Descartes’s first stage of doubt,which con-
cerns the reliability of our senses and which leaves our confidence in the existence of
extra-mental things untouched, retains a legitimate claim to count as a form of Pyr-
rhonism. But when we also take the first core-feature of Pyrrhonism into account—its
anti-dogmatic nature—even the scepticism induced by Descartes’s first stage of
doubt fails to be Pyrrhonian. This is due to the strong epistemological use Descartes
makes of his methodologically employed doubts. As he writes in the second
Meditation:
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly
false; and I will proceed in this way until l recognize something certain, or, if nothing else, until I
at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty (AT 7:24; CSM 2:16).
In employing his scepticism as a method for revealing an indubitable foundation of
knowledge, Descartes uses his doubts not only to incite suspension of judgment, but
as an immediate reason for denying claims of true knowledge or certainty about a
particular domain. This is quite different from the Pyrrhonian, who would always re-
main open to the possibility of overcoming these doubts and therefore refuse to
adopt the negative epistemological verdict announced by Descartes. Hence, far
from yielding an anti-dogmatic state of universal suspension of judgment, Descart-
es’s scepticism, if successful, helps us “to recognize for certain” that we do not
have any true or certain knowledge after all. In his quest for certain knowledge, Des-
 This result is closely related to another famous and widely debated view of Descartes: his convic-
tion that necessary and eternal truths depend on the will of God (and are to this extent not ultimately
necessary insofar as God could have chosen a different set of necessary and eternal truths). As an
entry point into the debate, see his Letter to [Mersenne], 27 May 1630 (AT 1:152; CSMK 25) and
David Cunning, “Descartes’ Modal Metaphysics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta (Spring 2014 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/descartes-
modal/.
Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 189
cartes takes the possibility of (the slightest) doubt about the belief that p to immedi-
ately establish the (dogmatic) epistemological verdict that we do not have any cer-
tainty or true knowledge as to whether p.¹⁶
Starting from the textually well-founded premise that Pyrrhonian scepticism is
essentially characterised by that fact that it is (1) anti-dogmatic in nature (and merely
aims at our suspension of judgment) and (2) restricted in scope to the extent that it
does not question the existence of extra-mental things that appear to us in a certain
way, we have to conclude that, pace Popkin, none of the scepticisms invoked by Des-
cartes’s three stages of doubt qualify as genuine forms of Pyrrhonism. As an instru-
ment for laying bare a secure and lasting foundation of knowledge, Descartes takes
his scepticism to be sufficient to refute our claims of certain knowledge about a par-
ticular domain and for this reason it is clearly dogmatic in nature. Furthermore, the
forms of scepticism invoked by Descartes’s dream and evil demon hypothesis go far
beyond the restricted scope of Pyrrhonism in that they undermine our beliefs in the
existence of extra-mental things in general. Descartes’s scepticism is distinctively
non-Pyrrhonian.¹⁷
3 Humean Scepticism (about Causation)
In fairness to Popkin, it is important to note that he did not classify David Hume¹⁸ as
a Pyrrhonian sceptic in the traditional sense, though he argued that “Hume, himself,
actually maintained the only ‘consistent’ Pyrrhonian point of view.”¹⁹ In fact, Popkin
identifies two aspects in Hume’s scepticism that he takes to be different from Sextus
Empiricus’s standard formulation of Pyrrhonism.²⁰ First, Popkin contends that
Hume’s scepticism is more dogmatic than Pyrrhonism in that Hume assertorically
 Note that even if we take Descartes to articulate only a maxim of assent here, according to which
we should not accept what can be doubted, this maxim is stronger than the ancient sceptic’s precept
to only accept a proposition for which there is more evidence than counter-evidence. For a discussion
of this point, see Janet Broughton, Descartes’ Method of Doubt (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2002), 43‒49.
 This is not changed by the fact that Descartes’ contemporaries (like Hobbes; see AT 7:171; CSM
2:121) as well as Descartes himself (AT 7:171‒72, CSM 2:121; AT 5:147, CSMK 333) denied that the scep-
tical considerations of his firstMeditation have any title of novelty or originality.Vis-à-vis ancient Pyr-
rhonism, Descartes’s sceptical considerations were original indeed.
 Hume’s works are cited in parentheses according to the following abbreviations: EHU refers to An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford and New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1999); T refers to A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David F. Norton and Mary J.
Norton (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Citations from both works are followed
by a reference to L.A. Sebly-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch’s Clarendon editions (1975 and 1978, respective-
ly), abbreviated as SBN.
 Richard Popkin, “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism,” The Philosoph-
ical Quarterly 1, no. 5 (October 1951): 385.
 Popkin, 386‒87.
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claims that (many) philosophical questions are ultimately unanswerable. Second,
Popkin holds that Hume does not discuss, let alone accept the traditional Pyrrhonist
strategy for deciding practical questions by appeal to our appearances and local cus-
toms and traditions. Unlike Sextus, who would concede that we can “have opinions
about what appears to be the case, without giving up one’s suspensive attitude as to
what really is the case,”²¹ Hume famously denied that we are able to persistently
withhold judgments about what appears to be the case even if philosophical enquiry
reveals that we lack any rational grounds for these judgments.
I do not want to discuss Popkin’s characterisation of Hume’s scepticism here. Let
me just note that, unlike Popkin, I am not fully sure whether there is more than a
verbal disagreement when it comes to Hume’s and Sextus’s diverging verdicts on
the possibility of shedding our opinions by suspending our judgment.²² However, I
very much agree that many of Hume’s sceptical considerations are much more dog-
matic than those provided by Sextus insofar as they aim not only at our suspension
of judgment but also at defeating our claims of true or certain knowledge altogeth-
er.²³
I will thus follow Popkin in his first assessment that Hume’s scepticism is less
anti-dogmatic than traditional Pyrrhonism. All this leaves the second core feature
of Pyrrhonian scepticism—its scope—untouched. What about the scope of Hume’s
scepticism?
Given the many sceptical facets of Hume’s philosophy, this question defies a uni-
fied and simple answer. There are just too many sceptical strands in Hume’s thought
to determine the scope of Hume’s scepticism. In the following I will focus on only one
form of scepticism in Hume—his famous scepticism about causation. As I will argue,
Hume’s scepticism about causation is not only decidedly wider in scope than tradi-
tional Pyrrhonism, but also ventures beyond Descartes’s most radical from of scep-
ticism, his evil demon hypothesis.²⁴
Hume’s worries about causation have many facets: One of these concerns our
justification in making causal inferences—our practice of inferring from a perceived
 Popkin.
 For similar concerns in this direction, see Terence Irwin, review of Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies
in Hellenistic Epistemology, ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes, Noûs 17,
no. 1 (March 1983): 127; Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Vol. 2:
From Suarez to Rousseau (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 253‒54; and Julia
Annas, “Hume and Ancient Scepticism,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 66 (2000): 271‒85. I have profited
considerably from discussions with Máté Veres on this point.
 A particularly telling passage with respect to Hume’s negative dogmatism is his famous dictum
that all reasoning must, in light of sceptical reflections, “from knowledge degenerate into probabil-
ity” (T 1.4.1.3, SBN 181).
 Note that the kind of scepticism that I am interested in with respect to Hume also manifests in his
considerations about substances (T 1.1.6; 1.4.6). I confine myself to Hume’s scepticism about causation
because Hume is more explicit about the distinctive nature of this form of scepticism and because it is
this kind of scepticism to which Kant explicitly refers.
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object the existence of its (unperceived) cause.²⁵ Another worry concerns our very no-
tion of a cause, which is taken to undergird our practice of causal inferences because
it is traditionally conceived as a notion of necessary connection between objects or
events, which licenses the inferential transition from the perception of one object
or event to another. Here I focus on the latter.
Hume’s worry about our notion or our idea of causation goes back to his empiri-
cist commitment that all our ideas must ultimately be derived from impressions. Or,
as Hume puts it: “all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impres-
sions or more lively ones” (EHU 2.5, SBN 19).²⁶ Even though Hume allows for minor
exceptions to this principle, he is clear that these are only singular cases, and a sin-
gular case is “scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we
should alter our general maxim” (T 1.1.1.10, SBN 6). He is thus firmly convinced
that his “general maxim” applies to our idea of causation as well. Accordingly,
Hume opens his inquiry into the experiential sources of our idea of causation by not-
ing:
I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connex-
ion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonimous; and therefore ’tis an absurdity to employ
any of them in defining the rest. By this observation we reject at once all the vulgar definitions,
which philosophers have given of power and efficacy; and instead of searching for the idea in
these definitions, must look for it in the impressions, from which it is originally deriv’d (T
1.3.14.4, SBN 157).
Given that there is a whole family of conceptually interrelated causal concepts or
ideas, it will not help to uncover the empiricist source or basis of our idea of causa-
tion by appealing to other ideas of this family (as it is done by what Hume calls “vul-
gar definitions”). In order to give an empiricistically acceptable analysis of causation,
we “must look for it in the impressions, from which it is originally deriv’d”.
As Hume famously argues, however, there is no single impression that could
serve as the experiential basis or source for the idea of causation that philosophers
seem to rely on when they conceive of causation as a necessary connection between
events or objects.While experience makes us acquainted with events or objects (reg-
ularly) succeeding each other, it does not provide us with any impression of a force
or connection between them. As Hume lucidly puts it:
 As Hume famously explained, “[a]ll reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on
the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our
memory and senses” (EHU 4.4, SBN 26).
 In his Treatise, Hume articulates his so copy-principle, saying “[t]hat all our simple ideas in their
first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they
exactly represent” (T.1.1.1.7, SBN 4). For further discussion of this principle and problems connected
with it, see Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1997), 41‒57.
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[E]ven in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most un-
usual, and […] we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being
ever able to comprehend any thing like Connection between them. (EHU 7.21, SBN 70)
Consider a thrown stone breaking a window. We take it for granted that the thrown
stone causes the window to shatter. But on what grounds? Hume is clear that this
“ground” is no impression or experience of a certain connection holding between
the stone and the breaking window because all we can actually observe is the fact
that one event—the stone hitting on the window—is followed by another event—
the window’s breaking; an experience, indeed, that we can have repeatedly: when-
ever we have seen a stone hitting a window, we have observed the window breaking
afterwards. But far from being aware of any causal tie or connection between events
or objects, “we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects,” i.e.,
their regular succession.
The lack of a single impression that could figure as a source of our idea of cau-
sation leaves us in an awkward situation. Given Hume’s “general maxim” that an
idea is nothing but a “feeble copy” of a corresponding impression, the lack of an im-
pression that underlies our idea of a causation seems to imply that we do not have an
idea of causation in the first place. Hume is well aware of this difficulty—and sug-
gests an ingenious solution to it:
Thus upon the whole we may infer, that when we talk of any being […] as endow’d with a power
or force, proportion’d to any effect; when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects,
and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of
these objects are endow’d; in all these expressions, so apply’d, we have really no distinct mean-
ing, and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate ideas. But as ’tis
more probable, that these expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply’d,
than that they never have any meaning; ’twill be proper to bestow another consideration on this
subject, to see if possibly we can discover the nature and origin of those ideas,we annex to them
(T 1.3.14.14, SBN 162).
As Hume reminds us, concluding that we do not have any causal notions or ideas—
such that all of our causal vocabulary is meaningless—is only one of two possibili-
ties. Another possible conclusion—and this is the conclusion that Hume is going
to embrace—is that our causal vocabulary has a different meaning than philosophers
usually assume: it does not express an idea of a necessary connection between dis-
tinct events or objects (which—due to a lack of a corresponding impression—we do
not have in the first place). According to Hume, our idea of a cause is rather the idea
of “an object, followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are
followed by objects similar to the second” (EHU 7.29, SBN 76), as our experience re-
veals us no more than such regular sequences.
Hume’s solution to the awkward situation mentioned above consists in providing
a revisionist theory of causation according to which causation simply amounts to a
regular succession or “conjunction”—as Hume puts it—as opposed to a modally ro-
bust relation or a “connexion.” In addition to this, Hume offers an explanation for
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the fact that many philosophers take their idea of causation to be about a necessary
connection between distinct objects or events, even though we simply cannot have
such an idea. In Hume’s diagnosis, philosophers are usually mistaken about their
idea of causation because they misinterpret the impressions that accompany our
ideas of regular successions. If we observe a regular succession between objects or
events frequently, we grow accustomed to this succession. And having grown accus-
tomed to this sequence, we tend to expect and thereby mentally anticipate the suc-
ceeding event or object upon the observation or imagination of its typical antece-
dent. In the course of acquiring an idea of a regular succession of events, then, we
also acquire the habit to mentally transit from the appearance of the former to the
idea of the latter. This habit manifests itself in a typical feeling: upon the experience
of an event of a regular succession we feel urged to expect its usual attendant. It is
“[t]his connexion,” Hume explains, “which we feel in the mind, this customary tran-
sition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, [that] is the senti-
ment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion”
(EHU 7.28, SBN 75). Philosophers, then, tend to conceive of A causing B as a form of A
necessitating B, because they themselves feel psychologically forced or necessitated
to think of Bs upon the appearance of As. And since they acquired this psychological
determination in the course of having observed Bs regularly following As, they mis-
takenly take to perceive this psychological “necessitation” as a metaphysical neces-
sitation in the regularly succeeding objects or events themselves.
Let me clarify the precise nature of Hume’s scepticism about causation. As re-
vealed by my brief sketch, this scepticism is primarily directed towards our idea or
notion of causation. Not only does Hume call into question the possibility to know
whether events or objects are genuinely causally connected (in the sense of being re-
lated by a necessary connection), he even disputes that we can have the very idea or
notion of such a relation. In Hume’s words:
[W]e cannot […] point out that circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its
effect. We have no idea of this connexion; nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to
know, when we endeavour at a conception of it (EHU 7.29, SBN 77).
Closely inspecting our idea of a cause and cognate notions, Hume argues, we find
that they only refer to a regular succession of objects or events and that every as-
sumption about this regular succession having a distinct modal character is due to
a misunderstanding of our felt psychological tendency to transit from the appear-
ance of one object to its usual attendant. Lacking a distinctive impression of a
cause necessitating its effect, we cannot even have an idea or notion of what the dis-
tinctive mode of necessitation that we tend to attribute to what we describe as causal
relations would actually be like.
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4 Three Varieties of Scepticism
How is Hume’s scepticism about causation to be distinguished from the other vari-
eties of scepticism considered in this chapter? Being first and foremost concerned
with our ideas or notion of causation, it goes significantly beyond the forms of scep-
ticism that Descartes invokes by his dream and evil demon hypothesis. For as radical
as Descartes’s “hyperbolic” doubt might be, it never questions the very meaning of
our ideas. This is particularly evident from the strategy Descartes uses to rebut the
hyperbolic doubt he introduced, namely proving God’s existence, who—as a benev-
olent and omnipotent being—would never allow us to be systematically deceived
along the lines suggested by Descartes’s dream and evil demon hypotheses. This ar-
gument for God’s existence proceeds from a survey of our ideas in our minds, about
which Descartes explains, in the third Meditation:
[A]s far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do not
refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a
chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the former as the latter (AT 7:37; CSM
2:26).
According to Descartes, there can be no question about the “falsity” of our ideas:
they have a distinctive representational content, which is—at least primarily—fully
transparent to us and about which we cannot be deceived; an idea about a goat is
about a goat, and an idea about a chimera is about a chimera.²⁷ The question in-
voked by Descartes’s scepticism only appears when we ask ourselves about the rela-
tion between our ideas and the external reality: do our ideas, with their distinctive
content, correspond to an extra-mental reality? In this vein, Descartes’s scepticism
takes the intentionality of our ideas for granted. He does not question that they
have a distinctive intentional content or representational purport. He simply ques-
tions their truth: is the world really the way that our ideas represent it to be?
This is different from Hume’s scepticism about causation. Unlike Descartes’s
form of scepticism, Hume’s scepticism about causation not only calls into question
whether things are in fact causally related, but undermines our very idea of causa-
tion as a necessary connection. In Hume’s view, when we think about causation as
a necessary connection, we are deceived about our own ideas. Being misled by
our psychological habit to associate ideas of causes with ideas of their effects, we
 Note that in the thirdMeditation, Descartes concedes that while ideas by themselves cannot strict-
ly speaking be false, still some of them qualify as materially false, “when they represent non-things
as things” (AT 7:43, CSM 2:30). (His paradigm example is the idea of coldness that represents some-
thing as real and positive even though it is just an absence of heat.) Nonetheless, Descartes is clear
that materially false ideas exist and have a distinctive representational content, it is just that this con-
tent is so confused that “I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something
positive which exists outside of my sensation” (AT 7:234, CSM 2:146).
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take causes to stand in a necessary connection to their effects, even though “we have
no idea of this connexion; nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know,
when we endeavour at a conception of it” (EHU 7.29, SBN 77). As opposed to the truth
of our thoughts, which are questioned by Descartes’s scepticism, Hume’s scepticism
about causation concerns the very meaning or intentional content of our idea of cau-
sation: are our causal notions in fact about a necessary connection or about some-
thing else? The particular threat of Hume’s scepticism consists in his case of the pos-
sibility that we can be and in fact are deceived about the content of our own
thinking, something which had been exempt from Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt.
This all makes plain that far from just rehashing forms of Pyrrhonian scepticism,
Descartes’s hyperbolic scepticism and Hume’s scepticism about causation introduce
varieties of scepticism that are markedly different from the kind of scepticism de-
scribed by Sextus Empiricus. Not only are Descartes’s and Hume’s forms of scepti-
cism both “negatively dogmatic” in the sense that they justify the claim that we
do not have any genuine knowledge about their specific domains, they are also sig-
nificantly more comprehensive, calling into question what Pyrrhonism still takes for
granted. In fact, Hume’s scepticism about causation defines a variety of scepticism
that is even stronger than Descartes’s hyperbolic scepticism insofar as it calls into
question the very intentionality or meaning of our ideas, which Descartes takes to
be unquestionably transparent (though not necessarily adequate).²⁸ We should
thus distinguish between at least three forms of scepticism, each characterised by
a distinctive form of doubt:
Pyrrhonian Scepticism asks whether x is really F, or only appears to be F, and pertains
to the adequacy of our thoughts as to the nature of things, leaving the existence of the
things revealed in our thoughts untouched.
Cartesian Scepticism—as manifested in Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt—asks whether
there is in fact an x that is F, as it appears to be and pertains to the truth of our
thoughts (of the form x is F), leaving their meaning or intentionality untouched.
Humean Scepticism—as manifested in Hume’s scepticism about causation—asks
whether the thought of x being F is a thought about x being F at all and concerns
the very meaning or intentionality of thoughts.
 In fact, I think that Cartesian scepticism and the Humean scepticism induced by Hume’s reflec-
tions on causation correspond to the two kinds of sceptical problematics that Jim Conant has distin-
guished in terms of “Cartesian” and “Kantian scepticism.” See Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,”
in Rethinking Epistemology, Volume 2, ed. Günter Abel and James Conant (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyt-
er, 2012), 1‒72. My understanding of Cartesian and Humean scepticism developed here is very much
indebted to Conant’s revealing discussion of these two varieties of scepticism.
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Given that Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepticism articulate distinctive forms
of doubt, each of which undermines a different claim or pretence of our thought (is it
adequate? is it true? and is it genuine thought or about anything at all?), it is certain-
ly of systematic importance to avoid subsuming them under the uniform label of
“Pyrrhonism,” as Richard Popkin had done. But distinguishing between these vari-
eties of scepticism is also important from the point of view of the history of philos-
ophy. This is because these three varieties of scepticism raise different philosophical
questions or problematics that have influenced prominent discussions in different
periods of the history of philosophy. While Pyrrhonian scepticism raises questions
about the adequacy or veracity of our thought, Cartesian scepticism calls into
doubt the very existence of things outside our thought. Humean scepticism, in
turn, raises a question about the content of our thought and our capacity to decide
whether our thought is about certain objects in the first place.
The Pyrrhonian type of question is representative of the ancient discussion about
a criterion of truth: is there a feature of our thought that we can appeal to in order to
justify its truth or adequacy—a criterion by which we can decide whether things are
really the way that we take them to be? While the Epicureans and Stoics have fa-
mously defended such a criterion, Pyrrhonists have denied its existence.²⁹
The Cartesian problematic invites the exploration of radically revisionist meta-
physical options that we can famously observe among prominent early modern phi-
losophers such as Berkeley and Leibniz. Is there a material reality which our
thoughts correspond to or should we rather embrace a version of idealism according
to which reality is ultimately constituted by mind-like entities with particular
thoughts?³⁰
Humean scepticism, finally, is a key for understanding Kant’s philosophical proj-
ect. While Kant concedes in a famous letter to Herz that in previous work he just
passed over the “question of how a representation that refers to an object without
being in any way affected by it can be possible,”³¹ it is this question that lies at
the heart of his transcendental philosophy, which he develops in his Critique of
Pure Reason. In this work Kant prominently asks how there can be meaningful met-
aphysical thoughts, which are about something that we cannot experience. It should
not come as much of a surprise that this is the problem raised by Humean scepticism
about causation: how can we be sure that our metaphysical idea of causation as a
necessary connection between two events or objects is really about something rather
than an empty phrase that we take to express an idea, even though it does not.
 For a discussion of this debate, see Gisela Striker, “The Problem of the Criterion,” in Essays on
Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
150‒65.
 Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy,” makes a powerful case to the effect that idealism is a
peculiar early modern idea, which is virtually absent from ancient thought.
 Kant, Letter Nr. 65, to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. Köni-
glich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1900‒), 10:125.
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Against this backdrop, Kant’s famous Copernican revolution—according to
which we should conceive objects as conforming to our mode of cognition rather
than taking our cognition to be determined by its objects—can be seen as a means
to ensure the representational purport of our metaphysical thoughts that has been
forcefully undermined by Hume’s scepticism about causation. Given that our objects
of cognition are constituted by our cognitive faculties, we can be sure that there are
objects that our cognition is about.³² In fact, Kant himself points out that it was
David Hume who “interrupted his dogmatic slumber and brought him to adopt a
fully new direction in his investigations in the area of speculative philosophy.”³³
In light of the fact that it was David Hume’s scepticism rather than Descartes’s
that awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber and brought him to develop his tran-
scendental philosophy, it is important not to conflate these different varieties of early
modern scepticism, each of which is concerned with a different problematic of our
thought.
5 Conclusion
Richard Popkin famously argued that the early modern period was shaken by an “an
insoluble crise pyrrhonienne, as the various gambits of Sextus Empiricus are explored
and worked out”.³⁴ In this chapter, I argued that Popkin’s description of the varieties
of scepticism developed in the early modern period as a species of Pyrrhonism is
highly misleading and blurs important differences.
As I have shown, both, René Descartes and David Hume, invoked and employed
certain forms or varieties of scepticism which differ from Pyrrhonian scepticism.
Even setting aside worries about the problematic assumption that ancient and
early modern forms of “scepticism” are indeed forms of a single overarching
genus of intellectual endeavour, the forms of doubt launched by Descartes and
Hume are crucially different from the doubts that would have been raised by Pyrrho-
nians if they had raised any doubts at all. In fact, the early modern varieties of scep-
ticism, which I have analysed here, not only differ from traditional Pyrrhonian scep-
ticism with respect to the kinds of doubt they incite, but also with respect to the
epistemological verdict they justify.
Concerning the latter, we have seen that Sextus Empiricus puts great emphasis
on the fact that Pyrrhonian sceptics recommend suspension of judgment about ev-
 Kant articulates his thought of a Copernican revolution in philosophy in the preface of the second
edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi‒xvii (Schriften 3:11‒12). For an excellent commentary of
Kant’s critical project and its relation to his Copernican revolution see Sebastian Gardner, Routledge
Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, 1999), 18‒33.
 Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können
(Schriften 4: 260).
 Popkin, History of Scepticism, 5.
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erything and even withhold their judgment as to the question about our possibility of
knowledge. Pyrrhonism is anti-dogmatic, as it were. The varieties of scepticism ar-
ticulated by Descartes and Hume, by contrast, are not anti-dogmatic in this sense.
Moreover, the forms of scepticism put forward by Descartes and Hume and dis-
cussed in this chapter, which I labelled as Cartesian scepticism and Humean scepti-
cism, raise different and more all-encompassing kinds of doubts than those raised by
Pyrrhonism.While the Pyrrhonian sceptics mainly call into question whether we can
know the nature of things, they do not doubt that there are things that appear to us
in a certain way. They leave the question about their existence untouched and merely
question our ability to discern the adequacy or veracity of our thoughts with respect
to the metaphysical structure of the world. Cartesian scepticism, by contrast, is di-
rected precisely against the realist presumption of Pyrrhonism by calling into ques-
tion the very existence of the external world. It thereby questions our ability to dis-
cern the truth of our thoughts in general. Still, it leaves unquestioned whether—and
thereby presupposes that—we have thoughts with a determinate content in the first
place. This presupposition is undermined by Hume’s scepticism about causation. In
Hume’s view, we have no genuine idea of causation proper—viz. a necessary connec-
tion between two events or objects. Unlike Cartesian scepticism, then, Humean scep-
ticism is concerned not only with the truth of our thoughts but with their intentional
content or representational purport. It puts into question whether what we take to be
thoughts about certain things are proper thoughts about these things at all.
Being clear about these three varieties of scepticism is important for both sys-
tematic or philosophical and historical reasons. The distinction is philosophically im-
portant because the three varieties of scepticism differ in scope and strength: They
call into question what is taken for granted by other varieties of scepticism.
Distinguishing these three varieties of scepticism is also pivotal for doing history
of philosophy as it provides us with a better understanding of the problems that his-
torical authors were grappling with. In particular, distinguishing Cartesian from Hu-
mean scepticism is crucial to understand the objective of Kant’s critical project,
which was first and foremost a response to David Hume’s scepticism about causa-
tion, and not to the varieties of scepticism suggested by René Descartes or Sextus
Empiricus.³⁵
 This is not to say that Kant’s philosophy was not also influenced by other forms of scepticism.
Michael N. Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), argues quite
convincingly that Kant’s discussion of the antinomies is crucially influenced by Pyrrhonian scepti-
cism.
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Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández
Narrowing of “Know” as a Contextualist
Strategy against Cartesian Sceptical
Conclusions
1 Introduction
This paper proposes that the free pragmatic enrichment process of narrowing can ex-
plain the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences, which is a central
tenet of epistemic contextualism. Epistemic contextualism is a semantic thesis
about the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences of the form “S
knows that p.” Even though it is a linguistic claim, it is proposed to solve an episte-
mic problem, i.e., the threat posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. The rough
idea behind epistemic contextualism’s solution to the sceptical problem is to argue
that the premises of Cartesian-style sceptical arguments (specifically, the first one)
generate a context in which the epistemic standards for knowledge attribution are
extremely high and impossible to meet, leading to the sceptical conclusion: “S
does not know that p”; under those standards, the sceptical conclusion seems to
be true. But ordinarily, the negation of the sceptical conclusion (which is the sen-
tence that asserts “S knows that p”) is evaluated as true because the epistemic stand-
ards operating in that context are loose.
Though epistemic contextualism provides an intuitive and elegant solution to
the problem posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, it seems to have become
unpopular because of linguistic objections blaming epistemic contextualism for the
lack of a semantic model capable of accounting for the context-sensitivity of “know.”
Unlike indexicals or gradable expressions, “know” is not clearly context-sensitive.
Therefore, the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences cannot be ac-
counted for in a satisfactory manner. In this paper, I will propose that there is no
need of such a semantic model to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge
attribution sentences, because it can be explained through a free pragmatic enrich-
ment process—i.e., lexical narrowing—that operates on the meaning of knowledge
attribution sentences. This proposal for overcoming these linguistic objections will
I would like to thank Andrea Iacona, François Recanati, Ricardo Mena, Axel Barceló, Mario Gómez Tor-
rente and Robert J. Stainton for reading earlier versions of this paper, and for giving comments and
suggestions to them. In particular, I would like to thank Carmen Curcó, for suggesting that I read Car-
ston and Wilson’s work; to Maite Ezcurdia for giving me copies of some papers of her own on con-
textualism; and to the anonymous referee for his or her helpful remarks on how to improve this
paper. Also, thanks to the attendants of the International Conference on Scepticism, where I present-
ed this paper in May 2017.
OpenAccess. © 2019 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández, published by De Gruyter. This work is
licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-012
allow us to recover confidence in the effectiveness of the contextualist strategy
against Cartesian-style sceptical arguments.
2 The Legacy of Cartesian Scepticism for
Contemporary Epistemology
Scepticism is one of the main concerns of contemporary epistemologists. It can take
many forms, of which the so-called “Cartesian” scepticism is one of the most debat-
ed. Contemporary epistemologists understand the problem of Cartesian scepticism in
terms of the following type of argument, which is characterised by the use of a scep-
tical hypothesis whose main features are its impossibility of being ruled out by the
available evidence and its inconsistency with propositions we ordinarily take our-
selves to know:
1. S does not know that not-h.
2. If S does not know that not-h, then S does not know that o.
3. S does not know that o.
This is the general template for a Cartesian-style sceptical argument. The varieties of
sceptical hypotheses that can stand for the h in this type of argument are inspired by
the dreaming or evil demon scenarios that Descartes portrays in the Meditations,¹
though he did not devise them in order to buttress a sceptical argument, but rather
to bring old prejudices into question.² The main feature of these scenarios is their
incompatibility with many propositions we ordinarily believe ourselves to know
(like “I have hands”). These propositions are the ones that stand for the o in the argu-
ment.
The dreaming scenario is incompatible with knowledge of the external world. In
the First Meditation, Descartes sets it by inviting the reader to consider the possibility
of being asleep dreaming. The assumed resemblance between some dreams and the
reality of the external world known through perception is strong enough to make
dreams and reality indistinguishable from one another: “waking can never be distin-
guished from sleep.”³ Such resemblance raises the possibility of mistaking dreams
for perceptions of the external world. But dreams can be deceitful: “Let us suppose
that we are dreaming, and that these particular things (that we have our eyes open,
 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. With Selections from the Objections and Replies,
trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
 Recall this passage from the First Meditation: “Hence I saw that at some stage in my life the whole
structure would have to be utterly demolished, and that I should have to begin again from the bottom
up if I wish to construct something lasting and unshakable in the sciences” (Descartes, Meditations,
17).
 Descartes, 19.
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are moving our head, are stretching out our hands) are not true; and that perhaps we
do not even have hands or the rest of a body like what we see.”⁴ In such circumstan-
ces, we would not know that we have hands. The impossibility to distinguish dreams
from the reality known through perception precludes knowledge of the external
world.
The evil demon scenario is incompatible with portions of knowledge that did not
seem to be under threat in the dreaming scenario, such as mathematical knowledge.
The dreaming scenario is a threat to knowledge of physics, astronomy and any other
subject matter pertaining to the external world, but
arithmetic, geometry and other disciplines of the same kind, which deal only with the very sim-
plest and most general things, and care little whether they exist in nature or not, contain some-
thing certain and indubitable. For whether I am waking or sleeping, two plus three equals five,
and a square has no more than four sides; nor does it seem possible that such obvious truths
could be affected by any suspicion that they are false.⁵
Near the end of the First Meditation, Descartes invites the reader to consider the pos-
sibility of the existence of an evil demon or spirit “supremely powerful and cunning,
[who] has devoted all his efforts to deceiving me.”⁶ The existence of such an evil
demon raises the possibility of error even about mathematical truths. Therefore,
the possibility of being deceived by an evil demon is a threat to knowledge so prob-
lematic that it even precludes mathematical knowledge.
The core of Cartesian-style arguments discussed by contemporary epistemolo-
gists are the sceptical hypotheses inspired by the scenarios depicted in Descartes’s
Meditations. Among the sceptical hypotheses standing for the h in those Cartesian-
style sceptical arguments are:
a) The possibility of being asleep dreaming.
b) The possibility of being deceived by an evil demon.
c) The possibility of being a bodiless brain in a vat that is being electrochem-
ically stimulated to form the kind of beliefs a human being has as a result
of its ordinary perceptual experiences.
d) The possibility of being in a sort of matrix world or any other alternative
reality.
The Cartesian inspiration is obvious in a) and b), but the incompatibility with large
portions of ordinary knowledge—characteristic of Descartes’s sceptical scenarios—is
also a feature of c) and d). For instance, being a bodiless brain in a vat (BIV) is in-
compatible with knowledge of many propositions I would ordinarily claim to know,
 Descartes, 19.
 Descartes, 20.
 Descartes, 22.
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such as “I have hands.” If I was a BIV, I would not have hands, even though I was
being electrochemically stimulated to believe that I have hands. Therefore, if I was a
BIV, I would not know that I have hands.
Thus, Cartesian scepticism has set the agenda for one of the main concerns of
contemporary epistemology: to defeat scepticism. John G. Cottingham refers to the
influence of Cartesian scepticism in contemporary epistemology, asserting that
The subsequent development of a branch of philosophy known as “epistemology” has tended to
see the theory of knowledge as a perpetual battleground between the sceptic and the anti-scep-
tic, with the latter attempting to establish such basic truths as the existence of the external
world, in face of the extreme “hyperbolical” doubts of the kind raised in the Meditations.⁷
Contemporary epistemologists have deployed many strategies to overcome those hy-
pebolical doubts and defeat scepticism. Among those strategies epistemic contextu-
alism has been the most debated due to its originality and perspicuity. In the next
section of this chapter I will outline that strategy.
3 The Contextualist Strategy against
Cartesian-Style Sceptical Arguments
3.1 Outline of Epistemic Contextualism
Epistemic contextualism holds that knowledge attribution sentences of the form “S
knows that p” are context-sensitive, which means that the truth conditions of
those sentences can vary from one context to another, depending on which epistemic
standards govern the context of the attribution.⁸ Broadly speaking, epistemic stand-
ards are standards for knowledge that vary according to the attributor’s context.
Thus, many epistemologists label this theory as “attributor contextualism.” For in-
stance, Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard claim that
the view is known as attributor contextualism, in order to emphasise that it is the context of the
person making the assertion that is important to epistemic status, rather than, the context of the
subject who is being ascribed knowledge.⁹
 John G. Cottingham, A Descartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 52.
 Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 52, no. 4 (December 1992): 913‒29; DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical
Review 104, no. 1 (January 1995): 1‒52.
 Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects,”
The Philosophical Quarterly 55, no. 219 (April 2005): 161.
206 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández
Given the interests, expectations, and other characteristics of knowledge attributors,
some contexts could be governed by high epistemic standards, which means that a
knowledge attribution sentence uttered in them will be assessed as true only if the
allegedly-known proposition p is true and the subject of the knowledge attribution
sentence is in a very strong epistemic position with respect to p; other contexts
could be governed by lower epistemic standards, namely that an assertion of the
very same knowledge attribution sentence will be assessed as true even if the sub-
ject’s epistemic position with respect to p is weaker. To illustrate these points, let
us quote DeRose’s bank cases:
Bank Case A.My wife and I are driving home on Friday afternoon.We plan to stop at the bank on
the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines
inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to de-
posit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they
be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks
on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the banks won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of
banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two weeks
ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice
the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining
that I was at the bank on Saturday morning two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until
noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our pay-
checks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important
check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is
not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change
their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was
before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I’d better go in and make sure.”¹⁰
If the bank will be open on Saturday, it seems that in Case A when DeRose asserts
that he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, his assertion is true. But consid-
ering only case B, it seems that when he denies that he knows the bank will be open
on Saturday, his denial is also true. So, we have assessed as true a knowledge attri-
bution sentence (“I know that the bank will be open on Saturday”) and its denial (“I
don’t know that the bank will be open on Saturday”). How is this possible? Because
the standards for knowledge in Case B are higher than in Case A. DeRose meets the
lower standards in place in Case A but he does not meet the higher standards in
place in case B, even though the strength of his epistemic position in both cases
is the same.
DeRose’s example illustrates the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution
sentences and displays two key notions for epistemic contextualism: strength of
an epistemic position and epistemic standard. A subject is in a strong epistemic po-
sition with respect to a proposition she believes when her belief in that proposition
corresponds to the truth in a non-accidental way, i.e., when her belief is true and has
 DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” 913.
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enough properties to constitute a piece of knowledge.¹¹ The truth of a knowledge at-
tribution sentence depends on the epistemic standards governing the context in
which the sentence is uttered, because those standards determine how strong
must be the subject’s epistemic position to count her as knowing a proposition.¹²
Thus, one speaker can truthfully attribute knowledge to a subject in one context,
but in another context—in which higher standards are in place—that knowledge at-
tribution would no longer be true, even though the subject and the allegedly known
proposition are the same in both contexts.
3.2 Epistemic Contextualism versus Scepticism
Although epistemic contextualism is a linguistic claim regarding the context-sensitiv-
ity of knowledge attribution sentences, it was proposed to solve an epistemic prob-
lem, i.e., the threat posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. To illustrate that
threat, let us recall one instance of such kind of argument:
1. I don’t know that I’m not a BIV.
2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
3. I don’t know that I have hands.
According to the contextualist, the previous argument is problematic because al-
though each premise is plausible, the conclusion seems extremely implausible, yet
the argument is formally valid. The first premise is plausible because it involves a
sceptical hypothesis we cannot rule out through the available evidence. Therefore,
it seems that we actually do not know that we are not a BIV. The second premise
is plausible because it is an instance of the epistemic closure principle, which epis-
temic contextualists assume to be true. But the conclusion of the argument strikes us
as highly implausible because it is something that ordinarily no one would assert.
Epistemic contextualists understand the problem of Cartesian scepticism as a
clash between two premises that seem to be true and a conclusion that seems to
 To define the properties that a belief has to have in order to constitute a piece of knowledge, DeR-
ose appeals to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking account of knowledge. The rough idea behind this ac-
count of knowledge is that a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge if it is true and tracks the truth in
nearby possible worlds where the subject uses the same method of belief-formation she uses in the
actual world. According to DeRose, those conditions must be fulfilled in order to be in a strong epis-
temic position. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Saul Kripke presented counterexam-
ples to Nozick’s truth-tracking account of knowledge in a lecture given at the American Philosophical
Association in the early 1980s, and that having a non-accidentally true belief is what matters for
being in a strong epistemic position.
 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2009), 7.
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be false, all within a valid argument. This particular way of conceiving the problem
posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments is exhibited by Keith DeRose:
We must explain how two premises that together yield a conclusion we find so incredible can
themselves seem so plausible to us. Only with such an explanation in place can we proceed
with confidence and with understanding to free ourselves from the trap.¹³
It is important to keep in mind that epistemic contextualists understand the problem
of scepticism in these terms. Consequently, they believe that an adequate solution to
the problem should fulfil the following desiderata:
i. explain the clash between the intuitions that lead to endorsing the premises of
the argument and the intuitions that lead to rejecting its conclusion;
ii. safeguard the ordinary intuitions regarding knowledge attributions.
In order to fulfil these desiderata and “free ourselves from the trap” of sceptical argu-
ments, epistemic contextualism appeals to the context-sensitivity of knowledge attri-
bution sentences. Roughly, the idea behind this solution is that the premises of scep-
tical arguments (specifically, the first one) generate a context in which the epistemic
standards governing knowledge attribution are impossible to meet, leading to the
sceptic’s concluding sentence: “I don’t know that I have hands.” Under these high
standards, the sceptic’s conclusion is assessed as true. But the truth conditions of
knowledge attribution sentences in the Cartesian-style sceptical argument context
are at variance with the ordinary context, because the latter is governed by lower
epistemic standards. Due to such variation, knowledge attribution sentences made
in ordinary contexts (like the denial of the sceptic’s conclusion “I know that I
have hands”) are assessed as true. Therefore, in ordinary contexts we normally
claim that subjects do know the very same propositions whose knowledge is subse-
quently denied in the sceptical conclusion. In other words, the variation among the
truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences allows us to safeguard our ordi-
nary intuitions concerning knowledge attributions.
Now that we have outlined the contextualist strategy against scepticism, let us
see how it manages to fulfil desiderata i) and ii).
In order to fulfil desideratum i), epistemic contextualism explains that Cartesian-
style sceptical argument’s premises seem plausible whenever the sceptical hypothe-
sis is well chosen. Recall that because of the main features of a sceptical hypothesis
it is impossible to rule out the argument’s first premise with the available evidence
and this premise turns out to be inconsistent with propositions we ordinarily take
ourselves to know. A well-chosen sceptical hypothesis possesses these features,
due to which the argument’s first premise seems plausible and is endorsed. Since
it is impossible to rule out the sceptical hypothesis through the available evidence,
then it seems that we do not know that it is false. To illustrate this point, let us think
 DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 3.
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about premise 1 of the previous instance of a Cartesian-style sceptical argument. Re-
garding 1, DeRose claims that “however improbable or even bizarre it may seem to
suppose that I am a BIV, it also seems that I don’t know that I’m not a BIV. How
could I know such a thing?”¹⁴ The use of a well-chosen sceptical hypothesis in the
first premise makes it salient and impossible to ignore, raising the standards for
knowledge attribution.¹⁵
The second premise of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument gains plausibility
from being an instance of a highly intuitive epistemic principle: the epistemic closure
principle.¹⁶ In addtition, once the first premise of a Cartesian-style sceptical argu-
ment is endorsed, the second one will be endorsed as well, as long as the ordinary
proposition involved in it is incompatible with the truth of the sceptical hypothesis.
Premise 2 of the previous instance of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument illus-
trates this point: having hands is incompatible with being a brain in a vat; therefore,
if my epistemic position is not strong enough to inform me that I am not a bodiless
brain in a vat, neither will it be strong enough to let me know that I have hands. And
once premises 1 and 2 are endorsed, 3 should be endorsed as well because it validly
follows from them. That is how, in the context of the Cartesian-style sceptical argu-
ment governed by unusually high epistemic standards, an assertion like “I do not
know that I have hands” seems to be true.
However, endorsement of the argument’s premises does not entail that it is easy
to endorse its conclusion. The intuitions leading to reject the conclusion of a Carte-
sian-style sceptical argument arise whenever the argument is assessed through ordi-
nary epistemic standards,which are looser and allow us to assert that we know many
things. Assessing the conclusion of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument through
ordinary epistemic standards, while assessing its premises through sceptical episte-
mic standards, results in a clash between the intuitions leading to reject the conclu-
sion and the intuitions leading to endorse the premises.
The previous explanation allows epistemic contextualism to fulfil desideratum i),
and contains the seeds for fulfilling desideratum ii). Epistemic contextualism man-
ages to safeguard our ordinary intuitions regarding knowledge attributions precisely
by claiming that a sceptical conclusion does not threaten the truth of our ordinary
knowledge attribution sentences because these appear in a context in which stand-
 DeRose, 2.
 Different contextualist theorists have proposed different conversational mechanisms to explain
how epistemic standards are raised through the use of the sceptical hypothesis (David Lewis proposes
a Rule of Accommodation, DeRose proposes a Rule of Sensitivity, etc.). The details of such mecha-
nisms are not relevant for the present exposition of the general strategy used by epistemic contextu-
alists to defeat scepticism.
 Though there is much controversy surrounding the epistemic closure principle, its most accepted
version states that “if one believes a conclusion by competent deduction from some premises one
knows, one knows the conclusion.” Timothy Williamson, “Probability and Danger,” The Amherst Lec-
ture in Philosophy 4 (2009): 2, http://www.amherstlecture.org/williamson2009/.
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ards for knowledge attribution are more relaxed and easier to meet. Thus, according
to contextualism, a “skeptic’s present denials that we know various things are per-
fectly compatible with our ordinary claims to know those very propositions,” be-
cause the truth value of a knowledge attribution sentence depends on the epistemic
standards governing the context in which the sentence is uttered.¹⁷ Recall that the
sceptic truthfully states her conclusion only by raising epistemic standards, therefore
her argument “doesn’t threaten the truth of our ordinary claims to know the very Os
[ordinary propositions] our knowledge of which the skeptic attacks.”¹⁸ Explaining
“how two premises that together yield a conclusion we find so incredible can them-
selves seem so plausible to us”¹⁹ has freed us from the sceptical trap by showing that
our ordinary practises of knowledge attribution are safe from the sceptic’s threat.
By claiming that the same sentence can have different truth-conditions in differ-
ent contexts, epistemic contextualism holds that the conclusion of Cartesian-style
sceptical argument poses no threat for our ordinary claims to know many things.
Though epistemic contextualism provides an intuitive and elegant solution to the
problem of Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, it seems to have lost its steam due
to the linguistic objections raised by Herman Cappelan and Ernest Lepore,²⁰ Jason
Stanley,²¹ and others. These authors argue that epistemic contextualism lacks a se-
mantic model capable of accounting for the context-sensitivity of “know”—which
is not clearly context-sensitive like indexicals or gradable expressions—and therefore
cannot satisfactorily account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sen-
tences. In response to this specific criticism, I claim that there is no need for such a
semantic model to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sen-
tences, because it can be seen as the result of a modulation-free pragmatic process
called narrowing, which operates on the meaning of knowledge attribution senten-
ces.²² Before explaining my proposal to account for the context-sensitivity of knowl-
edge attribution sentences, I will introduce and explain the narrowing process.
 DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 5.
 DeRose, 38.
 DeRose, 3.
 Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, “Context Shifting Arguments,” Philosophical Perspectives 17
(2003): 25‒50.
 Jason Stanley, “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” Philosophical Studies 119, nos. 1‒2
(May 2004): 119‒46; Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
 Robert Stainton and Geoff Pynn each propose similar strategies to defend epistemic contextual-
ism from linguistic objections. See Robert Stainton, “Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context
Sensitivity of ‘Knows,’” in Knowledge and Skepticism, eds. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke,
and Harry S. Silverstein (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), 113‒39; Geoff Pynn, “Pragmatic Contex-
tualism,” Metaphilosophy 46, no. 1 (January 2015): 26‒51. However, my proposal assumes that knowl-
edge attribution sentences are truth-evaluable and that the word “know” has an extension at a con-
text, which is fixed through a function, as I will explain later. Stainton and Pynn would disagree,
since they take epistemic contextualism to be about knowledge attributions as speech acts, and
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4 Narrowing of “Know” in the Conclusions of
Cartesian-Style Sceptical Arguments
4.1 Narrowing
“Narrowing” is a term used in lexical pragmatics for one type of pragmatic effect on
the meaning contributed by a word to the proposition expressed. Some words can be
seen as having extensions: the noun “meerkat” denotes (i.e., has as its extension) all
and only meerkats (i.e., the set of meerkats), and a statement such as “Meerk is a
meerkat” is true if and only if Meerk is a member of that set. “Narrowing” is the
term used for cases where the meaning of a word is “narrowed” to cover just a proper
subset of its usual extension. Consider an utterance of “John drinks” used to express
the proposition that John drinks alcohol. Events of drinking alcohol are a proper sub-
set of drinking events, so this is an instance of narrowing. In this case, the narrowed
meaning of the word “drink” has become lexicalized. In other cases, the narrowed
meaning is purely occasion-specific, as with “John cut the cake” to mean that
John cut it with a knife. Some metaphors may also be cases of narrowing, for exam-
ple the use of “John is a man” to express the idea that he is a man with certain qual-
ities: for example bravery and determination. The converse of narrowing is broaden-
ing, and both are species of lexical modulation. I will now outline the main
proposals given to explain narrowing, and then show how the variations of the
truth-conditions of knowledge attribution sentences can be explained by appealing
to the narrowing of the usual extension of “know.”
Narrowing is a pragmatic process in which the use of a word pragmatically con-
veys a more specific meaning than the word’s lexically encoded meaning.²³ Classical
examples of this phenomenon are:
(1) I don’t drink.
Even though the lexically encoded meaning of “drink” is something like the inges-
tion of any liquid, since I do drink several kinds of liquids, in (1) “drink” is used
to mean “drink alcohol,” therefore conveying a more specific meaning. To make
sense of (1), the linguistic denotation of “drink” must be narrowed to a more specific
one. This process is generally understood as a pragmatic one, since it occurs for pure-
ly pragmatic reasons, i.e., to make sense of what the speaker is saying; it is not trig-
gered by the encoded or linguistic meaning of the words in that sentence. The main
proposals to explain this phenomenon have been the neo-Gricean account, Rele-
vance Theory, and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.
deny that “know” is a context-sensitive word whose meaning involves a function to fix the extension
of the word in a given context.
 Yan Huang, The Oxford Dictionary of Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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Neo-Gricean account of narrowing. Yan Huang provides a neo-Gricean account of
narrowing in which a modified set of maxims is assumed.²⁴ This set reduces the orig-
inal Gricean programme (the maxim of Quality apart) to three neo-Gricean pragmatic
principles: Quantity, Informativeness, and Manner principles. These maxims are de-
signed to account for “generalised implicatures,” treating them as default inferences.
In this framework, narrowing is a kind of default inference to a stereotypical or pro-
totypical interpretation governed by the Informativeness principle (I-principle). The
basic tenet of the I-principle is:²⁵
Speaker: Do not say more than is required.
Addressee: What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.
The I-principle generates a conversational I-implicature in which the general lexical-
ly encoded meaning of an expression I-implicates a more specific interpretation
which accords best with stereotypical and explanatory expectations, thereby increas-
ing informativeness. An example of lexical narrowing based on this kind of I-impli-
cature is:
(2) John had a glass of milk for breakfast this morning.
In this case, “milk” I-implicates that the milk in question was cow’s milk, not goat’s
milk or any other mammal’s milk, so the semantically general term “milk” is nar-
rowed via I-implication to denote stereotypically expected cow’s milk.
Relevance Theory account of narrowing. According to relevance theorists,
Narrowing is the case where a word is used to convey a more specific sense than the encoded
one, resulting in a restriction of the linguistically-specified denotation. …The effect of narrowing
is to highlight a proper subpart of the linguistically-specified denotation.²⁶
Relevance theorists explain how listeners bridge the gap between linguistically en-
coded meaning and what speakers intend to communicate by appealing to relevance,
which is a property of inputs to cognitive processes characterised in cost-benefit
terms: the greater the cognitive effects, the greater the relevance; the greater the proc-
essing effort, the lower the cognitive relevance. In this framework, understanding an
utterance is the result of an interpretative process generated by expectations of rele-
vance; this process adjusts the communicated meaning of individual words based on
the interaction between linguistically encoded meaning, contextual assumptions,
and contextual implications. According to this view, narrowing would be triggered
 Yan Huang, “Neo-Gricean Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” International Review of Pragmatics 1,
no. 1 (January 2009): 118‒53.
 Huang, “Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.”
 Deirdre Wilson, “Relevance and Lexical Pragmatics.” Italian Journal of Linguistics 15, no. 2 (2003):
274.
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by the search for relevance following a path of least effort to choose easily accessible
contextual assumptions, expectations and implications, adjusting them with linguis-
tic meaning and cognitive effects, until the expectations of relevance raised by the
utterance are satisfied. For example, a conversation in which the speaker utters (3)
as an excuse to avoid some commitment:
(3) I have a temperature.
If the hearer does not narrow the linguistic meaning of “temperature” in (3) to con-
vey high temperature, the utterance would be trivial and irrelevant; hence to under-
stand the speaker’s intentions, the hearer must derive potential implication following
a path of the least effort and stop when expectations of relevance are satisfied.
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (TCP) account of narrowing. According to the TCP view,
truth-conditional content of an utterance may be affected by free pragmatic process-
es—i.e., “top-down” or context-driven processes not triggered by an expression in the
sentence, but taking place for purely pragmatic reasons—in order to make sense of
what the speaker is saying.²⁷ Such enrichment takes place when the following con-
ditions are met: (i) the context adds some element to the interpretation of the utter-
ance; (ii) the element is truth conditionally-relevant; and (iii) its contextual provision
is not necessary (i.e., not mandated by the linguistic material). François Recanati re-
fers to these kinds of free pragmatic processes as modulation processes.²⁸
Modulation operates on the meaning of expressions and returns a meaning of
the same type, by narrowing down the extension of an expression through the con-
textual addition of a component to its meaning.²⁹ Therefore, according to this view,
through free enrichment “drink” in (1) is interpreted as meaning “drink alcohol,”
adding to the meaning of the verb a specification of the kind of liquid I have in
mind. This interpretation enables to make sense of the intuitive truth-conditional
content of (1).
TCP offers a semantic construal of pragmatic modulation because the meaning
of the expression is mapped to another, more specific meaning. A systematic
truth-conditional semantics for natural language is explained by appealing to a
mod function which takes an expression e and the context c in which it occurs as
arguments; the particular modulation function g that is contextually salient/rele-
vant/appropriate for the interpretation of that expression in that context is the
value of mod. The value of mod will be the identity function whenever modulation
is unnecessary and the expression receives its literal interpretation.³⁰ So, there is a
 François Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.
 Recanati, Literal Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Recanati, Truth-Condi-
tional Pragmatics.
 Recanati, “Pragmatic Enrichment,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, ed.
Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara (New York: Routledge University Press, 2012): 67‒79.
 Recanati, 76.
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literal sense of a simple expression e, which is its semantic interpretation I(e); and
there is a modulated sense M(e)c carried by an occurrence of e in context c. The
modulated sense of an expression e in a context c results from applying the contex-
tually appropriate modulation function mod(e,c) = g to its semantic interpretation
I(e):
M(e)c = mod(e,c) (I(e)) = g(I(e))
To illustrate how this accounts for the interpretation of (1), let us take “ingestion of
any liquid” as the semantic interpretation of “drink.” Let us assume that I am the
speaker uttering (1). As a matter of fact, I don’t drink any alcoholic beverages but
I drink water on a regular basis, like any other human being. In such a context,
“drink” is modulated to narrow down its literal sense to a more specific one, deliv-
ering “drink alcohol” as the value of the mod function; therefore, affecting the truth-
conditions of (1), which I utter to mean that I don’t drink alcohol. Thus, according to
this view, the semantic interpretation of a complex expression, like a sentence, is a
function of the modulated senses of its parts and the way they are put together.³¹
That is how, according to TCP, pragmatic modulation may affect the semantic content
of complex expressions.
4.2 Narrowing of “Know” in Knowledge Attribution Sentences
As we have seen, epistemic contextualism claims that the truth conditions of knowl-
edge attribution sentences can vary from one context to another. Attempts to explain
such context-sensitivity through indexicality or gradability have not been satisfactory
because “know” does not exhibit the semantic behaviour or properties attributed to
clearly indexical or gradable terms. Nevertheless, the context-sensitivity of the truth-
conditions of knowledge attribution sentences is widely acknowledged. Here I pro-
pose that narrowing, understood as a free pragmatic enrichment process, can ex-
plain the context-sensitivity of the truth-conditions of knowledge attribution senten-
ces. Since this proposal is based on TCP, as formulated by Recanati, it differs from
what Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath call “speech act contextualism,” which fo-
cuses on speech acts rather than sentences.³²
 Recanati, 77.
 See Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009). It is worth recalling that, though I am talking about a free pragmatic enrichment
process, I am not fully endorsing the kind of pragmatic stance proposed by Robert Stainton,
which Fantl and McGrath call “speech act contextualism.” My explanation of that process appeals
to the modulation function proposed by Recanati, which would operate in the meaning of “know.”
Stainton would disagree with such a manoeuvre and with any other operating on the meaning of
“know.”
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As explained in the previous section, free pragmatic enrichment occurs when the
following three conditions are satisfied: (i) context adds some element to the inter-
pretation of the utterance; (ii) the element is truth-conditionally relevant; and (iii)
its contextual provision is not necessary. Utterances of knowledge attribution senten-
ces meet all these conditions: (i) the context adds an epistemic standard to the inter-
pretation of a knowledge attribution sentence; (ii) the truth-conditions of a knowl-
edge attribution sentence depend on that standard; but (iii) even if the epistemic
standard is left aside, the knowledge attribution sentence would still express a com-
plete proposition. The epistemic standards are taken into account just to make sense
of what the speaker is saying. For instance, asserting the conclusion of a Cartesian-
style sceptical argument like “she does not know she has hands”—when the subject
actually has hands—does not seem to make sense unless the epistemic standards
generated by the sceptical hypothesis in the Cartesian style argument are taken
into account. Thus, the conclusion of the sceptical argument should be interpreted
as saying that knowledge cannot be properly attributed to a subject if she does
not fulfil certain epistemic standards. Otherwise, the conclusion would seem to be
bluntly false.
Condition (iii) deserves attention if the truth-conditions of a sceptical argument’s
conclusion are regarded as the result of a narrowing process. In contrast to this kind
of free pragmatic enrichment processes, in bottom-up pragmatic processes (satura-
tion) no proposition is expressed unless something like a value is assigned to a var-
iable: in the sentence “she is cute,” no proposition has been expressed if no individ-
ual can be contextually singled out as the reference of “she.”³³ But knowledge
attribution sentences, like the conclusion of a Cartesian-style sceptical argument, ex-
press complete propositions even though the element added by the context—the
epistemic standard—is not taken into account.
Therefore, the truth-conditions of the conclusion of a Cartesian-style sceptical ar-
gument can be explained by appealing to a free pragmatic enrichment process in
which the extension of “know” is narrowed down through the contextual addition
of the epistemic standards generated by the sceptical hypothesis. The sceptical hy-
pothesis in the argument gives place to a context in which the epistemic standards
are so high that it is necessary to eliminate such hypotheses to consider the subject
as knowing anything. But ordinarily, the fulfilment of those unrealistic high episte-
mic standards is not considered necessary for attributing knowledge; therefore, ac-
cording to the epistemic standards governing ordinary contexts, a knowledge attribu-
tion sentence like the one asserted in the conclusion of a Cartesian-style sceptical
argument would be regarded as false. This can be explained as the result of a narrow-
ing process in which the sense of “know” is narrowed down from its ordinary sense
to a more specific one, determined by sceptical epistemic standards.
 Recanati, “Pragmatic Enrichment,” 70.
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In order to understand how this could work, let us assume along epistemic con-
textualism lines that the literal interpretation of “know” is given by the ordinary
practises of knowledge attribution sentences, which take into account loose episte-
mic standards according to which everyone knows many things, including that
they have hands (whenever they actually have them). Thus, in ordinary contexts,
the extension of “know” includes many cases where the strength of a subject’s epis-
temic position is relatively low. But in the context of a Cartesian-style sceptical argu-
ment, epistemic standards are higher and “know” is modulated to narrow down its
literal sense to a more specific one, according to which the extension of “know” only
includes cases where the subject’s epistemic position is very strong, delivering some-
thing like “know according to sceptical standards” as the value of the mod function.
This means that in the context of a Cartesian-style sceptical argument, “know” is un-
derstood in a more specific sense, through the provision of high epistemic standards.
Such narrowing may affect the truth-conditions of knowledge attribution sentences,
as, for example, a Cartesian-style sceptical argument’s conclusion:
(4) I don’t know that I have hands.
An utterance of (4) made in the context of a Cartesian-style sceptical argument seems
to be true because in that context the meaning of “know” is narrowed down to con-
vey just a proper subset of its usual extension. The extension of that proper subset is
restricted to cases in which the subject knows something according to high epistemic
standards; since I do not fulfil those standards, an utterance of (4) in the context of a
Cartesian-style sceptical argument seems true. Such narrowing of “know” happens
as the result of a free pragmatic enrichment process given in a context governed
by extremely high epistemic standards. This process, then, is not necessary but al-
lows us to make sense of the conclusion of a Cartesian-style sceptical argument, a
conclusion that otherwise would seem nonsense. In this case, the three conditions
for a free pragmatic enrichment are satisfied: (i) the context adds some element—a
sceptic standard—to the interpretation of the utterance; (ii) this element has an im-
pact in the truth-conditions of (4); and (iii) the contextual provision is not necessary
but allows us to make sense of a problematic assertion. In contrast, an assertion of “I
know that I have hands” in ordinary contexts is assessed as true because in those
contexts the extension of “know” covers not only cases in which the subject
knows according to high sceptical standards, but also cases in which the subject
knows according to low epistemic standards. When low epistemic standards govern
the context of assertion, the extension of “know” is broad enough to include many
cases in which the subject does not fulfil the demands imposed by the sceptic stand-
ards for knowledge attribution.
As happens with any other case of narrowing, in this case the speaker can make
sense of her assertion appealing to the contextual provision that modulates the sense
of the expression. For instance, when asked, the speaker of (1) can make sense of her
assertion of (1) explaining that she meant “drink alcohol” when she used the word
“drink”; likewise, the speaker of (4) can make sense of her assertion of (4) explaining
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that she meant “know according to sceptical standards” when she used the word
“know.” According to epistemic contextualism, this kind of explanation should be
available to us, since
Even while we’re in a context governed by high standards at which we don’t count as knowing
that o [any ordinary proposition incompatible with the chosen sceptical hypothesis], we at the
same time realize that as soon as we find ourselves in more ordinary conversational contexts, it
will also be wrong for us to deny that we know these things.³⁴
If we realise that as soon as we find ourselves in more ordinary conversational con-
texts, it will be wrong to assert something like (4), we can make sense of our asser-
tion of (4) and explain that it belongs to a context governed by high epistemic stand-
ards, in which either you “know according to sceptical standards,” or you don’t know
at all. In line with this, the speaker can realise that her assertion of (4) in the context
of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument does not commit her to assert something
like that in an ordinary context governed by lower epistemic standards. From the ex-
position of the contextualist strategy (section 3.2), we know this is a key element of
the epistemic contextualist solution to the Cartesian-style sceptical problem:
according to the contextualist solution …the skeptic’s present denials that we know various
things are perfectly compatible with our ordinary claims to know those very propositions.
Once we realize this, we can see how both the skeptic’s denials of knowledge and our ordinary
attributions of knowledge can be correct.³⁵
So, once we realise that the context may affect truth-conditions of knowledge attri-
bution sentences, we should be able to explain that a knowledge attribution sentence
could be assessed as true in an ordinary context, but as false in the context of a Car-
tesian-style sceptical argument. In the latter context, it is necessary to fulfil the scep-
tical standards in order to count as knowing something, narrowing down the exten-
sion of what is ordinarily conveyed by “know.” In ordinary contexts, where it is not
necessary to fulfil these high epistemic standards, the extension of “know” is broad-
er and permits the assessment of more knowledge attribution sentences as true.
5 Concluding Remarks
Epistemic contextualism provides an effective strategy against the problem posed by
Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. However, its effectiveness seems to be threat-
ened by some linguistic objections. In this paper, I showed how to overcome those
linguistic objections and account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution
 DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” 41.
 DeRose, 5.
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sentences through a free pragmatic enrichment process called narrowing. I proposed
that variations in the truth values of knowledge attribution sentences can be the re-
sult of such a narrowing process. Through narrowing, the extension of an expression
or word as it is used in an utterance is more specific than the extension expected
from its linguistic meaning. As I explained in this paper, narrowing can account
for the variations of the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences if we as-
sume that the epistemic standards governing ordinary knowledge attributions define
our understanding of knowledge itself. Therefore, when the sceptic states her conclu-
sion, this turns out to be true only because the epistemic standards she imposes are
higher than the ordinary ones, and thus, tend to narrow the meaning or extension of
“knowledge.”
This proposal shows that advocates of epistemic contextualism do not need to
provide a semantic model to account for the context-sensitivity of the knowledge at-
tribution sentences. This, in turn, paves the way to re-examine epistemic contextual-
ism as a satisfactory solution to the problem posed by Cartesian-style sceptical argu-
ments. The effectiveness of epistemic contextualism as a satisfactory solution to that
problem tended to be disregarded because of some linguistic objections. I showed
that it is not necessary to fulfil the specific demands implied in those objections be-
cause it is possible to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution
sentences through the process of narrowing. Thus, the solution of epistemic contex-
tualism against Cartesian-style sceptical arguments is safe from those objections and
retains its effectiveness.
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